Why the Supreme Court was Right Last Week to Deny Review of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Decisions Handed Down Prior to the 2020 Election

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, JASON MAZZONE

Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar and professor Jason Mazzone argue that the U.S. Supreme Court correctly denied review last week of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions handed down before the 2020 election. Dean Amar and Professor Mazzone explain why the majority denied review and point out that the dissenting opinions unwittingly demonstrate the rightness of the majority.

Read More

Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito de Rincon v. Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corp.

Docket: 19-1391

Opinion Date: March 2, 2021

Judge: William Joseph Kayatta, Jr.

Areas of Law: Bankruptcy

The First Circuit dismissed this appeal arising out of the Title III debt-restructuring proceedings commenced by the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico on behalf of the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation (COFINA) under the Puerto Rico Oversight Management and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), 48 U.S.C. 2101-2241, holding that the appeal was equitably moot. After Title III proceedings were initiated several Puerto Rican credit unions (Credit Unions) filed an adversary proceeding against several defendants, including the Commonwealth and COFINA. Thereafter, the Board proposed a plan (Plan) of adjustment restructuring COFINA's debt. The Plan as approved called for the dismissal with prejudice of all litigation against COFINA that arose before the effective date of the Plan. The Credit Unions sought to strike the provision releasing the claims they asserted against COFINA in their adversary proceeding. The Title III court denied the motion. This appeal followed. At the time of this opinion the Plan had been fully implemented for over two years. The First Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that it was equitably moot.

Gonzalez-Bermudez v. Abbott Laboratories P.R. Inc.

Docket: 19-2249

Opinion Date: March 3, 2021

Judge: William Joseph Kayatta, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court granting judgment in favor of Plaintiff in this discrimination and retaliation action, holding that Defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law in part. Plaintiff filed suit against Abbott Laboratories alleging age discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621-34, Puerto Rico Law 100 and Puerto Rico Law 155. A jury found for Plaintiff and awarded $4 million for emotional distress and $250,000 for back pay. The district court entered judgment against Abbott on all counts but reduced the damages to just over $500,000. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) Abbott was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's ADEA claims and her corresponding claims under Law 100 and Law 115; but (2) Abbott failed to preserve its challenge to a separate finding that Abbott retaliated against Plaintiff for reporting to the State Insurance Fund.

Casco, Inc. v. John Deere Construction & Forestry Co.

Dockets: 17-1570, 17-1571

Opinion Date: March 2, 2021

Judge: Jeffrey R. Howard

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Labor & Employment Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Casco, Inc.'s claim for dolus under Article 1902 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, 3408, awarding relief to Casco on its claims for unjust impairment and unjust termination under Puerto Rico's Dealer Protection Act, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 10, 278 (Law 75) and granting judgment on John Deere Construction & Forestry Company's counterclaim to recover amounts owed to it by Casco, holding that Casco was not entitled to relief on its allegations of error. Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) the jury's findings of liability against Deere under Law 75 were not unreasonable, and the district court correctly denied Deere's post-judgment motions regarding the Law 75 claims; (2) the district court properly dismissed Casco's dolus claim as not legally viable; (3) the district court correctly granted relief on Deere's counterclaim; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to upset the jury award or order a new trial on damages.

Joseph v. Lincare, Inc.

Docket: 20-1396

Opinion Date: March 2, 2021

Judge: William Joseph Kayatta, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Labor & Employment Law

The First Circuit vacated the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Lincare, Inc. and rejecting Jeffrey Joseph's racial discrimination challenge to the termination of his employment, holding that the district court erred in excluding several documents from the summary judgment record and that Joseph had enough evidence to warrant a trial. On appeal, Joseph argued, among other things, that the district court erred in excluding several documents as unauthenticated hearsay evidence and in granting summary judgment. The First Circuit agreed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) the district court erred in excluding the documents as "unauthenticated and hearsay evidence," and the error was not harmless; and (2) the record, supplemented with the stricken documents, provides a reasonable basis for a jury finding in Joseph's favor.

Thompson v. Gold Medal Bakery, Inc.

Docket: 20-1027

Opinion Date: March 2, 2021

Judge: David J. Barron

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Labor & Employment Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Gold Medal Bakery, Inc. and dismissing Robert Thompson's claims brought after he was fired, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion. After he was fired, Thompson brought this complaint alleging that Gold Medal terminated his employment in violation of the anti-retaliation provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and federal and state disability discrimination laws. The district court granted summary judgment to Gold Medal on all claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly determined that, as a matter of law, Thompson could not establish that he was a "qualified individual" under the Americans with Disabilities Act at the time of his firing; (2) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Gold Medal on Thompson's FMLA retaliation claim; and (3) Thompson's remaining arguments were unavailing.

Munyenyezi v. United States

Docket: 19-2041

Opinion Date: March 3, 2021

Judge: William Joseph Kayatta, Jr.

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255(a), holding that Defendant was not actually prejudiced by instructions given to the jury in her case. Defendant was convicted of procuring naturalization based on false statements to immigration officials about her conduct during the Rwandan genocide and of procuring naturalization as an ineligible person. After the First Circuit affirmed the convictions, the Supreme Court decided Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017), which held that the government must show that an illegality played a role in the acquisition of citizenship to prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1425(a). Defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the materiality instruction given in her case based on Maslenjak. The district court denied the petition. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that any assumed Maslenjak error in the challenged instruction did not substantially influence the jury's decision.

United States v. Rodriguez-Rivera

Docket: 19-1529

Opinion Date: March 4, 2021

Judge: William Joseph Kayatta, Jr.

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The First Circuit held that a conviction under 21 U.S.C. 846 for conspiring to commit a controlled substance offense qualifies as a conviction for a controlled substance offense under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(b), even though section 846 does not require proof of an overt act. Defendant pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a convicted felon and unlawful possession of a machine gun. In sentencing Defendant, the district court applied a controlled substance enhancement based on Defendant's previous drug distribution conspiracy conviction under 21 U.S.C. 846. On appeal, Defendant argued that his prior conviction did not qualify as a conspiracy offense for purposes of U.S.S.G. 2K2.1 because a conviction under section 846 does not have as an element the commission of an overt act. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that conspiring under section 846 is "conspiring" within the meaning of Application Note 1 to section 4B1.2(b).

Sterling Suffolk Racecourse v. Wynn Resorts, Ltd.

Docket: 20-1512

Opinion Date: March 3, 2021

Judge: Sandra Lea Lynch

Areas of Law: Gaming Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting Defendants' motion to dismiss this action brought under the civil portion of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1964(c), holding that Plaintiff had not and could not meet the causation of injury requirements set forth at 18 U.S.C. 1964(c). In 2014, the Massachusetts Gaming Commission granted a gaming license to Wynn, MA, LLC, a subsidiary of Wynn Resorts, Ltd. (collectively, Wynn), allowing Wynn to construct a casino in Everett, Massachusetts. Mohegan Sun Massachusetts had also applied for a license and had proposed a casino facility on a site in East Boston owned by Plaintiff, Sterling Suffolk Racecourse, LLC. Plaintiff brought this action alleging that Defendants, including Wynn, conspired to deprive Mohegan of a gaming license, therefore costing Sterling the opportunity to least its site to Mohegan. The district court dismissed the action. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff could not show a "direct injury" from Wynn's actions, and so its RICO claims failed as a matter of law.

Assured Guaranty Corp. v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

Dockets: 20-1930, 20-1931

Opinion Date: March 3, 2021

Judge: Sandra Lea Lynch

Areas of Law: Insurance Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the Title III court denying relief from an automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. 362(d), holding that the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) Title III court in Puerto Rico did not abuse its discretion in denying relief from the stay. These companion cases from the Title III court involved bonds issued by the Puerto Rico Infrastructure and Financing Authority (PRIFA) and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA). Appellants had insured millions of dollars of these bonds against default. When HTA and PRIFA defaulted on the bonds, causing Appellants to make payments to their insureds, Appellants brought this suit against Puerto Rico, HTA, and PRIFA. Thereafter, Puerto Rico petitioned to begin Title III proceedings under PROMESA, triggering an automatic stay of certain claims against them. Appellants sought relief from the automatic stay under section 362, as incorporated by PROMESA. The Title III denied relief. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no cause to lift the stay as to any of Appellants' claims.

LaChance v. Town of Charlton

Docket: 20-1103

Opinion Date: March 3, 2021

Judge: Jeffrey R. Howard

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendants - police officers and their employer - on the basis of qualified immunity in this case alleging, among other things, excessive force pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, holding that the district court erred in granting Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff sued the officers who pushed him onto a sofa-recliner, which toppled over, and who then kneeled on his back. The district court concluded that the push and the kneel constituted two discrete uses of force, granted summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity to Defendants as to the push, and entered a directed verdict for Defendants on the remaining counts, finding that Plaintiff failed to prove that any injury he suffered was caused by the kneel. The First Circuit vacated the judgment in part, holding (1) the push was not a clearly established violation of Plaintiff's right to be free of unreasonable seizures; but (2) there was enough evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found that it was more likely than not that the kneel caused Defendant some additional injury.