| United States v. Garcia |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 19-1816 Opinion Date: December 16, 2020 Judge: Boudin Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of a drug offense, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress the drug evidence as having resulted from an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Drug evidence was obtained from under the hood of a truck in which Defendant was a passenger. On appeal, Defendant argued (1) the government lacked probable cause to remove him from the truck and handcuff him during the search of the vehicle and to search the truck, and (2) the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to support their activities. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the officers were operating from a tip from a reliable informant that the individuals in the truck had drugs and were about to complete a drug sale, and no more information was needed to justify the seizure of Defendant and the inspection of the vehicle; and (2) because the officers had probable cause to seize Defendant and search the truck, they also had reasonable suspicion. |
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| United States v. Guzman-Merced |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-2146 Opinion Date: December 22, 2020 Judge: William Joseph Kayatta, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit vacated Defendant's plea of guilty to one count of violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which makes it a crime for a convicted felon to possess a firearm, holding that there was a reasonable probability that Defendant would not have pled guilty had he been advised that the government need prove that he knew when he possessed the gun that he was a felon. Defendant pleaded guilty in 2018 to one count of violating section 922(g)(1). In 2019, the United States Supreme Court held in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019), that a conviction for that crime requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that when the defendant possessed the gun he knew he had previously been convicted of an offense punishable by more than one year in prison. The First Circuit vacated Defendant's conviction, holding (1) the district court's failure to advise Defendant of Rehaif's knowledge requirement was clear error; and (2) there was a reasonable probability that Defendant would not have pled guilty had he been informed in accordance with Rehaif. |
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| Rad v. Attorney General United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 19-1404 Opinion Date: December 21, 2020 Judge: Krause Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law, Internet Law, White Collar Crime |
| In 2012, Rad and others were charged with acquiring penny stocks, “pumping” the prices of those stocks by bombarding investors with misleading spam emails, and then “dumping” their shares at a profit. Rad was convicted of conspiring to commit false header spamming and false domain name spamming under the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography And Marketing Act (CAN-SPAM), 15 U.S.C. 7701(a)(2), which addresses unsolicited commercial email. The PSR recommended raising Rad’s offense level to reflect the losses inflicted on investors, estimating that Rad realized about $2.9 million in “illicit gains” while acknowledging that because “countless victims” purchased stocks, the losses stemming from Rad’s conduct could not “reasonabl[y] be determined.” Rad emphasized the absence of evidence that any person lost anything. Rad was sentenced to 71 months’ imprisonment. The record is silent as to how the court analyzed the victim loss issue. The Third Circuit affirmed. DHS initiated removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which renders an alien removable for any crime that “involves fraud or deceit” “in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000.” The IJ and the BIA found Rad removable. The Third Circuit remanded. Rad’s convictions for CAN-SPAM conspiracy necessarily entail deceit under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). The second element, requiring victim losses over $10,000, however, was not adequately addressed. The court noted that intended losses, not just actual ones, may meet the requirement. |
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| United States v. Hart |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 19-3718 Opinion Date: December 21, 2020 Judge: Bibas Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2005, Hart was convicted of possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute. The Sentencing Guidelines recommended 35 years to life imprisonment; because of his extensive criminal record and the amount of crack, his mandatory minimum sentence was life. The 2010 Fair Sentencing Act lowered Hart's mandatory minimum to 10 years. The 2018 First Step Act made those lower minimums retroactive. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania U.S. Attorney’s Office and Federal Defender’s Office formed a committee that identified prisoners who were eligible for lower sentences, calculated new sentences, and submitted them for court approval. The committee incorrectly believed that eligible inmates could be resentenced only within their new Guidelines range, not below it. For Hart, the committee negotiated a 35-year sentence, which Hart accepted. Hart later asked the court to lower his sentence more based on the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. The court denied Hart’s motion, reasoning that Hart’s Guidelines range depended mainly on his criminal history, not on the amount of crack he had possessed. The court did not consider the 3553(a) factors nor Hart’s personal growth. The court added that Hart had gotten one sentence reduction and could not have another. The Third Circuit remanded. The Act’s section 404(c) bar on second resentencings is not jurisdictional and it is fair to accept the government’s waiver of that bar. When a court rules on a First Step Act resentencing motion, it must consider the applicable section 3553(a) factors. |
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| United States v. Al-Muwwakkil |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-6201 Opinion Date: December 23, 2020 Judge: G. Steven Agee Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2001, defendant was convicted of one count of possessing a firearm as a felon and sentenced under the heightened penalties of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on then uncontested proof that he had at least three violent felony convictions. After the Supreme Court's ruling in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), defendant filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion contending that he had been improperly sentenced as an armed career criminal and sought resentencing without the ACCA's enhanced penalties. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the section 2255 motion, holding that defendant's 1971 conviction for attempted rape, in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.1-44, does not qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA's force clause and cannot be used to support his ACCA-based conviction. The court explained that every conviction for section 18.1-44 does not necessarily involve a use of force sufficient to satisfy the ACCA's force clause. The court also held that defendant's 1990 burglary conviction does not qualify as an ACCA predicate under the force clause. The court took no position on the substantive question of whether defendant's conviction for use of a firearm during an abduction qualifies as an ACCA violent felony. The court remanded with instructions for the district court to consider the parties' arguments in the first instance. |
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| United States v. Loughry |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-4137 Opinion Date: December 21, 2020 Judge: Niemeyer Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| After defendant, the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, was convicted of mail fraud and wire fraud for the misuse of public assets, he filed a motion challenging the fairness of his trial on the grounds that a juror allegedly engaged in misconduct and was biased. The district court denied defendant's motion for a new trial, sentenced defendant to 24 months' imprisonment, and imposed a fine and restitution. In the present appeal, defendant challenged the district court's judgment dated February 25, 2019, alleging only that the district court abused its discretion in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing to investigate the juror's potential misconduct and bias. The Fourth Circuit rejected defendant's contention that a juror's use of social media during the trial constituted misconduct in violation of Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954), entitling him to an evidentiary hearing. In this case, the juror's Twitter activity related to football and did not refer to any facts about the case or the scandal at large. The court concluded that, at bottom, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for an evidentiary hearing under Remmer because defendant failed to make a credible allegation that an improper contact occurred. The court also held that because defendant has not made a colorable showing that the juror dishonestly answered material questions during voir dire, the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to investigate McDonough bias. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing on actual bias. |
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| United States v. McCauley |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-4318 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: James Harvie Wilkinson, III Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit vacated defendant's conviction of one count of employing, using, persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct "for the purpose of producing [a] visual depiction of such conduct" in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). The court agreed with defendant that the district court incorrectly instructed the jury that section 2251(a) merely requires filming to be "a purpose," which can arise at any time, of engaging in the sexual conduct. The court stated that the instructional error in this case—which was objected to and went to the absolute heart of the defense—is too much to overlook because it fundamentally misconstrued the statute, prejudicing defendant. The court remanded for further proceedings. |
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| United States v. Runyon |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 17-5 Opinion Date: December 23, 2020 Judge: Niemeyer Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder for hire, carjacking resulting in death, and murder with the use of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. Defendant was sentenced to death, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Defendant now files this motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate or correct his sentence, asserting 18 grounds for relief. The district court denied his motion and denied a certificate of appealability (COA). The Fourth Circuit granted a COA as to four issues: (1) whether defendant's 18 U.S.C. 924 conviction is invalid; (2) whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance; (3) whether the government violated Brady v. Maryland; and (4) whether the government exercised its peremptory jury strikes in a discriminatory manner. The court vacated the district court's ruling dismissing defendant's claim that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to investigate mitigating evidence of brain injury and potential mental illness and remanded that claim for an evidentiary hearing. The court otherwise affirmed the district court's judgment. |
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| United States v. Duran-Gomez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 20-20147 Opinion Date: December 23, 2020 Judge: Jennifer Walker Elrod Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit granted the government's emergency motion to stay the district court's order of release and expedited this appeal. In 2010, petitioner was indicted on capital charges stemming from a 2006 double homicide. In 2019, petitioner claimed that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated. The district court agreed, dismissed all charges with prejudice, and ordered petitioner released. Under the Supreme Court's balancing test in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the court concluded that petitioner's speedy trial right was not violated. The first factor, the over nine year length of delay, weighs heavily against the government; the second factor, the reason for the delay, weighs heavily against petitioner where he contributed substantially to the delay, requested a slew of continuances, and represented that he needed those continuances; the third factor, petitioner's diligence in asserting his right to a speedy trial, weighs heavily against petitioner; and the fourth factor, prejudice suffered by petitioner as a result of the delay, weighs against petitioner because petitioner failed to prove that he suffered actual prejudice. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for a prompt trial. The court rejected petitioner's Fifth Amendment due process claim. |
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| United States v. Garcia |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-10465 Opinion Date: December 22, 2020 Judge: Cory T. Wilson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant argued that the district court did not properly pronounce supervision conditions requiring him to participate in drug treatment and to pay at least $25 per month towards its costs. Defendant also argued that the payment condition is inconsistent with the district court's previous findings regarding his indigence and inability to pay a fine. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that defendant failed to assert a lack of notice and failed to support his contention that the ambiguity in the record indicates that the district court failed to pronounce the conditions at issue. Furthermore, the court was not persuaded that the district court's findings related to defendant's current indigence are inconsistent with a future payment condition. Rather, defendant may be able to pay $25 per month once he leaves prison and finds employment. Regardless, even if it turns out that defendant cannot afford to pay $25 per month upon release, the court explained that the district court could not automatically revoke his supervised release. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by requiring defendant to pay for his own drug treatment during his term of supervised release. |
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| United States v. Henry |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-2445 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Karen Nelson Moore Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2013, Henry was convicted of three counts of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), and three counts of using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), each related to the associated bank robbery count. A defendant’s first 924(c) conviction then carried a minimum sentence of five years’ incarceration; each additional 924(c) conviction carried a 25-year sentence, even if the convictions were part of the same indictment. Henry was sentenced to 730 months’ incarceration: 70 months for each bank robbery, to be served concurrently and 60 months for the first 924(c) count and 300 months each for the second and third counts, each to be served consecutively. Following a remand, the court sentenced Henry to 738 months’ incarceration. The Sixth Circuit remanded for resentencing, citing the Supreme Court’s 2017 “Dean” decision, permitting courts to consider mandatory-minimum sentences imposed under section 924(c) when determining the sentence for other counts. Congress passed the First Step Act, under which only a defendant who has a prior final 924(c) conviction is subject to the escalating mandatory-minimum sentences, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(C)). Henry argued that the 2018 remand meant that the court had not imposed a sentence before its enactment so that he could benefit from the amendment and have a total mandatory-minimum sentence of 15 years. The district court sentenced Henry to 60 months for the bank robberies plus 55 years under 924(c). The Sixth Circuit reversed. The language of the limited remand in Henry’s case requires the district court to revisit the sentences for his 924(c) convictions and to resentence him in accordance with the First Step Act. |
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| United States v. Mahaffey |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-6061 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Richard Allen Griffin Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Mahaffey and another were arrested at the Cincinnati Airport for suspected drug trafficking. Each possessed luggage containing about 40 pounds of vacuum-sealed marijuana. Hidden within one of Mahaffey’s marijuana parcels was four pounds of methamphetamine. They were charged under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846 with conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute methamphetamine, possession with the intent to distribute methamphetamine, and possession with the intent to distribute marijuana. The government did not establish that Mahaffey knew about the methamphetamine. A jury convicted him of all counts and attributed to him 500 grams or more of a mixture containing methamphetamine. The district court then imposed a mandatory-minimum sentence of 10 years. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding its precedent that a drug-trafficking conviction under section 841 does not require proof that the defendant knew the type or quantity of controlled substance involved in the offense. The Supreme Court’s 2019 “Rehaif” holding did not abrogate that precedent. Rehaif involved possession of firearms; its scienter focus is not a new legal development or a fit for section 841. It is not unusual to punish individuals for the unintended consequence of their unlawful acts. Mahaffey knew that his planned conduct was wrongful. That he did not appreciate the exact consequences of his predetermined criminal conduct, that it “involved” large amounts of methamphetamine under section 841(b)(1), makes no difference for purposes of his decision to unlawfully possess a controlled substance with the intent to distribute. |
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| United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-5801 Opinion Date: December 22, 2020 Judge: Batchelder Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| Silvestre-Gregorio, then age 16, entered the U.S. illegally in 2001. He was detained within weeks. At his removal hearing, he did not have an attorney but was assisted by an interpreter and a social worker. The interpreter spoke Spanish; Silvestre-Gregorio spoke little English and some Spanish; his native tongue was a regional dialect of Guatemala. He answered open-ended questions in Spanish, including where he was born and how he crossed the border. The IJ had to repeat some questions and explained to Silvestre-Gregorio his ability to appeal and his right to be represented by retained counsel. The IJ asked several times whether he would like time to find an attorney. Silvestre-Gregorio declined, saying that he wanted to finish his case that day. Silvestre-Gregorio was removed from the U.S. in June 2001. Silvestre-Gregorio returned to the U.S. in 2002. He accumulated convictions for domestic assault, public intoxication, theft, DUI, and driving without a license. In 2018, he was charged with unlawful reentry of a removed alien, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). Silvestre-Gregorio argued that his 2001 removal violated his right to due process and could not be the basis for a section 1326 conviction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Silvestre-Gregorio could understand the interpreter during his removal hearing and did not have a constitutional right to government-provided counsel or to be notified of discretionary relief (voluntary removal). |
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| United States v. Banks |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-3245 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Diane S. Sykes Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Banks was charged with conspiracy and aiding and abetting a robbery of the Gary, Indiana Post Office, where she worked, 18 U.S.C. 371, 2114(a). After a five-day trial and four hours of deliberation, at about 8:45 p.m., the jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts. At the request of Banks’s counsel, the judge polled the jurors. The first four affirmed the verdict. The fifth did not. When asked whether the guilty verdict was in fact his verdict, Juror 32 responded, “Forced into.” The judge repeated the question. Juror 32 responded that he needed more time. The remaining jurors affirmed the verdict, singling out Juror 32 as the lone dissenter. The judge instructed the jurors to continue deliberating and sent them back to the jury room at 9:06 p.m. Twenty-nine minutes later, the jury again returned a guilty verdict. This time the poll confirmed a unanimous decision. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for a new trial. The totality of the circumstances, most notably, Juror 32’s troubling responses to the poll questions, the judge’s decision to complete the poll notwithstanding the juror’s dissent, the lateness of the hour, and the extreme brevity of the jury’s renewed deliberations, were unacceptably coercive. |
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| United States v. Meza |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-2243 Opinion Date: December 23, 2020 Judge: Daniel Anthony Manion Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| Meza, deep in debt, fell for fraudulent international trading programs promising incredible profits. He then tricked people he knew into investing in these programs. The scam involved ridiculous promises. The district judge called the dupes “the most improbable victims” she had ever seen. Meza was acquitted on one count of wire fraud and acquitted on another The judge sentenced him to 19 months in prison and ordered him to pay $881,500 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The trial court adequately explained its reasons for aggregating losses and excluded all losses around the time of the wire supporting the acquitted count: $295,000. The sentencing hearing covered the misrepresentations and losses in detail. Meza’s restitution did not include unconvicted and acquitted conduct. |
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| United States v. Onamuti |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1153 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Scudder Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2014-2016, Onamuti, a Nigerian citizen, led an identity-theft ring responsible for filing almost 1,500 tax returns and netting $5 million in illicit refunds. Charged with 11 counts of presenting false claims, 18 U.S.C. 287, nine counts of identity theft, section 1028(a)(7), two counts of aggravated identity theft, section 1028A, and conspiracy to defraud the government, section 371, Onamuti pleaded guilty to one count each of false claims, identity theft, and aggravated identity theft. Onamuti expressly acknowledged that, while his plea “may have consequences” for his immigration status, he wanted to accept responsibility. He certified that he had read the agreement, discussed it with his attorney, and understood its terms. Onamuti also “expressly waive[d]” the right to appeal “on any ground” except a claim alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel. During his plea colloquy, Onamuti confirmed under oath that, by pleading guilty, he “may very well be deported” and that he was waiving his appellate rights. The district court sentenced him to 204 months’ imprisonment. Onamuti sought to withdraw his plea, arguing that his lawyer failed to advise him that his convictions would subject him to mandatory deportation. The district court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Seventh Circuit dismissed his appeal without addressing the merits. Onamuti is bound by the waiver of appeal. The court noted that “almost invariably, defendants are better served by pursuing such claims on collateral review under 28 U.S.C. 2254 or 2255.” |
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| Finch v. Payne |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2369 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Bobby E. Shepherd Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of plaintiff's 28 U.S.C. 2254 motion for habeas relief based on the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. Defendant was convicted of aggravated residential burglary, aggravated assault on a family or household member, and first-degree terroristic threatening. The court held that plaintiff clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to self-representation; as soon as he manifested this clear and unequivocal invocation, the proceedings should have paused, and the trial court should have conducted a proper Faretta hearing; and thus the Arkansas Supreme Court's finding to the contrary was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law. The court also held that the record does not support a finding that plaintiff engaged in serious and obstructionist misconduct, and the Arkansas Supreme Court's finding to the contrary is objectively unreasonable. In this case, there is no evidence in the record that defendant was attempting to manipulate, subvert, or delay the trial process. Finally, the state waived its argument that there was a determination that plaintiff was incapable, under Faretta, of waiving his right to counsel. |
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| Hill v. Rivera |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3756 Opinion Date: December 23, 2020 Judge: William Duane Benton Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Military Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 where petitioner was convicted in 2012, after trial by general court-martial, of rape committed in 1998. At the time of petitioner's conviction and direct appeals, there was no statute of limitations for prosecution of rape under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). In 2018, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held for the first time that a five-year statute of limitations applied to rape in United States v. Mangahas, 77 M.J. 220, 222-24 (C.A.A.F. 2018). However, in United States v. Briggs, 2020 WL 7250099, at 2 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2020), the Supreme Court held that there is not a statute of limitations under the UCMJ for rapes committed between 1986 and 2006. Therefore, the court held that petitioner's conviction was not untimely. |
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| United States v. Holly |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-3202 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Grasz Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress firearms and drugs after defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle. In this case, the district court credited the officers' account that they observed or inferred that defendant failed to stop at a stop sign over defendant's experts' recreation of the incident ostensibly showing that was not possible. The court concluded that this was not clearly erroneous, and the officers' testimony was no so incredible or inconsistent as to justify disturbing the district court's finding. Having accepted the district court's findings of fact, the court concluded that the officers had probable cause to believe defendant had committed a traffic violation. |
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| United States v. Isler |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1891 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Bobby E. Shepherd Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's 42-month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of theft of trade secrets and one count of making a false statement to the FBI, related to his access and use of confidential company information belonging to his former employer, DuPont, Inc. The court held that defendant's sentence was procedurally reasonable where the district court committed no error in its factual findings as it related to its decision to vary upwards in imposing defendant's sentence; the district court committed no error in its application of the Guidelines to formulate defendant's sentencing range; and the district court did not rely on clearly erroneous facts as a basis to increase defendant's sentence. The court also held that defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court did not err in considering defendant's traffic infractions and past drug conviction in fashioning his sentence. Furthermore, the district court did not err by utilizing its wide latitude in assigning weight to specific sentencing factors, and nothing in the record demonstrates that the district court imposed a disproportionate sentence for defendant's crimes. |
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| United States v. Ricker |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2351 Opinion Date: December 22, 2020 Judge: Roger Leland Wollman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Ricker traveled from South Dakota to Texas to sexually abuse the seven-year-old twin daughters of an acquaintance. He took photos and videos of the abuse. Months later, South Dakota officers received information that cheer_dad17 sent and received child pornography via online chat. The internet provider disclosed that cheer_dad17 was accessing the internet from Ricker’s address. Officers obtained a search warrant. During the search, Ricker made incriminating statements and confirmed that he was "user cheer_dad17." Officers seized several devices; forensic review revealed approximately 30,000 images and more than 100 videos of child pornography and child erotica, including images of the twins. Ricker was charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a child who had not attained the age of 12 years; travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct; and counts related to the transportation, distribution, receipt, and possession of child pornography. He was deemed competent to stand trial. His evaluation included diagnostic impressions of autism spectrum disorder and major depression. The court found that Ricker had a prior conviction for possession or distribution of child pornography and sentenced him to 600 months’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Ricker did not assert his Fifth Amendment rights by saying that his attorney was at a funeral and that his father wanted his attorney to be present. Ricker being on the autism spectrum and English being his second language did not make his statements involuntary. The court properly excluded from the courtroom Ricker's father, a potential witness. Any error in admitting evidence cover sheets was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence. The sentence was reasonable, given that this was “one of the worst child pornography cases that the Court has seen.” |
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| United States v. Robinson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2207 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Jane Louise Kelly Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court first concluded that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during this arrest. In this case, detectives saw defendant shove another man and shout threatening words at him, which is itself potentially a crime under Missouri law. Because the detectives witnessed defendant committing what looked like an assault, they had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop. The court also concluded that defendant has not shown that, but for the error in the jury instructions in light of Rehaif v. United States,139 S. Ct. at 2200, the outcome of his case would have been different. Therefore, defendant cannot establish plain error. |
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| United States v. Smith |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-3528 Opinion Date: December 23, 2020 Judge: Bobby E. Shepherd Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant was sentenced to 180 months imprisonment for possession of controlled substances with the intent to distribute, and a consecutive term of 30 months imprisonment for violating the terms of a previously imposed term of supervised release. The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence, holding that the district court did not procedurally err by finding that a consecutive term was mandatory under the Sentencing Guidelines. Rather, the record reflects that the district court treated the Guidelines as merely advisory and exercised its discretion in ordering consecutive sentences. In this case, the district court calculated the Guidelines range for defendant's new offense as 168 to 210 months imprisonment and noted the parties' plea agreement (and the agreed-to range of 144 to 216-months imprisonment). |
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| United States v. Soderman |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2879 Opinion Date: December 21, 2020 Judge: Roger Leland Wollman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from his vehicle. Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute controlled substances and possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. The court held that the state trooper's discovery that defendant's driver's license had been suspended justifiably extended the lawful scope of the traffic stop because of defendant's legal inability to remove the vehicle from the scene and the consequential need for a licensed driver or a tow truck to do so; officers had probable cause to believe that defendant's car contained evidence of trafficking while the trooper was addressing the issue of defendant's suspended license and related vehicle removal; and the automobile exception to the warrant requirement permitted the officer to conduct a warrantless search of defendant's car following its removal from the scene. Finally, defendant was not in custody during the traffic stop and the district court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress his unMirandized statements. |
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| United States v. Zerba |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2409 Opinion Date: December 22, 2020 Judge: Erickson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Zerba agreed to sell a half-pound of marijuana to Beener. The drug deal resulted in the shooting death of Beener’s associate, Plotz. Zerba pled guilty to conspiring to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(D), 846, and to possessing a weapon in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), 2. The plea agreement states: Defendant ... will be required to pay full restitution to all victims of the offense(s) including relevant conduct victims. The court ordered Zerba to pay $5,611.55 in restitution for Plotz’s funeral costs. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that federal courts are permitted to order restitution only when authorized by statute and that Plotz was not a “victim” under the Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663. The Act allows restitution to be ordered in a plea agreement. The plea agreement phrase “including relevant conduct victims” goes beyond the Act's definition of "victim." “Relevant conduct” is defined in the Sentencing Guidelines and includes the acts of others that occurred during or in preparation for the offense. Clemens, the shooter, was present and armed at the direction of Zerba, was a member of the conspiracy to distribute marijuana, and committed the crime of use, carry, brandish, and discharge of a firearm during and in relation to the conspiracy to distribute marijuana. |
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| Smith v. U.S. Attorney General |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 19-12622 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Marcus Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's determination that petitioner should be removed from the United States because he has been convicted of two or more crimes of moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). The court held that petitioner's conviction for vehicular homicide in Florida contains the necessary mens rea to constitute a crime of moral turpitude. When a person deviates from the standard of care by operating a motor vehicle so recklessly that it is likely to cause death or great bodily harm, and, in fact, results in the killing of a human being, the court has little difficulty finding that he has exhibited the baseness in the duties owed to society that constitutes moral turpitude. Therefore, petitioner's conviction in Florida of vehicular homicide is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, and he is removable under the controlling statute. |
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| United States v. Smith |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 19-12686 Opinion Date: December 21, 2020 Judge: Hull Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e). The court held that defendant failed to show that his counsel's representation with respect to the state plea offer was objectively unreasonable under Strickland v. Washington, and the district court did not err in concluding that defendant failed to show prejudice. The court also held that the district court did not err in determining that defendant's three prior sale of cocaine convictions under Fla. Stat. 893.13(1)(a)(1) were serious drug offenses within the meaning of the Armed Career Criminal Act. |
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| California v. Bravo |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E072782(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: December 23, 2020 Judge: Manuel A. Ramirez Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 1997, defendant Estaban Zarate Bravo pleaded guilty to, and was convicted on a plea bargain agreement of: a felony violation of domestic violence (count 1) and felony violation of child cruelty (count 2). Defendant was a native of Mexico and Spanish was his first language. He appeared in custody at a hearing on June 24, 1997, at which he pleaded guilty to both counts with the use of an interpreter. The immediate advantage of his plea was that defendant was to be released from custody that same day so that he could return to his construction job without being fired and could therefore support his spouse and their child. Of more immediate importance, defendant was informed by counsel and the prosecution that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) would conduct a sweep of the county jail where he was being held by the next morning; being released that afternoon allowed him to avoid the ICE sweep and likely deportation. The trial court sentenced defendant to two years’ incarceration, suspended, and placed him on formal probation for 36 months on terms and conditions including 25 days’ custody, for which he was granted time served. In 2018, defendant filed a motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to Penal Code sections 1016.5 and 1473.7. In 2019, the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, defendant contended the Court of Appeal should grant his motion to vacate or, alternatively, remand to and direct the trial court to grant the motion, specifically contending that at the time of his plea agreement, he was unaware of future immigration consequences of his plea. Defendant contended his trial attorney’s communication, coupled with the written admonition on the plea, as read to him by the interpreter, would leave any reasonable person to believe that so long as he avoided the ICE agents while incarcerated, he would not confront immigration consequences. The Court of Appeal found that “a defendant’s self-serving statement—after trial, conviction, and sentence—that with competent advice he or she would have accepted [or rejected] a proffered plea bargain, is insufficient in and of itself to sustain the defendant’s burden of proof as to prejudice, and must be corroborated independently by objective evidence.” With no such evidence in the record, the Court declined to vacate the trial court's judgment. |
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| California v. Scott |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E074939(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: December 22, 2020 Judge: Raphael Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| A decade after his conviction for attempted murder, defendant-appellant Derrick Scott filed an unsuccessful petition to set it aside under Penal Code section 1170.95. On appeal, his counsel filed a brief asserting no grounds for relief. Scott was invited to file a brief of his own but did not. Following the law that the Court of Appeal generally has applied to postjudgment appeals in the last decade, the Court dismissed the appeal as abandoned. "We believe that we typically should issue such a dismissal through a concise unpublished order, but we publish this opinion to explain why that practice is our preferred course for most uncontested postjudgment appeals." |
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| People v. Brooks |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A158988(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: December 22, 2020 Judge: Streeter Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2007, Brooks was charged with 21 counts of robbery, with most counts carrying an enhancement for personal use of a firearm. He pled no contest to three counts of second-degree robbery, with the accompanying firearm use allegations, in exchange for a stipulated prison term of 19 years eight months. At the sentencing hearing, no testimony was taken or evidence introduced of his military service or substance abuse issues. The court imposed the agreed sentence. In 2019, Brooks filed a petition to recall his sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.91(b)(1). Brooks alleged that he was a member of the U.S. military, he developed a substance abuse problem as a result of such service, he was sentenced before 2015, and neither his military service nor his substance abuse was considered as mitigation during his sentencing hearing. The court of appeal affirmed the summary denial of relief. In his plea bargain, Brooks agreed to a stipulated term, so the court had no power to resentence him. The court noted that Brooks’s military service and his drug use were known to the sentencing court, that Brooks never requested those facts be considered in mitigation, and that there was no proof his drug use was caused by his military service. |
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| People v. M.C. |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B304097(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: December 23, 2020 Judge: Kenneth R. Yegan Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| Defendant appealed the trial court's decision sustaining a petition for first degree burglary with a person present, contending that the trial court erred in denying his Brady/Johnson motion for an in camera review and discovery of the arresting officer's confidential personnel file. In People v. Galan (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 6, the Court of Appeal upheld the denial of a motion to inspect the confidential personnel file of a police officer. The court held that there, as here, there was no good cause for discovery. In this case, defendant cites no authority, and the court has found none, that a Brady/Johnson motion may be used as a fishing expedition to disclose confidential personnel files that have no logical link to the 911 call, the arrest, the charges, a defense, or the impeachment of a witness. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment. |
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| Trala v. Delaware |
| Court: Delaware Supreme Court Docket: 480, 2019 Opinion Date: December 22, 2020 Judge: Karen L. Valihura Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant-defendant John Trala was convicted by jury of driving under the influence. Trala contended the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial after the State, in its rebuttal argument, asserted that defense counsel’s lack of evidentiary objections to certain witness testimony relating to Trala’s blood chemical analysis suggested that defense counsel had acknowledged the reliability of that incriminating evidence. He also claimed he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor, in a rebuttal remark, expressed her favorable personal opinion as to the credibility of the arresting officer who was a key witness for the State. The Delaware Supreme Court determined the jury specifically found two independent theories of liability to support the same DUI charge. In light of that dual holding, which the Court found was supported by overwhelming evidence, any error arising from the prosecutor's misconduct was harmless. The Court therefore affirmed appellant's conviction. |
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| Armstrong v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1364 Opinion Date: December 21, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Jhakeem Armstrong appealed his conviction for malice murder for the death of Robert Parrish, Jr. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred by admitting evidence he was affiliated with a gang under OCGA 24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404 (b)”), by permitting witness testimony regarding certain photographs on the internet because the testimony amounted to hearsay and violated the best evidence rule and the Confrontation Clause, and by failing to give a limiting instruction regarding evidence that he was affiliated with a gang. He also contended his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to ensure that the trial court gave the jury the limiting instruction. The Georgia Supreme Court found the evidence of Armstrong’s gang affiliation was relevant to and probative of his motive for committing the crime charged and was thus admissible under Rule 404 (b). "And even assuming that the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding the internet photos and failing to give a limiting instruction, such errors did not contribute to the verdict, and Armstrong has not shown that his trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective." |
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| Boone v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S21A0171 Opinion Date: December 21, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2012, Odeirrick Boone entered a non-negotiated guilty plea to malice murder and other offenses in connection with the robbery of a convenience store and the stabbing death of the store owner, Balk Sung. In 2020, Boone filed a pro se motion for leave to file an out-of-time appeal, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for having failed to inform him of his right to pursue an appeal of his convictions. The trial court denied Boone’s motion summarily and without holding a hearing, which prompted this appeal. The State conceded the trial court’s order had to be vacated and this case remanded to the trial court to hold a hearing to determine whether Boone was entitled to an out-of-time appeal due to the ineffective assistance of his plea counsel. |
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| Doricien v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S21A0262 Opinion Date: December 21, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Jean Claude Doricien was convicted by jury of felony murder, possession of less than one ounce of marijuana, and various other offenses in connection with the shooting death of Tovara Flowers. On appeal, Doricien contended: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal; (2) the trial court erred by failing to exclude from trial various statements that Doricien made to the police; and (3) he was denied constitutionally effective assistance of trial counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Flanders v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20G0464 Opinion Date: December 21, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Georgia Supreme Court determined the court of appeals erred in holding a trial court properly declined to address a claim raised by Christina Flanders in an amended motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Flanders pled guilty to aggravated assault and first-degree child cruelty, for which Flanders was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment and 5 years' probation. A month later, Flanders moved to withdraw her plea, arguing her attorneys were ineffective; the amended motion at issue here alleged the State failed to disclose the existence of a taped interview with the victim wherein the victim denied Flanders injured her. The trial court denied the motion. The appellate court concluded the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the claim because the amended motion was filed outside the term of court in which Flanders had entered her guilty plea, even though the original motion was timely filed within the term of court in which the plea was entered. "With respect to a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, no statutory authority prohibits a defendant from amending outside the term of court a proper motion to withdraw a guilty plea that was filed within the term of court in which the conviction was entered. In fact, '[n]o statute sets forth the procedures by which a motion to withdraw a guilty plea may be entertained by the trial court after a sentence has been pronounced.'" The Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated the court of appeals' opinion, and remanded this case to that court so that it could address Flanders' claim the trial court erred in declining to address her claims in her amended motion to withdraw her guilty plea. |
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| Guzman-Perez v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1102 Opinion Date: December 21, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Fernando Guzman-Perez was convicted by jury of malice murder and concealing the death of another in connection with the death of his wife, Yamilet Rodriguez. On appeal, Appellant argued the evidence was insufficient to support his murder conviction and that he was denied constitutionally effective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Knighton v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1195 Opinion Date: December 21, 2020 Judge: David E. Nahmias Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Quran Knighton was convicted of malice murder and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony in connection with the stabbing death of Markice Harris. Appellant contended that by twice interrupting his counsel’s closing argument to provide instructions to the jury, the trial court committed plain error and denied him his constitutional right to a fair trial, and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the interruptions and instructions. Finding no reversible error from these contentions, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Lynn v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1533 Opinion Date: December 21, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| James Morris Lynn, Jr., appealed his conviction for malice murder and aggravated assault in connection with the beating death of his wife, Tonya. Lynn argued on appeal that the Georgia Supreme Court should vacate the trial court’s order denying his motion for new trial for lack of adequate findings and remand for more detailed findings. He also argued: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial; (2) he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (3) the combined errors cumulatively prejudiced him. The Supreme Court determined: the trial court was not required to make detailed findings in denying Lynn’s motion for new trial; the trial court did not err in denying Lynn’s motion for a mistrial because the alleged basis for a mistrial posed little prejudice to Lynn and the court gave a sufficient curative instruction; Lynn’s ineffective assistance claims failed because he did not establish trial counsel performed deficiently in any respect; and his cumulative error argument failed because there were no errors to cumulate. The Court vacated Lynn’s sentence for aggravated assault because this count should have merged with the malice murder conviction, but the murder conviction was affirmed. |
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| Martin v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Dockets: S20A1134, S20A1135 Opinion Date: December 21, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In related appeals, Dreshaun Martin and Tori Byrd appealed their convictions for the malice murder of Valentine Dwight Gant, Jr., and the aggravated assault of Gant’s three-year-old son. Both raised claims that the trial court erred in certain rulings during trial, that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions, and they received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Finding no errors, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed their convictions. |
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| Nuckles v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20G0492 Opinion Date: December 21, 2020 Judge: Carla Wong McMillian Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Wanda Nuckles was charged with depriving James Dempsey, an elder person, of essential services and concealing his death. Prior to her trial on those charges, Nuckles filed a motion seeking to exclude a video recording captured on a camera concealed in Dempsey’s room at the residential rehabilitation center where Nuckles worked, asserting that the recording was inadmissible under OCGA 16-11-67 because she did not consent to its recording as required under OCGA 16-11-62 (2). The trial court denied the motion, and Nuckles appealed that ruling to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court in an unpublished opinion. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Nuckles’s petition for certiorari on the issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the video recording at issue fell within the exception provided in OCGA 16-11-62 (2) (B). Because the Supreme Court agreed that the video recording fell within that exception, judgment was affirmed. |
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| Thomas v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1187 Opinion Date: December 21, 2020 Judge: Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Travis Thomas, Jr. was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting deaths of Jabrial Adams and Kenny Hart. On appeal, Thomas contended the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial, admitting evidence of a confession, and admitting testimony regarding pre-trial identifications of Thomas. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Idaho v. Sarbacher |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 47280 Opinion Date: December 23, 2020 Judge: Moeller Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The State charged Keith Sarbacher with grand theft by receiving or possessing stolen property: a 2001 Dodge pickup truck. After Sarbacher’s arrest, the State inventoried and photographed the truck and then returned it to the insurance company, who then sold the truck before Sarbacher’s attorneys could examine it. Sarbacher moved the district court for dismissal, arguing that the State violated his constitutional right to due process by disposing of evidence that was material and potentially exculpatory. The district court granted Sarbacher’s motion and dismissed the State’s case. The State appealed, arguing the evidence at issue was of unknown exculpatory value and the trial court expressly found that the State had not acted in bad faith. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded after a review of the district court record, it would have been entirely speculative for the district court to conclude that any of the additional analyses Sarbacher wanted to conduct would have resulted in the discovery of any exculpatory evidence to exonerate him. "the evidentiary value of the truck as the corpus delicti of the crime was sufficiently preserved by the State through its inventorying and photographing the vehicle prior to its release to Hunt’s insurance company." The Court vacated the district court's decision and remanded for further proceedings. |
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| Idaho v. Stegall |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 47612 Opinion Date: December 22, 2020 Judge: Roger S. Burdick Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| This case arose from a DUI suspect’s request to make a phone call from jail following his arrest. The State appealed a district court order granting Jeffery Stegall’s motion to suppress blood alcohol concentration (BAC) evidence obtained from a blood draw. The district court granted Stegall’s motion after determining that his right to due process had been violated when police officers at the jail refused his request to make a phone call. The State argued on appeal that the district court erred in determining Stegall’s due process rights were violated because the officers were not acting in bad faith when they failed to allow him access to a phone. To this, the Idaho Supreme Court disagreed, holding the district court did not err in determining the jail officers violated Stegall’s right to procedural due process when, despite his requests, they failed to allow him access to a phone for the purpose of contacting an attorney until the morning following his arrest. Accordingly, the district court’s order granting Stegall’s motion to suppress evidence of BAC was affirmed. |
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| Allen v. State |
| Court: Supreme Court of Indiana Docket: 20S-XP-506 Opinion Date: December 22, 2020 Judge: Goff Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court denying Appellant's petition for expungement, holding that because the trial court may have denied the petition on the erroneous belief that Ind. Code 35-38-9-4(b)(3) rendered Defendant ineligible for expungement, remand was required. Appellant pled guilty to Class B felony conspiracy to commit burglary. After completing the terms of his probation without any violations and waiting the required three years, Appellant petitioned for expungement under section 35-38-9-4. The trial court denied the petition for expungement without explaining its reasoning. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a trial court may consider facts incident to the conviction when evaluating an expungement petition; and (2) because the trial court did not articulate why it denied Appellant's petition, the case must be remanded with instructions for the court to reconsider its decision consistent with this opinion. |
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| State v. Barrett |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 19-1697 Opinion Date: December 23, 2020 Judge: McDermott Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, holding that the district court erred in applying too strict a standard in determining whether Defendant was entitled to a new trial under the circumstances of this case. Defendant, who was charged with sexual abuse of a child, requested the child's privileged mental health and counseling records. The district court denied the request. The court of appeals remanded the case, ruling that Defendant should have been granted access to the child's mental health and counseling records because they contained exculpatory information. On remand, the district court denied the motion for new trial after applying a weight of the evidence standard. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the appropriate standard for a new trial determination after a district court fails to order production of exculpatory medical records is the material standard in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and (2) because the district court applied the incorrect standard in denying the motion for new trial, the case must be remanded. |
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| State v. El-Amin |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 19-0925 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Thomas D. Waterman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming one of Defendant's two convictions of sexual abuse in the third degree based on an aiding-and-abetting theory, holding that the contested count was supported by a factual basis. Defendant raped a woman, G.S., and then forced his companion, J.C., to have sex with the same woman against both of their wills. Defendant pled guilty to two counts of sexual abuse in the third degree. The victim in count I was identified as G.S., and the victim in count II was identified as J.C. On appeal, Defendant argued that there was no evidence that he committed a sex act against J.C. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that J.C. was a victim because Defendant forced him to commit a sex act against his will. |
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| State v. Hawk |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 19-1814 Opinion Date: December 23, 2020 Judge: Oxley Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the restitution order of the district court in this criminal matter, holding that this Court had jurisdiction to review the restitution order and that Defendant did not meet his burden to overturn the restitution order. Defendant pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine. He was sentenced to ten years in prison and ordered to pay a $1000 fine. The district court then ordered a "second category" of restitution apart from the fine totaling $593 for court costs and attorney fees. Defendant appealed, arguing that the second category of restitution was excessive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this Court has jurisdiction to consider Defendant's appeal; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount of restitution Defendant had the ability to pay. |
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| State v. Shackford |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 18-1215 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: McDermott Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In this appeal from a court of appeals decision affirming Defendant's resentencing without eliminating the jail fees relating to the count on which Defendant was acquitted on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the assessment of $4935 in posttrial fees, holding that Defendant's reimbursement obligation must be reduced. Defendant was found guilty of two crimes, including a forcible felony. While Defendant was confined in the county jail until his sentencing, the sheriff filed a reimbursement claim for jail fees against Defendant. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's forcible felony conviction. On resentencing, the district court revised Defendant's prison sentence but left untouched the jail fees resulting from the dismissed conviction. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Defendant's reimbursement obligation under Iowa Code 356.7 must be reduced by $4935 because the costs for Defendant's confinement in the county jail were clearly attributed to the forcible felony charge on which Defendant ultimately received an acquittal. |
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| State v. Buck-Schrag |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 121203 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Eric S. Rosen Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree felony murder, criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle, aggravated assault, and criminal possession of a firearm, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the prosecutor did not err in its comments to the jury during closing argument; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (3) the instructions, as a whole, fairly and accurately stated the law and therefore were not erroneous; and (4) the district court did not err when it ordered Defendant to pay $7,000 in attorney fees. |
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| State v. Carter |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 120103 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Eric S. Rosen Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of criminal discharge of a firearm, and one count of criminal possession of a firearm, holding that there was no error in the proceedings above. On appeal, Defendant argued that the voir dire proceedings were closed to his family members and that not providing space for spectators violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly determined that the voir dire proceeding was open was reasonable and supported by substantial competent evidence; (2) the court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to admit certain testimony; and (3) Defendant's remaining allegations of error were not properly before the Supreme Court. |
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| State v. Stafford |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 120481 Opinion Date: December 23, 2020 Judge: Stegall Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the Defendant's convictions of premeditated first-degree murder and two counts of cruelty to animals, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) erred when it included additional information in the standard premeditation Pattern Instructions for Kansas instruction; (2) did not err when it failed to instruct the jury on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter; (3) certain testimony did not violate Defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause; and (4) because there was no error, cumulative error did not deny Defendant a fair trial. |
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| State v. Stanley |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 120310 Opinion Date: December 23, 2020 Judge: Stegall Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for first-degree murder, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant failed to preserve his claim that the district court erred when it refused to grant a mistrial after a witness claimed to have "double memories" and gave premeditation jury instructions; (2) the district court did not err when it included additional language in the general Pattern Instructions for Kansas defining premeditation; and (3) premeditated first-degree murder and intentional second-degree murder are not identical offenses, and Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-5402(a)(1) is not unconstitutionally vague. |
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| Brafman v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2019-SC-0449-MR Opinion Date: December 17, 2020 Judge: John D. Minton, Jr. Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of first-degree and second-degree arson and six counts of attempted murder, of which four were charged as hate crimes, holding that Defendant was denied a fair trial when the Commonwealth, aware of Defendant's intoxication during her arrest, opposed the intoxication defense instructions and implied to the jury that Defendant was not intoxicated. On appeal, Defendant argued that six trial errors required reversal, either individually or cumulatively. The Supreme Court held that the prosecutorial misconduct was flagrant enough to render the trial fundamentally unfair, simultaneously leading the jury to conclude facts contrary to the known facts and depriving Defendant of an ability to present her defense. The Court held that this one error was enough to require reversal but also addressed Defendant's remaining allegations of error, concluding that there were multiple errors in this case. |
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| Commonwealth v. Jennings |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2019-SC-0248-DG Opinion Date: December 17, 2020 Judge: Nickell Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals vacating and remanding the circuit court's denial of Defendant's motion to modify the terms of his probation to remove a restriction prohibiting him from having access to the internet during his probationary period, holding that Defendant's failure to challenge the probation restriction prohibiting all access to the internet at the time the restriction was imposed was fatal to Defendant's request to relief. In vacating the probation restriction, the court of appeals concluded that the complete ban on internet access under the facts of this case was impermissibly vague and overly burdensome on Defendant's right to free speech. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Defendant did not object to the restriction, the court of appeals should not have entertained this challenge, and its decision on the merits was in error. |
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| Exantus v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2018-SC-0241-MR Opinion Date: December 17, 2020 Judge: Lambert Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence of twenty years' imprisonment and convictions of not guilty by reason of insanity for first-degree murder, not guilty by reason of insanity for first-degree burglary, guilty but mentally ill of two counts of second-degree assault and guilty but mentally ill of fourth-degree assault, holding that any error was not prejudicial. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the jury’s verdicts were not impermissibly inconsistent; (2) the trial court did not err by failing to grant Defendant's motions for directed verdict; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to provide lesser-included offense instructions to the jury; (4) the trial court's failure to provide the jury with the definition of "dangerous instrument" was harmless error; (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's motion to strike two jurors for cause; and (6) the trial court erred by not making the requisite statutory findings under Ky. Rev. Stat. 703 before admitting prior bad act evidence, but the error was harmless. |
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| Mattingly v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2019-SC-0255-MR Opinion Date: December 17, 2020 Judge: John D. Minton, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of four counts of first-degree assault and other crimes and sentencing him as a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO) to forty years' imprisonment, holding that any error was harmless. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the trial court (1) did not err when it allowed into evidence a Facebook video from an anonymous tipster allegedly depicting the shooting; (2) did not commit palpable error when it allowed the testimony of Detective O'Daniel, who narrated surveillance video footage; (3) properly allowed Aleisha Courtney's prior identification of Defendant; (4) properly allowed another detective's prior identification of Defendant; (5) improperly excluded evidence of a civil suit by the victims against Defendant, but the error did not likely affect the outcome of the trial; (6) properly allowed Defendant's prior felony convictions at trial and at sentencing; and (7) properly allowed a summary sheet of Defendant's prior convictions that was prepared with certified records. Further, there was sufficient evidence of Defendant's prior felony convictions to support his conviction for possession of a handgun. |
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| State v. De St. Croix |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 142 Opinion Date: December 22, 2020 Judge: Ellen A. Gorman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of one count of intentional, knowing, or depraved indifference murder, one count of depraved indifference murder, and one count of arson and sentence of two life terms for the murders, holding that there was no error in Defendant's sentence. The trial court set Defendant's basic sentence for both murders at life imprisonment based on the application of two of the aggravating circumstances named in State v. Shortsleeves, 580 A.2d 145 (Me. 1990) - premeditation-in-fact and extreme cruelty. On appeal, Defendant challenged both aggravating circumstances. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the court did not err by applying premeditation-in-fact and extreme cruelty as aggravating circumstances to justify imposition of a basic sentence of life imprisonment for both counts of murder; and (2) the trial court precisely complied with the legal principles that apply to setting the basic sentence. |
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| State v. Pratt |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 141 Opinion Date: December 22, 2020 Judge: Humphrey Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of domestic violence assault, holding that Defendant was not prejudiced. On appeal, Defendant argued (1) the trial court erred by allowing testimony from Defendant's fifteen-year-old daughter concerning Defendant's parenting practices, and (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by commenting on admissible evidence during its cross-examination of her. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) because, in her opening statement, Defendant indicated her pursuit of the parental discipline justification found at Me. Rev. Stat. 17-A, 106(1), the court did not err in admitting evidence of Defendant's parenting; and (2) the State committed prosecutorial conduct by eliciting and commenting on evidence that other children had been removed from Defendant's home, but the error was not so prejudicial that it affected the outcome of the proceeding. |
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| Montague v. State |
| Court: Maryland Court of Appeals Docket: 75/19 Opinion Date: December 23, 2020 Judge: Getty Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In this case concerning the admissibility of jailhouse rap lyrics composed by Defendant as substantive evidence that he shot and killed George Forrester the Court of Appeals held that the rap lyrics were relevant and admissible and that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the lyrics. The State sought to introduce a recorded telephone call containing the rap lyrics as substantive evidence of Defendant's guilt. Defendant moved in limine to exclude the recording. The circuit court denied the motion and admitted the rap lyrics. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, concluding that the lyrics were admissible under Maryland Rules 5-401, 5-402, and 5-403. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the rap lyrics were relevant under Rule 5-401, and therefore were admissible under Rule 5-402; (2) the rap lyrics bore a close factual and temporal nexus to the details of the murder; and (3) therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the rap lyrics under Rule 5-403. |
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| Commonwealth v. Taylor |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12877 Opinion Date: December 17, 2020 Judge: Gaziano Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court held that double jeopardy barred this prosecution because the termination of Defendant's first trial was not justified by manifest necessity. The Commonwealth charged Defendant with carrying a loaded firearm, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, 10(n), but did not charge him with either of the required predicate offenses of sections 10(a) or (c). At trial, the district court granted Defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty based on the defect in charging. Thereafter, the Commonwealth obtained a second complaint charging Defendant with violating section 10(a) based on the same conduct. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint based on double jeopardy. The Supreme Court concluded that double jeopardy barred this prosecution because there was not a manifest necessity for a mistrial. |
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| Miller v. Montana Board of Pardons & Parole |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 318 Opinion Date: December 22, 2020 Judge: Beth Baker Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the district court that the Montana Board of Pardons and Parole did not violate Appellant's statutory or constitutional rights in denying Appellant's parole request, holding that the district court did not err. Appellant sought judicial review of the Board's decision, claiming that the Board denied him his right to know, right to participate, or right to due process when it denied him parole without first furnishing him a copy of documents on which the Board relied in making its decision. Appellant further argued that the Board unlawfully relied on a guideline without having adopted it as an administrative rule pursuant to the Montana Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted summary judgment for the Board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) where the guideline was not the reason for the Board's decision, Appellant could not demonstrated the likelihood of a different outcome; and (2) the Board did not violate Appellant's right to know, right to participate, or due process rights. |
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| New Hampshire v. Mack |
| Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court Docket: 2019-0171 Opinion Date: December 22, 2020 Judge: James P. Bassett Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Jeremy Mack was convicted by jury on one count of possession of a controlled drug: psilocyn and/or psilocybin (which he possessed in the form of mushrooms). On appeal, defendant argued that, because Part I, Article 5 of the New Hampshire Constitution protected his right to possess and use mushrooms as part of his religious worship, so long as he did not “disturb the public peace,” the trial court erred by denying his pre-trial motion to dismiss. This appeal required the New Hampshire Supreme Court to interpret Part I, Article 5 and interpretation of the phrase "disturb the public peace." The Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not apply the compelling interest balancing test that Part I, Article 5 required. "Nor, understandably, did it make the factual findings necessary to determine whether, under the test, the defendant’s possession and sacramental use of psilocyn and/or psilocybin mushrooms are protected under Part I, Article 5." The trial court'd order was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. |
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| State v. Best |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 300A93-3 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Earls Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion for appropriately relief filed after he was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, holding that certain undisclosed evidence was material and that it was reasonably probable that, had it been disclosed to Defendant prior to trial, the outcome would have been different. Defendant was convicted of first-degree burglary, first-degree rape, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. In postconviction proceedings, it became clear that the State failed to produce certain pieces of evidence to Defendant prior to his trial. Later that year, postconviction counsel uncovered additional evidence. Defendant then filed a motion for appropriate relief, arguing that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of his due process right pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case with instruction to grant the motion and order a new trial, holding that the failure to disclose the exculpatory evidence prejudiced Defendant's ability to present a defense. |
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| State v. Chandler |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 189A19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Robin E. Hudson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court refusing to accept Defendant's tendered guilty plea, holding that the trial court lacked discretion to reject Defendant's plea pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1023(c). Defendant pleaded guilty to the offense of taking indecent liberties with a child. The trial court chose to reject Defendant's plea following a colloquy. After a trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree sex offense and taking indecent liberties with a child. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court correctly rejected Defendant's tendered guilty plea because the trial court did not find that it was the product of Defendant's informed choice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the guilty plea was based on Defendant's informed choice, a factual basis existed for the plea, and the sentencing was left to the trial court's discretion, the trial court was statutorily required to accept Defendant's guilty plea; and (2) the trial court's error prejudiced Defendant. |
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| State v. Crump |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 151PA18 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Earls Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions, holding that the trial court abused its discretion when it "flatly prohibited questioning as to issues of race and implicit bias during voir dire" and that the trial court's improper restrictions on Defendant's questioning during voir dire prejudiced Defendant. Defendant was convicted of several crimes, including robbery with a dangerous weapon and second-degree kidnapping. On appeal, Defendant challenged the trial court's refusal to allow him to pursue during voir dire certain lines of inquiry relating to racial bias and police-officer shootings of black civilians. The court of appeals rejected Defendant's claims and found no error in the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion and prejudiced Defendant by restricting all inquiry into prospective jurors' racial biases and opinions regarding police officer shootings of black men. |
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| State v. Farmer |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 8A19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Morgan Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court held that the scheduling and procedural circumstances existent in this case did not constitute an infringement upon Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree sex offense with a child and indecent liberties with a child. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charges against him because the State violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial by failing to calendar his trial date for approximately five years following the issuance of the indictments against him. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that here was no speedy trial violation. The Supreme Court affirmed after weighing the factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), as they applied to the circumstances of this case, holding that Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated. |
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| State v. Glover |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 392A19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Morgan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's convictions and the resulting judgments against him, holding that the trial court committed prejudicial error in its jury instruction on the theory of acting in concert as a basis upon which to find Defendant guilty. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of simple possession of methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine. During trial, the trial court gave instructions to the jury on both constructive possession and acting in concert as legal theories underlying the drug possession charges. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and vacated Defendant's convictions, holding that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on Defendant's criminal culpability on the theory of acting in concert, and the error was not harmless. |
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| State v. Hollars |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 324A19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Morgan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals holding that substantial evidence existed to create a bona fide doubt as to Defendant's competency and that, therefore, the trial court's failure to make an inquiry into Defendant's competency at trial violated his due process rights, holding that the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to conduct a competency hearing for Defendant. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts each of second-degree sexual offense and taking indecent liberties with a child. On appeal, Defendant argued that events that occurred during trial combined with his lengthy history of mental illness, which included periods of incompetence to stand trial, created a duty upon the trial court sua sponte to inquire into his competency to stand trial. The court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court for a termination of whether a meaningful retrospective hearing could be conducted on the issue of Defendant's competency at the time of his trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in light of substantial evidence that was sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt regarding Defendant's competency to stand trial, the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to conduct a competency hearing for Defendant. |
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| State v. Sides |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 400A19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Davis Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction, holding that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a competency hearing under the circumstances of this case. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of felony embezzlement. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in declining to hold a competency hearing when Defendant attempted suicide one evening after her trial had recessed for the day and was thereafter involuntarily committed. The trial court concluded that Defendant had voluntarily waived her constitutional right to be present at her trial because of her suicide attempt and therefore proceeded with the trial without Defendant. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court was required to conduct a competency hearing before proceeding with the trial in her absence. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the trial court was presented with substantial information that cast doubt on Defendant's competency, and the trial court erred by failing to hold a competency hearing. |
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| State v. Steen |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 141A19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Ervin Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court remanded this case for a new trial with respect to the issue of Defendant's guilt of the murder of his grandfather, holding that the court of appeals erred in holding that the trial court's instruction that the jury was entitled to find that Defendant attempted to murder his mother using a garden hoe as a deadly weapon did not constitute prejudicial error. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon, the attempted first-degree murder of his mother, and the first degree murder of his grandfather on the basis of the felony-murder rule using attempted first-degree murder as the predicate felony. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in its jury instructions. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in holding that the trial court did not err by instructing that the jury could find that Defendant's hands and arms constituted a deadly weapon for purposes of the felony-murder provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-17(a); but (2) the trial court's instruction concerning the use of the garden hoe as a deadly weapon during Defendant's alleged attempt to murder his mother constituted prejudicial error necessitating a new trial in the case in which Defendant was convicted of murdering his grandfather. |
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| State v. Warden |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 484A19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Earls Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction, holding that the court of appeals correctly held that the trial court committed plain error when it admitted improper testimony by an investigator with the Department of Social Services (DSS) Child Protective Services who improperly vouched for the victim's testimony. Defendant was convicted of sexual offense with a child by an adult, child abuse by a sexual act, and indecent liberties with a child. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in allowing the DSS investigator's testimony. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court committed plain error requiring a new trial because the DSS investigator's testimony improperly bolstered or vouched for the victim's credibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court commits a fundamental error when it allows testimony which vouches for the complainant's credibility in a case where the verdict entirely depends upon the jurors' comparative assessment of the complainant's and the defendant's credibility. |
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| State ex rel. Romine v. McIntosh |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-6826 Opinion Date: December 23, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus or a writ of prohibition against Judge Stephen McIntosh of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, holding that the court of appeals did not err. Appellant was found guilty of all counts in two criminal cases. Judge McIntosh sentenced Defendant. Appellant then filed an original action seeking a writ of mandamus or a writ of prohibition against Judge McIntosh alleging that the judge had improperly sentenced him. The court of appeals concluded that mandamus was not available because Appellant could have challenged his convictions in a direct appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellant's sentencing entry was voidable, mandamus will not lie. |
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| State v. Chapman |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-6730 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: DeWine Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court held that a condition of community control imposed on Defendant that Defendant "make all reasonable efforts to avoid impregnating a woman" during his sentence was not reasonably related to the goals of community control, nor was it reasonably tailored to avoid impinging Defendant's liberty no more than necessary. Defendant was convicted of several felony counts of nonsupport of dependents. Defendant's sentence included the anti-procreation condition at issue. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the anti-procreation prohibition impermissibly infringed upon Defendant's constitutional rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the condition unnecessarily imagined upon Defendant's liberty, and therefore, the trial court must remove the anti-procreation condition but may impose other conditions that are appropriately tailored to the goals of community control. |
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| State v. Fazenbaker |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-6731 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Donnelly Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that entering a recreational travel trailer to commit theft does not constitute breaking and entering if the trailer is winterized, covered, and stored, holding that, contrary to the court of appeals' conclusion, such a structure is an "unoccupied structure" for the purposes of Ohio Rev. Code 2911.13(A). Defendant was convicted of breaking and entering under 2911.13(A). The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trailer that Defendant broke into did not constitute an unoccupied structure for the purposes of the statute because it was not being "maintained" for residential use when the crime occurred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the recreational travel trailer was manufactured for overnight accommodation, the fact that it was not occupied at the time of Defendant's theft rendered it an unoccupied structure rather than a nonstructure; and (2) therefore, the court of appeals erred in reversing Defendant's conviction and sentence based on insufficient evidence of the "unoccupied structure" element in section 2911.13(A). |
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| State v. Graham |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-6700 Opinion Date: December 17, 2020 Judge: Fischer Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of aggravated murder and other crimes but vacated his death sentence, holding that the aggravating circumstances that Defendant was found guilty of committing did not outweigh the mitigating factors present in the case beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore a sentence of death was not appropriate. Defendant was found guilty of multiple offenses, including aggravated murder and three accompanying death-penalty specifications - committing the aggravated murder during an aggravated robbery, an aggravated burglary, and a kidnapping. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the felony-murder aggravating circumstances that were found by the jury outweighed the mitigating factors presented by the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that they did not and therefore remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing consistent with Ohio Rev. Code 2929.06. |
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| State v. Hackett |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-6699 Opinion Date: December 17, 2020 Judge: DeWine Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for kidnapping, rape, and murder, holding that when a criminal defendant validly exercises his right to self-representation he can no longer raise claim under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution that his trial counsel - standby or otherwise - was ineffective. In his criminal trial, Defendant waived his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and chose to represent himself. The trial court accepted Defendant's waiver and appointed standby counsel to be available to assist Defendant. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by limiting the role of his standby counsel. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that, based on the court's understanding of the typical role of standby counsel, the trial court did not improperly limit the role of standby counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the trial court had the discretion not to appoint standby counsel at all, the court did not abuse its discretion by appointing standby counsel with a limited role. |
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| State v. Jones |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-6729 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Maureen O'Connor Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the court of appeals vacating Defendants' sentences for involuntary manslaughter for the death of their adopted daughter, holding that the court of appeals did not have the authority to review the trial court's findings. Defendants were convicted of involuntary manslaughter and sentenced to ten years in prison. The court of appeals vacated the sentences and remanded the cases for resentencing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in holding that Ohio Rev. Code 2953.08(G)(2) permits an appellate court to review whether the record supports findings under Ohio Rev. Code 2929.11 and 2929.12; and (2) the judgment of the court of appeals vacating Defendants' sentences was not justified under section 2953.08(G)(2). |
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| State v. Lingle |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-6788 Opinion Date: December 23, 2020 Judge: Sharon L. Kennedy Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In this case, the Supreme Court clarified what a sex offender whose offenses were committed in another state must prove pursuant to former Ohio Rev. Code 2950.09(F)(2) in order to successfully have the automatic sexual-predator classification under former section 2950.09(A) removed. The trial court here incorrectly determined that out-of-state offenders who are automatically required to register as sexual predators in Ohio must prove they are not likely to commit another sexually-oriented offense in order successfully to challenge the sexual-predator classification. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) first, an out-of-state offender challenging an automatic designation as a sexual predator under former R.C. 2950.09(A) must prove by clear and convincing evidence the reason for the imposition of the lifetime registration requirement in the other state; and (2) second, the offender must prove that the reason for the lifetime registration requirement is not substantially similar to a classification as a sexual predator under former Chapter 2950. |
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| State v. Patrick |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-6803 Opinion Date: December 22, 2020 Judge: Maureen O'Connor Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| The Supreme Court held that Ohio Rev. Code 2953.08(D)(3) does not preclude an appellate court from reviewing a sentence imposed by a trial court for aggravated murder when a defendant raises a constitutional claim regarding that sentence on appeal. A jury found Defendant guilty of aggravated murder and other offenses stemming from a fatal shooting when Defendant was seventeen years old. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after thirty years for the aggravated murder offense. On appeal, Defendant argued that his sentence violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Ohio Rev. Code 2953.08(D)(3) does not preclude an appellate court from reviewing a sentence imposed by a trial court for aggravated murder when a defendant raises a constitutional claim regarding that sentence on appeal; and (2) consistent with this Court's decision in State v. Long, 8 N.E.3d 890 (Ohio 2014), a trial court must separately consider the youth of a juvenile offender as a mitigating factor before imposing a life sentence under Ohio Rev. Code 2929.03 even if that sentence includes eligibility for parole. |
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| State v. Pendleton |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-6833 Opinion Date: December 23, 2020 Judge: Donnelly Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In this appeal concerning two prison sentences that Defendant received related to 133.62 grams of powder containing detectable amounts of heroin and fentanyl the Supreme Court held that the sentence violated the double jeopardy protections of the Ohio and United States Constitutions. Defendant was sentenced on a first-degree felony conviction for trafficking in 133.62 grams of heroin and was separately sentenced on a second-degree felony conviction for trafficking in 133.62 grams of fentanyl. The court of appeals upheld the sentences, concluding that the General Assembly intended to separately punish an offender for trafficking in different types of drugs. The Supreme Court reversed, vacated the sentences, and remanded the case for resentencing, holding that the imposition of two punishments for the same, singular quantity of drugs violated Defendant's constitutional double jeopardy protections. |
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| State v. Simpson |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-6719 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Judith L. French Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's App.R. 26(B) application for reopening, holding that the court of appeals applied the correct standard when it considered the application. On appeal, Appellant asked that the Supreme Court revisit the standard that Ohio courts of appeals must apply when considering applications for reopening. The Supreme Court declined to do so and (1) reaffirmed that the two-pronged standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which the Supreme Court adopted in State v. Reed, 660 N.E.2d 456 (1996), applies to applications for reopening under App.R. 26(B); (2) reaffirmed that courts of appeals should grant an application for reopening of the defendant shows a genuine issue was to whether she has a colorable claim that her appellate counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance caused her prejudice; and (3) held that the court of appeals applied the correct standard in this case. |
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| State v. Taylor |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-6786 Opinion Date: December 22, 2020 Judge: Fischer Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court held that, pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2941.51(D), a trial court in a criminal case may assess court-appointed counsel fees against a defendant without making explicit findings on the record to justify the fee assessment and that an order for payment of court-appointed counsel fees cannot be included as a portion of the defendant's sentence for a criminal conviction. On appeal from his conviction and sentence, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay $130 toward appointed counsel fees. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court could not order Defendant to pay the court-appointed counsel fees without first considering his financial ability to do so. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court has authority to impose court-appointed counsel fees; (2) section 2941.51(D) does not require the trial court to make explicit findings; and (3) court-appointed counsel fees cannot be imposed as part of a defendant's sentence. |
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| State v. Turner |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-6773 Opinion Date: December 22, 2020 Judge: Sharon L. Kennedy Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court held that, based on the plain language of Ohio Rev. Code 4511.33(A)(1), the definitions set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 4511.01 and the statutory scheme as a whole, the single solid white longitudinal line on the right-hand edge of a roadway - otherwise known as the fog line - does not prohibit "driving on" or "touching" the line. A highway patrol trooper stopped Defendant for failing to drive within the marked lanes, in violation of section 4511.33. Defendant was subsequently charged with a violation of section 4511.33 and of operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the trooper did not have probable cause or a reasonable and articulable suspicion to initiate the stop. The trial court granted the motion to suppress. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Defendant did not cross the fog line and driving on the fog line or touching it is not prohibited under section 4511.33(A)(1), no violation occurred. |
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| State v. Weber |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-6832 Opinion Date: December 23, 2020 Judge: Maureen O'Connor Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court held that the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution does not include the right to carry a firearm while intoxicated, and therefore, Ohio Rev. Code 2923.15 is not unconstitutional. Defendant was found guilty of violating section 2923.15(A), which provides that no person under the influence of alcohol or drugs shall carry or use any firearm. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. On appeal, Defendant argued that section 2923.15 violates the Second Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the constitutionality of section 2923.15 should be judged using intermediate scrutiny; and (2) the statute is constitutional under intermediate scrutiny. |
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| Oregon v. Chorney-Phillips |
| Court: Oregon Supreme Court Docket: S067557 Opinion Date: December 24, 2020 Judge: Flynn Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The issue before the Oregon Supreme Court in this matter was whether defendant Zackery Chorney-Phillips' conviction should be reversed in light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S Ct 1390 (2020), which held that only a unanimous jury can find a defendant guilty of a serious crime. Defendant was charged with first- and second-degree custodial interference and was found guilty on both counts by a twelve-person jury. At trial, which occurred before the Supreme Court’s Ramos decision, the court instructed the jury that “[t]en or more jurors must agree on your verdict,” and defendant did not object to that jury instruction. After the jury returned its verdict, on a form that contained no indication of how individual jurors voted, the trial court polled the jury at defendant’s request. All jurors indicated they concurred with the verdict. For purposes of sentencing, the court merged the jury’s two guilty verdicts into one conviction for first-degree custodial interference, and then entered judgment. Defendant appealed, arguing the nonunanimous jury instruction was a structural error, which always required reversal. In addition, defendant argued the erroneous instruction required reversal under the federal harmless error standard because the poll of the jury was insufficient to establish the jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The State did not dispute the instruction was given in error, but it argued the error was harmless because each of defendant’s convictions was based on a unanimous verdict. The State also argued defendant’s acceptance of the jury poll prevented him from challenging the adequacy of the jury poll on appeal. The Oregon Supreme Court ultimately determined it was not appropriate to exercise its discretion to review defendant's unpreserved assignment of error as plain error; judgment was therefore affirmed. |
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| Oregon v. Ciraulo |
| Court: Oregon Supreme Court Docket: S067569 Opinion Date: December 24, 2020 Judge: Duncan Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The issue before the Oregon Supreme Court in this matter was whether defendant Peter Ciraulo's conviction should be reversed in light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S Ct 1390 (2020), which held that only a unanimous jury can find a defendant guilty of a serious crime. Defendant was charged with first-degree forgery, possession of a forged instrument, and third-degree theft. Defendant was tried before a twelve-person jury, in a trial that occurred before the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramos. Before trial, defendant requested that the jury be instructed that it needed to be unanimous in order to return a conviction. The trial court denied defendant’s request, stating: “[U]ntil the Court of Appeals tells me otherwise, I’ll continue to comply with the law that requires the ten-person verdict in felony cases.” After deliberation, the jury found defendant guilty of all three counts. After receiving the verdict form, the trial court asked the presiding juror whether the jury’s decision had been unanimous, and the presiding juror confirmed that it had been. The trial court asked defendant whether there was any need to poll the jury further, and defense counsel responded that there was not. To the Oregon Supreme Court, defendant argued that Ramos required his convictions be reversed: (1) the nonunanimous jury instruction was a structural error, which always required reversal; and (2) even if the error is subject to a harmlessness analysis, the poll of the jury is insufficient to establish that the jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court concluded that, although the jury instruction permitting nonunanimous verdicts was erroneous, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to all of the verdicts in this case. Judgment was affirmed. |
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| Oregon v. Dilallo |
| Court: Oregon Supreme Court Docket: S067493 Opinion Date: December 24, 2020 Judge: Duncan Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The issue before the Oregon Supreme Court in this matter was whether defendant Michael Dilallo's conviction should be reversed in light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S Ct 1390 (2020), which held that only a unanimous jury can find a defendant guilty of a serious crime. Defendant was charged with delivery of methamphetamine and conspiracy to commit delivery of methamphetamine. He entered a plea of not guilty. Both charges were tried to a twelve-person jury in 2018, before the Ramos decision. At trial, consistent with Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, the jury was instructed that it could convict him without reaching unanimity. Defendant did not object to that jury instruction, and the record did not reveal whether the jury’s guilty verdicts were unanimous. Defendant argued that, although he did not preserve an objection to the erroneous jury instruction, the Oregon Supreme Court should exercise its discretion to review the trial court's error. Because of the absence of a jury poll, the Oregon Court concluded it was not appropriate to consider defendant’s unpreserved assignment of error; therefore defendant’s judgment of conviction was affirmed. |
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| Oregon v. Flores Ramos |
| Court: Oregon Supreme Court Docket: S067105 Opinion Date: December 24, 2020 Judge: Garrett Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The issue before the Oregon Supreme Court in this matter was whether defendant Isidro Flores Ramos' conviction should be reversed in light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S Ct 1390 (2020), which held that only a unanimous jury can find a defendant guilty of a serious crime. Defendant broke into a home and sexually assaulted a nine-year-old girl. Defendant was charged with first-degree unlawful sexual penetration, first-degree sexual abuse, attempted first-degree rape, first-degree burglary, and coercion. Before trial, he filed a motion requesting that the jury be instructed that it needed to be unanimous to convict. The trial court denied that motion. The jury returned guilty verdicts on each of the five counts. The trial court polled the jury; the poll indicated the jury had reached a unanimous guilty verdict on all counts except for the attempted first-degree rape count. On that count, only ten jurors voted to convict. Defendant did not object to the manner in which the trial court polled the jury, and defense counsel indicated that he was satisfied by the poll. Defendant appealed. As relevant here, he assigned error to both the use of the nonunanimous jury instruction and the receipt of the nonunanimous verdict—assignments of error that he had preserved in the trial court. He argued that those errors required reversal of all his convictions. In a decision before the federal Supreme Court's Ramos decision, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. Because the jury returned four unanimous verdicts, the Oregon Supreme Court determined those convictions could stand; however, pursuant to Ramos, the fifth, nonunanimous conviction was reversed. |
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| Oregon v. Kincheloe |
| Court: Oregon Supreme Court Docket: S067611 Opinion Date: December 24, 2020 Judge: Garrett Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The issue before the Oregon Supreme Court in this matter was whether defendant Charles Kincheloe's conviction should be reversed in light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S Ct 1390 (2020), which held that only a unanimous jury can find a defendant guilty of a serious crime. Defendant was charged with several offenses, including first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, and fourth-degree assault. Defendant’s case was tried to a twelve-person jury in 2018, prior to Ramos. While formulating jury instructions, the trial court asked defendant whether he wished to object to the instruction that the jury could return a nonunanimous verdict, stating, “All the defense attorneys are doing that now.” Defense counsel responded, “That’s fine.” There was no further discussion of the issue. The jury was instructed that “10 or more jurors must agree on the verdict.” The jury found defendant guilty as charged. Defendant requested that the trial court poll the jury. The poll revealed that the jury had unanimously convicted defendant of the sodomy and assault charges but that it had divided eleven to one on the rape count. Defendant appealed, assigning error to the nonunanimous jury instruction and to the receipt of the nonunanimous verdict. Defendant conceded that he had not preserved that assignment of error, and he asked the Court of Appeals to conduct plain error review. In his briefing to the Oregon Supreme Court, defendant argued that his exchange with the trial court was sufficient to preserve an objection to the nonunanimous jury instruction. The state conceded that defendant’s single conviction based on a nonunanimous verdict had to be reversed, but it argued the instructional error was harmless with respect to the two convictions based on unanimous verdicts. Even assuming that defendant preserved an objection to the jury instruction, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that error was harmless as to the two convictions based on unanimous verdicts. Defendant's convictions were therefore affirmed without the Court addressing whether defendant adequately preserved an objection to the nonunanimous jury instruction. |
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| Pennsylvania v. Alexander |
| Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Docket: 30 EAP 2019 Opinion Date: December 22, 2020 Judge: Donohue Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted Appellant Keith Alexander's petition for allowance of appeal asking the Court to overrule or limit Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014) (OAJC), a plurality result announcing that, without limitation, the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution applied in Pennsylvania. "What Gary did not settle is whether the federal automobile exception is consistent with Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution." The Court held Article I, Section 8 afforded greater protection than the Fourth Amendment, and reaffirmed prior decisions: the Pennsylvania Constitution required both a showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search of an automobile. |
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| Pennsylvania v. Peck Jr. |
| Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Docket: 75 MAP 2019 Opinion Date: December 22, 2020 Judge: Donohue Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Mitchell Gregory Peck, Jr. (“Peck”) was convicted of drug delivery resulting in death, and sentenced to twenty to forty years of imprisonment. In this appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the interplay between the territorial application of the Crimes Code, including in particular Section 102, 18 Pa.C.S. section 102, and the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. Specific to this appeal, the Court addressed whether Peck’s conviction was supported by sufficient evidence where the drug delivery occurred in Maryland and the resulting death occurred in Pennsylvania. While the Commonwealth had subject matter jurisdiction to prosecute Peck for DDRD, the Supreme Court determined it could not present evidence to support his conviction. The Superior Court’s decision to the contrary was reversed and Peck’s judgment of sentence was vacated. |
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| In re Alfred Dewayne Brown |
| Court: Supreme Court of Texas Docket: 19-0877 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Eva Guzman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court conditionally granted Alfred Brown's petition for writ of mandamus challenging the determination of the Comptroller of the State of Texas denying Brown's compensation claim brought after he was found to be wrongfully convicted and imprisoned, holding that Brown was eligible for compensation under the Time Cole Act. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 103.001-.154. Brown was wrongfully convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. After serving more than twelve years behind bars, Brown was released from prison when it was determined that the prosecuting attorney withheld and suppressed exculpatory evidence. After securing a judicial declaration of actual innocence Brown sought compensation under the Act for the time he was wrongfully imprisoned. The Comptroller denied the compensation claim, concluding that the district court had jurisdiction to issue an order declaring Brown actually innocent. The Supreme Court conditionally granted Brown's petition for writ of mandamus, holding (1) Brown was eligible for compensation under the Act; and (2) the Comptroller exceeded his authority by considering matters beyond the verified documents to make a de novo jurisdictional determination. |
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| In re Commitment of Jeffery Lee Stoddard |
| Court: Supreme Court of Texas Docket: 19-0561 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Debra Lehrmann Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing a jury's finding that Jeffery Lee Stoddard was a sexually violent predator (SVP) and civilly committing him under Tex. Health & Safety Code chapter 841, holding that the court of appeals applied an improper standard. The court of appeals described the standard governing the factual sufficiency review in which the burden of proof was beyond a reasonable doubt the court of appeals described the standard as requiring the court to weigh the evidence in a neutral light to determined whether the jury's finding was factually insufficient or so against the great weight and preponderance as to be manifestly unjust, shock the conscience, or clearly demonstrate bias. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals applied an improper standard that allowed the court to substitute its own judgment for that of a reasonable fact-finder and incorporated a statutory element that chapter 841's text did not support; and (2) a properly conducted factual-sufficiency review in an SVP case requires the appellate court to determine whether, on the entire record, a reasonable factfinder could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is an SVP. |
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| Vermont v. Brunetta |
| Court: Vermont Supreme Court Citation: 2020 VT 109 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Eaton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| Defendant Anthony Brunetta appealed the civil suspension of his driver’s license for driving under the influence (DUI), arguing that the criminal division erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence he alleged was obtained based on an illegal stop of his vehicle. Specifically, defendant claimed the officer lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion of wrongdoing to stop his car as required by the federal and state constitutions. At trial, the State played a dashboard video recording of the stop at issue, and the trooper who stopped defendant testified that he did not observe defendant use a turn signal at the intersection. On cross-examination, the trooper reiterated that defendant did not use his turn signal at the intersection, and that he would have seen the signal if defendant had used it. Defendant did not challenge the criminal division’s finding that he did not use his vehicle’s turn signal before changing direction at the intersection in question. He argued to the Vermont Supreme Court only that the state trooper had no reasonable basis to stop him without first confirming that he did not use a hand signal instead of the vehicle’s turn signal. The Supreme Court found Defendant correctly observed that 23 V.S.A. 1064(a) unambiguously allowed a driver to discharge the responsibility to signal a turn by using a hand signal rather than a mechanical or lighting signal. "But this does not mean that a law enforcement officer who is unable to see a hand signal even if one is given—whether due to darkness, weather conditions, or vantage point relative to the vehicle in question—may never form a reasonable suspicion that section 1064(a) has been violated. ... It follows that, where an officer suspects that a driver failed to signal a turn, but is unable to confirm or rule out the use of a hand signal, the officer may nonetheless have reasonable suspicion of a failure to signal sufficient to stop the car to further investigate the suspected traffic violation." |
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| Washington v. Batson |
| Court: Washington Supreme Court Docket: 97617-1 Opinion Date: December 24, 2020 Judge: Yu Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on whether the state legislature could impose a duty to register as a sex offender in Washington where an individual would be required to register in the state of conviction. In 1984, respondent Benjamin Batson pleaded guilty in an Arizona court to two counts of sexual conduct with a minor. As a result of his conviction, Arizona law required Batson to register as a sex offender for life. At some point prior to April 6, 2009, Batson moved to Washington. At that time, the State required individuals to register as sex offenders only if their out-ofstate offense would have been classified as a sex offense in Washington. Since Batson’s Arizona conviction arose from sexual contact with a 16-year-old, his offense would not have been a crime in Washington. But in June 2010, the state legislature amended the sex registry statute to require registration for “[a]ny federal or out-of-state conviction for: [a]n offense for which the person would be required to register as a sex offender while residing in the state of conviction.” The Court of Appeals held that RCW 9A.44.128(10)(h) was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed: "the legislature permissibly identified circumstances under which Washington sex offender registration requirements become operative as to individuals with out-of-state convictions." |
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| State v. Savage |
| Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court Docket: 2019AP000090-CR Opinion Date: December 23, 2020 Judge: Annette Kingsland Ziegler Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's judgment and order denying Defendant's postconviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea, holding that counsel was not ineffective and Defendant was not entitled to withdraw his plea post-sentencing. Defendant pleaded guilty to violation of sex offender registry and was sentenced. Almost one year later, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance and that, as a result, his plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. After a hearing, the circuit court denied Defendant's postconviction motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance in failing to inform Defendant about State v. Dinkins, 810 N.W.2d 787 (Wis. 2012), because Dinkins did not provide Defendant with a defense. |
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| State v. Stephenson |
| Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court Docket: 2018AP002104 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Ann Walsh Bradley Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's denial of Defendant's Wis. Stat. Chapter 980 petition for discharge from his commitment as a sexually violent person, holding that the court of appeals did not err. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the State is not required to present expert testimony to prove the required dangerousness element in Wis. Stat. 980.01(7); (2) the holding in In re Commitment of Curiel, 597 N.W.2d 697 (Wis. 1999), that the appropriate standard of review to use in Chapter 980 cases is the sufficiency of the evidence test set forth is reaffirmed; and (3) the evidence in the record satisfied the sufficiency of the evidence standard. |
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| Armajo v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 153 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Boomgaarden Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of second degree sexual abuse of a minor, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, and the prosecutor made two improper statements in rebuttal argument, but the statements did not prejudice Defendant when considered together. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the State produced sufficient evidence of "touching under the statutory definition of sexual contact and evidence that Defendant touched the victim with the "intent of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse"; and (2) the prosecutor made two improper statements during rebuttal argument, but, cumulatively, the improper statements did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial. |
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| Gutierrez v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 150 Opinion Date: December 16, 2020 Judge: Kate M. Fox Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance and delivery of a controlled substance, holding that the State's introduced of unnoticed Wyo. R. Evid. 404(b) evidence and irrelevant evidence about Defendant's citizenship did not deny him his right to a fair trial. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) even if the challenged evidence constituted Rule 404(b) evidence requiring the State to provide pretrial notice, the district court's admission of the evidence was not prejudicial; and (2) the admission of the irrelevant evidence concerning Defendant's citizenship did not demonstrate material prejudice, and Defendant did not identify anything to suggest that the verdict would have been different had the prosecutor not asked about Defendant's citizenship. |
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| Hightower v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 152 Opinion Date: December 16, 2020 Judge: Boomgaarden Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of aggravated homicide by a vehicle under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 6-2-106(b)(ii), holding that the district court erred in denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to show that she acted recklessly. During a trial, the State argued that Defendant acted in a reckless manner by consciously disregarding fatigue and that Defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of the death of another person. Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence was too uncertain to show that she acted recklessly. The district court denied the motion, and the jury found Defendant guilty. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State's evidence, taken as true, was insufficient for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant acted recklessly. |
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| Pryce v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 151 Opinion Date: December 16, 2020 Judge: Boomgaarden Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of two controlled substance charges, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence found during a search of the rental van he was driving. Defendant was charged with four drug-related felonies. Defendant moved to suppress evidence found in the rental van that he was driving, arguing that law enforcement violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure when they detained him for the purpose of having a dog unit arrive of scene. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it denied Defendant's motion to suppress because law enforcement did not violate Defendant's constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment. |
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