| United States v. Cotto-Flores |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-2013 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit reversed Defendant's conviction for transporting a minor in interstate or foreign commerce or in any commonwealth, territory or possession of the United States with the intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, holding that the trial judge violated Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to in-person confrontation when he allowed the victim to testify by two-way close-circuit television and without making specific on the record findings. Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) 2423(a)'s ban on transporting a minor to commit a sex crime applies to transportation without Puerto Rico, which is a "commonwealth" of the United States under the statute; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction; (3) the judge properly instructed the jury on the elements of the Puerto Rico crimes the government alleged Defendant had intended to commit at her destination; but (4) the judge violated Defendant's right to confront the victim in person absent a compelling need for remote testimony, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. |
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| United States v. Lara |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 17-1957 Opinion Date: August 12, 2020 Judge: David J. Barron Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit vacated in part the convictions and sentences that Victor Lara and Kourtney Williams (together, Defendants) each received in connection with a robbery in Maine, holding that Defendants' convictions for violating 18 U.S.C. 924(c), which makes it a crime to use a firearm "during and in relation to" a "crime of violence" could not stand. After a jury trial, Defendants were found guilty of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and of violating 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Defendants both received a total prison sentence of 184 months. The First Circuit held (1) conspiracy to commit Hobbs act robbery does not qualify as a "crime of violence" under section 924(c), and therefore, Defendants' convictions for violating section 924(c) must be reversed; (2) Defendants were not entitled to relief on their claims of instructional error; and (3) Defendants' remaining allegations of error were unavailing. |
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| United States v. Luthra |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-1980 Opinion Date: August 6, 2020 Judge: Boudin Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions of aiding and abetting the wrongful disclosure of individually identifiable health information and obstructing a criminal investigation of a health care offense, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) inferring from certain evidence that Defendant knew that protected information was being accessed was neither unreasonable, insupportable, nor overly speculative, and therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction of aiding and abetting the wrongful disclosure of individually identifiable health information; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction for obstructing a criminal investigation of a health care offense. |
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| Lasher v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 20-221 Opinion Date: August 11, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Under 28 U.S.C. 2253, in a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held. The Second Circuit determined, sua sponte, that it lacks jurisdiction to hear petitioner's appeal because a district court's order denying a certificate of appealability is not an appealable final order. In this case, petitioner moves for a certificate of appealability and for leave to file an oversized motion for a certificate of appealability, challenging the district court's order denying a certificate of appealability. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and denied petitioner's motion as moot. |
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| United States v. Bullock |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 18-1013 Opinion Date: August 11, 2020 Judge: Hardiman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Following a 2016 altercation with a correctional officer at the U.S. Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Bullock pleaded guilty to knowingly and intentionally forcibly assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating, and interfering with a correctional officer, 18 U.S.C. 111(a) and (b). Bullock had two prior convictions for robbery in North Carolina. that corresponded to generic robbery under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2). The district court found that Bullock qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, with a Guidelines range of 151-188 months’ imprisonment, but gave Bullock a substantial downward variance, imposing a sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment. Bullock argued his conviction under 18 U.S.C. 111 was not categorically a crime of violence for purposes of the sentencing enhancement. The Third Circuit affirmed. Applying the modified categorical approach, the court looked to the record of conviction and determined that a defendant who violates section 111(b) has used physical force against the person of another, either through employing a deadly or dangerous weapon or by inflicting bodily injury. |
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| United States v. Savage |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 14-9003 Opinion Date: August 13, 2020 Judge: Smith Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Savage's North Philadelphia regional drug trafficking operation, KSO, distributed large quantities of controlled substances and fiercely protected its network and territory, using guns and violence. Early in KSO’s operation, Savage took care of threats against KSO himself. As his power grew, his enforcers did his bidding. While detained on criminal charges, Savage continued to manage KSO’s affairs. He retaliated against those who cooperated with government agents and arranged for the murder of the prosecution’s main witness in a murder case and, in a later case, orchestrated the firebombing of the home of another cooperating witness, ensuring no one would survive. Savage was convicted of conspiracy to participate in a racketeering (RICO) enterprise, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d); 12 counts of violent crime in aid of racketeering (VICAR) murder, section 1959(a)(1); VICAR conspiracy to commit murder, section 1959(a)(5); retaliating against a witness, section 1513; and using fire to commit a felony, section 844(h)(1). The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions and the imposition of the death penalty, rejecting several challenges to the selection of the jury. If any gaps exist in the record, they do not entitle Savage to relief. Savage was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the court waited until days before voir dire began to substitute new lead counsel. The district court did not plainly err in instructing the jury on the doctrine of transferred intent. The court rejected six challenges relating to the penalty phase proceedings. |
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| United States v. Cobb |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-4172 Opinion Date: August 11, 2020 Judge: William B. Traxler, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress child pornography images that were seized from his computer pursuant to a search warrant issued by a state magistrate judge. The court held that, even if the Fourth Amendment might require more specificity as to the place to be searched or the items to be seized in some computer searches, defendant failed to convince the court that the Fourth Amendment demanded that the descriptions of the place to be searched and the things to be seized needed to be more specific in this case. The court also affirmed the district court's ruling that the constitutionality of the warrant was unaffected by the superfluous language included at the end of the warrant; affirmed the district court's application of the plain view doctrine to the evidence of child pornography; and rejected defendant's belated request that the court not follow its own prior holding in United States v. Williams, and hold instead that ordinary principles of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, including the plain view doctrine, should not apply to computer searches. |
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| United States v. Khweis |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 17-4696 Opinion Date: August 11, 2020 Judge: Allison J. Rushing Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| After defendant was captured and transported to a detention center in Iraq, the FBI Assistant Legal Attaché for Iraq interviewed defendant to gather intelligence about the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) without providing him Miranda warnings. Ten days later, a different team of FBI agents interviewed defendant for purposes of a potential United States criminal prosecution. Defendant was subsequently convicted of conspiring to provide material support or resources to ISIL; providing material support or resources to ISIL; and possessing, using, and carrying firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence. On appeal, defendant challenged the admission of his statements to the second team of FBI agents, contending that the midstream Miranda warnings he received were ineffective. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress his Mirandized statements and held that, even assuming the FBI deliberately used a two-step interview strategy, the agents undertook sufficient curative measures to ensure that a reasonable person in defendant's position would understand the import and effect of the Miranda warnings and waiver. However, the court vacated defendant's firearm conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) in light of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), because defendant's conspiracy offense is not a predicate crime of violence. The court remanded for resentencing. |
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| Atkins v. Hooper |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-30018 Opinion Date: August 7, 2020 Judge: Leslie Southwick Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) based on a Confrontation Clause violation. Petitioner was convicted by a jury of armed robbery and aggravated battery. The court first held that the state intentionally waived its defense of procedural default. The court also held that the state district court's decision that no Confrontation Clause violation occurred through the handling of a detective's testimony constitutes an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, and the state waived harmlessness. In this case, the detective testified that a nontestifying witness implicated petitioner and the prosecution likewise referenced that testimony in its closing argument. Therefore, such testimony violates the Confrontation Clause. The court remanded for the district court to grant habeas relief. |
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| In Re: Larry Sharp |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 20-30127 Opinion Date: August 12, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| After the Supreme Court ruled in Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1394, 1397 (2020), that the Sixth Amendment, as incorporated against the states in the Fourteenth Amendment, requires a unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of a serious offense, movant moved for the Fifth Circuit's authorization to file a second or successive federal habeas petition. The court denied the motion for authorization to file a successive habeas corpus petition and held that, even if the court assumed that movant's current claim is different from the one he raised twelve years ago, it remains barred by 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2). The court explained that, even if it further assumed that Ramos constitutes a "new rule of constitutional law," the Supreme Court plainly has not made it retroactive to cases on collateral review. |
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| United States v. Garner |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-10884 Opinion Date: August 13, 2020 Judge: W. Eugene Davis Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| 18 U.S.C. 3583(g), which requires revocation of supervised release and a term of imprisonment for certain drug and gun violations, is not unconstitutional under United States v. Haymond, 130 S. Ct. 2369 (2019). In Haymond, the Supreme Court held that a different mandatory revocation provision, section 3583(k), violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The Fifth Circuit held that section 3583(g) lacks the three features which led the Supreme Court to hold section 3583(k) unconstitutional: first, while subsection (g) singles out certain conduct, only some of it is criminal; second, although subsection (g) takes away the judge's discretion to decide whether a violation should result in imprisonment, it does not dictate the length of the sentence; and third, subsection (g) does not limit the judge's discretion in the same "particular manner" as subsection (k). Therefore, the district court did not err in its revocation decision. |
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| United States v. Jones |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 17-30829 Opinion Date: August 7, 2020 Judge: Stephen Andrew Higginson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for conspiracy to distribute a kilogram or more of heroin. The court held that the statements in the factual basis form an adequate evidentiary foundation for defendant's guilty plea and thus defendant failed to show any error; the district court did not reversibly err by explaining the government's burden of proof for proving a conspiracy and attributing a quantity of drugs to defendant; and the court declined to evaluate defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. The court dismissed the ineffective assistance of counsel claims without prejudice. |
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| United States v. Penado-Aparicio |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-50401 Opinion Date: August 12, 2020 Judge: Carl E. Stewart Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant appealed his sentence for illegal reentry, contending that the district court vindictively resentenced him to a harsher sentence. In this case, defendant's initial sentence was 72 months that was to run concurrently with a separate 24 month term. Defendant then appealed the 72 month sentence for violating the Ex Post Facto Clause, the case was remanded for resentencing, and the district court sentenced defendant to 60 months but ordered that the sentence now run consecutively to the 24 month sentence. The Fifth Circuit held that the record evidence supports a presumption of vindictiveness that has not been rebutted as required by Fifth Circuit case law. Furthermore, the district court plainly erred in ordering the instant sentence to run consecutive to defendant's revocation sentence. Accordingly, the court exercised its discretion and modified the judgment so that defendant's imprisonment terms run concurrently. |
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| Beck v. Hamblen County |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-5428 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Murphy Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Beck claims he was assaulted by other inmates while detained at the Hamblen County, Tennessee jail. He sued Sheriff Jarnagin under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Jarnagin had no direct involvement in Beck’s detention; section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors for their subordinates’ actions. Beck argued that the overcrowded jail has repeatedly failed minimum standards; that Jarnagin has long known of its failures; and that Jarnagin has been deliberately indifferent to inmate safety. The Tennessee Corrections Institute has identified the jail’s failures in inspection reports that are sent to Jarnagin each year. The court denied Jarnagin qualified immunity on Beck’s Fourteenth Amendment claim, reasoning that pretrial detainees have a clearly established right to be free from a government official’s deliberate indifference to inmate assaults. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Existing precedent would not have clearly signaled to Jarnagin that his responses to the overcrowding problem were so unreasonable as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Beck has no evidence suggesting that Jarnagin had any personal knowledge of Beck’s specific situation Jarnagin did make efforts “to abate” th3 general risk of inmate-on-inmate violence but did not have the power to allocate more taxpayer dollars to the safety problems. The court noted that Beck’s suit against Hamblen County remains viable. |
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| Tlapanco v. Elges |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-1392 Opinion Date: August 12, 2020 Judge: Gibbons Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| A.F., age 14, reported to police that she was being blackmailed by a user on the messaging application Kik. The perpetrator had obtained nude photographs from her phone and was threatening to release the images if she did not send additional nude photographs. Oakland County, Michigan, deputies investigated her claims but disregarded the fact that the blackmailer used the Kik username “anonymousfl” rather than “anonymous”—a separate Kik username associated with Tlapanco, a New York resident. As a result, NYPD officers working with Oakland County Deputy Elges, searched Tlapanco’s apartment, seized his electronic devices, arrested him, and detained him in New York for two weeks before extraditing him to Michigan. He was detained at the Oakland County jail for another three weeks before the charges were dismissed. Tlapanco sued the deputies and Oakland County under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Elges unlawfully searched his apartment, caused his false arrest, and prosecuted him; Deputy McCabe unlawfully seized, searched, and copied his electronic devices before returning them; and Oakland County is liable for failure to train or because of McCabe’s decisions as a purported county policymaker. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to McCabe and Oakland County but reversed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Elges on Tlapanco’s Fourth Amendment unlawful search and seizure, unlawful arrest, and malicious prosecution claims. |
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| United States v. Bradley |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-5985 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Jeffrey S. Sutton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2009-2015, Bradley ran a Tennessee drug trafficking conspiracy that distributed opioid pills. He pleaded guilty to drug trafficking and money laundering charges, the court sentenced him to 17 years in prison and ordered him to forfeit a million dollars, two cash payments, and five properties. On remand in light of the Supreme Court’s 2017 decision, Honeycutt v. United States, that forfeiture must be based on the defendant’s own receipts, not the conspiracy’s, the court found additional facts and ordered Bradley to forfeit a million dollars, the two cash payments, and four (instead of five) properties. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. When a defendant is convicted of certain crimes, district courts must order forfeiture of “any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the [defendant] obtained as the result of” the crimes, and “any of the [defendant’s] property used, or intended to be used . . . to commit, or to facilitate the commission of,” the crime, 21 U.S.C. 853(a)(1)–(2). If the defendant no longer has the property, the court “shall order the forfeiture of any other property of the defendant” as a substitute. The court rejected an argument that section 853 does not authorize money judgments. It is irrelevant whether the money was kept as profits or went toward the costs of running the conspiracy. Bradley offers no authority for his argument that the statute prohibits “financially ruinous” forfeitures. |
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| United States v. Kettles |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-5698 Opinion Date: August 12, 2020 Judge: Larsen Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Kettles first prostituted an 18-year-old, planning to build a prostitution “empire,” then prostituted a 13-year-old child to at least six different men. Kettles was convicted of one count of sex trafficking a child, 18 U.S.C. 2 andv1591(a)(1), (b)(1), and (c), and one count of conspiracy to do the same, section 1594(c). The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction and 180-month sentence. In light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, the district court’s error in prohibiting Kettles from cross-examining the minor about inconsistent statements she had allegedly made concerning three prior sexual assaults (citing Federal Rule of Evidence 412) was harmless. The jury instructions contained all the elements required for the jury to find that section 1591(b)(1)’s enhanced penalties apply; that the indictment contained superfluous elements is of no consequence. Finally, the court rejected a vagueness challenge to the statute. |
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| Wofford v. Woods |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 18-2367 Opinion Date: August 13, 2020 Judge: Danny Julian Boggs Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Wofford was found guilty of a 1993 murder in a Michigan court following the removal and replacement of a juror. While that juror was holding out against conviction at the time, the judge removed her for misconduct: she had violated his instructions not to discuss the case with anyone other than her fellow jurors by hiring a lawyer to address the court about tensions in the jury room. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Wofford’s conviction under a state precedent on juror removal. A federal district court granted Wofford’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, finding that decision not entitled to deference under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254, because the Michigan court had overlooked Wofford’s Sixth Amendment claims and the removal of the juror violated Wofford’s Sixth Amendment rights. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The 2020 Supreme Court decision, “Ramos,” held that the right not to have a juror removed due to the juror’s opinions on the merits of the case is contained in the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a “trial by an impartial jury.” Michigan did not overlook Wofford’s Sixth Amendment claims. While the juror was a holdout, she was not removed for this reason, but because of her misconduct. The Michigan court was free to require a showing of an actual constitutional violation and clearly, if implicitly, did so. |
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| Fieldman v. Brannon |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1795 Opinion Date: August 12, 2020 Judge: KANNE Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In July 2010, Fieldman climbed into a truck in a Walmart parking lot and told a hitman that he wanted his ex-wife and her boyfriend killed. The hitman was actually an undercover police officer who videotaped their conversation. Fieldman was convicted in Illinois state court for solicitation of murder for hire. Fieldman contested his intent, a necessary element of the offense, and sought to testify about his interactions with the informant during the weeks before his conversation with the hitman. Fieldman believed this testimony would provide critical contextual information about his state of mind and demonstrate that his meeting with the hitman was a charade. The trial court did not allow the jury to hear this testimony because the court concluded it was irrelevant. Fieldman unsuccessfully appealed his convictions. In his federal habeas petition, Fieldman successfully argued that the court’s exclusion of his testimony deprived him of his federal constitutional right to present a complete defense. The Seventh Circuit held that exclusion of the testimony was contrary to clearly established federal law confirming a defendant’s right to testify, on his own behalf, about circumstances bearing directly on his guilt or innocence or the jury’s ascertainment of guilt. The exclusion of material portions of his testimony had a detrimental effect on his interests because it undercut his entire defense and effectively prevented him from challenging the state’s strongest evidence. |
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| Henry v. Hulett |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 16-4234 Opinion Date: August 11, 2020 Judge: St. Eve Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| A certified class claimed that during 2011 female inmates at an Illinois prison were strip-searched as part of a training exercise for cadet guards; the inmates were required to stand naked, nearly shoulder to shoulder, in a room where they could be seen by others not conducting the searches, including male officers. Menstruating inmates had to remove their sanitary protection in front of others, were not given replacements, and many got blood on their bodies, clothing, and the floor. The naked inmates had to stand barefoot on a floor dirty with menstrual blood and raise their breasts, lift their hair, turn around, bend over, spread their buttocks and vaginas, and cough. The district court awarded summary judgment to defendants on the 42 U.S.C. 1983 Fourth Amendment theory; a jury returned a defense verdict on the Eighth Amendment claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed but, on rehearing, reversed, holding that the Fourth Amendment protects a right to bodily privacy for convicted prisoners, albeit in a significantly limited way, including during visual inspections. The court remanded for the district court to assess whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated that an issue of fact exists as to the reasonableness of the strip and body cavity searches. |
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| United States v. Gamble |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-2514 Opinion Date: August 11, 2020 Judge: HAMILTON Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Gamble robbed a Chicago branch of Chase Bank, where she had worked until three months earlier. Two Chase employees were working at the time of the robbery, Gamble entered the bank wearing a disguise and waited for customers to leave, then pulled out a gun and ordered the employees to open the vault, pressing the gun against the back of one employee's head, The employee later testified that the gun felt cold and made a clicking noise. Gamble took over $126,000 from the vault and left the bank. Both employees had recognized her. FBI agents arrested Gamble hours later when she arrived for work at another Chase branch. Gamble waived her Miranda rights and admitted that she had robbed the bank. She said that the gun was a “play gun” that she had bought at a Walmart store. A later investigation determined that Walmart did not sell fake guns in Illinois. Gamble also said that she disposed of the gun on Irving Park Road and stashed the money in a trash can. FBI agents canvassed Irving Park Road and looked for the money, but found nothing. Convicted of armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113, Gamble was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Ample evidence supported a finding that Gamble used a real firearm. Gamble’s Fifth Amendment rights were not violated. The district judge was entitled to consider her false statements in deciding on her sentence. |
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| United States v. Medina |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1909 Opinion Date: August 13, 2020 Judge: William Joseph Bauer Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The U.S. Postal Inspection Service identified suspicious packages sent from Puerto Rico to Duenas. Milwaukee officers intercepted and followed a package and arrested Duenas once he accepted the delivery. Duenas mentioned the shooting incident and stated that Medina had repeatedly shipped him cocaine from Puerto Rico. The powdery substance in the intercepted package contained cocaine; 40 small bags amounted to more than one kilogram. Three fingerprints inside the package matched Medina’s fingerprints. Medina was indicted for conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine. The defense suggested that a fourth mail receipt—labeled as being sent from Milwaukee on August 19, 2014, at 3:25 pm—could not have been in Medina’s car. The judge said the receipt raised a “mystery” but dismissed the idea that it created a reasonable doubt as to the Puerto Rico officers’ testimony or the receipts bearing Duenas’ name. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Medina’s conviction. The judge recognized the factual discrepancies that Medina identified and only relied on the credible portions of the testimony. Medina’s arguments do not render the testimony physically impossible or otherwise unbelievable. Given the testimony and the corroborating physical evidence, a rational trier of fact could have easily found Medina guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. |
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| United States v. Orr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1938 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Brennan Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics |
| A confidential source, “Bonz” told Champaign Police that he knew a crack cocaine dealer named Moe. Over a few months, the department conducted five controlled buys from Moe, consistent with information from Bonz. After reviewing the video of the transactions, officers identified Moe as Orr, who was on parole after being convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Bonz identified a picture of Orr. Officers tied the involved vehicle and apartment to Orr. Pursuant to a warrant, officers searched Orr’s apartment. They found a semi-automatic pistol with ammunition, approximately 22 grams of crack cocaine, approximately 15 grams of powdered cocaine, and drug paraphernalia. Orr voluntarily admitted that the gun and cocaine were his. Indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), Orr unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence, asserting Bonz was an unreliable source. Orr testified that he had no reason to possess a firearm. The prosecutor presented evidence of Orr’s drug involvement. The jury found Orr guilty. Before sentencing, the Judicial Council of the Seventh Circuit determined that Judge Bruce had breached the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges by engaging in improper ex parte communications in other cases with members of the U.S. Attorney’s Office. Although the Council found no evidence that those communications affected the outcome of any case, it suspended Bruce from all criminal matters involving the U.S. Attorney’s Office for one year. Orr’s case was transferred to another judge. The Seventh Circuit vacated Orr’s conviction. Judge Bruce’s conduct “cast a pall over certain decisions" that "required the exercise of substantial discretion.” This was not harmless error. |
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| Sittner v. Bowersox |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1742 Opinion Date: August 11, 2020 Judge: Melloy Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254 where petitioner raised two grounds for relief under the Sixth Amendment. Petitioner was convicted of first-degree statutory rape, first-degree sodomy, and two counts of incest based on his sexual abuse of his stepdaughter starting when she was nine years old. The court held that the Missouri Court of Appeals' determination that the trial court's decision to exclude evidence regarding possible other sources for the victim's sexual knowledge was not contrary to or an unreasonable interpretation of federal law as clearly established by the Supreme Court. The court also held that trial counsel's failure to object to the expert witness's testimony did not deny petitioner effective assistance of counsel because the evidence was admissible and an objection would have been meritless. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the record contained all the facts necessary to resolve petitioner's claims, and that no further evidentiary development was required. |
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| United States v. Bartunek |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1584 Opinion Date: August 12, 2020 Judge: Steven M. Colloton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for distribution of child pornography and possession of a visual depiction involving a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. The court held that photographs of four life-sized dolls found in defendant's bedroom were properly admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) where the dolls were relevant to overcome the defense by showing defendant's motive for acquiring and distributing child pornography. The court also held that admission of testimony from a witness about viewing child pornography with defendant was admissible under Rule 414, because twenty-year-old evidence of child molestation can be probative and admissible where, as here, it is similar to the charged offense. In light of the extensive evidence of child pornography seized from defendant's residence, other evidence about his sexual interest in minors and history of viewing child pornography, and the minimal likely impact of the traffic cone with the word "chimo" on it (short for child molester) when viewed in context of the entire trial, the court held that there was no abuse of discretion in denying a mistrial. |
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| United States v. Caudle |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-3219 Opinion Date: August 7, 2020 Judge: James B. Loken Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court held that the undisputed facts taken together establish a nexus between defendant and his wife sufficient to support the district court's finding of constructive possession. In this case, the couple's joint occupancy of the home and joint possession of the three firearms support an inference that defendant had knowledge of, and access to the pistol found in his wife's vehicle. The court also held that there was no plain Rehaif error that warrants giving defendant another opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea that he did not seek to withdraw at sentencing. The court explained that defendant has not shown a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty had he known of Rehaif. |
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| United States v. Flynn |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1263 Opinion Date: August 13, 2020 Judge: Kobes Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| After defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States and filing a false tax return, he unsuccessfully tried to withdraw his plea. The Eighth Circuit affirmed and held that defendant failed to show fair and just reasons why he should have been allowed to withdraw his plea where the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded, based on the totality of the circumstances, that defendant's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary; his plea did not lack a factual basis supporting the conviction; and the Government did not breach the plea agreement by failing to recommend a sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The court also held that the Klein conspiracy conviction under 18 U.S.C. 371 was not void for vagueness; the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion to continue his sentencing or to bifurcate the sentencing and restitution proceedings; there was no error in the district court's order of restitution; and the court rejected defendant's argument that the district court erred by imposing a four-level enhancement under USSG 3B1.1. |
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| United States v. Luna |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Dockets: 18-1814, 18-3302, 18-3304 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Stras Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In these consolidated appeals, Defendants Luna, Forthun, and Hussein were convicted of charges related to their membership in a recruitment-and-kickback scheme involving car-accident victims, a chiropractic clinic, and automobile insurers. The Eighth Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Forthun committed mail and wire fraud, that both Luna and Hussein were his accomplices, and that all three entered into a conspiracy to defraud insurers. The court also held that the district court failed to consider the possibility of offsets to Forthun's sentence and to the size of the restitution awards. Therefore, the court vacated Forthun's sentence and remanded for resentencing. However, the court held that the forfeiture order stands because the reimbursement for all 500 patients were "gross proceeds" of the fraud itself. |
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| United States v. Ross |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Dockets: 18-2800, 18-2877 Opinion Date: August 11, 2020 Judge: Steven M. Colloton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendants Ross and King's convictions and sentences for multiple federal charges arising from the carjacking, kidnapping, and murder of Jaime Patton. Jaime was abducted in his Jeep Patriot while leaving the hospital to buy his pregnant wife, who was about to give birth to their second child, a muffin and milk from a convenience store. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support defendants' conviction for using a firearm in furtherance of kidnapping and carjacking that resulted in felony murder; a violation of 18 U.S.C. 2119 constitutes a "crime of violence" under section 924(c), and defendants were properly convicted under section 924(j) of causing death through use of a firearm in the course of a carjacking; the evidence was sufficient to support Ross's convictions for kidnapping, for carjacking resulting in death, for using a firearm in furtherance of a carjacking resulting in felony murder, and for being a felon in possession of a firearm; the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a text message between the defendants; the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give defendants' requested jury instructions; defendants' combined mandatory minimum sentences on counts two, three, and five did not violate the Eighth Amendment; and King's sentence is not substantively unreasonable. |
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| United States v. Trimble |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2077 Opinion Date: August 11, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| After defendant pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography and completed his initial prison sentence, defendant violated the terms of his supervised release. The district court resentenced defendant to one year in prison followed by five years of supervised release. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to modify the conditions of supervised release. The Eighth Circuit first held that the district court had authority to rule on defendant's request for the district court to exercise its statutory authority to modify the terms of his supervised release, and there is no barrier to the court's review of the district court's judgment on appeal. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to modify or eliminate the condition restricting his access to the internet, computers, and media storage devices. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining the conditions related to barring contact with minors. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to modify the condition prohibiting defendant from shopping or working at a business that derives a majority of its revenue from the sale of alcohol. |
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| United States v. Williams |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2182 Opinion Date: August 7, 2020 Judge: James B. Loken Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. The court rejected defendant's claim that the district court abused its discretion by not addressing defendant's request that the sentence be made concurrent with an anticipated state sentence; the district court did not abuse its discretion or plainly err by deciding not to explain why it did not vary downward when defendant did not request further explanation; the district court did not clearly err in finding that this was jointly undertaken criminal activity and therefore the total quantity of unsold drugs found in the car should be attributed to each participant; and any error in determining drug quantity for sentencing purposes was harmless. |
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| Gomez Fernandez v. Barr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 19-70079 Opinion Date: August 13, 2020 Judge: Milan Dale Smith, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's request for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The panel held that the federal generic definition of murder is "the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought" under 18 U.S.C. 1111(a); because federal law defines the term "human being" to exclude an unborn fetus, California Penal Code section 187(a), which criminalizes the unlawful killing of an unborn fetus, is broader than the federal generic definition; section 187(a) is divisible because it creates distinct crimes for the unlawful killing of a human being and the unlawful killing of a fetus; and, under the modified categorical approach, petitioner's section 187(a) second degree murder conviction under section 187(a) for the unlawful killing of a human being is an aggravated felony under the INA. Accordingly, substantial evidence supported the denial of deferral and petitioner is removable as charged. |
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| Syed v. Barr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 17-71727 Opinion Date: August 12, 2020 Judge: Bumatay Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision and held that petitioner's conviction under California Penal Code 288.3(a), for attempting to communicate with a child with the intent to commit lewd or lascivious acts upon that child, was categorically a crime involving moral turpitude that made him removable. The panel explained that not all of section 288.3(a)'s enumerated offenses involve moral turpitude, and thus the statute is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. However, the panel held that the statute is divisible; petitioner pleaded guilty to section 288.3(a) with the specific intent of violating section 288; and thus he was properly deemed removable as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). The panel also distinguished Menendez v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 467 (9th Cir. 2018), from petitioner's circumstances in this case. |
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| United States v. Fuentes-Galvez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 18-10150 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: William K. Sessions, III Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit reversed defendant's conviction for illegal reentry into the United States. Defendant argued that the district court committed plain error by failing to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(2)'s requirements of establishing that the plea was voluntary. In light of the magistrate judge's egregious failure to comply with Rule 11(b)(2), which the panel has previously noted is part of a disturbing "pattern," the panel agreed. In this case, the magistrate judge did not engage in direct inquiries regarding force, threats, or promises, nor did he address competence to enter the plea. Furthermore, the government's bare bones justifications are not enough to establish voluntariness in light of defendant's significant mental challenges and the magistrate judge's complete lack of inquiry into whether the plea was coerced by any threats or promises. The panel explained that defendant showed that there was a reasonable probability that the error may have affected his decision to plead, and that the district court's plain error was sufficiently serious to impinge on the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. |
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| United States v. Oriho |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 19-10291 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Richard C. Tallman Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| After defendant was indicted on healthcare fraud and money laundering charges, he challenged a pre-trial repatriation order entered by the district court as a violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The order requires defendant to repatriate any proceeds of the fraudulent scheme that he may have transferred to any African bank during a three-year period, up to $7,287,000, despite the indictment alleging that he transferred only $760,000 to two specific banks in Uganda and Kenya. The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order, holding that the challenged order compels defendant to incriminate himself by personally identifying, and demonstrating his control over, untold amounts of money located in places the government may not presently know about. The panel also held that the district court failed to apply the proper "foregone conclusion" exception test, relieving the government of its obligation to prove its prior knowledge of the incriminating information that may be implicitly communicated by repatriation. The panel explained that the order allows the government to shirk its responsibility to discover its own evidence, and the government's narrow promise of limited use immunity is insufficient to counterbalance these harms. Accordingly, the panel remanded with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing. |
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| McKathan v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 17-13358 Opinion Date: August 12, 2020 Judge: Rosenbaum Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion for habeas relief and remanded for further proceedings. In this case, while petitioner was on supervised release, he faced a classic penalty situation when his probation officer asked him to answer questions that would reveal he had committed new crimes. Petitioner's attorneys never raised this argument during his criminal proceedings on the newly revealed crimes and, had they done so and filed a motion to suppress petitioner's statements, the government would have had to establish that it nonetheless would have obtained the incriminating evidence against petitioner through other, lawful means. The court explained that, if the government had been unable to do so, it is reasonably likely that petitioner would have prevailed on his suppression motion, and the outcome of his case would have been different. Therefore, petitioner would be entitled to habeas relief upon a showing that his counsel's performance was deficient in failing to raise this argument. Because the current record lacks information concerning whether the evidence derived from petitioner's statements otherwise would have been admissible, the court remanded for the government to present any evidence and arguments to show that the evidence from petitioner's phone would have otherwise been admissible, and the district court shall rule on any such arguments. Should the district court conclude that the evidence would have been otherwise admissible, it shall deny the section 2255 motion, since filing the Fifth Amendment suppression motion would not have been reasonably likely to change the outcome in McKathan II. However, should the district court determine that the evidence would not have been otherwise admissible, it shall address whether petitioner's counsel performed deficiently by failing to raise the Fifth Amendment issue in McKathan II. |
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| Osbourne v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 18-11004 Opinion Date: August 7, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus based on lack of jurisdiction as an unauthorized second or successive petition. In this case, the state trial court granted in part petitioner's motion to correct sentence, pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a), and issued an amended sentence nunc pro tunc, which removed a 10-year mandatory minimum term on one of his counts of conviction. The court held that the district court properly determined that petitioner's latest section 2254 petition was an unauthorized second or successive petition over which it lacked jurisdiction. The court explained that, because the amended sentence was entered nunc pro tunc under Florida law, it related back to the date of the original judgment and it was not a "new judgment" for purposes of section 2244(b). |
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| United States v. Carter |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 18-14806 Opinion Date: August 12, 2020 Judge: Grant Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Over ten years ago, defendant pleaded guilty in a state court to distributing cocaine and to distributing marijuana. At issue was whether defendant pleaded to committing those offenses at different times for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The Eleventh Circuit held that, under these circumstances, it is more likely than not that defendant committed his crimes in different places. In this case, the State charged him with two counts of drug distribution; only one count alleged that defendant's sentence should be enhanced because his crime was committed near both a school and public housing; and thus the same location-based enhancements would have applied to both offenses if they had been committed in the same place. The court also held that, under its precedent, this is enough to support a finding that defendant committed distinct offenses. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment on different grounds. |
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| United States v. Estrada |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 17-15405 Opinion Date: August 13, 2020 Judge: Jill Pryor Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Entertainment & Sports Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions for smuggling four Cuban baseball players into the United States and conspiring to commit crimes against the United States. Defendants, a baseball trainer and a baseball manager, partnered with business professionals, human traffickers, and members of a Mexican criminal organization to smuggle baseball players out of Cuba. The players went to the United States to enter into "free agent" contracts with Major League Baseball (MLB) teams. The players used false residency documents procured from defendants and other co-conspirators to obtain unblocking licenses permitting them to contract with MLB teams. Sometimes the players also relied on the false documents to obtain visas, which allowed them to come to the United States to play baseball. The court held that the Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA) and the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot policy did not provide prior official authorization for the Cuban players to come to, enter, or reside in the United States; the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions on the substantive smuggling counts and the conspiracy count; and the district court committed no abuse of discretion in the challenged evidentiary rulings. |
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| United States v. Green |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 17-10346 Opinion Date: August 11, 2020 Judge: Charles R. Wilson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendants were convicted of charges related to their operation of a drug-trafficking organization in Bradenton, Florida. The Eleventh Circuit held that RICO conspiracy does not qualify as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Therefore, the court vacated defendants' section 924(c) convictions and sentences. The court also held that Defendant Corey's 120-year sentence was procedurally unreasonable where the district court inadequately explained the sentence by failing to clarify the applicable guideline range. Furthermore, the district court relied on a clearly erroneous fact -- that Corey participated in a murder -- in sentencing defendant. Accordingly, the court vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court affirmed as to the remaining suppression issues, peremptory challenge, evidentiary claims of error, claims of cumulative error, claims of insufficient evidence, and inconsistent verdicts claims. |
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| United States v. Hatum |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 18-11951 Opinion Date: August 11, 2020 Judge: Martin Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| If a defendant is convicted of a money laundering scheme that caused no financial harm to an innocently involved bank, an order of forfeiture is still mandatory. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the government's forfeiture motion. The court held that the definition of property in 18 U.S.C. 982(a)(1) is distinct from that in the other subsections of section 982(a), as well as 21 U.S.C. 853(a). The court's ruling allows forfeiture in the amount of property that defendant transferred as a part of his laundering scheme. The court explained that this outcome is what Congress intended when it used the broad term "any property, real or personal, involved in such offense" and instituted a scheme of substitute forfeiture. Therefore, the district court was under an obligation to order forfeiture against defendant. |
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| United States v. Henry |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 18-15251 Opinion Date: August 7, 2020 Judge: William Holcombe Pryor, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for the district court to adjust his sentence pursuant to USSG 5G1.3(b)(1). The court held that court precedent establishes that an adjustment under section 5G1.3(b)(1) is mandatory when its requirements are satisfied, and the court's precedent is consistent with United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). In this case, the court held that the district court erred by refusing to adjust defendant's federal sentence for time served on a related state sentence. The court explained that the maximum adjusted sentence the district court could have imposed consistent with section 5G1.3(b)(1) was 96 months of imprisonment—12 months less than the 108-month sentence defendant received. Consequently, the district court's error was not harmless. On remand, the court instructed the district court to determine whether the requirements of section 5G1.3(b)(1) are satisfied and, if so, adjust defendant's sentence accordingly. |
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| State v. Carter |
| Court: Arizona Supreme Court Docket: CR-18-0508-PR Opinion Date: August 13, 2020 Judge: Robert M. Brutinel Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part Defendant's convictions and sentences for two counts of theft, two counts of vehicle theft, and one count of robbery, holding that theft is a lesser-included offense of both vehicle theft and robbery but that vehicle theft is not a lesser-included offense of robbery. At issue was whether Defendant's convictions and sentences constituted multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court held (1) theft is a lesser-included offense of vehicle theft, and therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited Defendant's convictions for both theft and vehicle theft; (2) theft is a lesser-included offense of robbery; (3) vehicle theft is not a lesser-included offense of robbery, and vehicle theft and robbery may be punished separately; and (4) an offense with a greater penalty can be a lesser-included offense of one with a lesser penalty. |
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| State v. Robertson |
| Court: Arizona Supreme Court Docket: CR-19-0175-PR Opinion Date: August 12, 2020 Judge: Lopez Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's probation revocation and sentence on the basis that Defendant was precluded from challenging her sentence on appeal because she had invited any potential error, holding that an appellate court may not apply the invited error doctrine to preclude review of an illegal, stipulated sentence in a plea agreement. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter and reckless child abuse. Consistent with the agreement, the trial court sentenced Defendant to ten years' imprisonment for the manslaughter and a consecutive term of lifetime probation for child abuse. After Defendant violated her probation, Defendant argued that her convictions for manslaughter and child abuse comprised a single criminal act against a single victim, and therefore, the stipulated consecutive sentences in her plea agreement resulted in an illegal double punishment. The trial court disagreed and revoked Defendant's probation. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that Defendant was precluded from challenging her sentence on appeal because she had invited any potential error by stipulating to consecutive sentences in her plea agreement. The Supreme Court vacated the court's opinion, holding that the court of appeals erred in applying the invited error doctrine to preclude Defendant from challenging the error on appeal. |
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| Facebook, Inc. v. Superior Court |
| Court: Supreme Court of California Docket: S245203 Opinion Date: August 13, 2020 Judge: Tani Cantil-Sakauye Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law |
| Here, the Supreme Court addressed the propriety of a criminal defense subpoena served on Facebook seeking restricted posts and private messages of one of its users, who was a victim and critical witness in the underlying attempted murder prosecution, holding that the trial court erred in denying Facebook's motion to quash the subpoena. Lance Touchstone, the defendant in the prosecution below, argued that the trial court properly denied Facebook's motion to quash. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the trial court erred by conducting an incomplete assessment of the relevant factors and interests when it found that Defendant established good cause to acquire the communications at issue from Facebook. After highlighting seven factors a trial court should explicitly consider and balance in ruling on a motion to quash a subpoena directed to a third party the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order denying the motion to quash and remanded the matter to the trial court to conduct further proceedings consistent with the guidelines set forth in this opinion. |
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| People v. Duong |
| Court: Supreme Court of California Docket: S114228 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Carol Corrigan Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of three counts of first degree murder and one count of second degree murder with a multiple murder special circumstance and various gun use enhancements, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a venue change; (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress items discovered during a warrantless search of his vehicle; (3) Defendant's decision not to testify was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; (4) the trial court did not improperly exclude a defense expert; (5) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's pretrial motion to exclude evidence of his gang membership; (6) there was no instructional error; (7) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct during penalty phase argument; and (8) Defendant's challenges to the victim impact testimony were unavailing. |
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| People v. Morales |
| Court: Supreme Court of California Docket: S136800 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Kruger Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of four counts of first degree murder and other crimes, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion during the guilt phase or penalty phase of trial. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the evidence was sufficient to show that Defendant committed the murders with premeditation and deliberation; (2) the trial court did not err in admitting testimony of the People's crime scene reconstruction expert; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting certain crime scene and autopsy photographs of the victims; and (4) during the penalty phase, the trial court did not err by admitting victim impact testimony or in instructing the jury. |
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| People v. Silveria |
| Court: Supreme Court of California Docket: S062417 Opinion Date: August 13, 2020 Judge: Groban Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the of the trial court convicting Defendants of first degree murder and other crimes and sentencing both defendants to death, holding that no prejudice resulted from any error of the trial court. Separate juries convicted Daniel Silveria and John Travis of first degree murder, second degree robbery, and second degree burglary. After retrials, a single penalty jury returned death verdicts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) during the guilt phase, the trial court did not err in denying Travis's motion to suppress or in instructing the jury on first degree murder; and (2) during the joint penalty retrial, there was no abuse of discretion in denying Defendants' severance motions, the trial court did not wrongfully excuse for cause prospective jurors, the trial court did not err in admitting portions of Silveria's first penalty phase testimony, any error in placing conditions on proffered testimony by Travis's trial counsel was harmless, and any other assumed or actual error was not prejudicial. |
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| People v. Suarez |
| Court: Supreme Court of California Docket: S105876 Opinion Date: August 13, 2020 Judge: Goodwin Liu Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for four counts of first degree murder and other crimes and sentence of death, holding that, considering any actual or assumed errors altogether, their cumulative effect did not warrant reversal of Defendant's convictions or sentence. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) assuming that the trial court erred by using an unsworn, uncertified interpreter during the preliminary hearing and to interpret a victim's outburst, there was no prejudice; (2) sufficient evidence supported the theory of felony murder for two murders, and even assuming there was no sufficient evidence, the first degree murder verdicts would still be upheld; (3) there was assumed or found error during trial regarding difficulties that made it difficult to hearing the court proceedings, the accuracy of interpreters, and other issues, but there was no prejudice; and (4) none of the assumed or actual errors, considered either individually or collectively, warranted reversal of Defendant's convictions or sentence. |
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| California v. Cardenas |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E070624(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: August 7, 2020 Judge: Menetrez Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| A brief encounter between two groups of strangers in a restaurant parking lot at closing time ended in one man shot and killed. Three others were injured. Pedro Cardenas was one of the shooters, and convicted by jury trial on one count of murder, two counts of attempted murder, and one count of assault with a firearm, and he pled guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court instructed the jury on the "kill zone" theory as to the attempted murder counts. On the felon in possession count, Cardenas argued that his rights under California v. Arbuckle, 22 Cal.3d 749 (1978) were violated because he was sentenced by a different judge from the one who took his guilty plea. Cardenas did not object on that basis at sentencing, but he cited California v. Bueno, 32 Cal.App.5th 342 (2019) for the proposition that he did not thereby forfeit the issue. A split Court of Appeal concluded that the evidence was insufficient to justify instructing on the kill zone theory under California v. Canizales, 7 Cal.5th 591 (2019), and the error was prejudicial. The Court therefore vacated the attempted murder convictions. The Court disagreed with Bueno and held that Cardenas forfeited the Arbuckle issue by failing to raise it at sentencing. The Court affirmed in all other respects. |
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| California v. Lippert |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E072688(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: August 11, 2020 Judge: Carol D. Codrington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant-appellant, David Lippert, filed a petition under Penal Code section 1170.95 to vacate his 2003 murder conviction. The parties stipulated that defendant made a prima facie showing that he “fall[s] within the parameters for resentencing” under the statute. Plaintiff-respondent, the San Bernardino County District Attorney’s Office (the State), however, moved to strike the petition on the ground that Senate Bill No. 1437 was unconstitutional because it: (1) impermissibly amended Proposition 7; (2) impermissibly amended Proposition 115; (3) violated separation of powers principles; and (4) violated Victims’ Bill of Rights of 2008 (Marsy’s Law). The trial court agreed Senate Bill No. 1437 unconstitutionally amended Propositions 7 and 115, and struck defendant’s petition without addressing the State's remaining arguments. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that the trial court erred in concluding Senate Bill No. 1437 was unconstitutional, and reversed. |
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| California v. Mirmon |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E072119(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Miller Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In April 2010, a trial court sentenced defendant-appellant Richard Mirmon to 12 years in prison for attempted first degree burglary in Los Angeles County. On June 27, 2011, an information charged defendant with conspiracy to bring a controlled substance into prison, bringing a controlled substance into prison, possession of heroin, and possession of methamphetamine in Riverside. The Riverside information also alleged defendant had a prison prior and two strike priors. As charged in the information, defendant faced: (1) 101 years to life in prison with two strikes; or (2) 14 years four months with one strike. Pursuant to a plea agreement, on September 6, 2011, defendant pled guilty to all four counts in exchange for a sentence of eight years four months. On December 2, 2011, the trial court dismissed one of defendant’s two strikes and imposed the agreed-upon sentence of eight years four months. The court made no reference to defendant's Los Angeles case, but stated the sentence was to be served concurrent with any other sentences defendant was serving. On June 11, 2018, defendant filed a petition under Proposition 47 to reduce counts 3 and 4 in the Riverside Case to misdemeanor convictions. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) filed a letter with the Riverside County Superior Court on June 22, 2018. In the letter, CDCR stated that Penal Code section 667 (c)(8), mandated consecutive, not concurrent, sentences for defendant in the Los Angeles and Riverside cases. On June 22, 2018, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges. On September 7, 2018, the trial court held a hearing. The court denied defendant’s petition to reduce counts 3 and 4 to misdemeanor convictions. The court then clarified its order on defendant’s sentence in the Riverside Case and ordered that the sentences in the two cases be served consecutively. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal found the Riverside trial judge had no discretion to sentence defendant to a concurrent term for his in-prison possession convictions in the original sentencing on the Riverside case, so the trial court properly sentenced defendant to a term to be fully served consecutively to the sentence defendant was already serving. |
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| California v. Ogaz |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: G055726(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: William W. Bedsworth Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant-appellant Ignacio Ogaz appealed a judgment sentencing him to prison for illegal drug activity. He contended his Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses was violated by the admission of certain drug testing evidence, and to this, the Court of Appeal agreed. Because appellant did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the analyst who conducted the drug testing, judgment was reversed. |
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| California v. Tacardon |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: C087681(Third Appellate District) Opinion Date: August 7, 2020 Judge: Andrea Lynn Hoch Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Leon Tacardon was charged with possession of a controlled substance for sale, and misdemeanor possession of marijuana for sale. Evidence of these crimes was seized following an interaction with San Joaquin County Sheriff’s Deputy Joel Grubb. After an unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence made during the preliminary hearing under Penal Code section 1538.5, defendant renewed his motion under Penal Code section 995, and prevailed. The State appealed. Based on the magistrate’s factual findings expressed on the record and supported by substantial evidence, the Court of Appeal concluded defendant was detained by Deputy Grubb not when the deputy detained defendant's passenger, M.K., but when the deputy, after smelling marijuana coming from the BMW and seeing three large bags of the substance on the rear floorboard, told defendant to remain in the car while he conducted a records check. "At that point, there can be no doubt the deputy possessed reasonable suspicion defendant was engaged in criminal activity." The Court concluded the superior court erred by setting aside the magistrate’s ruling denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. |
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| People for the Ethical Operation of Prosecutors etc. v. Spitzer |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: G057546(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: August 12, 2020 Judge: Raymond J. Ikola Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| According to the complaint, “Plaintiff/Petitioner the People for the Ethical Operation of Prosecutors and Law Enforcement . . . is an association of residents of Orange County that includes at least one member who pays property taxes to Orange County.” People for the Ethical Operation of Prosecutors and Law Enforcement was a watchdog group seeking to ensure Orange County law enforcement agencies complied with their constitutional and statutory duties. The other plaintiffs were three individuals who were Orange County residents, and who had various interests in ensuring the integrity of the criminal justice system. The defendants were Todd Spitzer and Don Barnes who were the elected District Attorney and Sheriff, respectively. The gist of the complaint was that defendants operated an illegal and clandestine confidential informant (CI) program. The basic structure of the alleged CI program was that the Sheriff recruited confidential informants from among the prison population, moved those informants near a criminal defendant to facilitate a surreptitious interrogation, notwithstanding that the defendant was represented by counsel, which rendered the interrogations illegal under Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The Sheriff allegedly kept extensive logs of these interactions, but kept those logs secret, even from the courts. The District Attorney used information from these interrogations, despite knowing their illegality, and did not disclose information about the CI program to defendants, in violation of their discovery duties. This appeal stemmed from a dismissal following a sustained demurrer in plaintiffs’ taxpayer suit against the Orange County officials. The trial court ruled that plaintiffs did not have standing to pursue taxpayer claims for waste under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a, nor a petition for a writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the point of taxpayer standing, as well as the related doctrine of public interest standing in mandamus proceedings, was to confer standing on the public at large to hold the government accountable to fulfill its obligations to the public. "The fundamental rights at stake fit comfortably within the doctrines of taxpayer and public interest standing." |
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| People v. Harrell |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A156017(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Tucher Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Fairfield Officer Anderson testified that, while patrolling a residential neighborhood, he noticed a BMW parked on the street without license plates. He approached the car and saw that Harrell was asleep in the driver’s seat. Anderson identified himself as police and asked Harrell to roll the window down or open the door to talk. Harrell did not comply nor would he show identification but gave his name and date of birth. A record check revealed that Harrell was on Post Release Community Supervision (PRCS). Anderson removed Harrell from the car to conduct a PRCS compliance check. Anderson found notebooks and paperwork that contained personal identifying information for approximately 20 people. After arresting Harrell, Anderson contacted several of those people, who reported that Harrell did not have permission to have their personal information. The prosecution submitted documentary evidence regarding Harrell’s prior conviction for identity theft. Harrell was convicted of three felony counts of acquiring or keeping the personal identifying information of three individuals. after having previously suffered a conviction for this same crime. He was sentenced to 12 years and 8 months in prison. The court of appeal rejected Harrell’s contention that his convictions for felony fraudulent possession of personal identifying information must be reclassified under Penal Code 490.2 as misdemeanors and affirmed the denial of Harrell’s suppression motion, but concluded his section 667.5(b) enhancements must be stricken. |
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| People v. Santos |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B299844(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: August 13, 2020 Judge: Moor Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant appealed from a postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 and Senate Bill No. 1437. Defendant alleged that the judge erred by ruling on the petition although he was not the judge who sentenced defendant in the underlying matter, and by summarily denying defendant's petition. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the trial court erred in denying defendant's petition based on the constitutional challenges to Senate Bill 1437 and section 1170.95 and on the the merits of his petition. The court explained that the record provides no basis for the trial court's determination as a matter of law that "the overall record" precluded defendant from showing that he was not a major participant in the robbery and did not act with reckless indifference to human life. The court interpreted the statute to require the judge who originally sentenced the petitioner to rule on the petition, unless that judge is unavailable. In this case, the record contains no evidence that the original sentencing judge was unavailable. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. |
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| Atwater v. State |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC19-1709 Opinion Date: August 13, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Defendant's fifth successive postconviction motion filed pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that Defendant was not entitled to postconviction relief. Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and robbery and sentenced to death. In his fifth successive postconviction motion, Defendant argued that his counsel conceded guilt without his consent and that the error was structural. The trial court dismissed the motion on the grounds that it was untimely and that, even if it had been timely, it was without merit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not state a facially sufficient claim. |
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| Freeman v. State |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC19-1532 Opinion Date: August 13, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court summarily denying Defendant's second successive motion for post conviction relief, holding that Defendant was not entitled to postconviction relief. Defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder and burglary with an assault. The trial judge imposed the death sentence, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant later filed a second successive motion for postconviction relief under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 claiming that he was entitled to relief under Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). The trial court summarily denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to retroactive Hurst relief; and (2) Defendant's intellectual disability claim was untimely. |
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| Agee v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0726 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Keith R. Blackwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Linda Agee was tried by jury and convicted of murder in connection with the fatal shooting of her husband, Randall Peters. Agee appealed, contending the trial court erred when it admitted certain hearsay statements of a deceased witness and determined that Agee had forfeited her constitutional right to confront that witness. After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed, finding the trial court erred in ruling the deceased-witness' statements to law enforcement were admissible. An error of “constitutional magnitude,” such as the one in this case, will not warrant a reversal “if the State can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” The witness' statements, especially statements that he would receive life imprisonment or the death penalty if he told the truth, were highly incriminating. "They were essentially an implicit admission of guilt, providing the most direct evidence that Sargent was involved in Peters’s murder. These statements also cast a large shadow of suspicion over Agee, given her close association with Sargent at the time of the killing and their eventual marriage. Indeed, in its closing argument, the prosecution heavily emphasized Sargent’s statements about his receiving life in prison or the death penalty if he told police what he knew about the murder." At the same time, the other evidence against Agee was entirely circumstantial and not particularly strong. No evidence definitively identified Agee or anyone else as the shooter. "While a reasonable juror might conclude that certain statements and conduct of Agee suggested that she was somehow involved in Peters’s murder, the nature and extent of her involvement are far from clear. Thus, it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of Sargent’s statements did not contribute to the verdict." |
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| Arnold v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1027 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Bethel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Slyrika Arnold was found guilty of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2011 fatal shooting of Curtis Pinkney, Jr. On appeal, he contended his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance for failing ot object to three statements the prosecutor made in his closing argument. After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court determined Arnold failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s alleged deficient performance, therefore, the Court affirmed his conviction. |
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| Blackshear v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0713 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Bethel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Ulysses Blackshear, Jr. was found guilty of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the death of William Land. On appeal, Blackshear challenged the sufficiency of the evidence as to each offense of which he was found guilty and sentenced. Blackshear also argued the trial court erred by failing to apply the proper standard in considering his motion for new trial on the general grounds and that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by not objecting to the admission of certain photographs from Land’s autopsy. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Brown v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0782 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Keith R. Blackwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Melvin Brown, Jr. was tried by jury and convicted of murder and other crimes in connection with the 2014 fatal shooting of Javious Tucker and wounding of Cyntrelis Boggs. Brown appealed, claiming that the trial court plainly erred in its jury charge on his justification defense and when it admitted in-life photographs of Tucker and allowed Tucker’s mother to testify about those photographs. Brown also contended he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Upon its review of the record and briefs, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. |
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| Clark v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1021 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Jennifer Clark was convicted by jury of malice murder for the 2008 death of her husband, Donald Clark. On appeal, she contended her trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to request that the jury be instructed that it could consider her paramour, Michael Yost’s felony convictions in assessing his credibility. After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court determined Clark failed to demonstrate that she was prejudiced by her trial counsel’s alleged deficient performance, therefore, the Court affirmed her conviction. |
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| Clark v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0688 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Rodney Carter Clark was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Mario Johnson. On appeal, Clark contended only that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Finding that the evidence presented at Clark’s trial was legally sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than Clark’s guilt, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Clark's convictions. |
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| Cross v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0717 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: David E. Nahmias Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2003, appellant Brandon Cross was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the death of Debra Hymer, who was the mother of his girlfriend, Jessica Cates. On appeal, he contended the trial court erred by declining to allow him to impeach the hearsay statements of his co-conspirator Cates, by failing to charge the jury as to the burden of proof for co-conspirator statements, and by admitting three autopsy photographs and a video recording of the crime scene. He also argued that he should have been granted a new trial because the record was insufficiently complete. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Finnissee v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0966 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Freddie Finnissee, Jr. was convicted by jury for malice murder and first-degree arson. On appeal, he argued the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court found the evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find Finnissee guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. And, though Finnissee now argues that he acted under provocation and that there was no evidence presented to the jury upon which malice could be found, the Court determined he was incorrect. Finnissee claimed his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance because counsel did not request an instruction on the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter. To this, the Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed his convictions. |
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| Georgia v. Grier |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Dockets: S20A0633, S20X0634 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Keith R. Blackwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Quantavious Grier was tried by jury in 2010, and convicted of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the robbery and fatal shooting of James Yarborough. Grier successfully moved for a new trial. The trial court found that the case against Grier was based substantially upon the testimony of Rimion Rawlings, that the greater weight of the evidence indicated that Rawlings was Grier’s accomplice, and that Rawlings’s testimony was insufficiently corroborated by independent evidence. The State appealed, contending the trial court abused its discretion when it granted the motion for new trial. Grier cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court also should have concluded that the evidence presented at trial was legally insufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon its review of the record and the briefs, the Georgia Supreme Court found no merit in either of these claims, and affirmed. |
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| Georgia v. Hinton |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0648 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| A trial court found that the State failed to prove that Evontae Hinton, after invoking his right to remain silent, initiated further discussions with a detective and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent; the court therefore suppressed statements Hinton then made to the detective. The State appealed the suppression, arguing the trial court misapplied the law and made erroneous factual and credibility determinations, because the detective’s testimony at the motion to suppress hearing clearly showed that Hinton waived his rights and reinitiated discussions with the detective. The Georgia Supreme Court found the trial court was not required to credit the detective’s testimony, and the State did not introduce any other evidence to meet its burden of establishing the voluntariness of Hinton’s custodial statements. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. |
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| Gibbs v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1006 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Carla Wong McMillian Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Rodney Gibbs was convicted of the felony murder of Marquis Stephens, the aggravated assaults of six other people, and numerous other crimes, all in connection with a shooting at a house party in 2015. Following the trial court’s denial of his motion for new trial, Gibbs appealed, arguing only that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Gibbs’ theory of defense at trial was that he and Reeves acted in self-defense after Stephens withdrew his weapon and fired first; Gibbs also called the victims’ credibility into question by casting them as drug dealers and drug users. Gibbs did not testify or put on any evidence in support of his defense. The parties stipulated that Gibbs was a convicted felon at the time of the incident, having previously been convicted of a felony involving the use of a firearm. As for the convictions for felony murder and aggravated assault, Gibbs argues, as he did below, that the incident was the result of a drug deal gone awry and that he shot Stephens in self- defense. Finding no reversible error, and that the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain his convictions, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Gibbs' convictions. |
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| Griffin v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0789 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Antonio Griffin appealed his convictions for malice murder and other crimes related to the 2015 shooting death of Mikell Wright and attempted robbery of Mikell’s brother, Rodregus Wright. On appeal, Griffin, who was 13 years old at the time of the crimes, argued primarily that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to object to testimony about tape-recorded conversations between Griffin and a friend who was also a minor. Because the argument that the testimony was inadmissible "at best is novel," the Georgia Supreme Court determined Griffin could not show that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to raise it. Griffin’s only other argument on appeal was an argument about jury selection that the Supreme Court rejected last year in affirming the convictions of his co-defendant, Tobias Daniels. The Court therefore affirmed. |
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| Heyward v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0946 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Joseph Heyward appealed his convictions for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the 2015 shooting death of Frank Wilson. The victim was shot eight times, with most shots entering from behind; Heyward argued on appeal that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce evidence to refute the prosecutor’s statements to the jury that a person could not claim self-defense if the victim was shot in the back. Specifically, Heyward claimed that counsel should have elicited evidence that Wilson, in shooting Heyward’s brother Antonio years earlier, was found to have acted in self-defense despite allegedly shooting Antonio in the back. But the Georgia Supreme Court found the evidence that Heyward said would have shown that Antonio was shot from behind actually showed only that Antonio had some wounds to his back; no evidence indicated whether those wounds were entry or exit wounds, or from where Wilson shot Antonio, while other evidence showed clearly that Wilson shot Antonio from the front. Because failure to elicit such equivocal evidence could not have prejudiced Heyward, the Supreme Court rejected his ineffectiveness claim and affirmed his convictions. |
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| Hill v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0804 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Garren Hill was convicted by jury of malice murder, felony murder, armed robbery, and various other offenses in connection with the robbery of a convenience store and the shooting death of store clerk Ajit Kumar Dwivedi. On appeal, Hill contended only that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court found the evidence "more than sufficient for a rational trier of fact of find Hill guilty of all of the crimes for which he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt." Therefore, the Court affirmed Hill's convictions. |
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| Hood v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0725 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Carla Wong McMillian Areas of Law: Construction Law, Criminal Law |
| Diara Hood was convicted by jury of the felony murder of Steven Carden, the aggravated assault of Thomas Smith, and other related crimes. Following the trial court’s denial of her motion for new trial, Hood appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting other-acts evidence and by charging the jury on that evidence. Although the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the trial court committed two merger errors at sentencing, it otherwise affirmed her convictions. |
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| McDowell v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0739 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| James McDowell was convicted by jury for the 2002 shooting death of Eric Kemp. In his sole enumeration of error, McDowell contended that, due to the destruction of the .40-caliber handgun prior to trial, the State could not prove an appropriate chain of custody for the handgun at trial, and the trial court erred by allowing the admission of evidence of that handgun. The Georgia Supreme Court found that the relevant portion of the record on appeal revealed that, when the handgun at issue was initially recovered from the car in which McDowell was a passenger, the serial number engraved on the gun was documented by police in the incident report. The gun was later transported to the GBI for ballistics testing, and, again, the serial number of the gun was recorded by the GBI. At some point towards the end of 2012, the gun was inadvertently destroyed, and, though it had been made available to the defense prior to destruction, it was not available at the time of the trial. The Court found only evidence relating to the handgun was admitted at trial, not the handgun itself. "So, McDowell’s argument, which is based on proving the chain of custody of the handgun, is generally misplaced. And, even if we assume without deciding that McDowell’s chain of custody argument could somehow apply to the evidence concerning the handgun which was admitted at trial, as opposed to the handgun itself, McDowell’s argument would still fail." Judgement was affirmed. |
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| Miller v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0943 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Robert Miller was tried by jury and found guilty of malice murder, aggravated assault, and associated firearms charges in connection with the shooting death of Antonio Robinson, and the shootings of Martaveous Lawrence, and Christopher Sheppard. On appeal, Miller contended the trial court committed plain error in excusing a juror, who was found to be communicating privately with the presiding judge’s secretary, without first conducting a hearing to determine the circumstances of the contact, the impact on the juror, and whether the contact was prejudicial to Miller. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated in part to correct a sentencing error, but otherwise affirmed conviction. |
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| Powell v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0852 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Tyree Powell appealed the denial of his timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea to malice murder. He argued his motion was improperly denied because he was not properly advised of the rights listed in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and was forced to proceed with counsel with whom he had a bad relationship and who was not prepared for trial. Powell also argued he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because the trial court erred in denying his request for new counsel. The Georgia Supreme Court found the trial court’s determination that Powell entered his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily was supported by the record, and Powell did not show that he was prejudiced by any deficient performance by plea counsel. Therefore, with no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. |
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| Reyes v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0780 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Bethel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Herminio Reyes was found guilty by jury of malice murder and other offenses in connection with the stabbing death of Sadot Ozuna-Carmona. He appealed, arguing: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict on the malice murder count; (2) the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence pursuant to the “residual” exception to the hearsay rule; and (3) that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in several regards. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Ringold v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0580 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Carla Wong McMillian Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Following the grant of an out-of-time appeal, Richard Ringold appealed a trial court’s November 2013 order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds in what was the second time this case went before the Georgia Supreme Court. The State contended the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of Ringold’s ineffective assistance claim because he was still represented by counsel when he filed his pro se motion to withdraw. To this, the Supreme Court agreed, concluding Ringold’s pro se filing was a legal nullity and that the trial court therefore should have dismissed the void motion rather than reach its merits. |
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| Rodriguez v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0874 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Carla Wong McMillian Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Elijah Rodriguez was convicted by jury of felony murder in connection with the shooting death of Kevin Rivera, among other crimes. The trial court denied Rodriguez’s motion for new trial, and he appealed, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for felony murder and the predicate felony of aggravated battery, and that the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever. The Georgia Supreme Court concurred with the Court of Appeals that Rodriguez’s sentence for aggravated battery, should have merged with felony murder by operation of law. So that portion of Rodriguez's sentence was vacated. Otherwise affirmed Rodriguez’s convictions. |
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| Rutledge v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0766 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: David E. Nahmias Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The trial court summarily denied appellant Marcus Rutledge’s pro se motion for an out-of-time appeal from his murder conviction, which was entered on his guilty plea; in the motion, Rutledge also requested a copy of his case file and transcripts. Because the trial court did not hold a hearing to determine whether Rutledge’s failure to file a timely appeal was due to the ineffective assistance of his plea counsel, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated the part of the court’s order denying the motion for an out-of-time appeal and remanded for such a hearing. Because Rutledge’s request for a free copy of his case records did not satisfy the standard for such a request made after the deadline for a timely appeal, the Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of that part of his motion. |
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| Sanchious v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20G0123 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Christopher Sanchious was tried by jury and found guilty of three counts of aggravated child molestation, two counts of child molestation, and one count each of aggravated sodomy and sexual battery involving his girlfriend’s 12-year-old daughter. This appeal centered Sanchious’s contention that certain expert testimony and an expert report were improperly admitted at his jury trial. Specifically, Sanchious argued the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the expert testimony of forensic biologist Karen Turpin, who testified about DNA analysis conducted by, and memorialized in a report written by, forensic biologist Dr. Tesheka Wortham, and by admitting Dr. Wortham’s written report. At trial, Turpin testified that she personally tested the victim’s sexual assault kit, which “failed to reveal the presence of male DNA,” but that Dr. Wortham, who did not testify at trial but whose report Turpin had “peer reviewed . . . [t]o ensure that the analyst ha[d] followed policies and procedures, and that the results [were] correct and reliable," tested the victim’s underwear and comforter, and that both items “contained [DNA] profiles . . . matching the profile[s] of [the victim] and . . . Sanchious.” When the State began to elicit testimony from Turpin about Dr. Wortham’s DNA report, Sanchious’s counsel objected on hearsay grounds. The Court overruled the hearsay objection and admitted the report. To this, the Georgia Supreme Court concurred, granting Sanchious’s writ of certiorari, vacating the Court of Appeals’s opinion, and remanding the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. |
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| Stephens v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0583 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Lajuante Stephens was convicted by jury for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault and related offenses in connection with the 2013 shooting death of James Evers. He received life imprisonment without parole for the malice murder, and a range of prison terms for the other crimes, all to be run consecutively. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred in striking a particular juror for cause. After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed Stephens' convictions. |
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| Styles v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0668 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Michael Styles was tried by jury and found guilty of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Alberto Lumens and the armed robbery of Juan Garcia. Styles contended on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, the trial court erred in charging the jury and in handling a communication from the jury, the prosecutor improperly expressed personal opinions during the trial, and that defense counsel rendered him ineffective assistance. Because the Georgia Supreme Court found no merit to any of these claims of error, it affirmed judgment. |
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| Thomas v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0721 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Joseph Thomas was convicted by jury of murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Gregory Savelio. In his sole claim of error, Thomas contended the trial court erred in denying his Batson challenge to the State’s use of its peremptory strikes to remove African-Americans from the jury pool. Specifically, Thomas contended the trial court failed to properly scrutinize whether the prosecutor’s facially race-neutral reasons for striking Jurors 18, 31, and 42 were pretextual. He argued the trial court’s failure to apply Batson’s three-step analysis resulted in the court improperly shifting the burden to the defense to prove the prosecutor’s discriminatory intent. The Georgia Supreme Court found no merit to this claim of error; therefore, it affirmed. |
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| Young v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0859 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Jermaine Young was convicted by jury of malice murder in connection with the 2016 shooting death of Shane Varnadore. Young appealed, arguing the trial court erred in denying Young’s motion to suppress his statements made during police interviews, that the trial court erred in admitting a Facebook photo into evidence at trial, and that Young’s trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court disagreed with Young's contentions and affirmed his convictions. |
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| State v. Ellis |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 120046 Opinion Date: August 7, 2020 Judge: Eric S. Rosen Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress drug-related evidence, holding that that the Court of Appeals correctly denied the motion to suppress. Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine and possessing drug paraphernalia. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that she was unlawfully detained. In response, the State argued that the attenuation doctrine legitimized the seizure. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the investigatory detention of Defendant exceeded the scope of the initial welfare check. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) where the police officer had no reasonable suspicion that Defendant was committing, had committed, or was about to commit a crime the officer's conduct constituted an unlawful seizure and consequent search; and (2) the facts of this case rendered application of the attenuation doctrine inappropriate. |
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| State v. Timley |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 120414 Opinion Date: August 7, 2020 Judge: Wilson Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for first-degree premeditated murder, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) even if a challenged remark by the prosecutor constituted prosecutorial error, there was no possibility that it contributed to the verdict; (2) the district court did not err in admitting cell tower maps and accompanying testimony; (3) the district court did not commit clear error in failing sua sponte to instruct the jury on intentional second-degree murder as a lesser included offense of premeditated first-degree murder; and (4) the district court's failure to give any lesser included instructions did not violate Defendant's due process rights. |
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| State v. Peaslee |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 105 Opinion Date: August 13, 2020 Judge: Humphrey Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of one count of murder, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Defendant's motion for a new trial was based on a statement allegedly made by his brother in the presence of another individual in which Defendant's brother claimed responsibility for the victim's murder. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the brother's statement would not be admissible in a new trial and that, even if it were admissible, Defendant failed to establish that the proffered evidence would probably change the result if a new trial were granted. |
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| State v. Plummer |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 106 Opinion Date: August 13, 2020 Judge: Connors Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of two counts of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs, holding that the the trial court did not commit obvious error in instructing the jury and did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's motion for a new trial. Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on accomplice liability; (2) the jury instruction on a written report not admitted into evidence was not erroneous; and (3) the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's motion for a new trial on the basis that statements made during the State's closing argument impermissibly commented upon Defendant's out-of-state residence as evidence of his guilt. |
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| State v. Proctor |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 107 Opinion Date: August 13, 2020 Judge: Horton Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant for failure to comply with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act of 1999 (SORNA of 1999), Me. Rev. Stat. 34-A, 11227(2), holding that, due to inadequate representation by Defendant's trial counsel, the court committed obvious error by not addressing the constitutionality of SORNA of 1999, as retroactively applied to Defendant. In 1990, Defendant was convicted of four counts of unlawful sexual contact, and in 1992, he was convicted of gross sexual assault. Neither offense required Defendant to register as a sex offender. After the Legislature enacted SORNA of 1999, Defendant 's two convictions became subject to SORNA of 1999. In 2018, Defendant was found guilty of failure to comply with a duty under SORNA of 1999. On appeal, Defendant argued that the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999 to require him to register for life violated the state and federal constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed, holding that it could not be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999 to Defendant's 1990 and 1992 convictions did not affect his substantial rights by virtue of a punitive alteration of his original sentences. |
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| State v. Sloboda |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 103 Opinion Date: August 11, 2020 Judge: Ellen A. Gorman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant's conviction for violating a condition of release, holding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Defendant's prosecution because the violation occurred in New Hampshire. Defendant was indicted for violating a condition of release. Defendant challenged the court's subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that his alleged violation occurred outside Maine. The trial court determined that it had jurisdiction and found Defendant guilty. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that Maine lacked jurisdiction to prosecute Defendant on a charge of violating a condition of release for his conduct in New Hampshire. |
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| Franklin v. State |
| Court: Maryland Court of Appeals Docket: 57/19 Opinion Date: August 13, 2020 Judge: Biran Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming the judgment of the coram nobis court ruling that Defendant failed to prove that his attorney performed below constitutional standards and was therefore not entitled to coram nobis relief, holding that the coram nobis court did not err. Defendant was convicted of reckless endangerment and illegally transporting a handgun in a vehicle. The court sentenced Defendant to fourteen days of jail time and three years of probation. Defendant's attorney later filed a motion for modification of sentence, asking that the court consider changing the sentence to probation before judgment. However, the attorney asked the court to defer consideration of the motion until after the conclusion of Defendant's probation. A hearing on the motion was never held. Defendant subsequently sought to expunge the records of his criminal charges but was not successful because he had not received probation before judgment. Defendant sought a writ of error coram nobis asking that the sentencing court belatedly hold a hearing and decide his motion for modification of sentence. The coram nobis court and the court of special appeals denied relief. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant's attorney did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel. |
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| Commonwealth v. Mora |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12890 Opinion Date: August 6, 2020 Judge: Barbara A. Lenk Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the denial of the motions to suppress filed by Nelson Mora and Ricky Suarez, holding that the continuous, long-term pole camera surveillance targeted at the residences of Mora and Suarez was a search under article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Using video footage collected by hidden video cameras on public telephone and electrical poles (pole cameras) the Commonwealth secured indictments against twelve defendants, including Mora and Suarez. Eight defendants moved to suppress the pole camera footage and evidence derived from that footage as the fruits of an unreasonable search. The superior court denied the motions, concluding that the pole camera surveillance did not constitute a search. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed as to Mora and Suarez and remanded the matter to the superior court for further proceedings, holding that the warrantless surveillance of Mora's and Suarez's residences for more than two months was a "search" under article 14. |
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| Commonwealth v. Peno |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12464 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Barbara A. Lenk Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, holding that the errors that occurred during the trial did not require a new trial. On appeal, Defendant argued that she was prejudiced from the Commonwealth's use of prior bad act evidence. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) some of the challenged evidence should not have been admitted, but there was no abuse of discretion int he judge's conclusion that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect; (2) the prosecutor's reliance on the prior bad act evidence in closing arguments was improper, but the improprieties did not so infuse the trial with unfairness as to deny due process of law; and (3) a reduction in the verdict pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E would not serve the interests of justice. |
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| Green v. Fotoohighiam |
| Court: Supreme Court of Missouri Docket: SC98262 Opinion Date: August 11, 2020 Judge: Zel M. Fischer Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Personal Injury, Real Estate & Property Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court entering partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on the issue of liability, holding that the circuit court did not err in entering summary judgment on the issue of liability in Plaintiff's favor. After he mobile home caught on fire Plaintiff sued several defendants, including Mehrdad Fotoohighiam, alleging that Fotoohighiam and the other defendants conspired to set her home on fire, causing her mental and physical harm and property damage. The circuit court entered partial summary judgment as to liability in Plaintiff's favor. After a jury trial on the issue of damages only the jury returned a verdict of $250,000 in actual damages and $2,500,000 in punitive damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly determined that the uncontroverted material facts established Plaintiff's right to partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. |
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| State v. Knox |
| Court: Supreme Court of Missouri Docket: SC98298 Opinion Date: August 11, 2020 Judge: Laura Denvir Stith Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court against Defendant for one count of class C felony stealing and two counts of class A misdemeanor stealing, holding that absent proof of value, the offense submitted was a class D misdemeanor, not a class A misdemeanor, and that the circuit court should have entered judgment against Defendant for a class D felony rather than a class C felony. The jury instructions in this case required the jury to find Defendant retained the two victims' personal items without their consent and with the purpose of withholding this property from them. At trial, the State did not present evidence of the value of the stolen items of personal property. At issue on appeal was whether the circuit court properly entered judgment for one count of class C felony and two counts of class A misdemeanor stealing. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that the circuit court should have entered judgment for one count of class D felony stealing and two counts of class D misdemeanor stealing. |
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| State v. Grimshaw |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 201 Opinion Date: August 11, 2020 Judge: Gustafson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of sexual intercourse without consent, holding that the district court abused its discretion and compromised Defendant's right to a fair trial when it allowed expert witness testimony on statistics about false reports of sexual assault. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court's admission of the expert testimony regarding the statistics about false reports of rape prejudiced his right to a fair trial by turning the case into a "trial by statistic" rather than a case based on specific facts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the expert testimony regarding the rate of false reports of sexual assault was improper, and the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony; and (2) Defendant's right to a fair trial was violated by the improper admission of the false reporting statistics. |
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| State v. Walston |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 200 Opinion Date: August 11, 2020 Judge: Gustafson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs, methamphetamine, and criminal possession of dangerous drugs, methamphetamine, holding that the district court erred in denying Defendant's motion to disclose the identity of a confidential informant. After Defendant was charged, Defendant filed a motion asking the district court to compel the State to disclose the identity of the confidential informant that led to Defendant's arrest. The district court denied the motion. After a second trial, the jury convicted Defendant. On appeal, Defendant argued that she had the right to know the identity of the informant because the informant played a continuous, active, and primary role in the alleged crime. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that, considering the circumstances of the case balanced against the public's interest in withholding the confidential informant's identity, the district court erred in denying Defendant's motion to compel disclosure of the informant's identity. |
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| REO Enterprises, LLC v. Village of Dorchester |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 306 Neb. 683 Opinion Date: August 7, 2020 Judge: Funke Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment for REO Enterprises, LLC and declaring that the Village of Dorchester's ordinance No. 684 unconstitutionally violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Nebraska Constitutions, holding that the ordinance did not violate the Equal Protection Clauses. REO filed a complaint requesting that the district court declare ordinance No. 684 void because it violated the Equal Protection Clauses. Specifically, REO argued that the ordinance treated tenants and owners of property differently when applying for utility services by requiring tenants to obtain a landlord's written guarantee that the landlord would pay any unpaid utility charges for the rented property. The district court entered summary judgment for REO. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinance's requirement that a residential tenant obtain a landlord's guarantee for initiating utility services did not violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. |
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| State v. Cervantes |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 306 Neb. 740 Opinion Date: August 7, 2020 Judge: Lindsey Miller-Lerman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of obstructing a police officer, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. When law enforcement officers were returning property to Defendant at her home, they were greeted by Defendant's husband, against whom Defendant had a protection order. Worried that she was "going to get in trouble" Defendant fled through a window and was found by officers a block away. Defendant was convicted of obstructing a peace officer. On appeal, Defendant argued that she was convicted without sufficient evidence that she obstructed a peace officer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to find that Defendant's intentional acts impaired peace officers from enforcing a penal law. |
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| State v. Hale |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 306 Neb. 725 Opinion Date: August 7, 2020 Judge: Michael G. Heavican Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Appellant's postconviction motion for DNA testing under Nebraska's DNA Testing Act (Act), Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-4116 et seq., holding that Appellant did not meet his burden of showing that DNA testing may produce noncumulative, exculpatory evidence relevant to his claim that he was wrongfully convicted. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Appellant later filed a motion for DNA testing pursuant to the Act requesting DNA testing of four swabs of apparent blood taken from the victim's home and a buccal swab obtained from another individual that had been observed in the area. The district court denied the motion, determining that the requested testing would not produce noncumulative, exculpatory evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion on the grounds that Defendant's request for DNA testing did not satisfy the requirements of Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-4120(5)(c). |
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| State v. Lauhead |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 306 Neb. 701 Opinion Date: August 7, 2020 Judge: Freudenberg Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence for one count of attempted first degree sexual assault of a child and one count of child abuse, holding that the district court did not err by finding Defendant competent to stand trial and in sentencing Defendant. After convicting Defendant, the Supreme Court sentenced Defendant sentencing Defendant to incarceration for terms of twenty to twenty-two years and three years to be served concurrently. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in determining that Defendant was competent to stand trial; and (2) Defendant's sentences were within the statutory sentencing range, and Defendant failed to show that the district court considered improper factors or abused its discretion in sentencing him. |
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| State v. Jones |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-4031 Opinion Date: August 13, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated this Court's denial of Defendant's motion to supplement and remanded the case to the court of appeals to consider the issue of whether Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to trial counsel. Defendant filed a motion to supplement the record with the transcript of a hearing, during which Defendant signed a waiver of his right to trial counsel. The transcript had not been included in the record considered by the court of appeals, which overruled Defendant's argument that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. The Supreme Court denied the motion to supplement, but, on further consideration, vacated the denial and granted the motion to supplement the record with the transcript of the hearing. Because the court of appeals was not privy to the complete record of the hearing, the Supreme Court remanded the cause to the court of appeals to render an opinion, upon its review of the supplemented record, the issue of whether Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. |
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| Carabajal v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 104 Opinion Date: August 10, 2020 Judge: Michael K. Davis Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting the State's motion to dismiss the charges against Defendant without prejudice, holding that the court abused its discretion in granting the State's Wyo. R. Crim. P. 48 motions. The State filed two separate informations charging Defendant with multiple felonies and misdemeanors. The State later filed motions to join the charges for trial. The district court denied the motions as untimely. Thereafter, the State filed a motion to dismiss the charges without prejudice, noting that it intended to refile the charges in a single information. The district court entered orders of dismissal without prejudice on the basis that the State had provided a reason for its motions. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for entry of an order dismissing the charges with prejudice, holding that the district court abused its discretion in granting the State's Rule 48 motions where the State was attempting to use dismissal without prejudice to escape from a position of disadvantage caused by its failure diligently to prosecute the case. |
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