Latest 12 Cases This Week: Mckesson v. Doe (U.S.), Ex parte D.R.J. (Ala.), Hoffman v. Young (Cal. Ct. App.)

Pope Francis’s Statement Endorsing Same-Sex Civil Unions Undermines the Moral Legitimacy and Legal Arguments in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia

DAVID S. KEMP, CHARLES E. BINKLEY

David S. Kemp, a professor at Berkeley Law, and Charles E. Binkley, MD, the director of bioethics at Santa Clara University’s Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, consider the implications of Pope Francis’s recently revealed statement endorsing same-sex civil unions as they pertain to a case currently before the U.S. Supreme Court. Kemp and Binkley argue that the Pope’s statement undermines the moral legitimacy of the Catholic organization’s position and casts a shadow on the premise of its legal arguments.

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Stigma and the Oral Argument in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia

LESLIE C. GRIFFIN

UNLV Boyd School of Law professor Leslie C. Griffin explains why stigma is a central concept that came up during oral argument before the Supreme Court in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia. Griffin points out that some religions have long supported racial discrimination, citing their religious texts, but courts prohibited such discrimination, even by religious entities. Griffin argues that just as religious organizations should not enjoy religious freedom to stigmatize people of color, so they should not be able to discriminate—and thus stigmatize—people based on sexual orientation.

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Mckesson v. Doe

Court: US Supreme Court

Docket: 19-1108

Opinion Date: November 2, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Personal Injury

Mckesson organized a demonstration in Baton Rouge to protest a shooting by a police officer. The protesters, allegedly at Mckesson’s direction, occupied the highway in front of the police headquarters. As officers began making arrests to clear the highway, an unknown individual threw a rock-like object, striking Officer Doe in the face. Doe suffered devastating injuries. Doe sued Mckesson on the theory that he negligently staged the protest in a manner that caused the assault. The Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the claim, reasoning that a jury could plausibly find that Mckesson breached his duty not to negligently precipitate the crime of a third party; a violent confrontation with a police officer was a foreseeable effect of negligently directing a protest onto the highway. The First Amendment does not bar tort liability if the rock-throwing incident was a consequence of tortious activity, which was authorized, directed, or ratified by Mckesson, who allegedly directed an unlawful obstruction of a highway. The Supreme Court vacated. The constitutional issue is implicated only if Louisiana law permits recovery under these circumstances. Certification to the Louisiana Supreme Court is advisable for the questions: whether Mckesson could have breached a duty of care in organizing and leading the protest and whether Doe has alleged a particular risk within the scope of protection afforded by any such duty. Speculation by a federal court about how a state court would weigh the moral value of protest against the economic consequences of withholding liability is gratuitous when Louisiana courts stand willing to address these questions on certification to ensure that any conflict between state law and the First Amendment is not purely hypothetical.

Ex parte D.R.J.

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1190769

Opinion Date: October 30, 2020

Judge: Sellers

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law, Personal Injury

Defendants D.R.J. and his mother, Dana Sides, petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate two orders holding that a pro tanto release executed in their favor was void, thus restoring them as defendants in the underlying lawsuit. Kathy and Barry King sued D.R.J. and Sides seeking damages for injuries the Kings sustained as a result of an automobile accident allegedly caused by D.R.J.'s negligence in driving Sides' vehicle. D.R.J. was a minor at the time of the accident. Defendants and their insurer, Alfa Mutual Insurance Company, offered to settle the Kings' claims for $95,000. Counsel for the Kings notified their insurer, State Farm, of the settlement offer, preserving its subrogation rights against defendants. State Farm responded by offering the Kings $25,000 to settle the UIM claim, which the Kings rejected. The Kings then accepted the $95,000 settlement offer without State Farm's consent, expressly reserving their UIM claim against State Farm. The Kings then moved to dismiss all claims against defendants, and the trial court entered an order dismissing defendants with prejudice. When State Farm learned of the pro tanto release, it moved the trial court for summary judgment, arguing the Kings forfeited their rights to UIM benefits by executing the pro tanto release without its consent. The trial court found State Farm validly objected to the Kings' settlement, made no ruling on State Farm's motion, and declared the pro tanto release void, thus restoring the "status quo" of the case. Defendants argued the trial court should have granted State Farm's motion and ended the litigation. The Supreme Court determined defendants' situation was not one in which they had a clear legal right to relief sought but the trial court refused to grant. They thus had not met their burden for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, and the Court denied their petition.

Hoffman v. Young

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B292539(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 30, 2020

Judge: Kenneth R. Yegan

Areas of Law: Personal Injury, Real Estate & Property Law

Where, as here, a child of the landowner is living with the landowner on the landowner's property and the landowner has consented to this living arrangement, the child's express invitation of a person to come onto the property operates as an express invitation by the landowner within the meaning of Civil Code section 846, subdivision (d)(3), unless the landowner has prohibited the child from extending the invitation. Appellant filed suit against her friend and his parents after she was injured while riding her motorcycle on the parents' motocross track. The jury found that the parents had no liability for the collision or the allegedly negligent medical care provided to appellant after the collision. The court held that the friend's express invitation to appellant stripped his parents of the immunity that would otherwise have been provided to them by the recreational use immunity defense under section 846. In this case, the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the express invitation exception to the immunity defense applies only if one of the friend's parents, i.e., the actual landowner, expressly invited appellant onto the property. The court held that the erroneous instruction was prejudicial to appellant. Furthermore, the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the express invitation must be for a recreational purpose. The court reversed as to the general negligence and premises liability causes of action. The court affirmed in all other respects.

Boone v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20200

Opinion Date: November 10, 2020

Judge: Kahn

Areas of Law: Drugs & Biotech, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Defendants, Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Boehringer Ingelheim International, GmbH, on claims brought by Plaintiff, the executrix of the decedent's estate, that an oral anticoagulant medication wrongfully caused the decedent's death, holding that the trial court did not err. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not improperly (1) preclude evidence and arguments related to spoliation; (2) prevent Plaintiff from using an excerpt from a particular deposition on rebuttal; (3) grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment on a design defect claim relating to the absence of a reversal agent; and (4) issue a curative instruction to the jury after closing arguments.

Atlanta Women's Specialists, LLC et al. v. Trabue et al.

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Dockets: S19G1138, S19G1140

Opinion Date: November 2, 2020

Judge: Boggs

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in five appeals consolidated appeals for review to address two discrete issues – one related to pleading vicarious liability, and the other related to vicarious liability and apportionment. In August 2009, Keith Trabue’s wife, Shannon, suffered a catastrophic brain injury resulting from pulmonary edema leading to full cardiac arrest within days of giving birth to the couple’s daughter at Northside Hospital in Atlanta. At the hospital, Shannon was treated by physician-employees of Atlanta Women’s Specialists, LLC (AWS), including Dr. Stanley Angus and Dr. Rebecca Simonsen. Trabue and the bank serving as his wife’s conservator (Plaintiffs) later filed a medical malpractice action naming as defendants only Dr. Angus and AWS, although the complaint contained allegations regarding Dr. Simonsen’s conduct and alleged that AWS was vicariously responsible for the acts and omissions of both Dr. Angus and Dr. Simonsen. The complaint did not allege any independent acts of negligence on the part of AWS. At a two-week trial in 2017, after the close of the evidence, Dr. Angus and AWS, asked the court to require the jury to assess the percentages of fault of Dr. Angus and Dr. Simonsen and to apportion the damages between Dr. Angus and AWS under OCGA 51-12-33 (b). The Supreme Court asked the parties to brief two questions: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the plaintiffs sufficiently pled a claim for vicarious liability against AWS based on the conduct of Dr. Simonsen?; and (2) Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that, to obtain apportionment of damages with regard to the negligence of Dr. Simonsen, the defendants were required to comply with OCGA 51-12-33 (d) by filing a pretrial notice of nonparty fault? The Supreme Court answered both questions in the negative and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment.

Quynn v Hulsey et al.

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S19G1612

Opinion Date: November 2, 2020

Judge: Ellington

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this wrongful death and personal injury case to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred by holding that TriEst Ag Group, Inc., the employer of the driver whose truck struck and killed the decedent, was entitled to summary judgment on the estate’s claims of negligent entrustment, hiring, training, and supervision because TriEst admitted the applicability of respondeat superior and the estate was not entitled to punitive damages. The Supreme Court concluded OCGA 51-12-33 ("the apportionment statute") abrogated the decisional law rule on which the Court of Appeals relied in affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. Accordingly, judgment was reversed.

Russell v. Johnson & Johnson Inc.

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2019-SC-0118-DG

Opinion Date: October 29, 2020

Judge: Wright

Areas of Law: Consumer Law, Drugs & Biotech, Personal Injury

In this lawsuit brought against Johnson & Johnson, Inc. and other entities (collectively, Defendants) alleging state tort claims due to injuries caused by a Class III medical device the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court granting Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings based on federal preemption of all claims, holding that, under Kentucky's notice pleading standards, the motion for judgment on the pleadings should have been denied. In their complaint, Plaintiffs asserted claims for, inter alia, strict liability negligence, and lack of informed consent. Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings based on federal preemption of all claims. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under Kentucky's notice pleading standard, Plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently put Defendants on notice of parallel claims under Kentucky law that may not be preempted.

MDB Trucking, LLC v. Versa Products Co.

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 72

Opinion Date: November 5, 2020

Judge: Kristina Pickering

Areas of Law: Personal Injury, Products Liability

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court imposing case-termination sanctions on MDB Trucking, LLC for spoliation of evidence, holding that the record did not support the imposition of case-terminating sanctions in this case. Plaintiffs filed lawsuits against MDB, a commercial trucking company, and Versa Products Company, which manufactured the dump gate valves, after an MDB driver experienced an uncommanded activation of the dump gate in his rig's trailer, causing it to open and unexpectedly dump its loads. The incident caused several collisions. MBD cross-claimed against Versa for contribution, alleging an unreasonably dangerous and defective design of the Versa valve. MDB reached a settlement with Plaintiffs, who assigned their claims against Versa to MDB. Versa then filed the motion for sanctions underlying this appeal, asking the district court to dismiss MDB's claim with prejudice for having spoliated evidence, namely by discarding plug, sockets, and cords in the tractor/trailer rig. The district court dismissed MDB's claims with prejudice, holding that MDB's failure to preserve the replaced parts caused Versa prejudice that lesser sanctions could not cure. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that MDB acted negligently, not willfully, when it discarded the replaced parts and that, on remand, the district court should consider whether Versa can meet its burden of proving prejudice.

Wynn v. Associated Press

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 70

Opinion Date: October 29, 2020

Judge: Cadish

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's defamation claim against The Associated Press and one of its reporters (collectively, Respondents), holding that a news article reporting on the contents of a citizen's complaint to the police that was neither investigated nor evaluated by the police is not a report of an official action or proceeding for which the fair report privilege provides an absolute defense. Respondents published a news article reporting on a 2018 citizen's complaint to the police, in which the complainant alleged that Appellant sexually assaulted her in the early 1970s. Police did not investigate the allegations for statute of limitations reasons. In his complaint, Appellant asserted that the complainant's accusations against him were false and that Respondents published the article with malice. The district court concluded that the fair report privilege protected Respondents from defamation liability because their article reported on a public record, namely documentation of a citizen's complaint to the police alleged that a crime occurred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the complaint did not constitute an official action or proceeding as contemplated by the fair report privilege.

Ladue v. Pla-Fit Health, LLC

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2019-0354

Opinion Date: October 30, 2020

Judge: James P. Bassett

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

Plaintiff Theresa Ladue was injured in a fall at a gym in Nashua, New Hampshire, operated by defendant Pla-Fit Health, LLC (Planet Fitness). Ladue brought a negligence claim against Planet Fitness. Planet Fitness moved for summary judgment. The Superior Court granted the motion, finding that Ladue’s claim was barred by a release of liability provision in her membership agreement. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment.

Selby v. Baird

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 17-421

Opinion Date: November 5, 2020

Judge: Francis X. Flaherty

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court entering summary judgment against Plaintiff and in favor of Defendants - Michael Baird, Mike's Professional Tree Services, Inc. (MPTS), and John Rossi - with respect to Plaintiff's personal injury claims, holding that the superior court did not err. This litigation arose from a serious injury that Plaintiff suffered while he was engaged as a foreman for a tree removal crew. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Defendants had been negligent on the day of the accident. The central dispute between the parties on summary judgment was whether Plaintiff was employed by MPTS, as Defendants asserted, or whether Plaintiff was an employee of a related but distinct entity, as Plaintiff insisted. The hearing justice determined that MPTS was Plaintiff's employer and granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice properly determined that Plaintiff was employed by MPTS and correctly granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

Monongahela Power Co. v. Buzminsky

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Docket: 19-0228

Opinion Date: November 2, 2020

Judge: Margaret L. Workman

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Monongahela Power Company's (Mon Power) motion to dismiss on the basis of statutory immunity, holding that the circuit court did not err in determining that a private corporate entity or employer is not entitled to immunity under W. Va. Code 15-5-11(a). Michael Buzminsky, an employee of HSC LLC, was electrocuted and injured when he was sent to perform repairs to the City of Ronceverte's wastewater treatment plant. Michael and Vickie Buzminsky (collectively, Plaintiffs) pled negligence against Mon Power, alleging that, despite its knowledge continued electrical issues, Mon Power left the plant energized. Citing the immunity extended to emergency services workers pursuant to W. Va. Code 15-5-11(a), Mon Power moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over it because it was statutorily immune. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the immunity established for "duly qualified emergency services workers" pursuant to section 15-5-11(a) applies only to individual employees and does not extend to such employees' private employer or corporate entity; and (2) Mon Power does not derivate immunity vicariously through the immunity which its employees enjoy under the statute.