Beck v. Honorable Ernesto Scorsone |
Docket: 2019-SC-0726-MR Opinion Date: December 17, 2020 Judge: John D. Minton, Jr. Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Medical Malpractice |
In this medical negligence lawsuit, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals denying Defendants' application for a writ of prohibition seeking to prevent the trial court from enforcing a protective order that forbade them from certain ex parte communications, holding that the trial court abused its discretion. Plaintiff brought this action against the University of Kentucky Medical Center and thirteen healthcare professionals allegedly employed by the Medical Center. Here, Defendants sought to prevent the trial court from enforcing a protective order forbidding them from ex parte communication with Plaintiff's unnamed treating physicians or other healthcare providers employed by the Medical Center. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of appeals with direction to issue a writ consistent with this decision, holding that the trial court abused its discretion because the basis of the order was purportedly the personal conviction of the trial court that departed from precedent without appropriate justification. |
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Brafman v. Commonwealth |
Docket: 2019-SC-0449-MR Opinion Date: December 17, 2020 Judge: John D. Minton, Jr. Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of first-degree and second-degree arson and six counts of attempted murder, of which four were charged as hate crimes, holding that Defendant was denied a fair trial when the Commonwealth, aware of Defendant's intoxication during her arrest, opposed the intoxication defense instructions and implied to the jury that Defendant was not intoxicated. On appeal, Defendant argued that six trial errors required reversal, either individually or cumulatively. The Supreme Court held that the prosecutorial misconduct was flagrant enough to render the trial fundamentally unfair, simultaneously leading the jury to conclude facts contrary to the known facts and depriving Defendant of an ability to present her defense. The Court held that this one error was enough to require reversal but also addressed Defendant's remaining allegations of error, concluding that there were multiple errors in this case. |
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Exantus v. Commonwealth |
Docket: 2018-SC-0241-MR Opinion Date: December 17, 2020 Judge: Lambert Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence of twenty years' imprisonment and convictions of not guilty by reason of insanity for first-degree murder, not guilty by reason of insanity for first-degree burglary, guilty but mentally ill of two counts of second-degree assault and guilty but mentally ill of fourth-degree assault, holding that any error was not prejudicial. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the jury’s verdicts were not impermissibly inconsistent; (2) the trial court did not err by failing to grant Defendant's motions for directed verdict; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to provide lesser-included offense instructions to the jury; (4) the trial court's failure to provide the jury with the definition of "dangerous instrument" was harmless error; (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's motion to strike two jurors for cause; and (6) the trial court erred by not making the requisite statutory findings under Ky. Rev. Stat. 703 before admitting prior bad act evidence, but the error was harmless. |
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A.H. v. Louisville Metro Government |
Docket: 2018-SC-0359-DG Opinion Date: December 17, 2020 Judge: Nickell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Personal Injury |
The Supreme Court held that Louisville Metro Government (LMG) and its employees are cloaked in sovereign immunity and qualified official immunity for an alleged violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 71.040 and that money damages are unavailable because Ky. Rev. Stat. 446.070 does not waive immunity. James Hatcher died within twenty-four hours of entering the custody of the Louisville Metro Department of Corrections (LMDC). Plaintiffs filed suit alleging a violation of section 71.040. Plaintiffs alleged multiple torts and constitutional violations, seeking compensatory and punitive damages from LMG, the LMDC director, and six LMDC guards. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants on all claims, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that LMG was immune from a claim for money damages, and that immunity was not waived. |
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Commonwealth v. Jennings |
Docket: 2019-SC-0248-DG Opinion Date: December 17, 2020 Judge: Nickell Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals vacating and remanding the circuit court's denial of Defendant's motion to modify the terms of his probation to remove a restriction prohibiting him from having access to the internet during his probationary period, holding that Defendant's failure to challenge the probation restriction prohibiting all access to the internet at the time the restriction was imposed was fatal to Defendant's request to relief. In vacating the probation restriction, the court of appeals concluded that the complete ban on internet access under the facts of this case was impermissibly vague and overly burdensome on Defendant's right to free speech. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Defendant did not object to the restriction, the court of appeals should not have entertained this challenge, and its decision on the merits was in error. |
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Mattingly v. Commonwealth |
Docket: 2019-SC-0255-MR Opinion Date: December 17, 2020 Judge: John D. Minton, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of four counts of first-degree assault and other crimes and sentencing him as a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO) to forty years' imprisonment, holding that any error was harmless. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the trial court (1) did not err when it allowed into evidence a Facebook video from an anonymous tipster allegedly depicting the shooting; (2) did not commit palpable error when it allowed the testimony of Detective O'Daniel, who narrated surveillance video footage; (3) properly allowed Aleisha Courtney's prior identification of Defendant; (4) properly allowed another detective's prior identification of Defendant; (5) improperly excluded evidence of a civil suit by the victims against Defendant, but the error did not likely affect the outcome of the trial; (6) properly allowed Defendant's prior felony convictions at trial and at sentencing; and (7) properly allowed a summary sheet of Defendant's prior convictions that was prepared with certified records. Further, there was sufficient evidence of Defendant's prior felony convictions to support his conviction for possession of a handgun. |
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Normandin v. Normandin |
Docket: 2018-SC-0451-DG Opinion Date: December 17, 2020 Judge: Michelle M. Keller Areas of Law: Family Law |
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the order of the family court in this divorce action, holding that the family court miscalculated the combined monthly income for purposes of setting child support. On appeal, Appellant challenged the family court's classification and division of marital property, calculation of maintenance, and calculation of child support. The court of appeals affirmed the family court's decision in its entirety. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) the family court erred in classifying Appellee's restricted stock units and thus miscalculated the combined monthly income in setting child support; and (2) the family court did not abuse its discretion by not considering Appellee's income as an independent factor for increasing directed maintenance or computing Appellant's reasonable needs. |
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Commonwealth ex rel. Brown v. Stars Interactive Holdings Ltd. |
Dockets: 2019-SC-0058-DG, 2019-SC-0209-DG Opinion Date: December 17, 2020 Judge: Wright Areas of Law: Gaming Law |
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the court of appeals that the term "person" in Kentucky's Loss Recovery Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. Chapter 372, is limited to a natural person, holding that the Commonwealth had standing to bring this suit. The Commonwealth, through the Secretary of the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet, filed the underlying complaint seeking to recover under statutory treble damages for money lost by its citizens playing real-money poker on an illegal internet website called PokerStars, which was owned by Defendants (collectively, PokerStars). The court entered partial summary judgment against Defendants based on the actual amount Kentucky players lost on PokerStars' websites. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the Commonwealth lacked standing because it did not qualify as "any other person" under the Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commonwealth qualified as a "person" under the Act; (2) the Commonwealth had standing to bring this lawsuit; and (3) the manner in which the trial court calculated damages in this case was proper. |
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Smith v. Fletcher |
Docket: 2019-SC-0503-TG Opinion Date: December 17, 2020 Judge: Michelle M. Keller Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Medical Malpractice |
In this case heard after the Kentucky Medical Review Panel Act (MRPA), Ky. Rev. Stat. 216C.005 et seq., was declared to be unconstitutional, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court finding the complaint to be untimely and dismissing this case, holding that the complaint was timely as to the individual defendants. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against advanced Practice Registered Nurse Wynetta Fletcher, Dr. Amjad Bkhari, Dr. James Detherage under the MRPA. After the claims made their way through the medical review panel process, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the same defendants and the entities that allegedly employed them. After Plaintiffs filed their complaint, the Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Claycomb, 566 S.W.3d 202 (Ky. 2018), wherein the Court declared the MRPA unconstitutional, was finalized. Thereafter, Defendants filed motions to dismiss, alleging that the claims were untimely and that Plaintiffs could not rely on the tolling provision of the MRPA to extend the deadline. The circuit court dismissed the suit as untimely. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Ky. Rev. Stat. 413.270 applied to Plaintiffs' claims; and (2) Plaintiffs' claims were timely filed under section 413.270 but saved only those claims that were filed with the medical review panel. |
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Department for Community Based Services v. Baker |
Docket: 2018-SC-0610-DG Opinion Date: December 17, 2020 Judge: Lambert Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law |
The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals holding that the Department for Community Based Services, Cabinet for Health and Family Services (Cabinet) exceeded its statutory authority by investigating allegations that Rebecca Baker neglected children in her care, holding that the Cabinet did not meet its burden of proof to substantiate its allegations of neglect against Baker. Baker worked for an elementary school afterschool program supervising several young children. The Cabinet substantiated findings of neglect against Baker, and a hearing officer affirmed the Cabinet's findings of neglect. On appeal, the court of appeals sua sponte raised the issue of whether the Cabinet had the authority to investigate Baker and concluded that it did not. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Cabinet did not exceed its statutory authority by investigating the allegations against Baker; but (2) the Cabinet did not meet its burden of proof to substantiate the allegation of neglect by Baker. |
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Henderson County Health Care Corp. v. Honorable Karen Lynn Wilson |
Docket: 2020-SC-0001-MR Opinion Date: December 17, 2020 Judge: Michelle M. Keller Areas of Law: Health Law, Personal Injury |
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Henderson County Health Care Corporation's (hereinafter, Redbanks) petition for a writ of prohibition prohibiting the enforcement of an order issued by Judge Karen Wilson of the Henderson Circuit Court compelling Redbanks to produce certain consultant reports to the real party of interest, Roland McGuire, holding that the court of appeals erred. Specifically, the Supreme Court held Redbanks was entitled to the issuance of the writ because the consultant reports at issue in this case were protected by the Federal Quality Assurance Privilege, 42 U.S.C. 1396r(b)(1)(B) and 42 U.S.C. 1395i-3(b)(1)(B), because they were used for quality assurance purposes. |
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Merritt v. Catholic Health Initiatives, Inc. |
Docket: 2018-SC-0155-DG Opinion Date: December 17, 2020 Judge: Hughes Areas of Law: Insurance Law, Medical Malpractice |
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants in this insurance dispute, holding that the Legislature has clearly and unequivocally excluded captive insurers from the requirements of the Kentucky Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act (USCPA), Ky. Rev. Stat. 304.12-230. Plaintiff brought this action against various healthcare defendants. The medical negligence claims were eventually settled. Thereafter, the circuit court denied Plaintiff's motion for declaratory relief as to his bad faith insurance claim against First Initiatives Insurance, Ltd., a foreign captive insurance entity that provides self-insurance for Catholic Health Initiatives, Inc. The court granted summary judgment for Catholic Health and First Initiatives. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that First Initiatives, as a captive insurer, is not subject to the USCPA. |
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Northern Kentucky Area Development District v. Wilson |
Docket: 2018-SC-0665-DG Opinion Date: December 17, 2020 Judge: John D. Minton, Jr. Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law |
The Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's summary judgment dismissing Mary Wilson's Kentucky Whistleblower Act (KWA) claims against Northern Kentucky Area Development District, Inc. (NKADD), holding that NKADD is one of the Commonwealth's political subdivisions, making it a KWA-covered employer and thus potentially liable for Wilson's claims. Wilson brought her KWA claim in circuit court against NKADD, her former employer, alleging that NKADD retaliated against her after she reported a co-worker's fraudulent billing practice by forcing her resignation. The trial court concluded that NKADD was not a KWA-covered employer and granted NKADD's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that NKADD is not a political subdivision of the state because it does not serve an integral function of government; and (2) therefore, NKADD was not subject to the KWA as a political subdivision and was therefore not subject to Wilson's claims under the KWA. |
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Gentry v. Judicial Conduct Commission |
Docket: 2020-SC-0434-RR Opinion Date: December 17, 2020 Judge: Vanmeter Areas of Law: Legal Ethics |
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Judicial Conduct Commission finding misconduct on the part of Judge Dawn M. Gentry and ordered that she be removed from office as a circuit judge for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Fifth Division, a Family Court division serving Kenton County, holding that there was no error warranting reversal of the Commission's final order. The Commission brought a twelve-count formal proceeding against Judge Gentry alleging that she had used her judicial role to coerce attorneys who served as guardians ad litem in her court to support her campaign, had asked in the courtroom for a yard sign placement, and had utilized court staff to perform campaign work during work hours. Ultimately, the Commission entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law and final order finding that Judge Gentry had violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and engaged in the misconduct alleged in ten of the twelve counts charged and determining that removal was the appropriate sanction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on Judge Gentry's numerous violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and her misconduct in office, the sanction of removal was appropriate. |
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Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission |
Docket: 2019-SC-0691-RR Opinion Date: December 17, 2020 Judge: Vanmeter Areas of Law: Legal Ethics |
The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of fact, conclusions of law and final order issuing a public reprimand against Beth Lewis Maze, Judge of the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit, Second Division, holding that the Judicial Conduct Commission appropriately issued a public reprimand. Judge Maze inappropriately intervened in her ex-husband's criminal case and then self-reported to the Commission. Ultimately, Judge Maze was criminally indicted for two counts of forgery and one count of tampering with public records, and the Commission brought six counts of judicial misconduct against her. After a hearing, the Commission found that Judge Maze violated SCR 4.020(1)(B)(i) and that her acts constituted misconduct in office and violated SCR 4.300, Kentucky's Code of Judicial Conduct. The Supreme Court held that the Commission appropriately issued a public reprimand under the circumstances. |
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Howard v. Big Sandy Area Development District, Inc. |
Docket: 2018-SC-0601-DG Opinion Date: December 17, 2020 Judge: John D. Minton, Jr. Areas of Law: Personal Injury |
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to Big Sandy Area Development District, Inc. (BSADD) in this negligence and wrongful death action, holding that BSADD did not have governmental immunity but that the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiff's claims against BSADD. BSADD arranges for assistants to visit elderly clients in their homes on a regular basis. After Emma Jean Hall died of the effects of sepsis that developed from a bed sore on her lower back, Plaintiff, in her capacity as the executrix of Hall's estate, brought this action alleging that Hall's condition could have been found and remedied had BSADD's home care aid not been negligently attentive. The trial court granted BSADD's motion for summary judgment, concluding that BSADD enjoyed governmental immunity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) BSADD did not have governmental immunity because it did not perform an integral state function; and (2) BSADD was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the substance of the negligence claim because it did not breach of standard of care to Hall. |
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