Joe, Joey, Joe-Baby, Sexist: Where’s Your Imposter Syndrome?

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN

SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman responds to a recent Wall Street Journal op-ed criticizing soon-to-be First Lady Jill Biden for using the academic title she earned. Professor Grossman dissects the op-ed, penned by a retired lecturer at Northwestern University, and explains the deep and pervasive sexism behind it.

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International Union of Operating Engineers v. Daley

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Dockets: 20-1672, 20-1724

Opinion Date: December 17, 2020

Judge: Joel Martin Flaum

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

Wisconsin grants public-sector employees the right to bargain collectively through the State Employment Labor Relations Act (SELRA) and the Municipal Employment Relations Act (MERA). In 2011, SELRA and MERA were amended by Act 10, which divided Wisconsin state and municipal employees into “[p]ublic safety employee[s],” which includes police officers, firefighters, and deputy sheriffs, and “general municipal employee[s],” i.e., everyone else. A subsequent amendment created a class of “[t]ransit employee[s].” Public safety and transit employees and their unions continue to operate under the pre-Act 10 scheme but for general employees, Act 10 limited the scope of employers’ collective bargaining obligations, prohibiting bargaining over anything except increases to base wages and mandating that general employee unions submit to an annual recertification election. Certification now requires affirmative votes from an absolute majority of all employees in the bargaining unit, not just those voting. Act 10 bars public employers from deducting union dues from the earnings of general employees. The Seventh Circuit has previously rejected two challenges to Act 10’s constitutionality and affirmed the dismissal of this First Amendment suit, filed a public-employee labor union and two of its members, challenging the annual recertification requirement, the limitations on collective bargaining, and the prohibition on payroll deduction of union dues.

Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 20-16169

Opinion Date: December 15, 2020

Judge: Milan Dale Smith, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

Calvary Chapel challenges Nevada Governor Steve Sisolak's Directive 021, which prohibits certain gatherings because of the COVID-19 pandemic, as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Specifically, Calvary Chapel challenges section 11 of the Directive, which imposes a fifty-person cap on indoor in-person services at houses of worship. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the church's request for a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the Directive against houses of worship. The panel held that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, --- S. Ct. ----, 2020 WL 6948354 (2020) (per curiam), arguably represented a seismic shift in Free Exercise law, and compels the result in this case. Similar to the pandemic-related restrictions in Roman Catholic Diocese, the panel explained that the Directive treats numerous secular activities and entities significantly better than religious worship services. The panel explained that the Directive, although not identical to New York's, requires attendance limitations that create the same "disparate treatment" of religion. Because disparate treatment of religion triggers strict scrutiny review, the panel reviewed the restrictions in the Directive under strict scrutiny. Exercising its discretion, the panel concluded that, although slowing the spread of COVID-19 is a compelling interest, the Directive is not narrowly tailored to serve that interest. In this case, the Directive—although less restrictive in some respects than the New York regulations reviewed in Roman Catholic Diocese—is not narrowly tailored because, for example, "maximum attendance at a religious service could be tied to the size of the [house of worship]." Therefore, Calvary Chapel has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its Free Exercise claim. Calvary Chapel has also established that the occupancy limitations contained in the Directive—if enforced—will cause irreparable harm, and that the issuance of an injunction is in the public interest. The panel reversed the district court, instructed the district court to employ strict scrutiny review to its analysis of the Directive, and preliminarily enjoined the State from imposing attendance limitations on in-person services in houses of worship that are less favorable than 25% of the fire-code capacity.

Addo v. Barr

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 18-9560

Opinion Date: December 14, 2020

Judge: Harris L. Hartz

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law

Ghanian native and citizen, petitioner Joachim Addo appealed when his application for asylum was denied by an immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals. Petitioner was the son of the chief of the Challa tribe. For several years the Challa have been in a land dispute with another tribe, the Atwode. The Atwode tribe was larger than the Challa, but the Challa controlled more land in the Nkwanta district, and in the past they often leased land to the Atwode. Starting in 2005 the Atwode began violating the lease terms and customs. Petitioner’s father instructed the Challa to stop leasing land to the Atwode, and he took the Atwode to court over the land disputes, winning every case. The Atwode responded with violence against the Challa and vowed to eliminate Petitioner’s father and family. This led to several violent incidents perpetrated by the Atwode against Petitioner and other members of his family. Shortly after these attacks, Petitioner and his father agreed that, for his own safety, Petitioner would relinquish his position as heir-apparent to the Challa chiefdom and would move from Nkwanta to Accra, the capital of Ghana. But this did not stop the Atwode, and harassment continued. In January 2017 Petitioner entered the United States. He expressed a fear of returning to Ghana and was granted a credible-fear interview. An asylum officer determined that Petitioner was credible and referred his case to adjudication. At a hearing in June 2017 the IJ determined that Petitioner was removable. Petitioner indicated, however, that he wished to apply for asylum, so the IJ scheduled a hearing to consider the asylum claim. Petitioner filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. In the briefs on his petition for review by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Petitioner challenged the denial of asylum and withholding of removal, arguing that substantial evidence did not support the BIA’s determination that he could successfully avoid future persecution by relocating within Ghana. The Court agreed with Petitioner that the decision on his ability to safely relocate was unsupported by substantial evidence. The petition was granted and the matter remanded to the BIA for further proceedings.

United States v. Allen

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 19-1380

Opinion Date: December 17, 2020

Judge: Mary Beck Briscoe

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Defendant-appellant Robert Allen appealed his conviction for depredation of government property. arguing his conviction violated both the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and separation of powers principles. Allen also appealed the district court’s restitution order of $20,300, claiming the order included restitution for uncharged conduct, and that the district court erred in applying the procedural framework of the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) by placing the burden on him to disprove the amount of loss contained in the presentence report and by ordering a restitution amount unsupported by evidence. After the parties completed briefing on this case, the government filed a notice of concession, acknowledging that the restitution order was erroneous and suggesting remand for resentencing on restitution. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Allen’s conviction, vacated the district court’s restitution order, and remanded the case to the district court to recalculate restitution.

Caton v. City of Pelham

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1190589

Opinion Date: December 11, 2020

Judge: Mendheim

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

Mark Caton appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of the City of Pelham ("the City"), in his action alleging retaliatory discharge against the City. In approximately 2001, he was hired as a police officer by the City. In 2004, while he was still a police officer, Caton injured his neck when he was wrestling with a suspect. Caton did not receive treatment for his neck at the time, but the pain from the injury gradually increased. In April 2006, Caton transferred from the Police Department to the Pelham Fire Department. In 2012, Caton had a vertebrae-fusion surgery. In 2015 and 2016, Caton would have periods of excruciating pain leading to unexcused absences from work. He received reprimands and suspensions. Caton would consult with multiple doctors and pain specialists for rehabilitation therapy and pain management each time he was reinjured as a result of his work. In 2016, Caton was referred to Dr. Michelle Turnley, a physiatrist at the Workplace Occupational Health Clinic located on the campus of the University of Alabama at Birmingham ("UAB"). Dr. Turnley and Caton tell differing stories of an encounter at the UAB clinic September 2016. Caton testified that he asked Dr. Turnley for pain medication for the next time his pain became too intense, but Dr. Turnley reminded Caton that on his first visit he had not signed a pain contract and he had refused to provide a urine sample, so she declined to give him pain medication. Caton denied the doctor's account, but Dr. Turnley's clinical notes described her encounter with Caton as him being "fairly aggressive requesting pain medication... he was fairly loud and refused to leave the clinic and UAB police were called. ... He did not appear to have any functional deficits. Additionally, someone in the waiting room saw him sling the door open like he was about to 'pull it off the hinges'; therefore, obviously he has no strength deficits." In October, Dr. Turnley sent Caton a letter dropping him as a patient. By November, the City terminated Caton's employment, citing in part, the visit to Dr. Turnley's office. His unemployment application was denied because of his discharge from the City for misconduct. Caton sued, alleging procedural issues with the unemployment compensation hearing, adding a retaliatory-discharge claim. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the City, finding Caton had a full opportunity to litigate his retaliatory-discharge claim at the unemployment hearing, thus he was barred from raising it again by collateral estoppel. The Alabama Supreme Court determined application of collateral estoppel did not violate Caton's right to a trial by jury, and concurred estoppel barred his retaliatory-discharge claim against the City. "Caton does not present any other reason why the trial court's judgment should be reversed. Therefore, we affirm summary judgment in favor of the City."

City of Fresno v. Fresno Building Healthy Communities

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Dockets: F080264(Fifth Appellate District) , F080265(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 17, 2020

Judge: Snauffer

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

The City filed a complaint for declaratory relief to establish whether Measure P, the Fresno Clean and Safe Neighborhood Parks Tax Ordinance, has been duly enacted through the voters' initiative power. On the same day the City filed its action, FBHC filed its own complaint for declaratory relief and petition for writ of mandate, seeking a declaration declaring that Measure P had been duly enacted. The Court of Appeal consolidated the cases and endorsed the holdings and reasoning of All Persons City and County of San Francisco v. All Persons Interested in the Matter of Proposition C (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 703, 708. Finding that All Persons was controlling in this case, the court concluded that neither Proposition 13 nor Proposition 218 affects the voters' initiative power, and therefore neither imposes a two-thirds voting requirement on the passage of voter initiatives that impose special taxes. The court rejected the Association's policy argument, noting that the Association's policy concerns are best addressed by the Legislature. The court reversed the judgments; on the City's action, the court ordered the trial court to enter a new judgment in favor of FBHC declaring that Measure P has passed; and on FBHC's action, the court directed the trial court to enter a new judgment granting FBHC's request for declaratory relief and declaring that Measure P has passed.

Department of Human Resources v. International Union of Operating Engineers

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F078825(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 17, 2020

Judge: Donald R. Franson, Jr.

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

The State entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Union regarding terms and conditions of employment for certain state employees classified as bargaining unit 12. The State subsequently appealed the trial court’s order denying its petition to vacate or correct an arbitration award determining that DWR had violated article 16.7(G) of the MOU by using purged documents to support the adverse disciplinary action taken against the employee. The Court of Appeal concluded that the arbitration award interpreted and enforced article 16.7(G) of the MOU in a manner that constitutes a violation of the constitutional merit principle, because it impedes the ability of state departments to make reasonable and sound employment decisions based on merit. Therefore, the award violated public policy and the trial court erred in denying the petition. The court reversed the trial court's order on the petition and the ensuing judgment, remanding the matter to the trial court with instructions to enter a new order vacating the award.

Keep Our Wells Clean, et al. v. DNREC

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 138, 2020

Opinion Date: December 15, 2020

Judge: Seitz

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control reviewed wastewater treatment facility construction permit applications under regulations adopted in 1999. In 2014, DNREC revised its regulations and adopted new requirements. In this appeal, the issue presented for the Delaware Supreme Court was whether Artesian Wastewater Management, Inc.’s 2017 construction permit application, which Artesian characterized as an amendment to its existing 2013 wastewater treatment facility construction permit, had to comply with the new requirements of the 2014 regulations. The Environmental Appeals Board and the Superior Court decided Artesian did not have to comply with the new requirements. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed.

Somers v. S.D. Warren Co.

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2020 ME 137

Opinion Date: December 15, 2020

Judge: Andrew M. Mead

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the Workers' Compensation Board Appellate Division vacating the judgment of the administrative law judge (ALJ) denying Lorraine Somers's petition to have her benefits reinstated, holding that the Appellate Division did not err. The Board entered a decree permitting S.D. Warrant Company and its insurer (collectively, S.D. Warren) to discontinue paying Somers partial incapacity benefits when those payments had reached the 520-week statutory limit. Somers filed a petition to have her benefits reinstated, arguing that S.D. Warren failed to comply with Me. W.C.B. Rule, ch. 2, 5(1) (the former Rule) by not providing her with notice that she could be eligible for an extension of weekly benefits. An ALJ denied the petition. The Appellate Division vacated that decision. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that S.D. Warren was required to give Somers notice pursuant to the former Rule before terminating her benefits.

Estate of Gorman v. Mississippi Gaming Commission

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2019-CA-01240-SCT

Opinion Date: December 17, 2020

Judge: Josiah D. Coleman

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

Robert Sharp shot and killed John Gorman during a firearm-training exercise ("a multitude of lapses in safety protocols"). Sharp and Gorman were employees of the Mississippi Gaming Commission and were acting in the course and scope of their employment. The Commission Shooting Review Board concluded that the incident “was an accidental discharge of an agency weapon,” it also concluded that the “failure to follow the prescribed policies, procedures and lesson plans” was the most significant contributing factor. After the incident, Gorman’s heirs began receiving automatic workers’ compensation payments. Each heir brought independent actions against the Commission that were later consolidated. Once consolidated, the Commission filed a joint motion for summary judgment in August 2017, stating the exclusivity of Mississippi Workers’ Compensation law barred further remedy. Gorman’s heirs opposed the motion by way of a pleading, memorandum, and a supplement with affidavits and admissions purportedly deemed admitted. The circuit court later granted summary judgment for the Commission. On appeal, the heirs argued: (1) the circuit court erred in determining the Workers' Compensation Act was the exclusive remedy to recover for the wrongful death of John Gorman; and (2) the circuit court erred in determining complete immunity applied regarding the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Finding no triable issues of material fact in the record, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court.

Reeves v. Gunn

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2020-CA-01107-SCT

Opinion Date: December 17, 2020

Judge: Michael K. Randolph

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Speaker of the Mississippi House or Representatives and the Speaker Pro Tempore alleged the Governor "ignored the dictates of [the Mississippi] Constitution, and exceeded his authority to strike parts of House Bill 1782 to partially veto appropriation bills. The Governor denies his acts were unconstitutional. Having reviewed the record of the chancery court proceeding, pertinent sections of the Mississippi Constitution, and case law addressing partial vetoes, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded the Governor did not exceed the power of his office. "His partial veto comports with section 73 of our Constitution and therefore carried with it the authority endowed that office by the people of Mississippi." Accordingly, the judgment of the chancery court holding otherwise was reversed.

Hensley v. Montana State Fund

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 MT 317

Opinion Date: December 16, 2020

Judge: Beth Baker

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Workers' Compensation Court that Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-703(2) did not violate Appellant's right to equal protection by denying an impairment award to a worker with a Class 1 impairment who has suffered no wage loss, holding that the statute passes rational basis muster under the Equal Protection Clause of the Montana Constitution. Section 39-71-703(2) allows impairment awards for claimants without actual wage loss only if they have a Class 2 or higher impairment rating. Appellant, who was designated as Class 1 and was denied an impairment award, challenged the statute, arguing that it violated her constitutional right to equal protection because other workers with different injuries but the same whole-person impairment percentage would receive the award. The WCC denied the challenge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC did not err in its determination that section 39-71-703(2) did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.

Parks v. Hy-Vee, Inc.

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 307 Neb. 927

Opinion Date: December 4, 2020

Judge: Papik

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

In this workers' compensation case, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the compensation court granting Donna Parks compensation for chronic pain and aggravation of her mental health issues, both caused by a work-related low-back injury, holding that there was no merit to Hy-Vee Inc.'s arguments on appeal. Parks incurred a work-related injury in 2008 while employed by Hy-Vee and was granted compensation for her low-back injury. In 2017, the compensation court entered a further award granting Parks compensation for chronic pain and aggravation of her mental health issues caused by the low-back injury. Thereafter, the court modified the further award upon Parks' motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the compensation court's further award was not based on legal error; (2) the record supported the court's findings of fact, upon which the further award was based; and (3) the compensation court did not abuse its powers in modifying the further award.

Peyton v. New York City Board of Standards & Appeals

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2020 NY Slip Op 07662

Opinion Date: December 17, 2020

Judge: Feinman

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the Board of Standards and Appeals of the City of New York (BSA) interpreting the definition of open space within the meaning of the New York City Zoning Resolution to encompass rooftop gardens accessible to a single building's residents as long as the residents of each building on the zoning lot receive at least a proportionate share of open space, holding that the BSA's determination was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. Plaintiff commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding asserting that BSA's interpretation of open space had no legal basis under the Zoning Resolution. Supreme Court denied the petition. The Appellate Division reversed, determining that the definition of open space unambiguously required that open space be accessible to the residents of every building on a zoning lot. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the BSA's application of the definition of open space to multi-owner zoning lots was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.

State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. Stein

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Dockets: 271A18, 401A18

Opinion Date: December 11, 2020

Judge: Ervin

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part orders entered by the North Carolina Utilities Commission addressing applications filed by Duke Energy Progress, LLC and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, holding that the Commission erred by rejecting an equitable sharing proposal without properly considering and making findings and conclusions concerning "all other material facts," as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. 62-133(d). Various interveners representing the utilities' consumers appealed the Commission's orders, challenging the lawfulness of the Commission's decisions concerning the extent to which the utilities were entitled to reflect costs associated with the storage and disposal of ash resulting from electricity production in coal-fired electric generating units in the cost of service used to set the utilities' North Carolina retail rates. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the Commission (1) did not err by allowing the inclusion of a majority to the utilities' coal ash costs in the cost of service used for establishing North Carolina retail rates and in increasing Duke Energy Carolinas' residential basic facilities charge; but (2) erred in rejecting an equitable sharing proposal without making the statutorily required findings and conclusions.

Interest of Buller

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 ND 317

Opinion Date: December 17, 2020

Judge: Jon J. Jensen

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

David Buller appealed a district court order granting a petition for commitment of a sexually dangerous individual. On January 23, 2020, the State filed a petition for civil commitment of Buller as a sexually dangerous individual. On January 28, 2020, following a preliminary hearing, the district court entered an order of dismissal of the petition after finding the State failed to establish Buller had a condition that was manifested by a sexual disorder, personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction. On January 30, 2020, sua sponte and without notice to the parties, the court issued an order vacating the prior order dismissing the petition and finding probable cause was established to commit Buller. On February 19, 2020, Buller filed a petition for writ of mandamus to this Court. This Court exercised supervisory jurisdiction and vacated the district court’s January 30, 2020 order after considering the procedural irregularity of the second order issued sua sponte and without notice to the parties. On March 6, 2020, the State filed a new petition and started a new proceeding seeking commitment of Buller as a sexually dangerous individual. Buller requested dismissal of the new petition asserting res judicata precluded a second petition because the January 28, 2020 order dismissing the petition following the preliminary hearing was not vacated in the first proceeding. After completion of an evaluation in which two doctors reached an opinion Buller met the criteria of a sexually dangerous individual, the district court again issued an order granting the petition seeking commitment. Buller argued the proceedings in this case were bared by res judicata and the order for commitment was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.

Begg v. Alexander-Scott

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 18-155

Opinion Date: December 10, 2020

Judge: Maureen McKenna Goldberg

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court denying Appellant's administrative appeal from a decision of the Rhode Island Department of Health (DOH) in favor of the DOH director, Board of Examiners in Dentistry of the DOH, and the DOH, holding that the trial justice did not err. The Board imposed sanctions upon Appellant John F. Begg, D.D.S. for violations of R.I. Gen. Laws 5-31.1-10(19), (23), and (24) and sections 25.1.1, 27.1(s), 27.1(x), and 27.1(w) of DOH's rules and regulations pertaining to dentists, dental hygienists, and dental assistants. The trial justice affirmed the Board's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the DOH had subject matter jurisdiction over the administrative proceedings; (2) the Board did not utilize the subpoena power provided to it by R.I. Gen. Laws 5-31.1-4 and 5-31.1-14 in its request for patient healthcare information, nor was it required to do so; and (3) legally competent evidence existed to support the sanctions imposed by the Board.