Fry v. Rand Construction Corp. |
Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-2083 Opinion Date: July 1, 2020 Judge: Richardson Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Family Law, Labor & Employment Law |
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment entered in favor of Rand in an action brought by plaintiff, a former employee, alleging that Rand unlawfully fired her for taking leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The court affirmed and agreed with the district court that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Rand's justification for the termination was false and merely a pretext for retaliation. In this case, Rand presented a lawful explanation for firing plaintiff: performance problems. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding a former employee's testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. |
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Burns v. Burns |
Court: Alaska Supreme Court Docket: S-17394 Opinion Date: June 26, 2020 Judge: Joel H. Bolger Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Family Law |
A mother appealed a final order modifying custody of her three children, arguing the modification was to punish her and was not based on the best interests of the children. She claimed the superior court clearly erred in finding that she misrepresented information to third parties, including her son’s medical providers. She additionally argued she was denied due process because the superior court did not give her expert the opportunity to defend his methodology once the court determined that his psychological evaluation was outside the scope of its expectations. And she asserted the superior court erred in assigning no weight to her expert’s evaluation in making its credibility determinations. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court did not find the modification was made to publish the mother. The Court found the superior court based its underlying findings on the children's best interests, and the court did not clearly err in finding mother misrepresented information ot third parties. The Supreme Court also concluded mother was provided a meaningful opportunity to be heard; it was within the superior court’s discretion to decide how much weight to assign the psychological evaluations in making its credibility determinations. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the superior court’s modification order. |
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Marriage of Mullonkal & Kodiyamplakkil |
Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: C085825(Third Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Murray Areas of Law: Family Law |
Wife Carolyn Mullonkal and husband Sithaj Kodiyamplakkil were married for three years and five months. Husband appealed the judgment of dissolution and some post judgment orders, contending: (1) the community was entitled to reimbursement, under Family Code section 2641, for community funds spent repaying wife’s educational loans; (2) reimbursement was also required for community funds used to pay wife’s non-educational loans; (3) wife breached her fiduciary duty by transferring community property to family members; (4) the trial court abused its discretion in awarding only $10,000 of the over $108,000 in attorney’s fees he incurred; (5) the court also abused its discretion in denying a new trial; and (6) the trial court erred in finding a bank account of husband’s was community property. The Court of Appeal agreed with husband as to every contention except the fifth. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. |
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McCord v. Smith |
Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: G057614(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 26, 2020 Judge: Richard D. Fybel Areas of Law: Family Law |
After the end of their relationship, former domestic partners Keith McCord and Celeste Smith each asked the trial court for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against the other. The court granted Smith’s request and denied McCord’s request. The court also dismissed with prejudice McCord’s request for an order to show cause (OSC) why Smith should not be held in contempt. McCord appealed from the court’s order. The Court of Appeal found substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings underlying the issuance of the DVRO in favor of Smith and against McCord. There was no evidence supporting the issuance of a DVRO in favor of McCord and against Smith, and McCord made no specific argument on appeal regarding that portion of the trial court’s order. |
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Yost v. Forestiere |
Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: F078580(Fifth Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Donald R. Franson, Jr. Areas of Law: Family Law |
Subdivision (j)(1) of Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 provides that civil harassment restraining orders are subject to modification or termination on the motion of a party, but does not specify the grounds for modification. In the published portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal addressed and resolved several legal questions involving section 527.6, subdivision (j)(1) that have not been explicitly decided in a published decision. First, the court held that the determination whether to modify or terminate a civil harassment restraining order is committed to "the discretion of the court;" second, the trial court's discretionary authority to modify or terminate a civil harassment restraining order includes, but is not limited to, the three grounds for modifying ordinary injunctions set forth in section 533; third, a trial court has the discretion to modify a restraining order when, after considering the relevant evidence presented, it determines there is no reasonable probability of future harassment; and fourth, the restrained party seeking modification on the ground that there is no longer a reasonable probability of a future harm has the burden of proving this ground by a preponderance of the evidence. In this case, the court reversed the trial court's order denying Grandfather's request to modify a civil harassment restraining order and directed the trial court to vacate the order. |
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Department of Revenue Child Support Enforcement v. Grullon |
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12784 Opinion Date: June 25, 2020 Judge: Cypher Areas of Law: Family Law |
In Father's appeal from a civil contempt order and subsequent judgment on a complaint for unpaid child support filed by Mother, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the judge abused her discretion in holding Father in civil contempt. Mother filed a pro se complaint for civil contempt in the probate and family court alleging that Father, the noncustodial parent, was $3,690 in his child support payments. Father filed an answer and counterclaim for modification, claiming that his past incarceration and subsequent difficulty obtaining employment made past and future payments at the set rate impossible. The judge held Father in contempt and then entered judgment on Father's complaint for modification, reducing his ongoing child support obligation to his requested amount. The Supreme Court vacated the civil contempt judgment against Father, holding (1) Father's case should not have reached the civil contempt hearing stage, (2) the Department of Revenue failed to follow the Federal regulations and its own procedures in failing to assist Father, and (3) the judge failed to provide Father with sufficient procedural safeguards. |
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Planned Parenthood of St. Louis Region v. Department of Social Services, Division of Medical Services |
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri Docket: SC98020 Opinion Date: June 30, 2020 Judge: Paul C. Wilson Areas of Law: Family Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law |
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court declaring section 11.800 of House Bill No. 2011 (HB2011) invalid, holding that there was a direct conflict between the language of Mo. Rev. Stat. 208.153.2 and 208.152.1(6), (12) requiring the MO HealthNet Division of the Missouri Department of Social Services to pay its authorized providers for covered physicians' services and family planning provided to Medicaid-eligible individuals and the language of section 11.800 prohibiting MO HealthNet from doing so. Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region and Reproductive Health Services of Planned Parenthood (Planned Parenthood) was an authorized provider of physicians' services and family planning because it had an agreement with MO HealthNet to do so. MO HealthNet informed Planned Parenthood that it could not reimburse Planned Parenthood for those services during the fiscal year 2019 due to section 11.800, which stated that "No funds shall be expended to any abortion facility...." The circuit court concluded that section 11.800 of HB2011 violated Mo. Const. Art. III, 23 because it amended substantive law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 11.800 was invalid because article III, section 23 prohibits using an appropriation bill to amend a substantive statute; and (2) the circuit court properly severed that provision from the remainder of HB2011. |
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Doerr v. Doerr |
Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 306 Neb. 350 Opinion Date: July 2, 2020 Judge: Michael G. Heavican Areas of Law: Family Law |
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dissolving the marriage of Tammy Doerr and Brian Doerr, holding that the district court did not err in its division of the marital estate. On appeal, Brian challenged the district court's decision to award half of the proceeds from what he claimed was his separate property to Tammy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in awarding roughly half of the equity of the parties' home on Howard Street in Fremont to Tammy; (2) did not err in its division of the parties' bank accounts; (3) did not err by not equally dividing the marital debt comprising a credit card balance and a bill for preseparation renovations; and (4) did not err calculating the amount of the equalization payment. |
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In re Interest of Noah C. |
Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 306 Neb. 359 Opinion Date: July 2, 2020 Judge: Lindsey Miller-Lerman Areas of Law: Family Law |
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the juvenile court terminating the parental rights of Samantha H. to her minor child, Noah C., holding that the juvenile court did not err when it denied Samantha's motion to continue the termination and when it found that termination was in the best interests of Noah. After a termination hearing, the district court entered a written order finding that sufficient evidence was presented to demonstrate clearly and convincingly that termination of parental rights was appropriate under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-292(7) and in the best interests of Noah. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Samantha's motion for a continuance; and (2) it was shown by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Samantha's parental rights would be in Noah's best interests. |
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State ex rel. Miah S. v. Ian K. |
Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 306 Neb. 372 Opinion Date: July 2, 2020 Judge: Stacy Areas of Law: Family Law |
The Supreme Court vacated the order of the juvenile court granting the State's complaint seeking to disestablish the paternity of Aaron S. to a child born during his marriage to the child's mother and to establish paternity in another man, holding that the State was not statutorily authorized to bring the action. After genetic testing showed that Ian K. was the child's biological father the State filed a complaint seeking to establish Ian's paternity. A trial was held, and at the conclusion of the evidence the State asked the court to disestablish Aaron, the husband of the child's mother, as the child's legal father and to establish Ian as the child's father so he could effectively relinquish his rights. The juvenile court entered an order which purported to disestablish Aaron as the child's biological father and to establish Ian's as the child's father. The Supreme Court vacated the order, holding that because the child was not born out of wedlock and was the legitimate child of Aaron, the State lacked statutory authority to bring this paternity action under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-1411. |
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Brown v. Brown |
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 135 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Jerod E. Tufte Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Family Law |
Nathanael Brown appealed the issuance of a domestic violence protection order which enjoined him from having contact with Flavia Brown and restricted his right to possess firearms. In late September 2019, Flavia Brown petitioned the district court for a protection order against Nathanael. The court issued a temporary protection order and an order for hearing procedure which set a hearing for October 9, 2019. The order for hearing procedure stated evidence would be taken by affidavit only and a party seeking to cross-examine an affiant must notify the opposing party at least twenty-four hours before the hearing. On the day before the hearing, Nathanael Brown filed notice of appearance and a request to continue the hearing. On the day of the hearing, he filed notice of cross-examination. At the time scheduled for the hearing, the district court denied Nathanael's requests for continuance and cross-examination because they were untimely under the order for hearing procedure. At the outset of the hearing, Nathanael objected to the district court’s affidavit procedure, arguing that it would deny him due process and a “full hearing” under N.D.C.C. 14-07.1-02. The district court denied Nathanael permission to cross-examine Flavia about her affidavit or to present any of his own evidence. The court accepted Flavia's affidavit and granted the domestic violence protection order preventing Nathanael from having contact with Flavia Brown for two years. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded Nathanael was denied a full hearing under N.D.C.C. 14-07.1-02(4), the protection order was reversed and the matter remanded for a full hearing. |
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Wisnewski v. Wisnewski |
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 148 Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Lisa K. Fair McEvers Areas of Law: Family Law |
Alicia Wisnewski appealed a divorce judgment distributing property, awarding spousal support, declining to award attorney’s fees, determining parenting time, decisionmaking responsibility, and child support. Alicia argued the district court’s findings on domestic violence were insufficient and the finding that the statutory domestic violence presumption was rebutted was clearly erroneous. She also argued the court erred in determining joint decisionmaking responsibility, distributing property, allocating debts, failing to award attorney’s fees, and in determining child support and spousal support. After review of the facts specific to this case, the North Dakota Supreme Court had difficulty finding support in the record for some of the trial court's decisions with respect to all issues Alicia raised. The Court affirmed with respect to the spousal support decision, but remanded for supplemental findings for generally all other issues. |
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State ex rel. Martin v. Tuscarawas County Job & Family Services |
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-3507 Opinion Date: July 1, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Family Law, Government & Administrative Law |
The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus sought by Relators compelling Tuscarawas County Job and Family Services (TCJFS) to produce copies of, or permit Relators to inspect, records pertaining to their childhood history with TCJFS, holding that TCJFS did not have a clear legal duty to allow Relators to inspect or copy the records they sought. Relators were sisters who spent portions of their childhoods in the Tuscarawas County foster care system. Relators believed that they experienced trauma while in foster care and that access to their TCJFS records would help them move forward with their lives. Relators commenced this mandamus action seeking to compel TCJFS to produce copies of, or permit Relators' access to, TCJFS records pertaining to them. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) the TCJFS director's good-cause finding did not create a legal duty requiring TCJFS to give Relators full access to all TCJFS records pertaining to them; (2) Ohio.Adm.Code 5101:2-33-21(H) did not impose a duty on TCJFS to disseminate any records to Relators; and (3) Relators failed to submit sufficient evidence supporting that there was good cause to override Ohio Rev. Code 5153.17's confidentiality requirement. |
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In the Matter of L.M.A. |
Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court Citation: 2020 OK 63 Opinion Date: June 30, 2020 Judge: James E. Edmondson Areas of Law: Family Law |
This case involved three children and a district court's judgment finding the children were deprived and father's parental rights should be terminated. The children were taken into emergency custody in 2016. The mother had been incarcerated, and the father shortly thereafter, for violation of the terms of his probation. DHS determined the home was "inadequate, dangerous, and unfit," and that the children were neglected. Their condition evinced developmental delay, lack of medical care, lack of hygiene, and lack of food. The children were removed from their home. Their mother voluntarily terminated her parental rights. The petition to terminate father's parental rights was based in part on his previous conviction for two counts of first-degree rape dating back to 2005. Father also had a previous Alaska conviction for sexual assault. After a jury trial, the children were adjudicated deprived by the court and the jury's verdict found two reasons for terminating father's parental rights. Father appealed the judgment and the Oklahoma Supreme Court retained the appeal. After review, the Supreme Court held the evidence was sufficient for the adjudication of deprived status and termination of father's parental rights. Accordingly, the Court upheld the district court's judgment. |
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In re Indiana M. |
Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court Docket: 18-187 Opinion Date: June 26, 2020 Judge: Paul A. Suttell Areas of Law: Family Law |
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the family court denying, without prejudice, Mother's motion to intervene, as well as her motion to vacate or, in the alternative, to revoke a guardianship regarding her daughter, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the hearing justice properly granted the guardianship petition but affirmed without prejudice to Mother filing a motion to revoke the guardianship. A guardianship was filed on behalf of the individuals caring for the child and signed by Father, signifying his consent to the guardianship. The hearing justice granted the guardianship petition. Mother subsequently filed a motion to vacate, otherwise grant relief, or in the alternative, to revoke guardianship, arguing (1) her due process rights were violated because she was never served with process for either the neglect or guardianship petitions, and (2) the guardianship petition was granted in violation of statutory in law because she never gave written consent to the petition. The family court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) despite the lack of formal service of process, the petition was properly granted; and (2) under the circumstances, the hearing justice properly granted the guardianship petition without Mother's consent. |
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In re Rylee A. |
Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court Dockets: 18-173, 18-174 Opinion Date: July 1, 2020 Judge: Maureen McKenna Goldberg Areas of Law: Family Law |
The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the family court terminating Respondents' parental rights to their daughter, holding that the findings of the family court justice were based on clear and convincing evidence and were not clearly wrong, nor did the justice overlook or misconceive material evidence. The family court justice concluded that it was in the best interest of the child that the parental rights of Respondents be terminated based on the finding of unfitness. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the family court justice did not err in (1) admitting into evidence a medical report prepared by Dr. Adebimpe Adewusi, the child's treating physician; (2) finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondents were unfit parents "by reason of conduct or conditions seriously detrimental to the child," in that they committed, or allowed to be committed, conduct toward the child "of a cruel and abusive nature"; and (3) finding that it was in the best interest of the child that Respondents' parental rights be terminated. |
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New v. Dumitrache |
Court: Tennessee Supreme Court Docket: W2017-00776-SC-R11-CV Opinion Date: June 29, 2020 Judge: Clark Areas of Law: Family Law |
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the chancery court dismissing Plaintiff's appeal from an order of protection "in nature of writ of error," holding that the writ of error is no longer a viable method of appeal. A general sessions court entered an order of protection prohibiting Plaintiff from having contact with Defendants, his ex-wife and child. Plaintiff subsequently filed an "appeal in nature of writ of error," attaching an incomplete copy of the couple's Texas divorce decree. The chancery court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the appeal untimely and the method of appeal obsolete, and determining that the petition for enrollment was defective on its face. The court then awarded Defendants attorney's fees and costs. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the chancery court (1) correctly concluded that the writ of error is no longer a viable method of appeal and dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) correctly dismissed Plaintiff's request to enroll the Texas decree because he provided an incomplete copy of the decree; and (3) correctly awarded Defendants attorney's fees. |
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In re C.J.C. |
Court: Supreme Court of Texas Docket: 19-0694 Opinion Date: June 26, 2020 Judge: Bland Areas of Law: Family Law |
The Supreme Court conditionally granted Father's petition for writ of mandamus, holding that when a nonparent requests conservatorship or possession of a child, the child's best interest is rooted in the presumption that the fit parent, rather than a court, makes the determination whether to allow that request. Over Father's objection, the trial court entered temporary orders naming Jason a possessory conservator of Abigail with rights to possession of the child. Jason, who was in a relationship with Abigail's mother until she died, had exercised care and control of Abigail when she resided with Mother for at least six months preceding Mother's death. Father filed a petition for writ of mandamus, arguing that the trial court's orders violated his right to parent Abigail without government intervention. The Supreme Court conditionally granted the writ and directed the trial court to vacate its temporary orders, holding (1) the presumption that fit parents act according to the best interest of their children applies when modifying an existing order that names a parent as the child's managing conservator; and (2) because no evidence demonstrated that Father was unfit to be Abigail's parent or did not act in her best interest, the trial court abused its discretion in ordering that Jason be named Abigail's possessory conservator. |
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