Department of Justice Once Again Proves Its Loyalty to the President, Not the Rule of Law

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat—Associate Provost, Associate Dean of the Faculty, and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science at Amherst College—comments on the recent news that the Justice Department will seek dismissal of charges against Michael Flynn. Sarat suggests that because the decision does not seem to advance the fair administration of justice in this case, the court should take the unusual step of refusing to grant the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss.

Read More

PPG Industries Inc. v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 19-1165

Opinion Date: May 4, 2020

Judge: D. Michael Fisher

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

Beginning around 1915, NPRC operated a Jersey City chemical plant, turning chromite ore into chromium chemicals for dyeing cloth and tanning leather. The process generated hazardous chemical waste that eventually seeped into the soil and groundwater. During both World Wars, the production of chromium chemicals was regulated. During World War II, the government designated chromium chemicals as “critical” war materials and implemented controls concerning labor conditions, supplies, subsidies, and pricing. In 1944, the Chemicals Bureau officially recommended that producers switch to a quicker, more wasteful process. Government orders did not direct how the ores were to be processed, how the chemicals were to be made, or how waste should be handled. PPG purchased the site in 1954 and processed chromium chemicals there until 1963, using essentially the same processes as NPRC, including stockpiling the waste outdoors. PPG has spent $367 million to remediate the site and other contaminated areas. PPG sued under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9607, seeking recovery and contribution for costs associated with cleanup. After four years of discovery, the district court granted the government summary judgment. The Third Circuit affirmed. Governmental involvement with the plant during the wars did not make it an “operator” liable for the cleanup costs associated with the waste. Governmental actions in relation to the plant were consistent with general wartime influence over the industry and did not extend to control over pollution-related activities.

Bates v. Green Farms Condominium Association

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 19-2127

Opinion Date: May 4, 2020

Judge: Murphy

Areas of Law: Banking, Consumer Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Bateses lost their condominium through a nonjudicial foreclosure. They claim the condo complex’s management company and its law firm violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, which generally defines “debt collectors” to cover parties who operate a “business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts” or who “regularly collect or attempt to collect” debts owed another, 15 U.S.C. 1692a(6). The Act contains a separate debt-collector definition for subsection 1692f(6), regulating parties who operate a “business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests.” General debt collectors must comply with all of the Act’s protections; security-interest enforcers need only comply with section 1692f(6). In 2019, the Supreme Court held (Obduskey) that parties who assist creditors with the nonjudicial foreclosure of a home fall within the separate definition, not the general one. Obduskey left open the possibility that these parties might engage in “other conduct” that would transform them from security interest enforcers into general debt collectors, subject to all of the Act’s regulations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a judgment on the pleadings for the defendants. The Bateses’ complaint did not plead enough facts to take the defendants outside the separate definition for security-interest enforcers and bring them within the general debt-collector definition; there were almost no well-pleaded allegations about the principal business or regular activities of either.

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Thunder Properties, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 17-16399

Opinion Date: May 1, 2020

Judge: Ronald Murray Gould

Areas of Law: Banking, Real Estate & Property Law

The Ninth Circuit certified to the Nevada Supreme Court the following questions: (1) When a lienholder whose lien arises from a mortgage for the purchase of a property brings a claim seeking a declaratory judgment that the lien was not extinguished by a subsequent foreclosure sale of the property, is that claim exempt from statute of limitations under City of Fernley v. Nevada Department of Taxation, 366 P.3d 699 (Nev. 2016)? (2) If the claim described in (1) is subject to a statute of limitations: (a) Which limitations period applies? (b) What causes the limitations period to begin to run?

Davis v. Pennymac Loan Services, LLC

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 Ark. 180

Opinion Date: May 7, 2020

Judge: Karen R. Baker

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

In a certified question of law regarding the requirement for creditors to comply strictly with the Arkansas Statutory Foreclosure Act the Supreme Court held that Ark. Code Ann. 18-50-104(b)(4) requires disclosure of the specific default under the terms of the mortgage agreement. The Court by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Arkansas certified the question of law to the Supreme Court, asking whether mere acknowledgment that a default has occurred is sufficient for the trustee's Notice of Default and Intention to Sell or whether section 18-5-104(b)(4) requires the trustee's notice of default to set forth the default for which foreclosure is made. The Supreme Court answered that the statute requires that the notice must state the specific default that occurred.

Gutierrez v. Gutierrez

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B291507(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 6, 2020

Judge: Wiley

Areas of Law: Family Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the family court's division of marital property and rejected father's four claims of error. The court deferred to the family court's credibility call in rejecting two of father's witnesses as unreliable, and held that substantial evidence supported the family court's conclusion that a $171,099 obligation remained on the Hacienda Heights home, which sum it subtracted from the home's value. The court upheld the family court's sanction against father for his omission of another property in his preliminary and final declarations of disclosure. The court held that the family court did not abuse its discretion in interpreting a 2008 order directing father to sell a third property. Finally, the court held that substantial evidence supported the family court's judgment regarding father's Jeep, tools, all-terrain vehicle, and watch.

Hiona v. Superior Court

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A158689(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 6, 2020

Judge: Barbara J.R. Jones

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law

In 2018, Landlord served Tenants with a Notice of Termination of Tenancy “in furtherance of [Landlord’s] withdrawal of the Property from residential rental use.” After the withdrawal date, Landlord filed unlawful detainer (UD) actions against Tenants under the Ellis Act. (Gov. Code, 7060) as unlimited civil cases. Landlord brought summary judgment motions for restitution of the premises based on Tenants’ holdover under the Ellis Act and the San Francisco rent ordinance. Landlord waived damages, estimated at $92-105 per day. After those motions were granted, Tenants moved to reclassify the actions as limited civil cases, arguing Landlord waived all unlawful detainer damages and that it was impossible for Landlord to meet the $25,000 minimum judgment amount for an unlimited civil matter. The trial court denied the motions for reclassification and entered judgments for possession in favor of Landlord. The court of appeal denied Tenants’ petition for a writ of mandate. Under the plain language of Code of Civil Procedure section 403.040(e), a UD action, filed as an unlimited civil case, need not be reclassified as a limited civil case if the landlord waives its claim to damages for the purpose of obtaining a judgment for possession by way of a motion for summary judgment.

Modesto Irrigation Dist. v. Tanaka

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C083430(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 7, 2020

Judge: Vance W. Raye

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Appellant Heather Robinson Tanaka’s great-grandfather purchased a subdivided parcel that had been part of a larger riparian tract but was no longer contiguous to water. Riparian rights can persist in land sold under such circumstances, though the grantee cannot acquire riparian rights any greater than those held by the grantor. The question presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether the parties intended the grantee to receive riparian rights in such a transfer. "The clearest expression of intent is when a deed expressly conveys the riparian rights to the noncontiguous parcel, in which case the parcel retains its riparian status. However, where the deed is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is admissible on the question." Here, the trial court, after considering the language of the deed at issue and extrinsic evidence, concluded the conveyance to Tanaka’s great-grandfather did not convey riparian rights. As a consequence, Tanaka had no rights to divert water from Middle River onto her small, approximately 106-acre parcel that has been used for farmland for 130 years. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court’s conclusion and reversed.

HawaiiUSA Federal Credit Union v. Monalim

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCWC-16-0000807

Opinion Date: April 30, 2020

Judge: Richard W. Pollack

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court held that, in foreclosure cases in which a deficiency judgment is entered, the traditional process by which Hawai'i courts calculate a deficiency judgment can result in unjust enrichment, and therefore, the equities weigh in favor of adopting the method of calculating a deficiency judgment employed by a majority of other jurisdictions because the majority rule protects all parties to the mortgage. Mortgagors defaulted on their loans, the property was sold, and the foreclosure sale process was less than the amount due on the mortgage. The mortgagee waited more than four years before it attempted to collect a deficiency judgment. Mortgagors argued that the traditional method for calculating a deficiency judgment is unfair and asked that the Court adopt the majority approach, in which the greater of the fair market value as of the date of the foreclosure sale or the sale prices of the property is deducted from the money owed when calculating the deficiency. The circuit court granted a deficiency judgment, and the intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts' judgments and remanded the case, holding that this Court adopts the majority approach to calculating deficiency judgments, and the adoption of the majority rule is prospective in effect.

Haynes v. Haas

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCWC-16-0000570

Opinion Date: May 5, 2020

Judge: Mark E. Recktenwald

Areas of Law: Personal Injury, Real Estate & Property Law

In this nuisance action, the Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's final judgments and the intermediate court of appeals' (ICA) judgment affirming in part, holding that the ICA erred by concluding that damages are not recoverable for common-law public nuisance actions absent a statute designating the activity as a public nuisance. Plaintiffs alleged that by allowing individuals to live in one of its storage units in violation of land use and public health laws Allied Storage property maintained a public nuisance and that Chung Partners, as a lesser/sub-lessor of the property, had a duty not to maintain the nuisance on the property. The circuit court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. The ICA affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs were foreclosed from recovering damages as a matter of law in the absence of a statutory duty. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter for further proceedings, holding that, as a matter of law, a claim for common-law public nuisance is cognizable when the plaintiff has suffered individualized harm.

Wiggins. v. City of Clinton

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2019-CA-00010-SCT

Opinion Date: May 7, 2020

Judge: Michael K. Randolph

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Matthew Wiggins appealed a decision of a special court of eminent domain to the County Court of Hinds County, Mississippi, approving the City of Clinton’s exercise of eminent domain. Wiggins bought property in March of 2016. At the time, the structures located there were dilapidated and were in need of extensive structural repairs. Soon after Wiggins took possession of the properties, Clinton found that the properties should be demolished due to neglect. Clinton assessed 1,434 separate code violations to property Wiggins owned. Wiggins pleaded guilty to the violations on January 26, 2017. Clinton then found additional violations against Wiggins at those properties and at other properties he owned in Clinton. Wiggins was found guilty of two violations by the County Court of Hinds County in 2018. The remaining violations were dismissed. In June 2018, Clinton adopted an urban-renewal plan. Wiggins' parcel was within the renewal area, and sought to take it. The special court found Clinton’s exercise of eminent domain proper. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found sufficient evidence in the special court record to support the taking my eminent domain. Similarly, the Court determined the record offered no evidence to demonstrate the determination of the special court was manifestly wrong. Therefore, judgment was affirmed.

FTR Farms, Inc. v. Rist Farm, Inc.

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 305 Neb. 708

Opinion Date: May 1, 2020

Judge: William B. Cassel

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in this partition action, holding that partition in kind cannot be decreed using owelty - or a monetary payment to equalize values - without great prejudice to the owners. On appeal, Appellant argued, among other things, that the district court erred in determining that it did not have authority to award owelty to make partition in kind equitable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) owelty is permitted in partition cases but should be rarely utilized and only when it is equitably necessary; and (2) the district court did not err in rejecting the owelty award and ordering partition by sale because Appellee met its burden to establish that partition in kind could not be had without great prejudice.

Chappell v. N.C. Department of Transportation

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 51PA19

Opinion Date: May 1, 2020

Judge: Earls

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court awarding Plaintiffs compensation for a taking of various portions of their property with pre-judgment interest, holding that the portion of the trial court's order concerning the proper evaluation of the pre-judgment interest rate was contrary to this Court's precedents. In 1987, the General Assembly adopted the Roadway Corridor Official Map Act. In 1992 and 2006, portions of Plaintiffs' property were designated as within a roadway corridor pursuant to that statute. Plaintiffs filed an inverse condemnation complaint against the North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) seeking compensation for the taking. Final judgment was issued awarding Plaintiffs $137,247 for the 1992 taking and $6,139 for the 2006 taking, both with pre-judgment interest at eight percent compounded annually. NCDOT appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court did not err in proceeding to trial on the inverse condemnation complaint; (2) any error in the court's characterization of the taking was harmless; (3) the court's treatment of the reduced property taxes was proper; but (4) the trial court erred concerning the proper evaluation of the pre-judgment interest rate.

CFS 915, LLC v. Unetixs Vascular, Inc.

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 18-237

Opinion Date: May 1, 2020

Judge: William P. Robinson, III

Areas of Law: Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court for possession of certain property in favor of Plaintiff pursuant to the granting of summary judgment for Plaintiff, holding that when Plaintiff purchased the property at a foreclosure sale, all interests inferior to the foreclosed mortgage were extinguished and that no genuine issue of material fact remained. In 2008, MCH Realty, LLC, the then-owner of the property, entered into a lease agreement with Unetixs Vascular, Inc. to lease the property. In 2013, MCH executed a mortgage deed to DBS Bank Ltd. secured by its interest in the property. DBS later assigned its interest in the mortgage to CFS. In 2016, MCH and Unitexs extended the term of the lease. In 2017, CFS foreclosed on the mortgage and purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. CFS then filed a complaint seeking to evict Unetisx and another tenant (together, Tenants) and MCH from the property. A hearing justice granted the motion, ruling that the mortgage was superior to the Tenants' unrecorded leases and that, therefore, the leases were extinguished upon foreclosure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that CFS was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

McElroy v. Stephens

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 18-352

Opinion Date: May 6, 2020

Judge: Gilbert V. Indeglia

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and declaring that Plaintiffs were entitled to unobstructed access to a beach easement and may cross Defendants' properties to reach that easement, holding that genuine issues of material fact remained, precluding summary judgment. At trial, Plaintiffs asserted that their property enjoyed an unrestricted easement appurtenant to the beach by virtue of the original easement to cross over the beach and that they were entitled access to the beach because they held a right-of-way over all three of defendants' properties based on the doctrines of easement by implication and easement by necessity. The hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that where the hearing justice did not first determine whether an implied easement or easement by necessity existed for Plaintiffs to cross over Defendants' properties, the case must be remanded for further fact-finding.

Trask v. Meade County Commission

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 S.D. 25

Opinion Date: May 6, 2020

Judge: Salter

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Tax Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court affirming the assessed value of Appellants' agricultural land by the Meade County Commission sitting as a board of equalization (the Board), holding that the circuit court did not err. Before the Board, Appellants argued that the director of equalization incorrectly applied statutory provisions to determine their land's production value. The Board further adjusted the assessment from an average of $519 per acre down to an average of $512 per acre. Appellants appealed the Board's decision to circuit court. After a trial de novo, the circuit court affirmed the Board's tax assessment of the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it determined that (1) the Board complied with the statutory provisions for evaluating agricultural land in their assessment of Appellants' property; and (2) the Board's tax assessment of the property did not violate provisions of the South Dakota Constitution that require uniform taxation at no more than its actual value.

Robbins v. Mason County Title Ins. Co.

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 96726-1

Opinion Date: May 7, 2020

Judge: Charles Wiggins

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts, Insurance Law, Native American Law, Real Estate & Property Law

In 1854, the Washington Territory and nine Native American tribes, including the Squaxin Island Tribe (the Tribe), entered into the 1854 Treaty of Medicine Creek (the Treaty), under which the Tribe relinquished their rights to land but retained “the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations . . . , in common with all citizens of the Territory.” The District Court for the Western District of Washington has interpreted “fish” under the Treaty to include shellfish. In 1978, Leslie and Harlene Robbins (Robbins) purchased property in Mason County, Washington that included tidelands with manila clam beds. In connection with the purchase of the property, Robbins obtained a standard policy of title insurance from Mason County Title Insurance Company (MCTI) which provided MCTI would insure Robbins “against loss or damage sustained by reason of: . . . [a]ny defect in, or lien or encumbrance on, said title existing at the date hereof.” For years Robbins had contracted with commercial shellfish harvesters to enter Robbins’s property to harvest shellfish from the tidelands. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether MCTI had a duty to defend Robbins when the Tribe announced it planned to assert its treaty right to harvest shellfish from the property. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the superior court for further proceedings. The Supreme Court held that because the insurance policy conceivably covered the treaty right and no exceptions to coverage applied, MCTI owed the property owners a duty to defend and, in failing to do so, breached the duty. Because this breach was unreasonable given the uncertainty in the law, MCTI acted in bad faith. Further, because the property owners did not seek summary judgment on MCTI’s affirmative defenses, the Supreme Court remanded to the superior court for consideration of the defenses.

CIBC National Trust Co. v. Dominick

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 WY 56

Opinion Date: May 4, 2020

Judge: Kate M. Fox

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law

In this real property dispute, the Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal from the district court's partial summary judgment order, holding that the district court abused its discretion when it certified its partial summary judgment order as a final judgment under Wyo. R. Civ. P. 54(b). After his long-term romantic partner died, Defendant provided notice that he was the surviving joint tenant with survivorship rights as to a home in Teton County. Plaintiff, the executor of the decedent's estate, filed a declaratory judgment that Appellant and the decedent were tenants in common and asserted claims for breach of contract or partition. The district court concluded that Defendant owned the property as the surviving joint tenant. Over Defendant's objection, the district court certified the partial summary judgment order as a final judgment and stayed the remaining claim for slander of title. Plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and declined to convert the appeal to a writ of review, holding that the district court abused its discretion in finding "no just reason for delay" and certifying its partial summary judgment order as a final judgment.

Gayhart v. Corsi

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 WY 58

Opinion Date: May 6, 2020

Judge: Kautz

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that Tiphany L. Gayhart, trustee of the Tiphany L. Gayhart Living Trust, did not have an easement over Teala Drive, a private road in a subdivision, holding that the district court did not err in finding that Gayhart did not have a valid easement. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the language of the easement and the declaration of covenants, conditions and restrictions for the subdivision demonstrated that the easement over Teala Drive was to benefit the subdivision, not property outside the subdivision. Because Gayhart's property lay outside the subdivision, the easement was not appurtenant to her property and could not be transferred apart from the subdivision.