Drafted and Shafted: Who Should Complain About Male-Only Registration?

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor comments on a recent opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit holding that requiring men but not women to register for the draft is constitutional under mandatory U.S. Supreme Court precedents. Specifically, Colb considers what the U.S. Supreme Court should do if it agrees to hear the case and more narrowly, whether the motives of the plaintiffs in that case bear on how the case should come out.

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Umbrella Investment Group, LLC v. Wolters Kluwer Financial Services, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 20-30078

Opinion Date: August 26, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Contracts, Real Estate & Property Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, for failure to state a claim, of UIG's complaint alleging claims for fraud and detrimental reliance. UIG obtained a loan from Pedestal Bank and Wolters Kluwer provided written certification that the property subject to the loan was not in a flood hazard area. When the loan came up for renewal, the bank informed UIG that the property was in a special flood hazard area and required flood insurance. Because the company was unable to afford flood insurance, the bank foreclosed on the property. After determining that it had jurisdiction over the appeal, the court held that the district court did not err in ruling that UIG failed to state a claim for fraud. In this case, the only relevant fact that UIG has alleged beyond what little it alleges "on information and belief" is that Wolters Kluwer provided "written certification that the property subject to the loan was not in a flood hazard area that required insurance under FEMA regulations pursuant to the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973." The court held that this fact alone can ground nothing more than speculation as to the cause of the error. Likewise, UIG's claim of detrimental reliance failed.

Protect Our Parks, Inc. v. Chicago Park District

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Dockets: 19-3333, 19-2308

Opinion Date: August 21, 2020

Judge: Barrett

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Barack Obama Foundation selected Jackson Park in Chicago to house the Obama Presidential Center. Chicago acquired 19.3 acres from the Chicago Park District, enacted the necessary ordinances, and entered into a use agreement with the Obama Foundation. Construction will require the removal of multiple mature trees, the diversion of roadways, and will require the city to shoulder some expenses. Opponents sued, alleging that the defendants violated Illinois’s public trust doctrine, which limits the government’s ability to transfer control or ownership of public lands to private parties and that under Illinois law, the defendants acted beyond their legal authority in entering the use agreement because it delegates decision-making authority to the Foundation and grants the Foundation an illegal lease in all but name, Under federal law, they argued that, by altering the use of Jackson Park and granting control to the Foundation, the defendants took the plaintiffs’ property for a private purpose and deprived them of property in a process lacking in procedural safeguards. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to the federal claims and held that the state claims should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Federal courts are only permitted to adjudicate claims that have allegedly caused the plaintiff a concrete injury. The federal claims allege a concrete injury, but the lack of a property interest is a fundamental defect. The state claims allege only policy disagreements.

United States v. Ginsberg

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 19-1305

Opinion Date: August 21, 2020

Judge: Daniel Anthony Manion

Areas of Law: Banking, Criminal Law, Real Estate & Property Law, White Collar Crime

Spring Hill owned a 240-apartment complex in a Chicago suburb. In 2007, the owner converted the apartments into condominiums and attempted to sell them. Ginsberg recruited several people to buy units in bulk, telling them they would not need to put their own money down and that he would pay them after the closings. The scheme was a fraud that consisted of multiple components and false statements to trick financial institutions into loaning nearly $5,000,000 for these transactions. The seller made payments through Ginsberg that the buyers should have made, which meant that the stated sales prices were shams, the loans were under-collateralized, and the “buyers” had nothing at stake. The seller paid Ginsberg about $1,200,000; Ginsberg used nearly $600,000 to make payments the buyers should have made, paid over $200,000 to the buyers and their relatives, and kept nearly $400,000 for himself. The loans ultimately went into default, causing the financial institutions significant losses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Ginsberg’s bank fraud conviction, 18 U.S.C. 1344. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude Ginsberg knew that the loan applications, real estate contracts, and settlement statements contained materially false information about the transactions, including the sales prices, the down payments, and Ginsberg's fees. The court rejected a challenge to the admission of testimony by a title company employee.

City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo & Co.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 19-15169

Opinion Date: August 26, 2020

Judge: Mary H. Murguia

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The City of Oakland filed suit alleging that Wells Fargo engaged in discriminatory lending practices by issuing predatory loans to its Black and Latino residents in violation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (FHA). On appeal, Wells Fargo challenged the district court's partial denial of its motion to dismiss the City's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami (Miami I), 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017), the Supreme Court held that to establish proximate cause under the FHA, a plaintiff must do more than show that its injuries foreseeably flowed from the alleged statutory violation. Rather, some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged is required. Pursuant to Miami I, the Ninth Circuit held, after reviewing the FHA's text and legislative history, that Congress clearly intended the nature of the statutory cause of action at issue in this case to be broad and inclusive enough to encompass less direct, aggregate, and city-wide injuries. Furthermore, all three of the Holmes factors support the panel's conclusion that it is administratively feasible for the district court to administer the aggregate, city-wide injuries that the City claims it suffered as a result of Wells Fargo's unlawful discriminatory lending practices throughout the City. The panel held that the allegations in the amended complaint are sufficient to plead that Oakland's reduced property-tax revenues, but not its increased municipal expenses, are proximately caused by Wells Fargo's discriminatory lending practices. Therefore, the panel affirmed the district court's denial of Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss as to the City's claims for lost property-tax revenues and the district court's grant of Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss as to Oakland's claims for increased municipal expenses. The panel also held that the FHA's proximate-cause requirement applies to claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. Accordingly, the panel reversed the district court's denial of Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss as to the City's claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The panel remanded for further proceedings.

United States v. Obaid

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 18-56657

Opinion Date: August 24, 2020

Judge: Johnnie B. Rawlinson

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying claimant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and for lack of proper venue a civil forfeiture case. This case arose from claimant's shares of stock in Palantir Technologies, a corporation with its principal place of business in California. Petitioner is a citizen of Saudi Arabia who wired $2 million from his account in Switzerland to a bank in California to purchase 2,500,000 shares of Series D preferred stock in Palantir. In this case, the government filed an in rem civil forfeiture action against claimant's Palantir shares, alleging that the shares were forfeitable because they were derived from proceeds traceable to a wire fraud and money laundering scheme. The panel held that the Supreme Court's decision in Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004), supports the panel's conclusion that the district court did not err when it determined that the constitutional due process requirements set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), were inapplicable to this in rem action. The Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), addressed quasi-in-rem actions rather than in rem actions directed solely toward a res instead of property seized as a substitute for the defendant. The panel explained that in an in rem action, the focus for the jurisdictional inquiry is the res, in this case claimant's Palantir shares, rather than claimant's personal contacts with the forum. The panel also held that venue was proper because sufficient acts giving rise to the civil forfeiture occurred in the Central District.

WM Mobile Bay Environmental Center, Inc. v. The City of Mobile Solid Waste Authority

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Dockets: 15-15466, 19-10239

Opinion Date: August 26, 2020

Judge: Lagoa

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Eleventh Circuit certified the following questions of law to the Alabama Supreme Court under Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure 18: (1) Can property owned by a solid waste disposal authority "belong to" a county or municipality for purposes of section 6-10-10? (2) If so, what factors should courts consider when making such a determination? (3) If section 6-10-10 can apply to property owned by a solid waste disposal authority, is such property "used for county or municipal purposes" when the authority has not used the property but is holding it for a future use? (4) Does Alabama continue to recognize a common law exemption from execution for property used for public purposes as described in Gardner v. Mobile & N.W.R. Co., 15 So. 271 (Ala. 1894)? (5) If so, does that exemption apply to public corporations like the Authority, and what standards should courts employ in applying this common law exemption?

Synergies3 Tec Services, LLC, et al. v. Corvo

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1170765

Opinion Date: August 21, 2020

Judge: Stewart

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury, Real Estate & Property Law

Synergies3 Tec Services, LLC ("Synergies3"), and DIRECTV, LLC ("DIRECTV"), appealed a circuit court judgment in favor of Lisa Corvo and Thomas Bonds and against Synergies3 and DIRECTV based on the doctrine of respondeat superior and a claim alleging negligent hiring, training, and supervision. Corvo and her fiance Bonds sued Daniel McLaughlin, Raymond Castro, and DIRECTV in the trial court, asserting claims of conversion and theft as to a diamond that had been removed from an engagement ring and $160 cash that, they alleged, had been taken from the master bedroom of Corvo's house on Ono Island when McLaughlin and Castro, employees of Synergies3, installed DIRECTV equipment in Corvo's house. Corvo and Bonds asserted the conversion and theft claims against DIRECTV under the doctrine of respondeat superior and, in addition, asserted claims against DIRECTV of negligent and wanton hiring, training, and supervision. They also sought damages for mental anguish and punitive damages. While the Alabama Supreme Court found the trial court did not err in denying Synergies3 and DIRECTV's motion for a judgment as a matter of law as to Corvo and Bonds's claim of negligent hiring, training, and supervision of Castro, but that punitive damages were improperly awarded. Judgment was reversed insofar as it held Synergies3 and DIRECTV vicariously or directly liable on the claims of theft and conversion, and insofar as it awarded punitive damages. The judgment was affirmed insofar as it held Synergies3 and DIRECTV liable for the negligent hiring, training, and supervision of Castro and awarded compensatory and mental-anguish damages.

Helvetica Servicing, Inc. v. Pasquan

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Docket: CV-19-0242-PR

Opinion Date: August 25, 2020

Judge: Robert M. Brutinel

Areas of Law: Banking, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court held that a trial court should consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding a residential purchase loan and identify certain factors in determining whether a loan is a construction loan entitled to anti-deficiency protection or a home improvement loan not entitled to anti-deficiency protection. Homeowners borrowed money from Desert Hills Bank to renovate and expand their property. Later, Homeowners borrowed money from Helvetica Servicing Inc. to pay off the Desert Hills loan. Homeowners' property secured the deed of trust. After Homeowners defaulted on the Helvetica loan, Helvetica sued to judicially foreclose. The trial court entered judgment for Helvetica and entered a deficiency judgment. Homeowners appealed, arguing that the Helvetica loan was entitled to anti-deficiency protection. The trial court ultimately found that the Desert Hills loan was a home improvement loan not entitled to anti-deficiency protection because Homeowners did not build a new home from scratch. The Supreme Court remanded the matter, holding (1) the "built from scratch" standard does not further the legislative objectives of Arizona's anti-deficiency statutes; (2) courts should consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding a loan when determining whether it is a home improvement or construction loan; and (3) the trial court did not make an independent factual determination as to whether the Desert Hills loan was a construction loan or a home improvement loan.

City of Bozeman v. Montana Department of Natural Resources & Conservation

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 MT 214

Opinion Date: August 25, 2020

Judge: James A. Rice

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order denying the petition filed by the City of Bozeman seeking judicial review of a final order of the Department of Natural Resources (DNRC) granting Utility Solutions, LLC's application to change a water right, holding that the court did not err in determining that the City's water facility plan did not qualify as an interest protectable from adverse effects under Mont. Code Ann. 85-2-402(2)(a). Utility Solutions filed its change application for authorization to change the place of use of its water use permit. The City filed an objection, arguing that the application would adversely affect the City's possessory interest in the area that was established by the City's adoption of a growth policy, as expanded geographically by an updated water facility plan. The DNRC hearing examiner granted the change application, concluding that although the change application resulted in a geographic overlap of the place of use with the City's water facility plan, the overlap did not result in an adverse effect within the meaning of section 85-2-402(2)(a). The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in affirming the DNRC's determination that Utility Solutions carried its burden to prove the City did not have an interest protectable from adverse effects.

Poplar Elementary School District No. 9 v. Froid Elementary School District No. 65

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 MT 216

Opinion Date: August 25, 2020

Judge: Beth Baker

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Education Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court affirming the Acting Roosevelt County Superintendent of School's grant of a territory transfer from Poplar Elementary School District No. 9 to Froid Elementary School District No. 65 pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 20-6-105, holding that the Acting Superintendent did not abuse her discretion, and that Poplar's constitutional challenges failed. On appeal, Poplar argued that the Acting Superintendent's decision granting the territory transfer petition constituted an abuse of discretion and that section 20-6-105, the territory transfer statute, is unconstitutional both facially and as applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly determined that the Acting Superintendent did not abuse her discretion in granting the petition to transfer the transfer territory; (2) the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel barred Poplar's facial constitutional challenge; and (3) Poplar's as-applied challenge failed because a school district does not have a constitutional right to due process.

J.E. Johnson & Associates v. Lindberg

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 55

Opinion Date: August 20, 2020

Judge: James W. Hardesty

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's amended judgment in favor of the buyers of residential real property and against the sellers and the real estate agents of both the buyers and the sellers and offsetting the judgment by a portion of the settlement amounts paid by the agents pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 17.245(1)(a), holding that the district court did not err. After the buyers brought suit alleging that all parties violated their statutory disclosure obligations the buyers settled with the sellers and the buyers' agents. The case proceeded to a bench trial against the sellers' agents, after which the district court entered judgment in favor of the buyers. Pursuant to section 17.245(1)(a), the district court offset the judgment by a portion of the settlement proceeds paid by the sellers and the buyers' agents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when considering if section 17.245(1)(a)'s settlement offsets apply, district courts must determine whether both the settling and the non settling defendants were responsible for the same injury; (2) substantial evidence supported the district court's determination that all the defendants caused the same injury; and (3) the district court properly calculated the offset amount.

City of Glen Ullin, et al. v. Schirado, et al.

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 ND 185

Opinion Date: August 27, 2020

Judge: Jerod E. Tufte

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The dispute concerned lots, streets, and alleys within or near the City of Glen Ullin. The lots, streets, and alleys were all surveyed and platted, but undeveloped. The Park District owned or had authority over the lots. The City had authority over the streets and alleys, which ran adjacent to and between the lots. The Schirados owned land near both the Park District property and the City property. The Shirados appealed after the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City and the Park District, concluding the case was res judicata due to a prior lawsuit between the Park District and the Schirados. The court entered judgment enjoining the Schirados from placing any obstruction or personal property on certain City lands and on certain Park District lands and awarded attorney’s fees. After its review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the court properly applied the doctrine of res judicata to the Park District lands, which were the subject of the prior lawsuit, but it erred when it applied res judicata to the City lands, which were not included in the prior lawsuit. The Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated the award of attorney’s fees and costs, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Gimbel v. Magrum, et al.

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 ND 181

Opinion Date: August 27, 2020

Judge: Daniel J. Crothers

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law

This dispute concerned two parcels of real estate located in Emmons County, North Dakota. Jeff and Donna Magrum appealed a district court judgment quieting title to real estate in Leslie Gimbel. The Magrums argued the court erred when it determined they did not acquire ownership of the property by adverse possession or acquiescence. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.

Kvande v. Thorson

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 ND 186

Opinion Date: August 27, 2020

Judge: Lisa K. Fair McEvers

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law

Dennis Thorson appeals from a judgment ordering him to remove a building from Keith Kvande’s property. Kvande owns real property described as Lot 3 in Block 1 of the School Addition to the City of Wheelock, Williams County, North Dakota. In 2012, Thorson purchased a building located in Epping, North Dakota. Kvande and Thorson had multiple discussions about moving the building to Kvande’s property. Thorson claimed they discussed moving the building onto Kvande’s property permanently, but Kvande claimed they only discussed moving the building onto his property for temporary storage. The parties did not have a written agreement about the property or the building. In fall 2012, Thorson had a concrete foundation poured for the building on Kvande’s property and moved the building onto the foundation. Thorson hooked the building up to sewer, water, and electrical service, and he began living in the building. Thorson did not pay Kvande rent or purchase the property. In May 2015 or 2016, Kvande demanded Thorson vacate the property, but Thorson did not leave. Kvande then attempted to evict Thorson from the property. In September 2017, Kvande sued Thorson, requesting the district court order Thorson to remove the building from the property and return the property to its prior state or award him the cost of having the building removed and the property restored. On appeal, Thorson argued laches and equitable estoppel applied and prevented Thorson’s removal from the property. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err by finding laches and equitable estoppel did not apply and did not preclude the court from ordering the removal of the building from Kvande’s property.

Muhlbradt, et al. v. Pederson, et al.

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 ND 187

Opinion Date: August 27, 2020

Judge: Lisa K. Fair McEvers

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law

Appellants, the Pederson defendants, appealed after a district court granted summary judgment quieting title to certain mineral interests in appellees, the Muhlbradt plaintiffs. The Pederson defendants argued the court erred in deciding a deed did not except or reserve a future 50 percent interest in the disputed mineral interests to the defendants or their predecessor in interest. They further contended the court erred in relying on division orders to conclude the defendants’ predecessor in interest conveyed the disputed mineral interests. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court.

Wilkinson, et al. v. Board of University and School Lands of the State of N.D.

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 ND 183

Opinion Date: August 27, 2020

Judge: Daniel J. Crothers

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Board of University and School Lands of the State of North Dakota, the State Engineer, and Statoil Oil & Gas LP appeal from a judgment determining William Wilkinson and the other plaintiffs owned mineral interests in certain North Dakota land. Although the judgment was not appealable because it did not dispose of all claims against all parties, the North Dakota Supreme Court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction to review the summary judgment. The Court concluded the district court did not err in concluding N.D.C.C. ch. 61-33.1 applied and the disputed mineral interests were above the ordinary high water mark of the historical Missouri riverbed channel, but the court erred in quieting title and failing to comply with the statutory process. Therefore, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

Gerlach v. The Cove Apartments, LLC

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 97325-3

Opinion Date: August 27, 2020

Judge: Debra Stephens

Areas of Law: Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law

After a night of drinking with friends, Kimberly Gerlach fell from the second-story balcony of her boyfriend’s unit at the Cove Apartments when the railing gave way. Gerlach sued, arguing Cove’s failure to repair the railing caused her fall and violated Cove’s duties to tenants and their guests. A jury agreed and found Cove was 93 percent at fault for Gerlach’s injuries. The Court of Appeals overturned this verdict and remanded for a new trial, finding the trial court erred by excluding evidence of Gerlach’s blood alcohol concentration (BAC) and by not dismissing Gerlach’s statutory claim under the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 1973 (RLTA). After review, the Washington Supreme Court reversed the appeals court: (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding BAC evidence that was only minimally relevant to Cove’s affirmative defense and risked prejudicing the jury against Gerlach.; and (2) while the trial court should not have allowed Gerlach’s RLTA claim, "this error alone does not justify a new trial because the jury’s verdict remains valid as to Gerlach’s common law claim."

75-80 Properties v. RALE, Inc.

Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Docket: 59/19

Opinion Date: August 24, 2020

Judge: Booth

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court vacating original development approvals by the Frederick Council Council so that the Council could proceed with a de novo reconsideration proceeding, holding that the circuit court did not err in vacating the development approvals after the Developers refused to participate in a de novo reconsideration proceeding. A local citizens group opposed the Developers' rezoning and development application and sought judicial review. The circuit court found that a former member of the Frederick County Board of Commissioners had violated the ethics statute by engaging in an ex parte communication and remanded the case for reconsideration. The Frederick County Council reconsidered the Developers' application in a de novo proceeding, but the Developers refused to participate. Thereafter, the circuit court vacated the original development approvals and remanded the matter. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the County Council had the discretion to determine the scope of the reconsideration proceeding; (2) the doctrine of zoning estoppel does not apply under the facts of this case; and (3) there is no ambiguity in the Ethics Statute.