Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: The Supreme Court Considers Whether an Independent Agency with a Single Director Who Can Be Removed Only “For Cause” is Constitutional

RODGER CITRON

Rodger Citron, Associate Dean for Research & Scholarship and Professor of Law at Touro Law, comments on a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court will hear argument this week that presents the question whether an independent agency with a single director who can be removed only “for cause” violates the separation of powers principle enshrined in the Constitution. Citron notes that the decision to hear the case is unusual in that there is no conflict among the federal appeals courts, but he points out that that the government’s support of the cert. petition and then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s dissent on the issue when it came before the D.C. Circuit likely helped the present case come before the Court.

Read More

Commonwealth v. Claudio

Docket: SJC-12786

Opinion Date: February 28, 2020

Judge: Budd

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case involving a consequence of the evidence tampering by Sonja Farak, a chemist at the State Laboratory Institute at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, the Supreme Judicial Court held that a defendant who qualified for an enhanced sentence due to a subsequently vacated predicate offense that had been tainted by Farak's misconduct may challenge the guilty plea without being exposed to a harsher sentence than that which he received in exchange for his plea. Defendant was indicted on two counts alleging aggravated statutory rape and as a habitual criminal, with two drug offenses on his prior record as the predicate convictions. Defendant pleaded guilty to lesser charges without the habitual offender enhancements. Defendant was later identified as a "Farak defendant," and one of his prior drug convictions was vacated. Before seeking to withdraw his guilty plea, Defendant requested a ruling that if he succeeded in withdrawing his plea he would not be subject to a harsher punishment as the result of a reprosecution of the rape charges. The superior court judge asked whether protections from harsher punishment established for "Dookhan defendants" apply to "Farak defendants" challenging Farak-related predicate offenses that resulted in enhanced sentences on subsequent convictions. The Supreme Judicial Court answered the question in the positive.

Drake v. Town of Leicester

Docket: SJC-12781

Opinion Date: February 28, 2020

Judge: Lowy

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court dismissing Plaintiff's negligence action against the Town of Leicester due to her untimely presentment, holding that Plaintiff's presentment was untimely because presentment occurs upon delivery to the office of the proper executive officer. Exactly two years after her claim arose, Plaintiff mailed her presentment letter to the Town. The Town denied liability for Plaintiff's injuries, and Plaintiff brought this action the following month. The superior court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint as untimely. At dispute on appeal was whether placing a presentment letter in the mail constitutes presentment under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, 4 or receipt by the proper executive officer. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on a third ground, holding (1) presentment occurs upon delivery to the office of the proper executive officer; and (2) therefore, Plaintiff's presentment was untimely.