Disaster Relief to States and Cities Is Both Right and Good: Part 2 of 2

NEIL H. BUCHANAN

In this second of a two-part series of columns, UF Levin College of Law professor Neil H. Buchanan explains why Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell is incorrect in claiming that the reason Democratic-led states are in trouble is that they are providing excessively generous pensions to retirees who worked for state and local governments. Buchanan then examines a workaround, first described by Professor Darien Shanske of the University of California at Davis, that would allow the Federal Reserve to give assistance to states and cities without interference from Republicans in the Senate or the White House.

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The Wisconsin Supreme Court Dresses Up Culture War in Jurisprudential Garb

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat— Associate Provost, Associate Dean of the Faculty, and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science at Amherst College—comments on the decision by the conservative Wisconsin Supreme Court halting the state’s stay at home order. Sarat points out that the opinion recapitulates, without acknowledgment, debates in analytic jurisprudence about the distinction between orders and rules, and he argues that while the decision may be good for the Trump campaign, it puts at risk the lives and well-being of Wisconsin’s citizens.

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Commonwealth v. Cousin

Docket: SJC-12840

Opinion Date: May 14, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court granting the Commonwealth's petition under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 and ordering that a certain superior court judge be recused from acting on Defendant's postjudgment motion to dismiss the indictments against him or for a new trial in his criminal case, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion. Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case for consideration of whether Defendant was prejudiced by trial counsel's potential conflicts of interest. On remand, Defendant moved to dismiss the indictments against him or for a new trial on the basis of Brady violations. The motion judge raised the question whether she could be impartial because the prosecutor had since been appointed as a superior cour judge and was now her judicial colleague. The Commonwealth subsequently filed a motion in support of recusal. The judge denied the motion, concluding that she could be fair and impartial. The Commonwealth filed a Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition. A single justice allowed the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the prudent and legally correct result under the circumstances was for the judge to recuse herself.

Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 234076 v. Sex Offender Registry Board

Docket: SJC-12762

Opinion Date: May 14, 2020

Judge: Lowy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this appeal challenging Appellant's classification before the Sex Offender Registry Board (Board) as a level three sex offender, the Supreme Judicial Court remanded the matter, holding that once a hearing examiner has allowed a motion for expert funds to a sex offender seeking a review hearing on his classification, expert testimony in a board hearing is admissible unless it is irrelevant, unreliable, or repetitive. After the Board notified Appellant of his duty to register Appellant requested his statutory right to a review of his classification by one of the Board's hearing examiners. Before the hearing, Appellant, who was indigent, moved for expert funds to hire an expert in forensic psychology and assessing sex offenders' risk of reoffense. The hearing examiner granted the motion but, during the hearing, significantly limited the expert's testimony. On appeal, the superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the matter to the Board for a new hearing at which Appellant's expert may testify as to any relevant, reliable, and nonrepetitive evidence, holding that the hearing examiner improperly limited the scope of Appellant's expert's testimony.