Which Laws Apply to Broker-Dealers? Federal Laws? State Laws? Both? General Principles Leading to an Answer

TAMAR FRANKEL

BU Law emerita professor Tamar Frankel explains the law of preemption as it pertains to broker-dealers and their investor clients. She predicts, among other things, that either the clients will demand that broker-dealers adhere to a fiduciary duty, or else that states will impose that duty on them.

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County of Kern v. Alta Sierra Holistic etc.

Dockets: F077887(Fifth Appellate District) , F078069(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 6, 2020

Judge: Donald R. Franson, Jr.

Areas of Law: Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

At issue in this appeal was how long a board of supervisors must wait before reenacting the essential feature of the protested ordinance. The Court of Appeal interpreted Elections Code section 9145 to mean a board of supervisors may reenact the essential feature of the repealed ordinance after there has been a material change in circumstances. The court held that a change in circumstances is material if an objectively reasonable person would consider the new circumstances significant or important in making a decision about the subject matter of the ordinance. Applying this statutory interpretation in this case, the court held that the Board did not violate section 9145 when it enacted the May 2016 moratorium on new marijuana dispensaries or subsequently banned dispensaries, and thus the ordinance banning dispensaries is enforceable. Accordingly, the court reversed the permanent injunction portion of the judgment.

People v. Kareem A.

Dockets: B287126(Second Appellate District) , B292685(Second Appellate District) , B292686(Second Appellate District) , B293476(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 6, 2020

Judge: Weingart

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law

DSH appealed from orders imposing sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5, in the amount of $1,500 per each "incompetent to stand trial" (IST) defendant that DSH failed to admit within 60 days of the commitment order. The Court of Appeal affirmed the orders, holding that the trial court was permitted to sanction DHS, because DHS was a "person" subject to section 177.5 and the ability to sanction DSH here is consistent with section 177.5's purpose to compensate public agencies for the cost of unnecessary hearings. In this case, the trial court was entitled to punish the repeated violation of orders designed to ensure compliance with IST defendants' constitutional and statutory rights. Furthermore, the sanctions had a compensatory purpose. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the underlying commitment orders, or in finding DSH did not have good cause or substantial justification for its violations of those orders.