Pope Francis’s Statement Endorsing Same-Sex Civil Unions Undermines the Moral Legitimacy and Legal Arguments in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia

DAVID S. KEMP, CHARLES E. BINKLEY

David S. Kemp, a professor at Berkeley Law, and Charles E. Binkley, MD, the director of bioethics at Santa Clara University’s Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, consider the implications of Pope Francis’s recently revealed statement endorsing same-sex civil unions as they pertain to a case currently before the U.S. Supreme Court. Kemp and Binkley argue that the Pope’s statement undermines the moral legitimacy of the Catholic organization’s position and casts a shadow on the premise of its legal arguments.

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Stigma and the Oral Argument in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia

LESLIE C. GRIFFIN

UNLV Boyd School of Law professor Leslie C. Griffin explains why stigma is a central concept that came up during oral argument before the Supreme Court in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia. Griffin points out that some religions have long supported racial discrimination, citing their religious texts, but courts prohibited such discrimination, even by religious entities. Griffin argues that just as religious organizations should not enjoy religious freedom to stigmatize people of color, so they should not be able to discriminate—and thus stigmatize—people based on sexual orientation.

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Gonzalez v. Texas

Docket: AP-77,066

Opinion Date: November 4, 2020

Judge: Keel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In October 2015, appellant Mark Gonzalez pled not guilty, but a jury convicted him of capital murder for the 2011 murder of a police officer, for which he was sentenced to death. Appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was automatic. Appellant raised twenty-eight points of error. The Court addressed point number four: the trial court's juror substitution procedure, which was an issue of first impression. The remaining points of error were addressed in the unpublished portion of the Court's opinion. Finding none of his points to have merit, the Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and sentence of death.

Lopez v. Texas

Docket: PD-0956-19

Opinion Date: November 4, 2020

Judge: Barbara Hervey

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant Antonio Lopez confessed to killing his 11-month-old foster child. He was indicted on two counts for capital murder and murder. He filed a motion to suppress, arguing that his confession was inadmissible because it was involuntary under the Due Process Clause and Article 38.21 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. According to appellant, he confessed only after police told him that, if he did not, he and his wife might be arrested and that, if they were, Child Protective Services (CPS) might take away their other children. The trial court denied the motion and filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. A jury acquitted Lopez of capital murder, but convicted him of murder. The trial court sentenced him to 35 years’ confinement based on the agreement of the parties. On appeal, Lopez argued the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress, but the court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s ruling. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the appellate court that Lopez’s confession was voluntary, but not based on the probable-cause analysis used by the court of appeals. Rather, the Court reached that result by examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession: "The existence of probable cause is only a factor in the analysis."