Latest 2 Cases: Gonzalez v. Wilkinson (Criminal Law), United States v. Johnson (Criminal Law)

The Oprah Interview as a Truth Commission

LESLEY WEXLER

Illinois Law professor Lesley Wexler explains how Oprah’s interview with Prince Harry and Meghan Markle might illuminate how a formal truth commission to deal with legacies of racism and colonialism might function in the British empire. Professor Wexler describes the purpose and function of state-operated truth commissions and notes the similarities and differences between those and the interview.

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Gonzalez v. Wilkinson

Docket: 19-3412

Opinion Date: March 9, 2021

Judge: Jane Louise Kelly

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

The Eighth Circuit held that the categorical approach does not require a petitioner seeking cancellation of removal to demonstrate both that the state offense he was convicted of is broader than the federal offense and that there is a realistic probability that the state actually prosecutes people for the conduct that makes the state offense broader than the federal offense. Rather, the categorical approach requires a petitioner seeking cancellation of removal to demonstrate that the state offense he was convicted of is broader than the federal offense. In this case, the BIA erred in finding that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal on the basis of his Florida conviction for possession of marijuana. The court explained that the Florida statute is unambiguously broader than the federal law referenced in 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(C), and this was all that petitioner was required to show under the categorical approach. Furthermore, because the BIA did not properly consider the IJ's alternative grounds for denying relief, those issues are not properly before the court. The court granted the petition for review, vacated, and remanded for further proceedings.

United States v. Johnson

Docket: 19-1610

Opinion Date: March 9, 2021

Judge: Lavenski R. Smith

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Eighth Circuit held that the Speedy Trial Act does not permit exclusion of days caused by the court's own scheduling conflicts resulting from a crowded docket. The court explained that this constitutes general congestion under the Act and is not a legitimate ground upon which to exclude days under the Act. In this case, because the district court's reason for delay was not excludable under the act, the court will permit the district court to determine in the first instance whether to dismiss the indictment with or without prejudice by applying the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3162(a)(2). The court also weighed the Barker factors and affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's Sixth Amendment claim. The court assessed the prejudice to defendant and concluded that her anxiety alone was insufficient to demonstrate prejudice.