Latest 2 Cases: Idaho v. Huckabay (Animal / Dog Law), Idaho v. Quigle (Constitutional Law)

How Mike Huckabee and Robert Bork Could Help Center Neil Gorsuch

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb analyzes an unusual comment by former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee that a government restriction on the size of people’s Thanksgiving gathering would violate the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. Colb describes a similar statement (in a different context) by conservative Supreme Court nominee Robert H. Bork during his (unsuccessful) confirmation hearings in 1987 and observes from that pattern a possibility that even as unenumerated rights are eroded, the Court might be creative in identifying a source of privacy rights elsewhere in the Constitution.

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Idaho v. Huckabay

Docket: 48109

Opinion Date: December 3, 2020

Judge: Bevan

Areas of Law: Animal / Dog Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant John Huckabay appealed his criminal conviction of felony unlawful possession of a moose. A couple heard a gunshot as they were packing up to leave their cabin by Mica Bay on Lake Coeur d'Alene in October 2014. They encountered a large truck with a cow moose hoisted in the back on a metal frame. A man beside the truck introduced himself as John Huckabay. At their inquiry, Huckabay told the couple he had a tag for the moose. The driver, still in the truck, introduced himself as “Bob” later identified as Bob Cushman, a local butcher and the owner of the vehicle. As the couple departed, the wife looked up Idaho’s moose hunting season on her phone. Concerned of a potential hunting violation, the couple proceeded to the Idaho Department of Fish and Game’s (“IDFG”) regional office where they reported the shooting of an antlerless moose by a man named Huckabay. While Huckabay did not give the IDFG officers information about Cushman or details about who specifically shot the moose, Huckabay accompanied a third officer to the area where the moose had been killed. Officers obtained Cushman’s address and visited his residence. With Cushman’s permission, the officers checked inside a walk-in cooler on the premises and found a skinned and quartered cow moose, which lacked the requisite tag. The officers also noted that the carcass was still “very warm,” showing it had only recently been placed in Cushman’s cooler. A grand jury indicted Huckabay for felony unlawful killing or possession of a moose. Huckabay moved to dismiss his indictment, arguing the evidence was insufficient to establish probable cause and the indictment lacked essential elements of the crime. He also filed additional motions to challenge a lack of jurisdiction. Each of these issues hinged on his argument that the plain language of Idaho Code section 36-1404(c)(3) required more than one animal to warrant a felony charge. The district court denied Huckabay’s motions, finding that the indictment was sufficient to establish probable cause that Huckabay possessed the moose even if there was insufficient evidence to establish he killed the moose in question. The Idaho Supreme Court concurred with the district court that Idaho Code section 36-1401(c)(3) could plainly apply to the unlawful killing, possessing, or wasting of a single animal, and affirmed Huckabay's conviction.

Idaho v. Quigle

Docket: 46107

Opinion Date: December 3, 2020

Judge: Moeller

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Robert Farrell-Quigle appealed his judgment of conviction for two counts of lewd conduct. He contends that the use of a shielding screen at trial during the testimonies of the alleged victims deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial, violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him, and failed to comply with Idaho’s laws on alternative methods for child witness testimony. Leading up to trial, the State filed a motion seeking permission for both daughters to testify by alternative methods to avoid “increased emotional and mental trauma” from testifying in Farrell-Quigle’s presence. After review of the trial court record, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the use of the screen deprived Farrell-Quigle of his Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial, finding specifically that use of the screen was inherently prejudicial, and did not serve an essential state interest. "the district court’s decision to use the shielding screen instead of CCTV, which this Court had previously found does not result in inherent prejudice where necessity has been shown, was at its core a decision borne out of convenience. Convenience alone cannot outweigh a defendant’s constitutional rights. " Judgment was vacated and the matter was remanded for a new trial.