How Allen v. Cooper Breaks Important New (if Dubious) Ground on Stare Decisis

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar comments on language in a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Allen v. Cooperdiscussing constitutional stare decisis in the context of state sovereign immunity. Amar points out some of the problems with the Court’s jurisprudence on state sovereign immunity and Congress’s Section 5 power, and he questions the Allen majority’s embrace of a “special justification” requirement for constitutional stare decisis.

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Markel Insurance Co. v. Rau

Docket: 19-2433

Opinion Date: April 9, 2020

Judge: Diane Pamela Wood

Areas of Law: Contracts, Insurance Law, Personal Injury

United owns a fleet of ambulances. In 2016, Stofko was driving his car when a United ambulance crashed into it; Stofko’s injuries were fatal. United was insured by Markel but the particular ambulance that crashed was not listed on the policy. Rau, the representative of Stofko’s estate, argued that it was nevertheless covered by the policy because before the crash United sent Markel’s agent, Insurance Service Center, an email requesting that the vehicle be added to the policy. The Center denied seeing the email and United acknowledged that it had not received a response as was customary. Markel argued that even if United had sent an email, it never endorsed the change, which the policy requires, and has no duty to indemnify United or the driver and no duty to defend in Rau’s suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Markel. It is not necessary to resolve what happened to the email request to add the vehicle to the policy; under Indiana law courts may not rewrite an insurance contract. Neither Center nor Markel accepted or responded in any way to United’s request, so the ambulance was not covered.

United States v. Godinez

Docket: 19-1215

Opinion Date: April 9, 2020

Judge: Kenneth Francis Ripple

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Godinez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, and to possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i). The prosecution notified the court under 21 U.S.C. 851 that Godinez had a prior Ohio conviction for possession of cocaine. The district court determined that this prior state conviction made Godinez eligible for a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment rather than the otherwise applicable five-year mandatory minimum. The Seventh Circuit vacated the Sentence, citing the First Step Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 5194 enacted after the signing of Godinez’s plea agreement but before his sentencing. By failing to recognize the changes implemented by the Act, including the heightened thresholds that must be met for a court to impose increased mandatory minimums for certain drug offenses, the district court premised its sentencing calculations on a mandatory minimum that was twice what it should have been. The oversight constitutes plain error and requires resentencing.