Latest 2 Cases: People v. Baker (Civil Rights), People v. Johnsen (Civil Rights)

Corporate Transitional Justice

LESLEY WEXLER, NICOLA SHARPE

Illinois law professor Lesley M. Wexler and Nicola Sharpe discuss various corporate responses to the recent storming of Capitol Hill and consider whether such responses might constitute private transitional justice. Professors Wexler and Sharpe point out, however, that simply vocalizing a commitment to social justice, diversity, and inclusivity is not enough; corporations should diversify boards and leadership representation and take other quantifiable steps that transform corporate culture and processes.

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People v. Baker

Docket: S170280

Opinion Date: February 1, 2021

Judge: Tani Cantil-Sakauye

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first degree murder and sentence of death, holding that any errors, found or assumed, were not prejudicial. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) at the guilt phase, assuming that the trial court erred in admitting certain DNA evidence, the error was not prejudicial; (2) at the penalty phase, assuming the trial court erred in admitting evidence of potential animal abuse, the error was not prejudicial; (3) any error in imposing a parole revocation fine was harmless; (4) even when viewed in combination, the guilt phase and penalty phase errors were not prejudicial; and (5) the abstract of judgment reflected a clerical error, which will be corrected.

People v. Johnsen

Docket: S040704

Opinion Date: February 1, 2021

Judge: Goodwin Liu

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of first degree murder, attempted murder, and other offenses, and sentencing Defendant to death, holding that any errors that occurred during the trial proceedings were not prejudicial. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) during the guilt phase, there was error with respect to the prosecutor's misstatement of the reasonable doubt standard and with respect to defense counsel's agreement with the prosecutor on a certain point of law, but there was no reasonable probability that the prosecutor's or defense counsel's misstatements were prejudicial; (2) at the penalty phase, the prosecutor's comment about Defendant during penalty phase arguments bordered on "inflammatory" rhetoric, but any error was not prejudicial; and (3) the cumulative effect of these errors did not rise to the level of prejudice necessary to reverse Defendant's conviction or sentence.