What Happened in Kahler v. Kansas?

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb describes how the U.S. Supreme Court purported to allow the state of Kansas to substitute one insanity defense for another, but in fact approved its abolishment of the insanity defense altogether. Colb explains the difference between the insanity defense—an affirmative defense to the commission of a crime—and facts that negate mens rea—the mental element of a crime. Colb also notes how in dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer made a case for veganism, albeit probably inadvertently.

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Plank v. Cherneski

Docket: 3m/19

Opinion Date: July 14, 2020

Judge: Booth

Areas of Law: Business Law

The Court of Appeals held that an independent cause of action exists for breach of fiduciary duty and that, to establish a breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a fiduciary relationship, breach of the duty owed by the fiduciary to the beneficiary, and harm to the beneficiary. William Plank and Sanford Fisher, both minority members of Trusox, LLC, filed an action alleging direct and derivative claims against James Cherneski, Trusox's president and majority member. Among other relief, Plank and Fischer (together, Minority Members), sought an order dissolving the LLC or appointing a receiver to take over its management. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Cherneski on most of the Minority Members' claims and in favor of the Minority Members on certain other claims and awarded attorneys' fees in favor of Cherneski and Trusox. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in entering judgment in favor of Cherneski on the breach of fiduciary duty count; (2) did not err in interpreting the contractual language of the fee-shifting provision and concluding that Cherneski and Trusox were the substantially prevailing parties; and (3) did not abuse its discretion by awarding Cherneski and Trusox all of their attorneys' fees.

State v. Frazier

Docket: 45/19

Opinion Date: July 14, 2020

Judge: Hotten

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Court of Appeals held that, under the merger rule articulated in State v. Lancaster, 631 A.2d 453 (Md. 1993), offenses and their sentences merge for purposes of sentencing, and therefore, Defendant's convictions for fourth-degree sexual offense and second-degree assault merge, leaving the only permissible punishment the sentence for fourth-degree sexual offense. Defendant was convicted of second-degree assault and fourth-degree sexual offense and sentenced to ten years' incarceration for the assault count and one year for the sexual offense charge, to run consecutively. The court of special appeals reversed and remanded the case to the circuit court for resentencing, holding that the convictions merged. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the offenses of second-degree assault and fourth-degree sexual offense and their sentences merge; and (2) there is no reason to overturn Lancaster.