What About the Bar Exam After the 2020 Dust Settles?

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois law dean and professor Vikram David Amar comments on some of the questions commentators and analysts are, or will soon be, asking—specifically why we have bar exams for legal licensure, and, assuming we retain them, what they should look like going forward. Amar observes the limitations of the so-called diploma privilege advocated by some and suggests that states adopt greater interstate uniformity in their bar exams, shift toward more performance (as opposed to memorization) exams, and move away from being so time pressured.

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Rodriguez v. Barr

Docket: 18-1070

Opinion Date: September 18, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitioned for review of the BIA's 2018 decision finding him removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for having been convicted of an "aggravated felony" as defined by section 101(a)(43)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The BIA found that petitioner was convicted of "sexual abuse of a minor" based on his 2010 New York state conviction under New York Penal Law 130.65(3) for sexual abuse in the first degree. The Second Circuit rejected petitioner's contention that section 130.65(3) criminalizes more conduct than the federal definition of "sexual abuse of a minor" covers. The court held that, because a conviction under N.Y. Penal Law 130.65(3) requires both that the victim be under the age of eleven and that the perpetrator's contact with the victim be "for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire," the state statute reaches no farther than the crime of "sexual abuse of a minor" as set forth in section 101(a)(43)(A) and construed by the BIA in In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 996. Therefore, a conviction under the state statute is an aggravated felony under the INA.

Santana v. Barr

Docket: 18-2755

Opinion Date: September 18, 2020

Judge: Raymond Joseph Lohier, Jr.

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal of petitioner to the Dominican Republic. The court held that a conviction under New York Penal Law 165.50 is categorically an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G). The court deferred to the BIA's reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous term "including" in "including receipt of stolen property" in section 1101(a)(43)(G). Under that interpretation, "'receipt of stolen property' is a distinct aggravated felony independent of theft and the property received need not have been stolen by means of 'theft' as generically defined." The court also determined that an intent to deprive is inherent in the requirement that an offender "knowingly" possesses stolen property. The court considered petitioner's remaining arguments and concluded that they are without merit.