What’s at Stake in Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue? What the Equal Protection Clause Means in the Context of Classifications Based on Religiosity

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, ALAN E. BROWNSTEIN

Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar and UC Davis emeritus professor Alan E. Brownstein comment on a case before the U.S. Supreme Court that raises the question whether a religiously neutral student-aid program in Montana that affords students the choice of attending religious schools violates the religion clauses or the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Amar and Brownstein express no opinion as to whether the courts’ often-expressed concerns about striking down invidiously motivated laws can be effectively overcome, but they contend that jurists who reject invalidating invidiously motivated laws must explain why reasons sufficient in other contexts are not persuasive in this case.

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State ex rel. Haynie v. Rudduck

Citation: 2020-Ohio-2912

Opinion Date: May 14, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals granting Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus against Judge John W. Rudduck of the Clinton County Court of Common Pleas, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy at law that precluded extraordinary relief. In 1993, Appellant was convicted of aggravated murder and other crimes. In 2019, Appellant filed a motion for a final appealable order in the court of common pleas, arguing that the trial court did not properly journalize his convictions in a single docket. Judge Rudduck denied the motion. Appellant then filed his petition for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals granted the petition and ordered Judge Rudduck to file a nunc pro tunc entry to bring the judgment of conviction in Appellant's 1993 criminal case into compliance with Crim.R. 32(C). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in granting a writ of mandamus because Appellant had an adequate appellate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

State v. Harper

Citation: 2020-Ohio-2913

Opinion Date: May 14, 2020

Judge: Sharon L. Kennedy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court realigned its precedent in cases involving the imposition of postrelease control with the traditional understanding of what constitutes a void judgment, holding that where a common pleas court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case and personal jurisdiction over the accused any error in the exercise of its jurisdiction in failing to properly impose postrelease control renders the judgment of conviction voidable, not void. Defendant pleaded guilty to robbery as a third-degree felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant to three years imprisonment and imposed a mandatory three-year term of postrelease control. The court, however, did not include the consequences of a violation of postrelease control in the sentencing entry as required by State v. Grimes, 85 N.E.3d 700 (Ohio 2017). Defendant later moved to vacate the postrelease control portion of his sentence, alleging it was void under Grimes. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings to correct the entry imposing postrelease control. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when the sentencing court has jurisdiction to act, sentencing errors in the imposition of postrelease control render the sentence voidable, not void, and the sentence may be set aside if successfully challenged on direct appeal.