The Third-Party Doctrine vs. Katz v. Untied States

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb proposes revising the third-party doctrine in a way that reconciles two of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions that some critics view as conflicting. Colb suggests that, contrary to what most critics argue and what she herself has long assumed, the prior decision, Katz v. United States rather than the later one, United States v. White, is the anomaly.

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State ex rel. Wade v. Honorable David W. Hummel, Jr.

Docket: 19-1047

Opinion Date: June 16, 2020

Judge: Jenkins

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's requested writ of prohibition prohibiting the circuit court from enforcing a ruling that found an audio/video recording of a voluntary statement made to law enforcement officers by H.D., the defendant in the underlying criminal proceeding, violated H.D.'s privilege against self-incrimination, holding that a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not violated by the admission into evidence and/or publication to the jury during a criminal proceeding of an audio/video recording of the defendant's voluntary statement made to law enforcement officers. Because H.D. was in a non-custodial setting when he made his incriminating statement and affirmatively waived his rights, H.D. may not now assert the privilege against self-incrimination in his criminal proceeding to avoid the admission into evidence and/or publication to the jury of that recording.

State v. Smith

Docket: 19-0143

Opinion Date: June 16, 2020

Judge: Walker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court vacated Petitioner's kidnapping convictions and affirmed his remaining convictions, holding that the indictment omitted an essential element of the crime of kidnapping. A grand jury indicted Petitioner on two counts of kidnapping, three counts of wanton endangerment, and one count of breaking and entering. A jury convicted Petitioner on all counts. Petitioner moved for a new trial, arguing that counts one and two of the indictment omitted the essential element of "transportation" of the crime of kidnapping. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the part of the circuit court's order as to Petitioner's kidnapping convictions and otherwise affirmed, holding that the indictment omitted an essential element of the crime of kidnapping, which rendered the kidnapping counts of the indictment insufficient under W. Va. Const. art. III, 14 and W. Va. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1).