Joint Employer Liability: Notes from Australia

SAMUEL ESTREICHER, NICHOLAS SAADY

NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher and Nicholas Saady, LLM, conduct a comparative analysis of the doctrine of joint employer liability, looking at the rules adopted by the U.S. Department of Labor and National Labor Relations Board as compared to the approach Australia has taken in an analogous context, “accessorial liability” doctrine.

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State v. Johnson

Docket: SC19-96

Opinion Date: May 21, 2020

Judge: Lawson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, holding that the party opposing a peremptory strike must make a specific objection to the proponent's proffered race-neutral reason for the strike, if the strike is contested, to preserve a claim that the trial court erred in concluding that the proffered reason was genuine. At issue was the proper procedure for preserving a challenge to the trial court's determination that the facially race-neutral reason proffered by the proponent of a peremptory strike was genuine under step three of Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1996). During the voir dire proceedings in Defendant's case, Defendant objected to the State's peremptory strike as to a prospective African-American juror but never argued that the State's proffered explanation was not genuine. The Fourth District reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the trial court had failed to demonstrate compliance with the duty to determine the genuineness of the proffered race-neutral reason. The Supreme Court quashed the Fourth District's decision, holding that because Defendant did not make a specific objection to the State's proffered facially race-neutral reason for the strike Defendant failed to preserve his challenge to the trial court's step three genuineness determination.

Phillips v. State

Docket: SC18-1149

Opinion Date: May 21, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court summarily denying Appellant's successive motion for postconviction relief filed under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that Walls v. State, 213 So. 3d 340 (Fla. 2016), is no longer good law. In 1998, Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. In 2006, Appellant sought postconviction relief on his claim that he was intellectually disabled and, therefore, constitutionally ineligible for the death penalty. The postconviction court denied relief, and the Supreme Court affirmed. In the instant postconviction petition, Appellant sought another determination of his intellectual disability. Appellant relied in part on the Supreme Court's decision in Walls v. State, in which the Court held that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hall v. Florida, 472 U.S. 701 (2014), is retroactive to cases where there has already been a finding that the defendant is not intellectually disabled. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this Court in Walls clearly erred in concluding that Hall applies retroactively, and this Court should not continue to apply the erroneous reasoning of Walls; and (2) therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying relief.