In Ruth We Trust: How the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act Can Promote Women’s Equal Citizenship and Justice Ginsburg’s Legacy

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN

In honor of the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman explains how the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) can promote women’s equal citizenship and protect Justice Ginsburg’s legacy of shaping gender equality. Grossman argues that the PWFA could help break down entrenched occupational segregation in the American economy, and, in so doing, honor Justice Ginsburg’s lifelong commitment to ensuring that women can be full members of society.

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A Half Century After Its Publication, What Can “The Greening of America” Tell Us About the United States Today?

RODGER CITRON

In recognition of the 50-year anniversary of the publication of Charles Reich’s “The Greening of America,” Touro law professor Rodger D. Citron explains what Reich actually said in “The Greening,” explains why it generated such a strong response, and reflects on what the piece has to say about the fractures of our current moment. Citron cautions that the promise of a new consciousness is as alluring—and may be as illusory—as it was when Reich wrote the article and book, 50 years ago.

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DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc. v. Sheridan

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 18-3187

Opinion Date: September 22, 2020

Judge: Julio M. Fuentes

Areas of Law: Banking, Civil Procedure

DLJ brought a debt and foreclosure action against the Sheridans and the IRS. At the close of DLJ’s case-in-chief, the district court granted judgment in favor of DLJ under FRCP 52(c), concluding that DLJ satisfied all elements of its claim. The Third Circuit affirmed. Sheridan was “fully heard” prior to judgment. At the close of its case-in-chief, DLJ moved for judgment based on partial findings. Sheridan did not object to the consideration of the motion. The parties made their respective arguments as to whether DLJ met its burden of providing evidence sufficient to establish its debt and foreclosure claims and whether DLJ had standing. Sheridan could have only challenged the validity of the loan documents through cross-examination of DLJ’s witness, Holmes, which he was given the opportunity to do, or through his own testimony, to the extent he had any personal knowledge. Sheridan has not indicated what additional admissible evidence he intended to present to contest DLJ’s standing. The court heard and considered Sheridan’s arguments concerning the transfer of the note and the validity of the assignment. He was fully heard with regard to DLJ’s standing to foreclose. Sheridan’s original answer asserted boilerplate affirmative defenses, none of which contained any allegations of fraud or violations of the Truth in Lending Act; Sheridan’s motion to amend was untimely, and the late assertion of fraud would have prejudiced DLJ.

McShannock v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 19-15899

Opinion Date: September 22, 2020

Judge: Nelson

Areas of Law: Banking, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

In 2005-2007, the borrowers obtained residential home mortgages on California properties. California law would normally have entitled them to “at least 2 percent simple interest per annum” on any funds held in escrow, California Civil Code Section 2954.8. The lender, a federal savings association organized and regulated under the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933 (HOLA), 12 U.S.C. 1461, did not pay interest because HOLA preempts California law. In a suit against the lender’s successor, Chase, a national bank organized and regulated under the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. 38, the district court denied the lender’s motion to dismiss; the Ninth Circuit has held that there is no “conflict preemption” between the National Bank Act and the California law. The Ninth Circuit reversed. HOLA field preemption principles applied to the claims against Chase even though its conduct giving rise to the complaint occurred after it acquired the loans in question. Because California’s interest-on-escrow law imposed a requirement regarding escrow accounts; affected the terms of sale, purchase, investment in, and participation in loans originated by savings associations; and had more than an incidental effect on the lending operations of savings associations, it was preempted by 12 C.F.R. 560.2(b)(6) and (b)(10), and 560.2(c).