The Twenty-Sixth Amendment and the Real Rigging of Georgia’s Election

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois law dean Vikram David Amar explains why Georgia’s law allowing persons 75 years and older to get absentee ballots for all elections in an election cycle with a single request, while requiring younger voters to request absentee ballots separately for each election, is a clear violation of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. Dean Amar acknowledges that timing may prevent this age discrimination from being redressed in 2020, but he calls upon legislatures and courts to understand the meaning of this amendment and prevent such invidious disparate treatment of voters in future years.

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COVID Comes to Federal Death Row—It Is Time to Stop the Madness

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat—Associate Provost and Associate Dean of the Faculty and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence & Political Science at Amherst College—explains the enhanced risk of COVID-19 infection in the federal death row in Terre Haute, not only among inmates but among those necessary to carry out executions. Professor Sarat calls upon the Trump administration and other officials to focus on saving, rather than taking, lives inside and outside prison.

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Perna v. Health One Credit Union

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 19-1965

Opinion Date: December 21, 2020

Judge: Murphy

Areas of Law: Banking, Civil Procedure

In 1971, Perna was hired by Health One, a federally-insured, Michigan-chartered credit union. Perna signed an employment agreement with an arbitration clause; it was set to expire in 2015. In 2014, the state concluded that Health One was operating in an “unsafe and unsound condition. The federal National Credit Union Administration Board was appointed as Health One’s liquidator and terminated Perna’s employment, 12 U.S.C. 1787(c)(1). The Board sold Health One’s assets. Perna sought unpaid benefits. The Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs dismissed Perna’s claim, citing the arbitration clause. Perna then submitted a claim to the Board under the claims-processing rules that apply when the Board acts as a credit union’s liquidating agent. 12 U.S.C. 1787(b)(5). The Board denied his claim as untimely under its notice to creditors. In 2018, Perna filed a claim for unpaid wages with the American Arbitration Association. Health One and the National Credit Union Administration refused to participate. The arbitrator found that Perna's firing was “without cause” and awarded him $315,645.02 but found that this decision could bind only Health One, not the Administration. Perna sued Health One and the Administration, seeking to confirm the award and make the Administration subject to it. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Federal Credit Union Act provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction over” claims against covered credit unions asserted outside its exclusive framework, 12 U.S.C. 1787(b)(13)(D).

Benskin, Inc. v. West Bank

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 18-1966

Opinion Date: December 23, 2020

Judge: Thomas D. Waterman

Areas of Law: Banking, Contracts

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment dismissing this case on the pleadings, except for slander of title, holding that slander of title was adequately alleged. Debtor brought this case against Bank, alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied duties of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, and slander of title. The district court granted Bank's motion to dismiss, ruling that the contract and fraud claims were time-barred, rejecting Debtor's discovery rule and equitable estoppel arguments, and concluding that the slander of title claim failed to allege publication to a third party. The court of appeals reversed and reinstated all claims. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals in part and affirmed the district court's judgment except as to the slander of title claim, holding (1) the contract, good faith, and fraud claims were time-barred, and the equitable estoppel argument failed as a matter of law; and (2) the slander of title claim was adequately alleged.