A Modest Proposal: A Heartbeat Bill for Those Who Don’t Wear Masks

MARCI A. HAMILTON

University of Pennsylvania professor Marci A. Hamilton draws upon a strategy used by anti-abortion advocates in suggesting a way to encourage (or coerce) more people into wearing masks to avoid the spread of COVID-19. Hamilton proposes requiring persons who opt not to wear a mask in public (1) to watch, on a large screen, an adult's beating heart for 30 seconds, and (2) to be read a statement about how their decision unreasonably endangers others.

Read More

Seiller Waterman, LLC v. RLB Properties, Ltd.

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Dockets: 2018-SC-000538-DG, 2018-SC-000558-DG

Opinion Date: July 9, 2020

Judge: Hughes

Areas of Law: Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals that Ky. Rev. Stat. 413.245, the one-year statute of limitations applicable to the rendering of professional services, does not apply to claims against attorneys when malice is alleged, holding that, regardless of whether malice is alleged, claims arising from an act or omission in the rendering of, or failing to render, professional services are governed by section 413.245. Plaintiff filed a complaint against a law firm and three of its attorneys based upon their allegedly wrongful acts undertaken on behalf of the firm's clients. The circuit court dismissed all claims either for failure to state a claim or for failure to timely file under the applicable statute of limitations. The court of appeals reversed as to the slander of title, civil conspiracy, and Ky. Rev. Stat. 434.155 violation claims, finding that section 413.245 would not time bar the claims if malice were proven. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that section 413.245 does not apply to claims against attorneys when malice is alleged.

Estate of Mary Curtis v. Las Vegas Medical Investors, LLC

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 39

Opinion Date: July 9, 2020

Judge: Silver

Areas of Law: Medical Malpractice, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

The Supreme Court held that the "common knowledge" exception to the affidavit requirement for professional negligence claims against a provider of health care can also be applied to determine whether a claim that appears to sound in professional negligence, and does not fall under Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.100, actually sounds in ordinary negligence and thus is not subject to Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071. A nursing home nurse mistakenly administered morphine to a patient that had been prescribed for another patient. The patient died three days later from morphine intoxication. The patient's estate sued the nursing home but did not explicitly assert any claim for professional negligence or file an expert affidavit under section 41A.071. The district court granted summary judgment for the nursing home, concluding that the complaint's allegations sounded in professional negligence and, therefore, the estate was required to file an expert affidavit. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the mistaken administration of another patient's morphine constituted ordinary negligence that a lay juror could assess without expert testimony, and such a claim is not subject to section 41A.071's medical expert affidavit requirement; and (2) the district court correctly granted summary judgment on the allegations regarding the failure to monitor, as those allegations required expert testimony to support.