Can A City Refuse Land-Use Permits Because it Doesn’t Like the Federal Policies the Property Will be Used to Implement?

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar explains why a local government cannot constitutionally create policy discriminating against entities that do business with the feds. Specifically, Amar discusses a situation in which the city of Farland, California, is trying to prevent a privately operated state prison facility located in that city from contracting with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

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Trustees of Estate of Bernice Pauahi Bishop v. Au

Docket: SCWC-16-0000235

Opinion Date: March 10, 2020

Judge: Richard W. Pollack

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) and the order of the circuit court determining that Appellant qualified as a "plaintiff" for the purpose of the vexatious litigant statute, Haw. Rev. Stat. 634J, and that the required circumstances were met, holding that the lower courts erred in determining that Appellant qualified as a "plaintiff" and that other requirements set forth in the statute were satisfied. Appellee filed a motion to declare Appellant a vexatious litigant under section 634J-1(2) and (3) based on Appellant's repeated assertion of arguments that Appellee contended were already resolved. The circuit court granted the motion, concluding that Appellant met the definition of "plaintiff" because he had, through seven motions, sought to relitigate the merits of a summary judgment order and thereby "maintained" the litigation and that Appellant met the definition of a vexatious litigant. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellant did not meet the definition of "plaintiff" under section 634J-1 or 634J-1(2); (2) a finding of bad faith is required in order to conclude a litigant is vexatious under section 634J-1(2) or (3); and (3) the record did not support a finding of bad faith in this case.

Honolulu Civil Beat Inc. v. Department of the Attorney General

Docket: SCAP-17-0000480

Opinion Date: March 11, 2020

Judge: Michael D. Wilson

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Legal Ethics

In this case concerning the State's refusal to produce the results of an investigation into the Office of the Auditor based in part on the lawyer-client privilege the Supreme Court held that the State may not exclude a government record from disclosure under the Uniform Information Practices Act (UIPA) on the basis of a lawyer-client relationship between two State entities that is asserted but not proved. Honolulu Civil Beat Inc. (Civil Beat) contacted the Department of the Attorney General (the Department) requesting under the UIPA access to copies of investigative reports related to the State Auditor's Office. The State refused to produce any documentation based in part on the lawyer-client privilege and the professional rule protecting confidential lawyer-client communications. Civil Beat filed a complaint alleging that the Department had denied Civil Beat its right to access government records under the UIPA. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Civil Beat. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that the requested record was protected from disclosure under the UIPA by Haw. Rev. Stat. 92F-13(4). Because the court did not address the two other disclosure exceptions asserted by the Department, the Supreme Court remanded the case.