Trump’s Lawyers Will Get Away with Facilitating His Anti-Democratic Antics and They Know It

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat—Associate Provost and Associate Dean of the Faculty and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence & Political Science at Amherst College—predicts that because the lawyer discipline process is broken, President Trump’s lawyers will get away with facilitating his anti-democratic misconduct. Professor Sarat notes that Lawyers Defending American Democracy (LDAD) released a letter calling on bar authorities to investigate and punish members of Trump’s post-election legal team, but he points out that while LDAD can shame those members, it still lacks the ability itself to discipline or disbar.

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United States v. Barraza

Docket: 19-2718

Opinion Date: December 11, 2020

Judge: Lavenski R. Smith

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Defendant was convicted of kidnapping Maria Eloiza and her five-year-old son, resulting in the deaths of both. Defendant was 16-years-old at the time he committed the offense, and the district court sentenced him to the statutorily mandated term of life imprisonment. The Supreme Court subsequently held in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012), that a mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. Based on Miller, the district court granted defendant's motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. After the district court sentenced defendant to 50 years' imprisonment, defendant appealed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding defendant competent to proceed with resentencing. In this case, the district court was entitled to base its competency determination on the BOP doctor's psychological evaluation concluding that defendant had been restored to competency. The court also held that the district court did not plainly err by calculating an advisory Guidelines range of life imprisonment under USSG 2A1.1; the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors, including defendant's youth; and defendant's sentence, a downward variance from the Guidelines range of life, was not substantively unreasonable.

United States v. Fine

Docket: 19-3485

Opinion Date: December 11, 2020

Judge: Steven M. Colloton

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine, distributing methamphetamine, conspiring to commit money laundering, and tampering with a government witness. The court held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The court explained that, although defendant's argument relies in part on decisions that were issued after his sentencing, his challenge to the career offender determination was still a challenge to his sentence. Furthermore, a federal inmate generally must challenge a sentence through a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, and a post-judgment motion that fits the description of a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence should be treated as a section 2255 motion. In this case, because defendant did not seek authorization to file a successive motion as required by section 2255(h), the district court correctly determined that defendant's challenge to his career offender determination was an unauthorized successive habeas petition. The court rejected defendant's other asserted ground for a sentence reduction, post-conviction rehabilitation. The court concluded that the district court correctly recognized that rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason.