Table of Contents | Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Powhatan Energy Fund, LLC Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | Miller v. Bruenger Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Insurance Law US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Alpern v. Ferebee Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit | Baystate Franklin Medical Center v. Azar Government & Administrative Law, Health Law US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | Blumenthal v. Trump Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | Lovitky v. Trump Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | Narragansett Indian Tribal Historic Preservation Office v. FERC Government & Administrative Law, Native American Law US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | Potter v. Department of Veterans Affairs Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit | In the Matter of the Necessity for the Hospitalization of: Arthur A. Government & Administrative Law Alaska Supreme Court | Alliance for Constitutional etc. v. Dept. of Corrections etc. Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law California Courts of Appeal | Herpel v. County of Riverside Government & Administrative Law, Native American Law, Tax Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use California Courts of Appeal | State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Baldwin & Sons, Inc. Civil Procedure, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use California Courts of Appeal | City of Atlanta v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys. Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use Supreme Court of Georgia | Shubert v. Ada County Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Legal Ethics, Personal Injury, Professional Malpractice & Ethics Idaho Supreme Court - Civil | Central Mississippi Medical Center v. Mississippi Division of Medicaid Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law, Public Benefits Supreme Court of Mississippi | Sheehy v. Commissioner of Political Practices Education Law, Government & Administrative Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics Montana Supreme Court | Leggio v. Devine Government & Administrative Law, Public Benefits New York Court of Appeals | Ouradnik v. N.D. Dept. of Transportation Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law North Dakota Supreme Court | Rockies Express Pipeline, LLC v. McClain Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law Supreme Court of Ohio | Aiken v. So. Carolina Dept. of Rev. Civil Procedure, Class Action, Government & Administrative Law South Carolina Supreme Court | Black v. Cent. Puget Sound Reg'l Transit Auth. Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law, Transportation Law Washington Supreme Court |
Click here to remove Verdict from subsequent Justia newsletter(s). | New on Verdict Legal Analysis and Commentary | The Investors’ Control of Their Investment Advisers. Who Has the Final Word? | TAMAR FRANKEL | | BU Law emerita professor Tamar Frankel discusses an emerging issue affecting financial advisers—when a client may exercise control over the actions of the adviser. Frankel relates the story of an investment adviser that did not follow the client’s orders to cease certain investments, at a cost of almost $5 million to the client. As Frankel explains, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) got involved, resulting in the investment adviser’s settlement for a significant payment to the client and other conditions. | Read More |
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Government & Administrative Law Opinions | Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Powhatan Energy Fund, LLC | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-2326 Opinion Date: February 11, 2020 Judge: James Harvie Wilkinson, III Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law | The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment holding that FERC's action against financial trading entities and an individual trader was timely-filed within the five-year statute of limitations on civil penalty actions under 28 U.S.C. 2462. The court held that FERC did not have a complete and present cause of action to file suit in federal district court until 60 days elapsed after it had issued the penalty assessment order and appellants refused to pay the assessed penalty. Therefore, FERC's claim had not accrued until then and this action was timely filed. | | Miller v. Bruenger | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-5763 Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Readler Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Insurance Law | The Office of Personnel Management (OPM), manages the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act (FEGLIA), 5 U.S.C. 8705(a). Absent a valid beneficiary selection, FEGLIA provides an order of precedence for the proceeds, starting with the policyholder's surviving spouse, followed by the policyholder's descendants. FEGLIA will not follow that order if a “court decree of divorce, annulment, or legal separation, or . . . any court order or court-approved property settlement agreement” “expressly provides” for payment to someone else. The decree, order, or agreement must be “received” by the policyholder’s “employing agency” or OPM before the policyholder’s death. At the time of his death, Miller worked at Tinker Air Force Base and maintained a MetLife policy. Coleman's 27-year marriage to Donna ended in divorce in 2011. Their property settlement agreement states that “[Donna] shall remain the beneficiary of the life insurance policy.” The court ordered Coleman to assign his FEGLI benefits to Donna. Upon Coleman’s death, his only child, Courtenay, was appointed administratrix of his estate. The Air Force informed Courtenay that the court order had not been filed with Coleman’s employing office. Courtenay was paid $172,000 in proceeds and sought a declaration that she is the rightful owner. Citing lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court dismissed the suit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the lack of a substantial federal question. FEGLIA does not contain an express cause of action for Donna. There is no federal agency involved. | | Alpern v. Ferebee | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-1086 Opinion Date: February 7, 2020 Judge: Gregory Alan Phillips Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use | Thomas Alpern claimed the United States Forest Service improperly charges him a fee when he entered Maroon Valley to park and hike. He cited an provision of the Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act (REA) he claimed prohibited charging a fee "solely for parking." He argued that this prohibition overrode another REA provision that allowed agencies to charge a fee when certain listed amenities were present, like picnic tables, security patrols, trash bins, and interpretive signs. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, finding section 6802(d)(1)(A) prohibited charging fees “[s]olely for parking . . . along roads or trailsides[,]” something Alpern did not do. The Court found Alpern parked in a developed parking lot featuring all the amenities listed in section 6802(f)(4), not along a road or trailside. So it affirmed the district court’s decision to reject Alpern’s as-applied challenge to the Maroon Valley fee program. | | Baystate Franklin Medical Center v. Azar | Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Docket: 18-5264 Opinion Date: February 11, 2020 Judge: Sentelle Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Health Law | Baystate filed suit against the Secretary, challenging his promulgation of a final rule calculating the wage index for hospital reimbursements in 2017. Baystate alleged that the Secretary failed to comply with the statutory requirement to calculate a wage index that reflected the actual wage levels in Massachusetts, relied on data that he knew to be false, and entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem. The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Secretary, holding that the Secretary's interpretation of his authority under the Medicare statute was lawful and his action was not arbitrary and capricious. In this case, the Secretary provided a reasonable explanation for his decision to enforce the deadline and reject Nantucket's revised data; the decision to enforce the deadline against third-party hospitals was not arbitrary or capricious; and the Secretary's interpretation of his authority to enforce a deadline in calculating the wage index fell squarely within them. | | Blumenthal v. Trump | Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Docket: 19-5237 Opinion Date: February 7, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law | 215 Members of the Congress sued President Donald J. Trump based on allegations that he has repeatedly violated the United States Constitution’s Foreign Emoluments Clause. The district court denied the President's motion to dismiss the complaint. The DC Circuit reversed and held that the members of Congress lacked standing. The court held that the district court erred in holding that the members suffered an injury based on the President depriving them of the opportunity to give or withhold their consent to foreign emoluments, thereby injuring them in their roles as members of Congress. The court held that Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997), and Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1953–54 (2019), were controlling in this case. In Bethune-Hill, the Supreme Court summarily read in Raines that individual members of Congress lack standing to assert the institutional interests of a legislature in the same way a single House of a bicameral legislature lacks capacity to assert interests belonging to the legislature as a whole. The court stated that the members—29 Senators and 186 Members of the House of Representatives—do not constitute a majority of either body and are, therefore, powerless to approve or deny the President's acceptance of foreign emoluments. Accordingly, in regard to the district court's holding that the members have standing, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint. In regard to the district court's holding that the members have a cause of action and have stated a claim, the court vacated as moot. | | Lovitky v. Trump | Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Docket: 19-5199 Opinion Date: February 11, 2020 Judge: Judith Ann Wilson Rogers Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law | The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's suit, alleging that President Trump violated the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 by obscuring liabilities on financial disclosure reports, because plaintiff has not shown that he has a clear and indisputable right to mandamus-type relief. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that President Trump violated the Act by over-disclosing; that is, by listing debts in Part 8 of his May 2018 and May 2019 financial disclosure reports for which he was not personally liable. The court rejected plaintiff's contention that the declaratory judgment statute and the federal question statute provided statutory bases for jurisdiction. The court also held that the Mandamus Act did not provide a base for jurisdiction, because plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that the Ethics Act, once interpreted, imposed a clear and indisputable duty on President Trump to differentiate personal from business liabilities. Therefore, the court vacated the portions of the district court's decision addressing whether the equities would favor issuing mandamus-type relief but otherwise affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. | | Narragansett Indian Tribal Historic Preservation Office v. FERC | Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Docket: 19-1009 Opinion Date: February 7, 2020 Judge: Patricia Ann Millett Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Native American Law | The Narragansett Tribe petitioned for review of the Commission's order denying its motion to intervene in a natural gas pipeline certificate proceeding after the certificate to build a pipeline had issued. While the Tribe awaited the Commission's action on its pending motion to intervene and its separate motion for reconsideration of an order allowing construction to commence, the pipeline was completed. In the process, more than twenty ceremonial stone features were destroyed. The Tribe then petitioned for review seeking only an order compelling the Commission to amend its regulation so that it cannot repeat the alleged violations of the National Historic Preservation Act in the future. The DC Circuit held that the Tribe lacked standing to seek such relief because it has not shown a substantial risk that a similar disagreement between it and the Commission will recur. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition based on lack of jurisdiction. | | Potter v. Department of Veterans Affairs | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Docket: 19-1541 Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Sharon Prost Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law | In 2014, the Phoenix VA Health Care System where Potter worked was in the midst of a patient care crisis that had resulted in an investigation by the Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Inspector General (OIG). Potter alleges she engaged in five whistleblowing activities by making four protected disclosures and by cooperating with OIG. In December 2014, during a reorganization of the Phoenix DVA, Potter’s title was changed, which she claimed amounts to a demotion; a position for which Potter had applied was withdrawn in November 2015; and Potter was assigned to “unclassified duties.” Potter alleges that in early 2017, conditions at the Phoenix DVA forced her “involuntary resignation.” constituting the agency’s fourth and final reprisal. Potter accepted an offer for a Staff Nurse position at the VA Northern California Health Care System in 2017, and filed a whistleblower reprisal complaint at the Office of Special Counsel. A Merit Systems Protection Board administrative judge found that Potter had shown only one prima facie case of whistleblower reprisal but denied corrective action because the government established that the DVA would have taken the same action even if Potter had not made the protected disclosures. The Federal Circuit affirmed as to three alleged reprisals. The court vacated as to the November 2015 failure to hire. | | In the Matter of the Necessity for the Hospitalization of: Arthur A. | Court: Alaska Supreme Court Docket: S-17210 Opinion Date: February 7, 2020 Judge: Daniel E. Winfree Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law | Arthur A. appealed a 30-day involuntary commitment order entered after the superior court determined he was mentally ill, posed a risk of harm, and was gravely disabled. He contended on appeal that the court erred by refusing to allow him to represent himself at the commitment hearing. The Alaska Supreme Court held that a respondent in involuntary commitment proceedings has at least an implied statutory right to self-representation, although that right is not absolute. "If a respondent clearly and unequivocally invokes the self-representation right, the superior court must hold a preliminary hearing and consider factors outlined in McCracken v. Alaska, 518 P.2d 85 (Alaska 1974), to determine whether self-representation should be allowed." Because the respondent’s self-representation request in this case was denied without adherence to the McCracken framework, the Court concluded the 30-day commitment order had to be vacated. | | Alliance for Constitutional etc. v. Dept. of Corrections etc. | Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: C087294(Third Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Elena J. Duarte Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law | The California Department of Corrections Rehabilitation (Department) challenged a trial court ruling striking down its regulation excluding from early parole consideration inmates serving sentences for current nonviolent sex offenses requiring them to register under Penal Code section 290. On appeal, the Department claimed its regulation was supported by Proposition 57’s overarching goal of protecting public safety and the requirement that the Secretary of the Department certify the Department’s regulations enhanced public safety. The Court of Appeal determined the regulation at issue contravened the plain language of the statute, so it affirmed the trial court’s ruling. | | Herpel v. County of Riverside | Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E070618(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Raphael Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Native American Law, Tax Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use | At issue before the Court of Appeal was whether Riverside County, California could impose a tax on possessory interests in federally owned land set aside for the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians or its members. In 1971, Court held that it could, holding in part that federal law did not preempt the tax. The tax was also upheld that year by the Ninth Circuit. Since then, the United States Supreme Court articulated a new preemption framework in considering whether states may tax Indian interests, and the Department of the Interior promulgated new Indian leasing regulations, the preamble of which stated that state taxation was precluded. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal concluded, as it did in 1971, this possessory interest tax was valid. | | State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Baldwin & Sons, Inc. | Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: D075617(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Guerrero Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use | Appellants Baldwin & Sons, Inc.; Baldwin & Sons, LLC; Sunranch Capital Partners, LLC; USA Portola Properties, LLC; Sunrise Pacific Construction; USA Portola East, LLC; USA Portola West, LLC; and SRC-PH Investments, LLC, all appealed an order compelling compliance with administrative subpoenas issued by the State Water Resources Control Board. Appellants were involved (or believed to be involved) in the construction of a large-scale development in the Portola Hills Community in Lake Forest, California. The State Board initiated an investigation into alleged violations of the federal Clean Water Act and California's Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act occurring during construction activities. In connection with its investigation, the State Board issued subpoenas seeking Appellants' financial records. When Appellants refused to produce the requested financial records, the State Board sought a court order compelling compliance with the subpoenas. With the exception of tax returns, the trial court concluded that the information sought was relevant to the State Board's investigation and subject to disclosure pursuant to the investigative subpoenas. Appellants argued on appeal: (1) their financial records were not reasonably relevant to the State Board's investigation; (2) compelling production of their financial records violated their right to privacy; and (3) the protective order did not adequately protect against disclosure of their private financial information to third parties. The Court of Appeal rejected these claims and affirmed the challenged order compelling production of the Appellants' financial records subject to a protective order. | | City of Atlanta v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys. | Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1203 Opinion Date: February 10, 2020 Judge: Robert Benham Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use | City of Atlanta (“the City”) and the Atlanta Independent School System (“APS”) were involved in a dispute over the City’s annexing property in Fulton County, while it expressly prohibiting the co-expansion of APS’s territory. The Georgia Supreme Court granted the City’s application for interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of its motion to dismiss. The Court concluded this matter did not amount to an actual, justiciable controversy; consequently, it vacated the trial court’s order and remanded for this case to be dismissed by the trial court. “These parties have appeared before this Court numerous times, and the instant dispute is part of a larger, ongoing disagreement between the City and APS. … Mere disagreement about the 'abstract meaning or validity of a statute [or ordinance]’ does not constitute an actual controversy within the meaning of the Declaratory Judgment Act. … APS has failed to establish the existence of an actual controversy, for purposes of declaratory relief, because it has failed to demonstrate that a ruling in its favor would have any immediate legal consequence.” | | Shubert v. Ada County | Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Docket: 46403 Opinion Date: February 12, 2020 Judge: Brody Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Legal Ethics, Personal Injury, Professional Malpractice & Ethics | Natalie Shubert filed a negligence claim against her former public defender, Michael Lojek, former Ada County chief public defender Alan Trimming, and Ada County (collectively, “Ada County Defendants”). In 2008, Shubert was charged with two felonies and pleaded guilty to both charges. Her sentences were suspended in each case, and she was placed on probation. After a probation violation in 2011, the Ada County district court entered an order extending Shubert’s probation beyond the time period allowed by law, and the mistake was not caught. After Shubert’s probation should have ended in both cases, she was charged and incarcerated for a subsequent probation violation in 2014. Thereafter, in 2016, Shubert was charged with a new probation violation. Shubert was assigned a new public defender, who discovered the error that unlawfully kept Shubert on probation. Shubert’s new public defender filed a motion to correct the illegal sentence, raising the error that had improperly extended her probation. The district court granted Shubert’s motion to correct the illegal sentence and released Shubert from custody. Shubert then sued her original public defender, the Ada County Public Defender’s Officer, and other unknown Ada County employees alleging false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence per se, negligence, and state and federal constitutional violations. The district court dismissed all of Shubert’s claims except for negligence. In denying the Ada County Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Shubert’s negligence claim, the district court held that public defenders were not entitled to common law quasi-judicial immunity from civil malpractice liability, and two provisions of the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA) did not exempt public defenders from civil malpractice liability. The Ada County Defendants petitioned the Idaho Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court affirmed, finding the district court did not err in its finding that the public defenders and the County were not entitled to immunity. The case was remanded for further proceedings. | | Central Mississippi Medical Center v. Mississippi Division of Medicaid | Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2018-SA-01410-SCT Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Michael K. Randolph Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law, Public Benefits | Central Mississippi Medical Center (CMMC) appealed a Chancery Court decision denying its appeal of a Division of Medicaid (DOM) hearing. The DOM had determined that CMMC owed it $1.226 million due to overpayment. The Mississippi Supreme Court recently decided a reimbursement dispute involving the DOM, Crossgates River Oaks Hosp. v. Miss. Div. of Medicaid, 240 So. 3d 385 (Miss. 2018). In Crossgates, the hospitals prevailed because the DOM had failed to adhere to the Medicare State Plan Agreement. Applying the same legal principles to this case, the Supreme Court ruled the DOM prevailed because the DOM adhered to the Plan. The chancellor found sufficient evidence to support the DOM’s decision, decreed that it was neither arbitrary nor capricious, and decreed that it did not exceed the DOM’s authority or violate any of CMMC’s statutory or constitutional rights. | | Sheehy v. Commissioner of Political Practices | Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 37 Opinion Date: February 12, 2020 Judge: Mike McGrath Areas of Law: Education Law, Government & Administrative Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics | The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court reversing the Montana Commissioner of Political Practices' summary decision of complaint without informal contested case hearing against Montana Board of Regents of Higher Education member Martha Sheehy, holding that Sheehy did not violate the Montana Code of Ethics, that the Commissioner lacks enforcement authority over regents, and that regents are public employees subject to the Ethics Code. The Commissioner concluded that Regents are public employees subject to the Commissioner's Ethics Code enforcement authority and that Sheehy violated the Ethics Code by soliciting support for a ballot issue while suing public time, facilities, and equipment. The district court overruled the Commissioner's summary decision, concluding that the Ethics Code does not apply to regents, that the Commissioner lacked enforcement authority over regents, and that Sheehy's statements did not violate the Ethics Code. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the Ethics Code applies to the Board of Regents of the Montana University System; (2) Sheehy did not violate the Ethics Code; and (3) the Commissioner does not have authority to enforce the Ethics Code against members of a state administrative board, like the Board of Regents. | | Leggio v. Devine | Court: New York Court of Appeals Citation: 2020 NY Slip Op 00999 Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Wilson Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Public Benefits | The Court of Appeals confirmed the determination of a local services agency, confirmed by a state agency, that child support payments a parent receives, made for the benefit of her five children living at home, are included as "household" income in deciding whether the household is eligible for benefits under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), holding that, for the purposes of SNAP, child support directly received by a parent is household income, even if it is used for the benefit of an ineligible college student living at home. The Suffolk County Department of Social Services (DSS) discontinued the household's benefits because its income exceeded the upper limit for the household. Because the two college children were ineligible for SNAP, DSS did not count them as household members but did include the full amount of child support in its calculation of household income. The mother appealed, arguing that the college children's pro rata share of the child support payment should be excluded from household income, rendering the household SNAP-eligible. The Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (OTDA) upheld the determination. The Appellate Division confirmed the OTDA's determination. The Court of Appeals also confirmed, holding that the OTDA's interpretation of the relevant federal statutes was not irrational and was entitled to deference. | | Ouradnik v. N.D. Dept. of Transportation | Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 39 Opinion Date: February 12, 2020 Judge: Jon J. Jensen Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law | The North Dakota Department of Transportation (NDDOT) appealed a district court judgment reversing an administrative hearing officer’s decision to revoke Kyle Ouradnik’s driving privileges for a period of 91 days. The NDDOT argued the district court erred in reversing the administrative decision by ruling on an issue Ouradnik failed to preserve for appeal during his administrative hearing. The North Dakota Supreme Court concurred, reversed the district court and reinstated the administrative hearing officer’s decision. | | Rockies Express Pipeline, LLC v. McClain | Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-410 Opinion Date: February 11, 2020 Judge: Judith L. French Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law | The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirming a tax assessment against Rockies Express Pipeline, LLC (Rockies), holding that Rockies' gross receipts for tax year 2015 from the transportation of natural gas within the state of Ohio were not excluded from taxation under Ohio Rev. Code 5727.33(B)(1) as "receipts derived wholly from interstate business" and that such taxation does not violate the Commerce Clause. Rockies is an interstate pipeline that transports natural gas for others. For tax year 2015, the Ohio Tax Commissioner assessed Rockies on transactions in which natural gas entered and exited Rockies' pipeline within Ohio. Rockies petitioned the tax commissioner for reassessment, arguing that its receipts derived wholly from interstate business and were thus eligible for exclusion under section 5727.33(B)(1). The tax commissioner upheld the assessment. The BTA affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rockies did not meet its burden of showing that its receipts fall under the exclusion in section 5727.33(B)(1) as "receipts derived wholly from interstate business"; and (2) imposing the tax under these circumstances does not violate the Commerce Clause because Rockies has substantial nexus with Ohio based on its physical presence within the State. | | Aiken v. So. Carolina Dept. of Rev. | Court: South Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 27944 Opinion Date: February 12, 2020 Judge: James Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Class Action, Government & Administrative Law | Respondents, individually and as members of a putative class, brought a declaratory judgment action against the South Carolina Department of Revenue seeking refunds of amounts garnished from their wages by the Department to satisfy delinquent debts they allegedly owed to other governmental entities. The sole issue on appeal centered on the circuit court's grant of Respondents' motion to strike one defense from the Department's answer to Respondents' second amended complaint: that South Carolina Revenue Procedures Act (RPA) subsection 12-60-80(C) prohibited this action from proceeding as a class action against the Department. The Department appealed the circuit court's order to the court of appeals, and the Supreme Court certified the Department's appeal pursuant to Rule 204(b) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and held this case could not proceed as a class action against the Department. | | Black v. Cent. Puget Sound Reg'l Transit Auth. | Court: Washington Supreme Court Docket: 97195-1 Opinion Date: February 13, 2020 Judge: Susan Owens Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law, Transportation Law | In 2015, the Washington legislature enacted RCW 81.104.160(1) (MVET statute) authorizing Sound Transit to use two separate depreciation schedules to calculate motor vehicle excise taxes (MVET). Under the statute, Sound Transit could pledge revenue from a 1996 depreciation schedule for MVETs to pay off bond contracts; Sound Transit could use a 2006 depreciation schedule for all other MVETs. Though each schedule is referenced, the MVET statute did not restate in full either schedule. Taylor Black and other taxpayers alleged the MVET statute violated article II, section 37 of the Washington Constitution, stating "no act shall ever be revised or amended by mere reference to its title, but the act revised or the section amended shall be set forth at full length." The Washington Supreme Court held the MVET statute is constitutional because (1) the statute was a complete act because it was readily ascertainable from its text alone when which depreciation schedule would apply; (2) the statute properly adopted both schedules by reference; and (3) the statute did not render a straightforward determination of the scope of rights or duties established by other existing statutes erroneous because it did not require a reader to conduct research to find unreferenced laws that were impacted by the MVET statute. | |
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