Why the Biden Administration Was Right Earlier This Week to Change Course in the Obamacare Challenge Pending Before the Court

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois Law Dean Vikram David Amar comments on an unusual move by the U.S. Solicitor General’s office, sending a letter to the U.S. Supreme Court amending the position of the federal government in a case currently pending before the Court challenging the Affordable Care Act. Dean Amar explains why the arrival of a new administration should generally not trigger such position reversals, but he argues that the unusual circumstances—specifically the “exceptional implausibility” of the government’s prior filings—may justify the government’s action in this instance.

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Pinto Lugo v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Dockets: 19-1181, 19-1160, 19-1182

Opinion Date: February 8, 2021

Judge: William Joseph Kayatta, Jr.

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law

In these three consolidated appeals arising out of the Title III debt-restructuring proceedings brought by the Financial Oversight and Management Board (Board) for Puerto Rico on behalf of the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation (COFINA) under the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) the First Circuit held that certain appeals were equitably moot and another claim was properly dismissed. The Title III court approved a plan of adjustment (the Plan) proposed by the Board resolving disputes between the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and COFINA and between the junior and senior holders of COFINA's outstanding debt. The Elliott and Pinto-Lugo groups objected to the Plan, arguing, among other things, that it unlawfully abrogated their rights as junior COFINA bondholders. Peter Hein, an individual creditor, challenged the dismissal of his proof of claim against COFINA. The Title III court dismissed Hein's challenges and overruled the objections to the Plan. On Appeal, the First Circuit (1) dismissed the Elliott and Pinto-Lugo appeals as equitably moot; and (2) affirmed the dismissal of Hein's claims against COFINA.

Zaruma-Guaman v. Wilkinson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 20-1533

Opinion Date: February 9, 2021

Judge: Selya

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for judicial review seeking to set aside the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and other relief, holding that the BIA's decision must be upheld. On appeal, Petitioner's principal assignment of error challenged the denial of his asylum claim. Petitioner specifically argued against the adverse credibility determination of the immigration judge (IJ), which the BIA upheld. The First Circuit denied the petition for review, holding (1) the IJ's adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence in the record, and therefore, the BIA's denial of Petitioner's asylum claim must be upheld; (2) because Petitioner failed to satisfy the standard required for asylum, his claim for withholding of removal necessarily failed; and (3) Petitioner's claim for CAT protection is deemed abandoned.

New York Legal Assistance Group v. Board of Immigration Appeals

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 19-3248

Opinion Date: February 5, 2021

Judge: Gerard E. Lynch

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law

After NYLAG sought access to non-precedential "unpublished opinions" issued by the BIA in immigrant cases under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the district court dismissed the case and concluded that FOIA's remedial provision does not authorize district courts to order agencies to make records publicly available. NYLAG seeks disclosure of these opinions, which are not routinely made available to the public, in order to aid in its representation of low-income clients in removal and asylum proceedings. The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment, concluding that FOIA's remedial provision authorizes the relief NYLAG seeks. The court explained that FOIA's text, read in light of its history and purpose, empowers district courts to order agencies to comply with their affirmative disclosure obligations under 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(2), including the obligation to make certain documents publicly available. Therefore, the court remanded for further proceedings.

Smith v. Allbaugh

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 20-6029

Opinion Date: February 10, 2021

Judge: Paul Joseph Kelly, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law, Personal Injury

Plaintiff-appellee Christina Smith was the mother of Joshua England. Her claims arose from the death of England from a ruptured appendix in May 2018, while England was housed at the Joseph Harp Correctional Center (JHCC), an Oklahoma Department of Corrections (ODOC) facility in Lexington, Oklahoma. England was a 21-year-old prisoner at JHCC who was a few months away from release when he submitted multiple sick call requests. At the fifth such request, England complained his stomach hurt and he was short of breath. Unable to bear the pain while waiting at the clinic, England died in his cell from a ruptured appendix with acute peritonitis. Defendants-Appellants Joe Allbaugh, the Director of the Department of Corrections at the time this claim arose, and Carl Bear, the Warden of Joseph Harp Correctional Center (collectively, Defendants) appealed the district court’s order denying their motion to dismiss Smith's subsequent lawsuit relating to England's death on grounds of qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding Smith alleged only that JHCC medical staff failed to follow procedure, not that Defendants failed to enforce those policies. Furthermore, the Court determined Smith failed to plead sufficient factual allegations to support deliberate indifference on the part of these defendants. Likewise, Smith failed to sufficiently plead Defendants improperly hired, supervised, and retained certain medical staff employees.

Leopold v. Central Intelligence Agency

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 20-5002

Opinion Date: February 9, 2021

Judge: Arthur Raymond Randolph

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Government & Administrative Law

A 2017 “tweet” by @realDonaldTrump stated: “The Amazon Washington Post fabricated the facts on my ending massive, dangerous, and wasteful payments to Syrian rebels fighting Assad.” BuzzFeed requested CIA records about Agency payments to Syrian rebels, citing the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(3)(A). The Agency invoked Exemptions 1 and 3. The district court granted the Agency summary judgment, explaining that the “tweet did not mention the [Agency] or create any inference that such a program would be linked to or run by the [Agency].” BuzzFeed sent another, more broadly stated, request. The Agency asserted that a response would reveal whether it had an intelligence interest in, intelligence sources about, and connection to programs related to Syrian rebels — information exempt from disclosure under Exemptions 1 and 3. Exemption 1 covers “matters”2 that are “specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Exemption 3 covers matters “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute,” the National Security Act qualifies as a withholding statute under Exemption 3, 50 U.S.C. 3024(i)(1). The district court granted BuzzFeed summary judgment, holding that the tweet officially acknowledged “the government’s intelligence interest in the broader categories of records that BuzzFeed has requested.” The D.C. Circuit reversed. The tweet was not an official acknowledgment of the existence (or not) of Agency records.

Homes v. United States Postal Service

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 19-1973

Opinion Date: February 8, 2021

Judge: Timothy B. Dyk

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

Holmes began working for the USPS in 1989. An investigation revealed that another letter carrier, Baxter, was selling marijuana from Baxter’s postal truck. Surveillance video showed Holmes and other USPS employees engaged in transactions with Baxter while on duty. Baxter later admitted to selling marijuana from his USPS vehicle; six other letter carriers admitted to purchasing marijuana from Baxter. Holmes denied purchasing marijuana while on duty. The surveillance video showed two relevant interactions between Baxter and Holmes, while on duty. At pre-disciplinary interviews, Holmes invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Following a Notice of Proposed Removal, Holmes met with the deciding official, Bush, and stated that he “wanted to apologize,” and that he “made this little mistake.” Bush issued a termination, explaining that removal was consistent with the penalties received by the other employees. Bush considered Holmes’s lengthy federal service and lack of disciplinary record but concluded that they did not outweigh the support for his removal. In five grievance arbitrations, the arbitrators mitigated the penalty to long-term suspension without back pay. Holmes instead appealed to the Merit System Protection Board, arguing that the agency had insufficient evidence to find that he purchased marijuana from Baxter. The Board upheld his removal. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the removal was arbitrary or otherwise not in accordance with law; obtained without procedures required by law,; or unsupported by substantial evidence, 5 U.S.C. 7703(c)

Mojave Desert Holdings, LLC v. Crocs, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 20-1167

Opinion Date: February 11, 2021

Judge: Timothy B. Dyk

Areas of Law: Bankruptcy, Government & Administrative Law, Intellectual Property, Patents

Crocs's Design Patent 789, titled “Footwear,” has a single claim for the “ornamental design for footwear.” Crocs sued Dawgs for infringement, Dawgs sought inter partes reexamination (IPE) under 35 U.S.C. 311. The district court stayed its proceedings. The examiner rejected the claim as anticipated, 35 U.S.C. 102(b). While an appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board was pending, Dawgs filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court approved the sale of all of its assets to a new entity, Holdings, “not free and clear of any Claims Crocs . . . may hold for patent infringement occurring post-Closing Date by any person ... or any defenses Crocs may have in respect of any litigation claims that are sold.” The bankruptcy court authorized the distribution of the net sale proceeds and dismissed Dawgs’s bankruptcy case. Holdings assigned all rights, including explicitly the claims asserted by Dawgs in the infringement action and the IPE, to Mojave. Dawgs dissolved but continued to exist for limited purposes, including “prosecuting and defending suits" and "claims of any kind.” The Board declined to change the real-party-in-interest from the IPE requestor to Mojave, then reversed the examiner’s rejection of the patent’s claim. The Federal Circuit granted the motion to substitute. The assignments indicate that Mojave is Dawgs's successor-in-interest; as such, Mojave has standing. If the Board precludes substitution on the basis of a transfer in interest because of a late filing, it would defeat the important interest in having the proper party before the Board.

Early v. Bacerra

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C089943(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 8, 2021

Judge: Vance W. Raye

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

Xavier Becerra and his election committee (collectively, Becerra) successfully defended a petition for writ of mandate brought by Eric Early and his election committee (collectively, Early) seeking to remove Becerra as a candidate for California's Attorney General on the November 2018 ballot. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision denying the petition. Early alleged that Becerra was ineligible for the office of Attorney General because his state bar status was “inactive” during the five years preceding the election and therefore he was not “admitted to practice” in the state as required for that period under Government Code section 12503. We held that the phrase “admitted to practice” in the statute “refers to the event of admission to the bar and the status of being admitted, and does not require engagement in the 'actual’ or 'active’ practice of law.” Becerra brought a motion for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, which the trial court granted awarding Becerra $69,718 in attorney fees. "Becerra's successful defense of the petition enforced an important public right and conferred a significant benefit on the general public as required by subdivision (a) of section 1021.5. . . . Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining under subdivision (b) of section 1021.5 that the financial burden Becerra incurred in defending Early’s suit outweighed any pecuniary benefit in the form of the salary paid to the Attorney General or otherwise."

Hernandez v. State Personnel Board

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E072444(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 10, 2021

Judge: Raphael

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

Petitioner-appellant Anthony Hernandez was convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence after choking his girlfriend. The California Department of Correction and Rehabilitation (Department) terminated him from his position as a correctional officer, stating that because of his domestic violence conviction, federal law prohibited him from carrying a firearm, which he needed for the job. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether the Department acted reasonably in terminating Hernandez. It was undisputed that federal law makes it a felony to possess a firearm after being convicted in any court of misdemeanor domestic violence, which was defined in part as the use of physical force by “a person similarly situated to a spouse” of a victim. Disputed here was whether Hernandez was “similarly situated to a spouse” of his girlfriend, given that he had been dating her five or six months and did not share a permanent residence with her. In line with the federal case law, the Court found the evidence was sufficient to support the Department’s determination that Hernandez was “similarly situated to a spouse” of his victim under these circumstances. Accordingly, the Department acted reasonably in terminating him.

Knight v. South Orange Community College Dist.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G058644(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 10, 2021

Judge: William W. Bedsworth

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law

Saddleback College and Juan Avalos, vice-president of Saddleback’s student services and its Title IX officer, appealed the granting of a writ of mandamus in favor of a Saddleback student, Marcus Knight. Knight petitioned for relief after he was disciplined when two female students complained that he was following them, taking photos of one of them on his phone, and touching them. Knight had multiple disabilities, including cerebral palsy and autism, which have complicated his experience at Saddleback. In March 2018, Knight received a letter from Avalos stating that he was “suspended” – barred from classes and campus activities. It appeared, however, that he was allowed to attend classes anyway, while he contested the suspension. Eventually the potential suspension was dropped, and a written disciplinary reprimand was placed in his student record instead. At trial, Knight based his petition on the ground that the college did not afford him a hearing during which he or his counsel could confront and cross-examine witnesses. The trial court granted the writ petition on that basis. The Court of Appeal determined Knight was not entitled to that level of due process: requiring a trial-like hearing before Saddleback could issue a written reprimand placed too great a burden on the college when compared to the minor detriment to Knight. "He received notice of the charges against him, and he had an opportunity to respond – several opportunities, in fact. Had the suspension gone forward, he would have had the hearing he feels he was entitled to. But it did not go forward, and he received a much lower level of discipline." Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment for Knight and directed the trial court to enter judgment for appellants.

Wilmot v. Contra Costa County Employee's Retirement Association

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A152100A(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 5, 2021

Judge: Richman

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

A county employee decided to retire. In December 2012, he submitted his application for retirement to the county’s retirement authority. In January 2013, the California Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act took effect, mandating the forfeiture of pension benefits/payments if a public employee is convicted of any felony under state or federal law for conduct arising out of or in the performance of his official duties (Gov. Code 7522.72(b)(l)). In February 2013, the employee was indicted for stealing county property. In April 2013, the county pension authority approved the employee’s retirement application, fixing the employee’s actual retirement on the December 2012 day he submitted his application. The employee began receiving monthly pension checks starting from December 2012. In December 2015, the employee pled guilty to embezzling county property. The county pension authority reduced the employee’s monthly check in accordance with the forfeiture provision. The court of appeal concluded the provision does apply to the employee because the employee merely initiated the process of retiring. Even if the employee was retired, and the forfeiture provision was applied to him, there would be no violation of the California Constitution’s provision against the undue impairment of the employee’s contract with his governmental employer, nor would that application constitute an ex post facto law.

DNREC v. Food & Water Watch

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 558, 2019

Opinion Date: February 3, 2021

Judge: Montgomery-Reeves

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

Appellant Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control (“DNREC”), challenged the Superior Court’s holding that Appellee Food & Water Watch (“Watch”), had organizational standing to contest Order No. 2016-W-0008 (the “Secretary’s Order”), which established a system to regulate pollutants from Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (“Feeding Operations”). Specifically, DNREC argued Watch did not have organizational standing to challenge the Secretary’s Order because its representatives could not adequately establish injury in fact, causation, and redressability. Watch responded that this action was moot: since DNREC ultimately won on the merits and neither party appealed the merits decision, the issue of standing was no longer justiciable because the action was not adversarial. Further, even if this action was not moot, Watch argued that it had standing. Having reviewed the briefs, the supplemental memoranda, and the record on appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court dismissed this appeal for lack of standing to appeal. DNREC was the prevailing party below; the Superior Court granted DNREC all of the relief it requested; and the Superior Court’s standing decision did not meet the criteria for a collateral adverse ruling. Accordingly, the standing decision did not render DNREC an aggrieved party, and DNREC does not have standing to appeal.

Kansas City Power & Light v. Missouri Public Service Commission

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC98039

Opinion Date: February 9, 2021

Judge: Paul C. Wilson

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of rulemaking issued by the Public Service Commission (PSC), holding that the order fell within the PSC's statutory authority and that the private entity fiscal note accompanying the promulgated regulation complied with the applicable statutes. In 2018, the PSC promulgated a rule (the Rule) that provided new regulations related to certificates of convenience and necessity. Kansas City Power & Light Company and KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations Company appealed, arguing that the order promulgating the Rule exceeded PSC's authority and that the fiscal note was deficient, rendering the Rule void and unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed the order, holding (1) the order promulgated by the PSC was supported by statutory authority and was reasonable; and (2) the accompanying fiscal note was not deficient.

Spire Missouri, Inc. v. Public Service Commission

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC97834

Opinion Date: February 9, 2021

Judge: Paul C. Wilson

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the amended report and order issued by the Public Service Commission (PSC) disallowing a portion of Spire Missouri, Inc.'s rate case expenses, including some of the proceeds from a sale of a facility in setting Spire's new rates, and determining that Spire Missouri East's prepaid pension was less than Spire contended, holding that an increase in the amount of Spire East's pension was warranted. Spire, an investor-owned public utility regulated by the PSC, filed tariff to increase its general rates for gas services in its Spire Missouri East and Spire Missouri West territories. The PSC suspended Spire's new tariffs and established a test year and then issued its contested amended report and order. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Spire's points challenging the PSC's decision to exclude a portion of Spire's rate case expenses were unavailing; (2) the PSC's order that relocation proceeds from the sale of the facility be used to reduce rates was not an abuse of discretion; but (3) the PSC's decision to extend the period in which it determined Spire East used cash accounting to value its pension asset from 1994 to 1996 was not supported by competent and substantial evidence.

Cascade Co. v. Montana Petroleum Tank Release Compensation Board

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 MT 28

Opinion Date: February 9, 2021

Judge: Gustafson

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law

In this dispute between Cascade County and the Montana Petroleum Tank Release Compensation Board regarding reimbursement for the cost of remediating petroleum contamination at the County's shop complex the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court on judicial review, holding that the district court erred in remanding the case to the Board to address issues the Board rejected. The Board concluded that the County was time barred from recovery by Mont. Code Ann. 27-2-231. The district court concluded that the Board erred when it relied on section 27-2-231 because the procedure for reimbursement is provided in Mont. Code Ann. 75-11-309. The court, however, remanded the case to the Board for further fact-finding. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not err in determining that section 27-2-231 did not time bar the County from submitting additional applications for eligibility to the Board; and (2) the district court erred in remanding the case to the Board to rule on the issues it rejected in its final decision.

The New London Hospital Association, Inc. v. Town of Newport

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2019-0616

Opinion Date: February 9, 2021

Judge: Anna Barbara Hantz Marconi

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Non-Profit Corporations

Plaintiff The New London Hospital Association, Inc. (Hospital), challenged a superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Town of Newport (Town), in the Hospital’s appeal of the Town’s denial of the Hospital’s application for a charitable tax exemption, and denying the Hospital’s motion to amend its complaint. At a meeting held on August 29, 2016, the Newport Board of Selectmen (board) voted to deny the Hospital’s application for the 2016 tax year “because the application for the exemption was untimely and because the level of charity care provided by the hospital is very small and it is a fee for service operation.” The Town informed the Hospital of the board’s decision by letter dated September 7, 2016. Aside from the filing of a related tax form on May 23, 2016, the parties did not communicate at all regarding the Hospital’s application for a charitable exemption for tax year 2016 between the date the Form A-9 was filed and the date the application was denied by the board. The Hospital did not dispute its form was untimely filed. However, the Hospital argued the Town waived any objection to the timeliness of the Hospital’s application, and because the Hospital was able to satisfy the statutory standard of accident, mistake or misfortune. While the summary judgment motion was pending, the Hospital moved to amend its complaint to add a claim alleging an equal protection violation based upon the Town’s administrative policy, uncovered by the Hospital during discovery, of notifying particular entities, not including the Hospital, of approaching filing deadlines for tax exemptions. The trial court denied the Hospital’s motion, ruling that the amendment introduced an entirely new cause of action, would call for substantially different evidence, and would not cure the defect in the complaint. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court determined the trial court properly granted the Town's motion for summary judgment, and sustainably exercised its discretion in denying the Hospital's motion to amend.

In the Matter of the Assessments for Tax Year 2012

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 OK 7

Opinion Date: February 9, 2021

Judge: James E. Edmondson

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law

Property owners (taxpayers) appealed ad valorem tax assessments made during 2012-2015 to the Tulsa County District Court after their appeals to the Tulsa County Board of Equalization were denied. Taxpayers were successful in the District Court appeal by showing one parcel of property was exempt and a second parcel partially exempt from ad valorem taxation. The District Court determined the amounts of the tax refund and stated the Tulsa County Treasurer "pay the Petitioners interest on such amounts as allowed by law." The Tulsa County Assessor appealed, but the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held the general postjudgment statute, 12 O.S. section 727.1, did not apply to taxpayers' ad valorem tax protest appeal, and the procedure for interest on taxpayers' protested tax payments was provided by the ad valorem statute, 68 O.S. section 2884.

Starnino v. Employees' Retirement System of City of Providence

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 18-233

Opinion Date: February 5, 2021

Judge: William P. Robinson, III

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Retirement Board of the Employees' Retirement System of the City of Providence denying Petitioner's application for an accidental disability retirement, holding that the Board relied on legally competent evidence. Petitioner, a firefighter, injured his right shoulder while lifting a patient. After he had recovered, he sustained a second work-related injury to his right shoulder. When a doctor evaluation concluded that he could not return to working full duty Petitioner submitted an application for an accidental disability retirement. The Board denied the application. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the Board ignored the legally competent evidence before it when it denied his application for an accidental disability retirement. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that some evidence supported the Board's decision.

South Carolina Public Interest Foundation v. Calhoun County Council

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28008

Opinion Date: February 10, 2021

Judge: Kaye Gorenflo Hearn

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

Voters in Calhoun County, South Carolina, approved a referendum in the November 2018 general election imposing a one percent sales and use tax ("a penny tax") to fund a list of fifteen projects. Nearly five months later, Appellants filed suit, contending four of the projects were not authorized pursuant to section S.C. Code Ann. sections 4-10-300 to -390 (2019). The County responded that the statute of limitations had expired, and alternatively, the projects fell within the scope of the Act. The circuit court found the thirty-day limitations period barred the action and did not address the merits. After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding the statute of limitations had run.

Holborn v. Deuel County Board of Adjustment

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2021 S.D. 6

Opinion Date: February 10, 2021

Judge: Jensen

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court reversing the decision of the Deuel County Board of Adjustment granting special exception permits (SEP) to Deuel Harvest Wind Energy, LLC and Deuel Harvest Wind Energy South, LLC (Deuel Harvest) to develop two wind energy systems in the County, holding that the circuit court erred by invalidating the votes of two Board members. Following a public hearing, the Board unanimously approved the SEPs. Appellees, several residents of Deuel County and neighboring counties, petitioned for a writ of certiorari, asserting that several Board members had interests or biases disqualifying them from considering the permits. The circuit court invalidated the votes of two Board members due to disqualifying interests and overturned the Board's approval of the SEPs. The Supreme Court reversed in part and reinstated the Board's unanimous vote in approving the SEPs, holding that the circuit court erred in disqualifying the two members from voting on the SEPs.

Wings As Eagles Ministries, Inc. v. Oglala Lakota County

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: INC. v. OGLALA LAKOTA COUNTY, 2021 S.D. 8

Opinion Date: February 10, 2021

Judge: Salter

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Tax Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Oglala Lakota County Commission denying Wings as Eagles Ministries, Inc.'s petition seeking an abatement of its property taxes for 2014 and 2015, holding that the circuit court did not err. Wings applied for property tax exempt status for the 2014 and 2015 tax years. The applications were denied and became final determinations of the property's exempt status for those years. Wings then filed its abatement petition, which the Commission denied. The circuit court affirmed, concluding that Wings was unable to meet the threshold eligibility element for an abatement because the final determinations denying exempt status conclusively established that Wings was not exempt for the 2014 and 2015 tax years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it concluded that Wings did not qualify for an abatement under S.D. Codified Laws 10-18-1(3); and (2) Wings' estoppel argument was unreviewable on appeal.

Beauregard v. Wash. State Bar Ass'n

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 97249-4

Opinion Date: February 11, 2021

Judge: Sheryl Gordon McCloud

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

The Washington State Bar Association (WSBA) Board of Governors (BOG) terminated the WSBA executive director during a closed executive session. WSBA member Lincoln Beauregard sued the WSBA, alleging that the vote to fire the executive director violated the Open Public Meetings Act (OPMA). He demanded that the executive director be reinstated. The trial court held that the OPMA applied to the WSBA and granted Beauregard a preliminary injunction, but not for the requested relief of reinstating the executive director. Instead, the injunction required the WSBA to comply with the OPMA. Because the OPMA did not apply to the WSBA and because the superior court ordered relief that Beauregard never requested, the Washington Supreme Court reversed the preliminary injunction.

In Re Recall of Snaza

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 98918-4

Opinion Date: February 11, 2021

Judge: Montoya-Lewis

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

This case involved a recall petition against Thurston County, Washington, Sheriff John Snaza. Petitioner Arthur West alleged Snaza committed a recallable offense because he stated in a press release that he would not enforce an order issued by the Washington State secretary of health intended to combat the COVID-19 (coronavirus) pandemic. Snaza appealed the trial court’s conclusion that the recall charge was factually and legally sufficient. The Washington Supreme Court concluded Snaza had discretion and his exercise of discretion (stating he would not criminally enforce the order) was not manifestly unreasonable. Therefore, the recall charge was neither factually nor legally sufficient, and the trial court's decision was reversed.