Death Penalty Opponents Should Rethink Their Support for Life Without Parole Sentences

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat—Associate Provost and Associate Dean of the Faculty and Professor of Jurisprudence & Political Science at Amherst College—argues that life sentences without the possibility of parole (LWOP) are as problematic and damaging as the death penalty. For this reason, Professor Sarat calls upon death penalty opponents to reconsider their support for LWOP sentences.

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Brownback v. King

Court: US Supreme Court

Docket: 19-546

Opinion Date: February 25, 2021

Judge: Clarence Thomas

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) allows a plaintiff to bring certain state-law tort claims against the United States for torts committed by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment if the plaintiff alleges six statutory elements of an actionable claim, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b). The judgment in an action under section 1346(b) bars “any action by the claimant” involving the same subject matter against the federal employee whose act gave rise to the claim. King sued the government under the FTCA after a violent encounter with federal task force members and sued the officers individually under “Bivens.” The district court dismissed his FTCA claims, holding that the government was immune because the officers were entitled to qualified immunity under Michigan law, then dismissed King’s Bivens claims. The Sixth Circuit found that the dismissal of King’s FTCA claims did not trigger the judgment bar to block his Bivens claims. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. The dismissal was a judgment on the merits of the FTCA claims that can trigger the judgment bar, similar to common-law claim preclusion. Whether the undisputed facts established all the elements of King’s FTCA claims is a quintessential merits decision. The court also determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because, in the unique context of the FTCA, all elements of a meritorious claim are also jurisdictional. Generally, a court may not issue a ruling on the merits when it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, but when pleading a claim and pleading jurisdiction entirely overlap, a ruling that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction may simultaneously be a judgment on the merits.

Plymouth Venture Partners, II, L.P. v. GTR Source, LLC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 20-118

Opinion Date: February 23, 2021

Judge: Richard J. Sullivan

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

The Second Circuit certified the following questions to the New York Court of Appeals: (1) whether a judgment debtor suffers cognizable damages in tort when its property is seized pursuant to a levy by service of execution that does not comply with the procedural requirements of CPLR 5232(a), even though the seized property is applied to a valid money judgment; and, if so (2) whether the judgment debtor can, under these circumstances, bring a tort claim against either the judgment creditor or the marshal without first seeking relief under CPLR 5240.

Campbell v. Wilkinson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 20-11002

Opinion Date: February 19, 2021

Judge: James C. Ho

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims of discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court dismissed the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) on the ground that plaintiff's counsel failed to retain local counsel as required by local rules. The court held that dismissal was unwarranted because Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA, 975 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1992), sets forth a strict framework that district courts must meet to justify dismissal with prejudice—and one that the district court plainly failed to meet here. In this case, the record shows neither a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct, nor the futility of lesser sanctions, nor any aggravating factor. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings.

Grace Ranch, LLC v. BP America Production, Co.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 20-30224

Opinion Date: February 24, 2021

Judge: Gregg Costa

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law

A Louisiana law, La. Stat. Ann. 30:16, allows citizen suits to enforce state conservation laws, but any injunction the citizen might obtain must be entered in favor of the Commissioner of Louisiana's Office of Conservation. Plaintiff filed suit contending that this potential state involvement at the end of the litigation precludes diversity jurisdiction in federal court because there is no such jurisdiction when a State is a party. The district court disagreed, held that it had subject matter jurisdiction, and remanded to state court anyway based on Burford abstention. The Fifth Circuit denied the motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction; reversed the remand order; and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that it has subject matter jurisdiction over Grace Ranch's suit. The court explained that, despite Grace Ranch's listing of Louisiana in the style of the case, the State is not a proper party because it has not authorized landowners to sue in its name. Furthermore, Grace Ranch's real-party-in-interest argument for state involvement fares no better because Louisiana has only a general interest in the outcome of this suit. The court also concluded that it has appellate jurisdiction to review the district court's abstention-based remand order. Making explicit what was previously implicit in its caselaw, the court reasoned that a discretionary remand such as one on abstention grounds does not involve a removal "defect" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). Finally, the court weighed the factors for Burford abstention and concluded that abstention is not warranted.

Tercero v. Texas Southmost College District

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-40740

Opinion Date: February 24, 2021

Judge: James Earl Graves, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Contracts, Labor & Employment Law

After plaintiff prevailed on her procedural due process and breach of contract claims against TSC, the trial court vacated the jury's verdict on the breach of contract claims and reduced the damages award on her procedural due process claim to $1. The Fifth Circuit held that TSC is entitled to neither sovereign immunity under the United States Constitution nor governmental immunity under state law. In this case, the Texas Legislature abrogated TSC's governmental immunity such that plaintiff could bring state law breach of contract claims against TSC. Therefore, the argument that the Texas Legislature attempted to limit federal jurisdiction over these claims is unavailing. The court also held that it was not required to address TSC's alternative arguments and declined to do so. The court reversed the dismissal of plaintiff's breach of contract claims, reinstated the jury's verdict on those claims, and remanded for the district court to consider TSC's alternative arguments regarding whether sufficient evidence supports plaintiff's breach of contract claims. The court affirmed the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law on the due process violation damages and reduction of the jury's award of $12,500,000 to the nominal amount of $1. The court reversed the district court's vacatur of the portion of the attorneys' fees award based on the breach of contract claims and remanded for the district court to address TSC's alternative arguments regarding those claims and to determine whether plaintiff is entitled to attorneys' fees and in what amount.

Doe v. Griffin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Dockets: 20-5852, 20-5850

Opinion Date: February 23, 2021

Judge: Gibbons

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Communications Law

High school students from Kentucky received widespread attention for their conduct at the Lincoln Memorial during the 2019 March for Life rally. An incident occurred after the march between Covington Catholic students, including the plaintiffs, and others, including “a self-described Native American Elder.” In the wake of negative coverage and critical posts on social media, the students sued several media defendants and people who had engaged in online commentary about the incident, alleging civil harassment, harassing communications, menacing, and terroristic threatening. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the cases against Twitter users Chandrasekhar, a doctor who lives in New Jersey, and Griffin, a comedian who lives in California, for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court rejected an argument that filing a notice of appearance automatically waives the personal jurisdiction defense; precedent that seemingly implied such a rule involved the defendant’s extensive participation in the litigation. Griffin had not filed any responsive pleading that omitted the defense, nor had she “participated in any other way that would lead plaintiffs to conclude that [she] would not assert the defense.” The defendants’ conduct is plainly outside the scope of the Kentucky long-arm statute since neither Griffin nor Chandrasekhar committed any act “in [the] Commonwealth” of Kentucky under KRS 454.210(2)(a)(3).

Moore v. Hiram Township

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 20-3259

Opinion Date: February 19, 2021

Judge: Ronald Lee Gilman

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Moore family, individually or in trust, has owned and maintained the 108-acre Hiram, Ohio property since 1813. They have operated a small airport on the Property since 1948. Around 1951, the Township enacted a zoning resolution that zoned the Property as Rural-Residential and classified the airport as a nonconforming use, permitted to continue so long as the use is not abandoned for two years. The airport remained active in varying degrees but its use for ultralight aircraft and hang gliders started recently, and prompted nuisance complaints from neighbors. In 2016, Township officials told Moore that he needed a certificate of nonconforming use to continue the airport’s operations. The Board of Zoning Appeals voted to grant Moore a certificate but imposed several conditions. The Portage County Common Pleas Court modified the conditions. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. While his state court appeal was pending, Moore filed a federal suit, alleging violations of his procedural and substantive due process rights and his equal protection rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the suit was barred by principles of claim preclusion. There was a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; this action involves the same parties; this action raises claims that were or could have been litigated in the Ohio action; and this suit arose out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the Ohio action.

Krislov v. Yarbrough

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 20-1928

Opinion Date: February 22, 2021

Judge: Frank Hoover Easterbrook

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Election Law

In 2020 Krislov sought to run in the Democratic primary for a position on the Illinois Supreme Court. To get on the ballot he needed 5,050 valid signatures, 0.4% of the votes cast in the same district for the same party’s candidate in the most recent gubernatorial election. He submitted about 9,500 signatures, but many were ruled invalid and his total fell about 100 short. Instead of protesting that decision in state court, Krislov sued in federal court, arguing that falling 100 signatures short of 5,050 is within the margin of error for document examiners. The district court dismissed the case as a state-law challenge to a state-law requirement, which Krislov had forfeited by not using his state remedies and stating that “close enough for government work” is not an available doctrine in Illinois. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of a justiciable controversy. The U.S. Constitution does not require states to ensure that their laws are accurately administered. Accurate adjudication always is in the public interest—as is accurate administration of state law—but federal courts cannot proceed if the plaintiff lacks standing or the proposed remedy would not redress the plaintiff’s injury. The election is over and Krislov cannot establish that the same problem is likely to recur for him, personally; if it does, Krislov is entitled to prompt review in state court. There is no “public interest” exception to the justiciability rules.

United States v. State Water Resources Control Board

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 20-15145

Opinion Date: February 24, 2021

Judge: Milan D. Smith

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order granting a partial stay under Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), of three state law claims, in an action brought by the United States alleging that the California State Water Resources Board violated various provisions of the California Environmental Quality Control Act. The panel held that the district court abused its discretion in granting a partial Colorado River stay. The panel explained that partial stays pursuant to Colorado River are permissible only in very limited circumstances, namely when there is strong evidence of forum shopping. In this case, there is little evidence of forum shopping. The panel also concluded that it could not affirm the district court on the basis of Pullman abstention where the Board, which did not cross-appeal, cannot ask the court to affirm on Pullman grounds. The panel reasoned that it would necessarily have to stay the intergovernmental immunity claim, which the district court allowed to proceed. On remand, the panel instructed the district court to allow the United States' claims to proceed, subject to regular issues of justiciability.

Carlile v. Reliance Standard Life Ins.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 19-4123

Opinion Date: February 22, 2021

Judge: Carolyn Baldwin McHugh

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts, Insurance Law

Reliance Standard Life Insurance (“Reliance”) appealed district court’s orders: (1) concluding that Reliance wrongly denied David Carlile’s claim for long-term disability benefits; (2) refusing to remand the case and instead ordering an award of benefits; (3) awarding attorney fees and costs to Carlile; and (4) denying Reliance’s motion to amend or alter judgment. After reviewing the policy at issue here, the Tenth Circuit determined the relevant policy language was ambiguous and therefore construed it in Carlile’s favor, and in favor of coverage. Furthermore, the Court concluded the district court did not err in refusing to remand the case back to Reliance or in awarding attorney fees and costs to Carlile.

Sinclair Wyoming Refining v. A & B Builders

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 19-8042

Opinion Date: February 22, 2021

Judge: Scott Milne Matheson, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Products Liability

In 2013, a refinery unit (“Unit”) at the Sinclair Wyoming Refinery Co. (“Sinclair”) in Sinclair, Wyoming caught fire and exploded because its “FV-241” control valve fractured and released flammable hydrogen gas. A high temperature hydrogen attack (“HTHA”) weakened the valve and caused the fracture. FV-241 was made from carbon steel, which was more susceptible to HTHA than stainless steel. Sinclair had purchased the Unit in 2004. Sinclair moved the Unit from California to Wyoming and converted it from its previous use to a hydrotreater, a refinery unit that introduced hydrogen to remove impurities from the product stream. Sinclair contracted the design, engineering, and construction work to other companies. During the moving and conversion process, FV-241 was remanufactured and installed on the Unit. Sinclair brought a diversity action against seven companies involved in dismantling the Unit, converting it to a hydrotreater, rebuilding it in Wyoming, and remanufacturing and installing FV-241. Sinclair alleged various contract and tort claims. The district court granted several motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment that eliminated all of Sinclair’s claims. The court also entered summary judgment in favor of certain Defendants’ indemnity counterclaim. Although its analysis diverged from the district court's judgment in some respects, the Tenth Circuit affirmed orders dismissing or granting summary judgment on all of Sinclair's claims, and granting summary judgment on the indemnity counter claim.

Reynolds v. Behrman Capital IV L.P.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 19-13537

Opinion Date: February 23, 2021

Judge: Jordan

Areas of Law: Bankruptcy, Civil Procedure

The Chapter 7 trustee for the bankruptcy estates of Atherotech Inc. and Atherotech Holdings, appeals the dismissal of his complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. After removal from Alabama state court, the district court applied the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction articulated in Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922), and ruled that because the state court did not have personal jurisdiction over defendants under Alabama's long-arm statute, it too lacked personal jurisdiction. The district court concluded that the trustee could not rely on Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d) (which looks to a defendant's national contacts and permits nationwide service of process) to establish personal jurisdiction. The district court also denied as futile the trustee's motion to transfer the case. The Eleventh Circuit reversed and concluded that the trustee did not waive his right to appeal the district court's dismissal of MidCap for lack of personal jurisdiction by failing to name MidCap in the amended complaint because amendment would have been futile. Under the circumstances of this case, the trustee did not waive his right to appeal the district court's dismissal of Mid Cap from the original complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court also concluded that the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction does not apply to removed cases in which the state court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The court explained that the district court could exercise jurisdiction following removal notwithstanding the state court's lack of personal jurisdiction over defendants under Alabama's long-arm statute. The court reasoned that the district court could look to Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d) to decide whether personal jurisdiction existed. Furthermore, the district court could consider the trustee's alternative request for a transfer to the Southern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1406 even if there was no personal jurisdiction over defendants under Alabama's long-arm statute. The court remanded for further proceedings.

Vibe Ener v. Martin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 19-12258

Opinion Date: February 22, 2021

Judge: William Holcombe Pryor, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Family Law

At issue in this appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion when it applied the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to dismiss plaintiff's action against defendant, the father of her two daughters. In this case, plaintiff left the United States against the orders of a Florida family court and could be arrested by Florida officials if she were to return to Florida. Plaintiff filed suit attacking the proceedings of the family court while remaining outside its jurisdiction. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to dismiss plaintiff's lawsuit. The court explained that because plaintiff remains a fugitive, her lawsuit collaterally attacks the very proceedings from which she absconded, and dismissal prevents her from using the judicial process only when it benefits her. The court denied as moot the motion to dismiss the appeal, the motion to strike part of the reply brief, and the motion to strike the appendix to the reply brief.

Allstate Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Harbin

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1190792

Opinion Date: February 19, 2021

Judge: Greg Shaw

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law, Personal Injury

Defendant Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company ("Allstate"), appealed a circuit court's order granting the posttrial motion of the plaintiff, Doyle Harbin, which sought the imposition of sanctions based on Allstate's purported violation of a pretrial mediation order. In 2015, Harbin was injured as the result of a motor-vehicle accident that he alleged was caused by Irvin Stewart. Harbin subsequently filed a complaint in the trial court asserting a negligence claim against Stewart. In the same complaint, Harbin also named Allstate, Harbin's automobile insurance carrier, as a defendant and sought to recover uninsured/underinsured-motorist ("UIM") benefits under his Allstate policy. Following Stewart's dismissal, Harbin, without opposition from Allstate, requested that the scheduled trial date be continued and the matter referred to mediation. Unable to reach a settlement, the matter proceeded to trial. A jury returned a $690,000 verdict in Harbin's favor. Approximately two weeks later, Harbin filed a "Motion for Entry of Judgment and Motion for Sanctions," essentially contending Allstate in bad faith failed to abide by the Order which set the Court-ordered mediation in which Allstate had agreed to participate. The motion requested Allstate pay Harbin's trial-related attorneys' fees. The Alabama Supreme Court found the evidence failed to show Allstate violated the trial court's mediation order, thus it exceeded its discretion by issuing Harbin's requested sanctions. The Court therefore reversed the portion of the trial court's order imposing sanctions exceeding Harbin's request for costs and fees totaling $57,516.36, and remanded this matter for further proceedings.

Goins v. Advanced Disposal Services Gulf Coast, LLC

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1190393

Opinion Date: February 19, 2021

Judge: Mitchell

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

Lonas Goins was injured when a train locomotive that he was operating collided with a garbage truck at a railroad intersection. Goins sued the owner and the driver of the truck. After a five-day trial, a jury found in favor of Goins and awarded him damages. Dissatisfied with the jury's damages award, Goins appealed the judgment, arguing that the trial court committed multiple errors that warranted a new trial. Finding no reversible error, the Alabama Supreme Court rejected Goins's arguments and affirmed the judgment.

Moore v. Tyson

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1190547

Opinion Date: February 19, 2021

Judge: Stewart

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

Chris and Suzanne Moore, as parents and next friends of Sydney Moore, a minor, appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of Pamela Tyson and Jennifer Douthit, two employees of the Huntsville City Board of Education ("the Board"), with regard to negligence and wantonness claims asserted against Tyson and Douthit by the Moores arising from injuries suffered by Sydney at her elementary school. Tyson was employed by the Board as a teacher at Goldsmith-Schiffman Elementary School. Douthit was employed as the principal of the school. Sydney was enrolled at the school as a third-grade student in Tyson's class. Tyson left the students unsupervised in the classroom while she went to the restroom. During that time, Sydney and another student in the class left their seats, and, according to Sydney, the other student caused her to fall and hit her head and face on a counter in the classroom. Sydney suffered injuries from her fall, including fractures of her left orbital bone, her eye socket, and her nose and entrapment of her eye. Sydney was admitted for treatment at a hospital and underwent surgery as a result of the injuries. THe Alabama Supreme Court determined the Moores did not demonstrate the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Tyson and Douthit based on immunity. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Murphy Oil, USA, Inc. v. English

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1190610

Opinion Date: February 19, 2021

Judge: Mitchell

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

Shirley English sued Murphy Oil USA, Inc., after she slipped and fell in the restroom of a Murphy Oil gas station. Murphy Oil moved for summary judgment, but the trial court denied the motion. After a bench trial, the court entered a judgment in favor of English. The trial court made no findings of fact during the trial and instead took the matter under consideration after inviting the parties to submit briefs. One day after the briefing deadline had passed, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of English and awarded her compensatory damages in the amount of $125,000. The trial court did not make any written factual findings as a part of its judgment. It appeared from the record that Murphy Oil did not move for a new trial or for judgment as a matter of law, and it did not otherwise challenge the sufficiency of the evidence before it appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court. Murphy Oil argued on appeal that: (1) the trial court erred by denying its summary-judgment motion; (2) English offered no evidence at trial to sustain a judgment holding it liable for negligence; and (3) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of medical expenses that was unsupported by expert testimony. The Supreme Court determined none of Murphy Oil's arguments provided a ground for reversing the trial court judgment: Murphy Oil did not establish the Supreme Court should disregard the general rule against reviewing a trial court's denial of a summary- judgment motion after a trial on the merits. And its argument about the sufficiency of the evidence at trial was not properly before the Supreme Court. Finally, based on the record before it, the Supreme Court could not say that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of English's medical expenses.

Bunton v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-17110

Opinion Date: February 19, 2021

Judge: Joel H. Bolger

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law, Legal Ethics

An employee sued her former employer for wrongful termination. The employee died, but her attorney continued to litigate, negotiate, and mediate the case for another year before informing the court or opposing counsel of her death. The superior court concluded the attorney had committed serious ethical violations related to this delay and disqualified him from the case. Post-disqualification, the attorney filed a motion to substitute the personal representative of the employee’s estate as plaintiff. The superior court issued an order dismissing the case on several grounds. The Alaska Supreme Court found the court did not abuse its discretion by disqualifying the attorney and denying the motion for substitution he submitted. The superior court was correct to dismiss the case, as only one party remained, but the Supreme Court concluded granting summary judgment in favor of the former employer and supervisor was error. "The estate is not entitled to appeal the court’s refusal to enforce a draft settlement agreement signed by the employee before her death and does not have standing to appeal the sanctions imposed against the attorney. But because the estate was not allowed to participate as a party, we conclude that awarding affirmative relief against it was error."

Werba v. Association of Village Council Presidents

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-17321

Opinion Date: February 19, 2021

Judge: Peter J. Maassen

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Labor & Employment Law

Several months after returning from maternity leave, an association’s employee accepted a new special projects position with reduced hours that allowed her to work from home. Later that year she was terminated; the association explained that there were no more special projects for her to work on and the position was no longer necessary. The employee filed suit, alleging that the association had unlawfully discriminated against her based on pregnancy and parenthood. Considering all the evidence before it, the trial court concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact relevant to the employee’s discrimination claim, and that the association was entitled to summary judgment. The employee appealed, contending the superior court should not have considered the evidence submitted after the filing of the deficient motion and that, even if all evidence was considered, the association was not entitled to summary judgment. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded the superior court acted within its discretion by accepting the authenticating affidavit with the association’s reply, and that it properly considered all the evidence before it in granting summary judgment.

Area 55 v. Nicholas & Tomasevic

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D075648(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 23, 2021

Judge: Joan Irion

Areas of Law: Antitrust & Trade Regulation, Civil Procedure, Class Action

Appellants Area 55, LLC, and SAB Holdings, LLC appealed a trial court order granting the special motion to strike their first amended complaint for malicious prosecution and the related judgment of dismissal in favor of Respondents Nicholas & Tomasevic, LLP (N&T), Craig Nicholas, and Alex Tomasevic. Appellants included the successors to Vinturi, Inc. (Vinturi), which developed and sold the “ 'Vinturi Essential Wine Aerator’ for wine-lovers who want to enhance their experience of drinking wine.” Vinturi started selling the Vinturi Aerator in 2006. As sold to the public, the box contained the Vinturi body with a decorative black silicone band, a rubber stand, and a filter screen -- parts all made in China, transported to the United States, and assembled in the United States. From 2006 until 2010, Vinturi sold its aerator in the United States with the statement “ 'VINTURI IS MANUFACTURED IN THE USA’ ” printed on the bottom panel of the box. Attorney Nicholas filed various consumer fraud claims, challenging Appellants claim the aerator was made in the U.S. when the components were made in China. Appellants were successful in getting two class action cases dismissed. In 2018, Appellants filed the present case for malicious prosecution, resulting in the grant of Respondents' "SLAPP" motion on appeal. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in ruling that Appellants could not establish the prior action was not terminated on its merits. "Thus, for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute, the court erred in ruling that Appellants did not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits of their malicious prosecution claim." In addition, in its de novo review, the Court exercised discretion to reach the additional issues raised by the parties in the motion and opposition: Appellants made a sufficient prima facie showing of the remaining elements of their claim, and Respondents did not defeat Appellants’ claim as a matter of law. Accordingly, the order granting Respondents’ special motion to strike the complaint was vacated and reversed. On remand, the trial court was directed to enter a new and different order denying Respondents’ special motion.

Guastello v. AIG Specialty Insurance Company

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G057714(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 19, 2021

Judge: Moore

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Insurance Law, Real Estate & Property Law

A subcontractor built a retaining wall that collapsed years later, causing damage to a nearby residential lot. The homeowner sued the subcontractor, obtained a default judgment, and then sued the subcontractor’s insurance company to enforce the default judgment. The insurance company moved for summary judgment, arguing the homeowner’s damages occurred long after the insurance policy had expired, and therefore the insurance company had no duty to cover the default judgment. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. On appeal, the homeowner alleged “continuous and progressive” damage began to occur shortly after the subcontractor built the retaining wall during the coverage period of the insurance policy. The insurance company disagreed. The Court of Appeal determined that was a triable issue of material fact, thus reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.

Varney Entertainment Grp. v. Avon Plastics

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G058903(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 23, 2021

Judge: Goethals

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts

Plaintiff Jason Varney was a master dock builder, and star of a cable television show called “Docked Out.” He was also the president and sole shareholder of plaintiff Varney Entertainment Group, Inc. (Varney). Defendant Avon Plastics Inc., d/b/a/ Master Mark Plastic Products (Avon), manufactured products used to build docks. Plaintiff’s operative complaint alleged claims for breach of contract and for unauthorized commercial use of name or likeness in violation of Civil Code section 3344. Defendant served a statutory offer to compromise under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, offering to have a $250,000 judgment entered against it on both claims, plus attorney fees and costs through the date of the offer. Less than a week later, while its section 998 offer was still pending, defendant offered to enter into a stipulated judgment for $191,626.03 on the contract claim only, and further offered that plaintiff would be the prevailing party on that claim for purposes of awarding attorney fees and costs. Plaintiff accepted the second offer and never responded to the section 998 offer. Two months later, at the beginning of trial, plaintiff dismissed its remaining section 3344 claim without prejudice so it could refile that claim in a different jurisdiction. Defendant moved for attorney fees and costs based on section 3344’s fee shifting provision and its unaccepted section 998 offer. The trial court denied its motion, and the Court of Appeal affirmed: "Section 3344 does not provide a basis for awarding the defendant its fees or costs here because the defendant was not the prevailing party on that claim within the meaning of section 3344. And section 998 does not provide a basis for shifting fees or costs to the defendant because the defendant’s offer to enter into a stipulated judgment extinguished its prior section 998 offer."

Wittkopf v. Stewart's Firefighter Food Catering, Inc.

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 46860

Opinion Date: February 19, 2021

Judge: Roger S. Burdick

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

This case arose from an Idaho Industrial Commission determination denying an application for unemployment benefits. William Wittkopf appealed pro se the Commission’s determination that he was ineligible for unemployment benefits because he voluntarily quit his job without good cause and he willfully made a false statement or willfully failed to report a material fact in his unemployment application. On appeal, Wittkopf challenged the factual findings made by the Commission and argued it violated his right to due process by taking into consideration the fact that he voluntarily terminated his employment approximately two and a half years prior to applying for unemployment benefits. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded: (1) Wittkopf failed to provide a cogent argument on appeal regarding whether his right to due process was violated; (2) the Commission’s determination that Wittkopf voluntarily terminated his employment at Stewart’s Firefighter without good cause and without exhausting all reasonable alternatives was supported by substantial and competent evidence; and (3) the Commission’s determination that Wittkopf willfully made a false statement or willfully failed to report a material fact in order to obtain benefits was supported by substantial and competent evidence. Accordingly, the Commission’s decision and order denying Wittkopf’s application for unemployment benefits was affirmed.

Goldfarb v. Solimine

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: a-24-19

Opinion Date: February 18, 2021

Judge: Jaynee LaVecchia

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts, Labor & Employment Law, Securities Law

Plaintiff Jed Goldfarb claimed defendant David Solimine reneged on a promise of employment after Goldfarb quit his job to accept the promised position managing the sizeable investment portfolio of defendant’s family. The key issue in this appeal involved whether plaintiff could bring a promissory estoppel claim because he relied on defendant’s promise in quitting his prior employment even though, under New Jersey’s Uniform Securities Law of 1997 (Securities Law or the Act), he could not bring a suit on the employment agreement itself. The New Jersey Supreme Court determined the Securities Law did not bar plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim for reliance damages. The Court affirmed the liability judgment on that claim and the remanded for a new damages trial in which plaintiff would have the opportunity to prove reliance damages. The Court found he was not entitled to benefit-of-the-bargain damages. To the extent that the Appellate Division relied on an alternative basis for its liability holding -- that a later-adopted federal law “family office” exception had been incorporated into the Securities Law -- the Court rejected that reasoning and voided that portion of the appellate court’s analysis.

Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Memphis

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Docket: W2019-00299-SC-R11-CV

Opinion Date: February 24, 2021

Judge: Page

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' action seeking a declaratory judgment concerning the rights and obligations of the parties under a 2001 contract, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that dismissal was appropriate on the grounds that the complaint was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. In a previously filed action, Plaintiffs sought similar relief, but the case was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In the instant case, the trial court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss, finding that Plaintiffs lacked standing. The court of appeals affirmed on other grounds, concluding that res judicata barred the complaint and, as such, declined to address the standing issue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that dismissal of the previous case did not constitute an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata. The Court then remanded the case to the court of appeals for consideration of the standing issue.