| DiCesare v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth |
| Docket: 156A17-2 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Ervin Areas of Law: Antitrust & Trade Regulation, Constitutional Law, Health Law |
| In this dispute in which Plaintiffs sought reimbursement for healthcare costs based upon claims for restraint of trade and monopolization pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. Chapter 75 and N.C. Const. art. I, 34, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the trial court deciding issues arising from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that the trial court erred in part. Plaintiffs were a group of current and former North Carolina residents who were covered under the commercial health insurance obtained through the Hospital Authority, a non-profit corporation providing healthcare services with a principal place of business in Charlotte. The trial court granted the Hospital Authority's motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to Plaintiffs' restraint of trade and monopolization claims but denied the motion with respect to Plaintiffs' monopolization claim. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in granting judgment on the pleadings with respect to Plaintiffs' Chapter 75 restraint of trade and monopolization claims; but (2) erred by denying the motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to Plaintiffs' claim pursuant to article I, section 34. |
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| State v. Best |
| Docket: 300A93-3 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Earls Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion for appropriately relief filed after he was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, holding that certain undisclosed evidence was material and that it was reasonably probable that, had it been disclosed to Defendant prior to trial, the outcome would have been different. Defendant was convicted of first-degree burglary, first-degree rape, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. In postconviction proceedings, it became clear that the State failed to produce certain pieces of evidence to Defendant prior to his trial. Later that year, postconviction counsel uncovered additional evidence. Defendant then filed a motion for appropriate relief, arguing that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of his due process right pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case with instruction to grant the motion and order a new trial, holding that the failure to disclose the exculpatory evidence prejudiced Defendant's ability to present a defense. |
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| State v. Crump |
| Docket: 151PA18 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Earls Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions, holding that the trial court abused its discretion when it "flatly prohibited questioning as to issues of race and implicit bias during voir dire" and that the trial court's improper restrictions on Defendant's questioning during voir dire prejudiced Defendant. Defendant was convicted of several crimes, including robbery with a dangerous weapon and second-degree kidnapping. On appeal, Defendant challenged the trial court's refusal to allow him to pursue during voir dire certain lines of inquiry relating to racial bias and police-officer shootings of black civilians. The court of appeals rejected Defendant's claims and found no error in the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion and prejudiced Defendant by restricting all inquiry into prospective jurors' racial biases and opinions regarding police officer shootings of black men. |
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| State v. Farmer |
| Docket: 8A19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Morgan Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court held that the scheduling and procedural circumstances existent in this case did not constitute an infringement upon Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree sex offense with a child and indecent liberties with a child. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charges against him because the State violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial by failing to calendar his trial date for approximately five years following the issuance of the indictments against him. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that here was no speedy trial violation. The Supreme Court affirmed after weighing the factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), as they applied to the circumstances of this case, holding that Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated. |
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| Zander v. Orange County |
| Docket: 426A18 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Morgan Areas of Law: Class Action |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order regarding class certification in this case and dismissed Defendants' interlocutory appeal regarding portions of the trial court's order that pertained to discovery matters, holding that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in certifying two classes of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs commenced a putative class action by asserting claims against Defendants, Orange County and the Town of Chapel Hill, seeking to recover impact fees assessed under a now-repealed statute that had been enacted to allow certain counties and municipalities to defray the costs for constructing, among other public services, public schools. The trial court certified two classes of plaintiffs. Defendants appealed, challenging the class certification and a discovery order concerning Plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery responses. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and dismissed in part, holding (1) the trial court did not err in certifying the classes; and (2) Defendants' effort to appeal the contested discovery ruling was premature and hence must be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. |
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| Crescent University City Venture, LLC v. Trussway Manufacturing, Inc. |
| Docket: 407A19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Morgan Areas of Law: Commercial Law, Contracts, Personal Injury |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Business Court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding that the Business Court properly determined that North Carolina's economic loss rule requires negligence claims to be based upon the violation of an extra-contractual duty imposed by operation of law. At issue was whether a commercial property owner who contracts for the construction of a building may seek to recover in tort for its economic loss from a subcontracted manufacturer of building materials with whom the property owner does not have contractual privity. Applying the economic loss rule irrespective of the existence or lack of a contractual relationship between the property owner and the subcontracted manufacturer, the court dismissed Plaintiff's negligence claim with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that purely economic losses are not recoverable under tort law, particularly in the context of commercial transactions. |
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| Cooper v. Berger |
| Docket: 315PA18-2 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Ervin Areas of Law: Constitutional Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals upholding that trial court's decision to grant judgment on the pleadings in favor of certain members of the North Carolina General Assembly and against the Governor of the State of North Carolina, holding that the General Assembly did not overstep its constitutional authority by appropriating the federal block grant money in a manner that differed from the Governor's preferred method for distributing the funds. In 2017, the Governor submitted a recommended budget to the General Assembly suggesting that funds derived from three specific federal block grant programs be spent in a particular manner. The General Assembly adopted Senate Bill 257, which became law as Session Law 2017-57. The Governor filed an amended complaint against certain legislative defendants challenging the constitutionality of the enacted state budget. The trial court granted the legislative defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the block grant funds at issue were subject to the General Assembly's appropriation authority; and (2) the enactment of Session Law 2017-57 did not violate the separation of powers or faithful execution clauses of the North Carolina State Constitution. |
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| N.C. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., Inc. v. Martin |
| Docket: 391A19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Davis Areas of Law: Contracts, Insurance Law |
| The Supreme held that the trial court did not err in determining that Defendants were not afforded underinsured motorist and medical payments coverage under an insurance policy issued by Plaintiff, an insurance company, to a family member. Defendants argued that they were entitled to medical payments and underinsured motorist coverage under Plaintiff's policy because they were "residents" of the insured's "household." Plaintiff disputed coverage and filed a declaratory judgment action in superior court, arguing that Defendants were not residents of the insured's household at the time of the accident. The trial court entered summary judgment for Plaintiff, concluding as a matter of law that Defendants were not entitled to coverage under the policy. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in determining that Defendants are not entitled to coverage under the policy and that the trial court appropriately awarded summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. |
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| State v. Chandler |
| Docket: 189A19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Robin E. Hudson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court refusing to accept Defendant's tendered guilty plea, holding that the trial court lacked discretion to reject Defendant's plea pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1023(c). Defendant pleaded guilty to the offense of taking indecent liberties with a child. The trial court chose to reject Defendant's plea following a colloquy. After a trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree sex offense and taking indecent liberties with a child. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court correctly rejected Defendant's tendered guilty plea because the trial court did not find that it was the product of Defendant's informed choice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the guilty plea was based on Defendant's informed choice, a factual basis existed for the plea, and the sentencing was left to the trial court's discretion, the trial court was statutorily required to accept Defendant's guilty plea; and (2) the trial court's error prejudiced Defendant. |
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| State v. Glover |
| Docket: 392A19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Morgan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's convictions and the resulting judgments against him, holding that the trial court committed prejudicial error in its jury instruction on the theory of acting in concert as a basis upon which to find Defendant guilty. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of simple possession of methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine. During trial, the trial court gave instructions to the jury on both constructive possession and acting in concert as legal theories underlying the drug possession charges. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and vacated Defendant's convictions, holding that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on Defendant's criminal culpability on the theory of acting in concert, and the error was not harmless. |
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| State v. Hollars |
| Docket: 324A19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Morgan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals holding that substantial evidence existed to create a bona fide doubt as to Defendant's competency and that, therefore, the trial court's failure to make an inquiry into Defendant's competency at trial violated his due process rights, holding that the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to conduct a competency hearing for Defendant. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts each of second-degree sexual offense and taking indecent liberties with a child. On appeal, Defendant argued that events that occurred during trial combined with his lengthy history of mental illness, which included periods of incompetence to stand trial, created a duty upon the trial court sua sponte to inquire into his competency to stand trial. The court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court for a termination of whether a meaningful retrospective hearing could be conducted on the issue of Defendant's competency at the time of his trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in light of substantial evidence that was sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt regarding Defendant's competency to stand trial, the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to conduct a competency hearing for Defendant. |
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| State v. Sides |
| Docket: 400A19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Davis Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction, holding that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a competency hearing under the circumstances of this case. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of felony embezzlement. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in declining to hold a competency hearing when Defendant attempted suicide one evening after her trial had recessed for the day and was thereafter involuntarily committed. The trial court concluded that Defendant had voluntarily waived her constitutional right to be present at her trial because of her suicide attempt and therefore proceeded with the trial without Defendant. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court was required to conduct a competency hearing before proceeding with the trial in her absence. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the trial court was presented with substantial information that cast doubt on Defendant's competency, and the trial court erred by failing to hold a competency hearing. |
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| State v. Steen |
| Docket: 141A19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Ervin Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court remanded this case for a new trial with respect to the issue of Defendant's guilt of the murder of his grandfather, holding that the court of appeals erred in holding that the trial court's instruction that the jury was entitled to find that Defendant attempted to murder his mother using a garden hoe as a deadly weapon did not constitute prejudicial error. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon, the attempted first-degree murder of his mother, and the first degree murder of his grandfather on the basis of the felony-murder rule using attempted first-degree murder as the predicate felony. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in its jury instructions. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in holding that the trial court did not err by instructing that the jury could find that Defendant's hands and arms constituted a deadly weapon for purposes of the felony-murder provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-17(a); but (2) the trial court's instruction concerning the use of the garden hoe as a deadly weapon during Defendant's alleged attempt to murder his mother constituted prejudicial error necessitating a new trial in the case in which Defendant was convicted of murdering his grandfather. |
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| State v. Warden |
| Docket: 484A19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Earls Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction, holding that the court of appeals correctly held that the trial court committed plain error when it admitted improper testimony by an investigator with the Department of Social Services (DSS) Child Protective Services who improperly vouched for the victim's testimony. Defendant was convicted of sexual offense with a child by an adult, child abuse by a sexual act, and indecent liberties with a child. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in allowing the DSS investigator's testimony. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court committed plain error requiring a new trial because the DSS investigator's testimony improperly bolstered or vouched for the victim's credibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court commits a fundamental error when it allows testimony which vouches for the complainant's credibility in a case where the verdict entirely depends upon the jurors' comparative assessment of the complainant's and the defendant's credibility. |
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| In re A.L.L. |
| Docket: 319A19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Earls Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court terminating Mother's parental rights to her minor daughter, holding that Petitioners did not prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Mother's parental rights and that the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(6) and (7) were not met in this case. The trial court ultimately appointed Petitioners as the child's legal permanent guardians pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-600. Petitioners filed a petition seeking to terminate Mother's parental rights in order to adopt the child. The district court terminated Mother's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(6) and (7). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the requirements of section 7B-1111(a)(6) were not met because the child resided with legal permanent guardians and that the record lacked any evidence supporting a conclusion that Mother acted willfully within the meaning of section 7B-1111(a)(7). |
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| In re B.L.H. |
| Docket: 276A19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Robin E. Hudson Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights to Beth, holding that the trial court did not err. After a termination hearing, the trial court terminated Father's parental rights, concluding that grounds existed for termination under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), (5), and (7). The written termination order did not explicitly state that the grounds to terminate Father's parental rights were proved by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, where the trial court stated the statutorily-mandated standard of proof in open court and there was nothing in the order indicating the trial court applied the incorrect standard of proof, the trial court did not reversibly err by failing to explicitly state the correct standard of proof in the written termination order. |
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| In re J.J.H. |
| Docket: 430A19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Ervin Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order terminating Mother's parental rights, holding that the trial court did not err in determining that Mother's parental rights in the children were subject to termination on the basis of neglect pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1) and that termination of Mother's parental rights would be in the children's best interests. The trial court concluded that Mother's parental rights were subject to termination on the basis of neglect and that termination of Mother's parental rights would be in the children's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's ultimate findings that there was current ongoing neglect and a likelihood of repetition of neglect were supported by the record evidence; and (2) the trial court's evidentiary and ultimate findings had sufficient record support. |
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| In re K.M.W. |
| Docket: 356A19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Ervin Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the orders of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights in her two children, holding that, given the very limited inquiry inquiry that the trial court undertook before allowing Mother's counsel's withdrawal motion, the trial court erred by allowing that motion. During the termination proceedings, Mother retained Roy Dawson to represent her. Dawson later filed motions seeking leave to withdraw as Mother's counsel in the proceedings. The trial court granted the request without further inquiry. After a termination of parental rights hearing, Mother's parental rights were terminated. Mother appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to make a proper inquiry before allowing Dawson's withdrawal motion. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that the trial court erred by allowing Mother's counsel to withdraw his representation of Mother without (1) making an adequate inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the making of that motion; and (2) inquiring, at the time Mother appeared at the termination hearing, whether she was represented by counsel, whether she wished to apply for court-appointed counsel, or whether she wished to represent herself. |
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| In re R.D. |
| Docket: 268A19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Davis Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the district court determining that termination of Father's parental rights was not in the child's best interests and dismissing Bethany Christian Services' petition to terminate parental rights, holding that a challenged portion of one of the trial court's findings of fact was erroneous. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court’s admission of the guardian ad litem’s report during the dispositional stage of the termination proceeding without allowing the child's guardian ad litem to be cross-examined about the report was not an abuse of discretion; and (2) the trial court’s written order contained a key finding of fact that lacked evidentiary support in the record and could be read as reflecting an inappropriate bias against adoption, and this inappropriate finding was prejudicial. |
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| In re W.K. |
| Docket: 458A19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Morgan Areas of Law: Family Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights to his two biological children, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the existence of the ground for termination of neglect. On appeal, Defendant argued that his guardian ad litem, appointed pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 17 and N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1101.1, did not participate sufficiently to satisfy the statutory requirements, and therefore, the trial court erred in advancing the adjudication and disposition proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Father did not identify any actions his guardian ad litem could have taken that would have improved Father's chances to obtain a decision in his favor and did not show that the guardian ad litem did not otherwise adequately assist him in executing his legal rights; and (2) the ground of neglect supported the termination of Father's parental rights. |
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| Ashe County v. Ashe County Planning Board |
| Docket: 249PA19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Ervin Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use |
| In this dispute between petitioner Ashe County Board of Commissioners and respondents Ashe County Planning Board and Appalachian Materials, LLC arising from Appalachian Materials' application for a permit pursuant to the County's Polluting Industries Development Ordinance authorizing Appalachian Materials to operate a portable asphalt production facility on property located in Ashe County, the Supreme Court held that the case should be remanded due to errors by the court of appeals. After the Planning Board ordered that a permit be issued to Appalachian Materials Ashe County sought judicial review. The trial court ordered the County to issue the requested permit within ten business days. The court of appeals affirmed the challenged trial court order. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the County's failure to appeal a letter written by the Planning Director gave that letter partially binding effect. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case, holding that the court of appeals erred by holding that Ashe County lost its right to challenge the issuance of the contested permit because it failed to seek review of opinions that the Planning Director expressed in the letter. |
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| In re J.D. |
| Docket: 343A19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Cheri Beasley Areas of Law: Juvenile Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision vacating a juvenile's adjudications for first-degree forcible sexual offense and second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor and a disposition order but reversed the court's holding that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile's attempted-larceny admission, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a new dispositional order as to that offense. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court erred by denying the juvenile's motions to dismiss second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor and first-degree forcible sexual offense; (2) the trial court did not err by accepting the juvenile's admission of attempted larceny; (3) the level 3 disposition and commitment order entered by the trial court must be vacated; and (4) the matter cannot be remanded for the entry of a new disposition order because the trial court's jurisdiction terminated when the juvenile turned eighteen years old. |
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| In re Clontz |
| Docket: 65A20 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Legal Ethics |
| The Supreme Court adopted the recommendations from the Judicial Standards Commission that Edwin D. Clontz, a Judge of the General Court of Justice, District Court Division, Judicial District Twenty-Eight, be publicly reprimanded, holding that the Commission's findings and recommendation of public reprimand were appropriate. After a disciplinary hearing, the Commission made findings of fact and conclusions of law and recommended that the Supreme Court publicly reprimand Judge Clontz for conduct in violation of Canons 2A and 3A(4) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-376. The Supreme Court held (1) the Commission's findings of fact were supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and there was no error in the Commission's conclusions; and (2) Judge Clontz must be publicly reprimanded. |
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| In re Murphy |
| Docket: 396A19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Legal Ethics |
| The Supreme Court ordered that Court of Appeals Judge Hunter Murphy should be censured for violations of Canons 1, 2B, 3A(3), and 3B(2) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct amounting to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-376(b), holding that censure was appropriate. The Judicial Standards Commission recommended that Judge Murphy be censured based on its findings of fact and conclusions of law. After reviewing the record and transcript, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commission's findings of fact and conclusions of law were supported by clear and convincing evidence and that the judge's conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice and denigrated the reputation and integrity of the judiciary as a whole. Therefore, the Supreme Court ordered that Judge Murphy be censured. |
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| Parkes v. Hermann |
| Docket: 241PA19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Paul M. Newby Areas of Law: Medical Malpractice |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to Defendant in this medical malpractice action, holding that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Defendant. Plaintiff went to the hospital complaining of slurred speech and numbness in her left arm. Defendant contacted Plaintiff's primary care physician and erroneously communicated that Plaintiff had no neurological deficits. Plaintiffs symptoms continued until she was admitted. Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that Defendant's negligence diminished her likelihood of full recovery, thus proximately causing her injury. At issue was whether Plaintiff's "loss of chance" at a better outcome following her stroke was a separate type of injury for which Plaintiff could recover in a medical malpractice action. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions granting summary judgment for Defendant, holding that losing the chance for an increased opportunity for an improved outcome is not a cognizable and compensable claim in North Carolina. |
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| Newman v. Stepp |
| Docket: 383A19 Opinion Date: December 18, 2020 Judge: Morgan Areas of Law: Personal Injury |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court reversing the trial court's order granting judgment on the pleadings regarding Plaintiffs' claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, holding that the court of appeals did not err. Plaintiffs filed a complaint including claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful death after their two-year-old child was accidentally killed by a shotgun at Defendants' home. The trial court granted Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, dismissing all of Plaintiffs' claims. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that Plaintiffs' allegations regarding foreseeability were sufficient to support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to support their claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress against Defendants. |
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