Economic Theory Shows that People Will Make Choices that Worsen the Pandemic

NEIL H. BUCHANAN

UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan points out some of the ways in which congressional Republicans misunderstand economics to justify withholding unemployment payments from Americans during the COVID-19 pandemic. Buchanan argues that economic theory soundly demonstrates that given the opportunity, people will make choices that worsen the toll of the pandemic.

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Armstrong v. Michigan Bureau of Services for Blind Persons

Docket: 19-2179

Opinion Date: August 7, 2020

Judge: Jeffrey S. Sutton

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law, Government Contracts

The Randolph-Sheppard Act, 20 U.S.C. 107, requires government agencies to set aside certain contracts for sight-challenged vendors. States license the vendors and match them with available contracts. In 2010, Michigan denied Armstrong’s bid for a contract to stock vending machines at highway rest stops. A state ALJ ruled in Armstrong’s favor and recommended that she get priority for the next available facility/location. The state awarded Armstrong an available vending route later that year. Armstrong nonetheless requested federal arbitration, seeking nearly $250,000 in damages to account for delays in getting the license. The arbitrators ruled that Armstrong was wrongfully denied the location she sought and ordered Michigan to immediately assign Armstrong the Grayling vending route but declined to award damages, reasoning that her request was “too speculative.” The district court upheld the arbitration award and rejected Armstrong’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims, concluding that the Randolph-Sheppard Act created the sole statutory right to relief under federal law. Michigan subsequently granted her the Grayling license. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The unfavorable arbitration decision was not arbitrary or capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. Armstrong may not sue under 42 U.S.C. 1983 to vindicate her rights under the Randolph-Sheppard Act.

Cuevas-Nuno v. Barr

Docket: 20-3034

Opinion Date: August 7, 2020

Judge: Nalbandian

Areas of Law: Immigration Law

Cuevas-Nuno, a native of Mexico, entered the U.S illegally and was charged as removable, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Cuevas-Nuno conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal and successfully moved to transfer his case from Virginia to Memphis. Notice of his next master hearing was sent to Cuevas-Nuno’s counsel. Cuevas-Nuno did not attend his second hearing. The IJ conducted an in absentia hearing, found Cuevas-Nuno’s cancellation of removal application abandoned, dismissed it, and ordered Cuevas-Nuno removed. Sixteen days later, Cuevas-Nuno moved to reopen, stating that he was confused about the date of the hearing. The IJ found no exceptional circumstance and denied the motion. The BIA upheld the determination. The Sixth Circuit dismissed a petition for review; Cuevas-Nuno failed to administratively exhaust his claims. Cuevas-Nuno’s argument that the incorrect notice his counsel’s employee gave him constitutes an “exceptional situation” sufficient for the IJ to sua sponte reopen her removal order is different from the issue of whether that conduct constitutes an “exceptional circumstance” sufficient to reopen the order under section 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i). His BIA brief did not mention lack of notice under 8 U.S.C. 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), his due process right to be heard, or his failure to submit evidence supporting his eligibility for cancellation of removal. The brief only discussed exceptional situations within the context of its argument that the IJ erred in failing to exercise her sua sponte discretion to reopen her removal order—not an 8 U.S.C. 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i) motion to reopen.

Karst Robbins Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs

Docket: 19-3836

Opinion Date: August 7, 2020

Judge: Eric L. Clay

Areas of Law: Insurance Law, Labor & Employment Law, Public Benefits

In 1983, Rice sought benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U.S.C. 901–45. The Department of Labor (DOL) looks to employers that employed the miner for at least one year and are capable of paying benefits. The miner’s most recent employer that meets these requirements is the “responsible operator.” Employers must either qualify as a self-insurer or purchase BLBA insurance. KRCC operated a coal mine where Rice worked in 1982-1983 but he was employed by a separate corporate entity, KRMS, which charged KRCC for the cost of Rice’s labor. The entities' ownership and management overlapped; KRMS had no assets and operated out of KRCC's offices. KRCC obtained BLBA coverage from Bituminous Casualty but only listed 10 employees. The other 150 were employed by KRMS. An ALJ identified KRMS as the responsible operator, then denied Rice’s claim on the merits. Rice appealed; KRCC and Bituminous successfully moved to be dismissed from the case, because the ALJ identified KRMS as the responsible operator. In 2002, Rice filed another BLBA claim. DOL again notified KRCC and Bituminous that KRCC might be the responsible operator. Bituminous claims it “denied coverage based on the fraudulent arrangements” between KRCC and KRMS. DOL refused to dismiss Bituminous. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that DOL was collaterally estopped from finding that KRCC was the responsible operator; that Bituminous was entitled to rescind its insurance agreement based on fraud by KRCC; and that delays in DOL administrative proceedings violated its right to due process.