Supreme Court Reverses “Bridgegate” Convictions

MICHAEL C. DORF

Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on last week’s decision by the U.S. Supreme Court reversing the convictions of two New Jersey officials for their role in the so-called “Bridgegate” scandal of 2013. Although the Court made clear that the underlying conduct was dangerous and wrong, its holding reversing the convictions may effectively permit corrupt bullies to continue to exercise political power, due in part to inadequate responses from other political actors.

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Buck v. Gordon

Docket: 19-1959

Opinion Date: May 11, 2020

Judge: Richard Allen Griffin

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Family Law

The Michigan Department of Health and Human Services contracts out most of its fostering and adoption services to private child-placing agencies (CPAs), which perform home evaluations of prospective adoptive and foster parent(s). One CPA, St. Vincent Catholic Charities, shares the religious teachings of the Roman Catholic Church regarding same-sex marriage. It “cannot provide a written recommendation ... endorsing a family situation that would conflict with [its] religious beliefs” so St. Vincent refers out home evaluations for same-sex or unmarried couples to other CPAs. In 2015, Michigan codified this practice. M.C.L. 722.124e(1)(g) provides that “[t]o the fullest extent permitted by state and federal law," a CPA shall not be required to provide any services if those services conflict with, or provide any services under circumstances that conflict with," the CPA’s "sincerely held religious beliefs.” The Dumonts alleged that they were a same-sex couple interested in fostering and adoption, but that St. Vincent refused to assist them with the licensing process because of their sexual orientation. Michigan settled that suit by agreeing to enforce, against CPAs, a policy prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. St. Vincent then claimed that the state violated its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by directing it to perform its duties in a manner that violates its sincerely held religious beliefs. The district court denied the Dumonts’ motions, seeking intervention. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to permissive intervention. Citing FRCP 24(b)(3), the court held that the Dumonts’ motion was timely, that it presented a common question of law, and that there is little risk of undue delay or prejudice to the existing parties.

Roberts v. Neace

Docket: 20-5465

Opinion Date: May 11, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Kentucky Governor Beshear, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, prohibited “[a]ll mass gatherings,” including faith-based events.” The order excepts “normal operations at airports, bus and train stations, . . . shopping malls,” and “typical office environments, factories, or retail or grocery stores where large numbers of people are present, but maintain appropriate social distancing.” A subsequent order required organizations that are not “life-sustaining” to close. Among the “life-sustaining” exempt entities are laundromats, accounting services, law firms, hardware stores, airlines, mining operations, funeral homes, landscaping businesses, and grocery stores. Religious organizations are not “life-sustaining,” except when they provide “food, shelter, and social services.” Maryville Baptist Church held an Easter service. Some congregants went into the church. Others parked in the church’s parking lot and listened to the service over a loudspeaker. State Police issued notices that their attendance, whether in the church or outdoors, amounted to a criminal act, recorded congregants’ license plate numbers, and sent letters requiring self-quarantine for 14 days. Congregants who attended the Easter service sued, claiming that the orders and their enforcement violated their free-exercise and interstate-travel rights. Two other federal district court cases, challenging the same ban, have resulted in preliminary relief. The Sixth Circuit granted an injunction pending appeal, Despite the lack of anti-religious animus and the legitimate health concerns, orders prohibiting religious gatherings, enforced by police officers telling congregants they violated a criminal law and taking down license plate numbers, will chill worship gatherings. Applying strict scrutiny, the court reasoned that there are many less restrictive ways to address these public health issues.

Babcock v. Commissioner of Social Security

Docket: 19-1687

Opinion Date: May 11, 2020

Judge: R[ansey] Guy Cole, Jr.

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law, Military Law, Public Benefits

Babcock joined the Michigan National Guard in 1970 and became a dual-status technician “a Federal civilian employee” who “is assigned to a civilian position as a technician” while maintaining membership in the National Guard, 10 U.S.C. 10216(a)(1); 32 U.S.C. 709(e). Babcock served as a National Guard pilot, held the appropriate military grade, wore a uniform that displayed his rank while working, and attended weekend drills. In 2004-2005, Babcock was deployed to Iraq on active duty. Babcock received military pay for his active-duty service and his inactive-duty training, including weekend drills. Otherwise, he received civil pay and participated in the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS), 5 U.S.C. 5301. Babcock paid Social Security taxes on the wages for his active-duty service and his inactive-duty training from 1988 onwards, 42 U.S.C. 410(l)(1). He did not pay Social Security taxes on his wages for inactive-duty training before 1988 or on his civil-service wages. In 2009, Babcock retired and began receiving monthly CSRS payments and separate military retirement pay. For several years after his retirement, Babcock flew medical-evacuation helicopters for hospitals. This private-sector income was subject to Social Security taxes. Babcock fully retired in 2014. The government reduced his Social Security benefits under the Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP) because of his CSRS pension. Babcock cited a WEP exception for payments “based wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service.” While Babcock's case was pending, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Eighth Circuit’s contrary analysis and held that the uniformed-services exception does not apply to dual-status technicians. The Sixth Circuit subsequently agreed that a federal civil-service pension based on work as a National Guard dual-status technician does not qualify as “a payment based wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service.”