Latest 3 Cases: California v. Hawara (Constitutional Law), People v. Sommer (Criminal Law), Pinto v. Farmers Insurance Exchange (Insurance Law)

The Oprah Interview as a Truth Commission

LESLEY WEXLER

Illinois Law professor Lesley Wexler explains how Oprah’s interview with Prince Harry and Meghan Markle might illuminate how a formal truth commission to deal with legacies of racism and colonialism might function in the British empire. Professor Wexler describes the purpose and function of state-operated truth commissions and notes the similarities and differences between those and the interview.

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California v. Hawara

Docket: E074698(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 8, 2021

Judge: Manuel A. Ramirez

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Munir Mtanews Hawara owned a liquor store. He hired Willis Simmons to burn down a rival liquor store, but Simmons failed. Simmons then subcontracted the job to Randy Ramirez. Ramirez tried to burn down the rival store three times, but he, too, failed. The scheme was exposed when Simmons’s sister contacted police. A jury found defendant guilty on four counts of arson of a structure. On all four counts, state of emergency enhancements were found true. On two counts, accelerant device enhancements were found true. Defendant was sentenced to 11 years 8 months in prison, along with fines, fees, and ancillary orders. On appeal, Defendant contended, among other things, that the prosecutor improperly cross- examined his character witnesses by asking them if it would change their opinion if they “knew” or “learned” about his commission of the crimes; he maintained that the only correct form for this type of cross-examination was to ask if it would have changed their opinion if they “heard” about his commission of the crimes. He also contended his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the improper cross-examination. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal held a defense character witness who testifies based on his or her own opinion — rather than based solely on the defendant’s reputation — can be asked on cross-examination if he or she knows about the defendant’s bad acts. Alternatively, the Court held any error was harmless, because defendant’s commission of the crimes was amply shown by other evidence. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court concluded that defendant did not show any other error.

People v. Sommer

Docket: A158234(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 8, 2021

Judge: Petrou

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Sommer, a psychologist at a mental health clinic on a military base, sexually assaulted three patients under the guise of using “exposure therapy.” A jury convicted Sommer of several felonies, including sexual battery by fraudulent representation (Pen. Code, 243.4(c)). The trial court sentenced him to state prison. The court of appeal affirmed. Sufficient evidence supports the sexual battery by fraud conviction. Confusion is not surprising when a professional unexpectedly touches the sexual parts of the victim’s body during purported professional treatment. Confusion or doubt about the purpose of the touching does not preclude a conviction as long as the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim allowed the touching to occur because of the defendant’s fraudulent misrepresentation of a professional purpose. The prosecutor did not misstate the law during his closing argument by saying: “Confusion is unconsciousness.” The court properly instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 1191B, regarding consideration of charged sex offenses. The court did not err by refusing to release portions of the victims’ sealed mental health records; the undisclosed information “was not material to the defense.”

Pinto v. Farmers Insurance Exchange

Docket: B295742(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 8, 2021

Judge: Victoria Gerrard Chaney

Areas of Law: Insurance Law

After judgment was entered against Farmers based solely on a special verdict, Farmers argued that the judgment must be vacated because the jury did not find, and no evidence established, that it acted unreasonably in failing to settle plaintiff’s claim against the insured. The Court of Appeal concluded that, in the context of a third party insurance claim, failing to accept a reasonable settlement offer does not constitute bad faith per se. Rather, bad faith liability requires a finding that the insurer acted unreasonably in some respect. The court explained that, to be liable for bad faith, an insurer must not only cause the insured's damages, it must act or fail to act without proper cause, for example by placing its own interests above those of its insured. In this case, the special verdict was facially insufficient to support a bad faith judgment because it included no finding that Farmers acted unreasonably in failing to accept plaintiff's settlement offer. The court also concluded that a special verdict based solely on an insufficient jury instruction cannot support a judgment. In this case, the jury was neither asked to nor did find that Farmers acted unreasonably or without proper cause in failing to accept plaintiff's settlement offer. Therefore, because a cause of action for bad faith requires a finding that the insurer acted unreasonably, the absence of such a finding precludes judgment for the plaintiff on that claim. Finally, the court concluded that the proper remedy is to vacate the judgment and enter a new judgment for Farmers.