The Third-Party Doctrine vs. Katz v. Untied States

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb proposes revising the third-party doctrine in a way that reconciles two of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions that some critics view as conflicting. Colb suggests that, contrary to what most critics argue and what she herself has long assumed, the prior decision, Katz v. United States rather than the later one, United States v. White, is the anomaly.

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Commonwealth v. Beverly

Docket: SJC-12814

Opinion Date: June 15, 2020

Judge: Kafker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the entry of continuance without a finding and immediate dismissal of the criminal case but held that the disposition cannot be imposed in any such future case because, without the imposition of terms and conditions or probation, the continuance without a finding constituted an illegal sentence and that this disposition shall apply prospectively from the date of this decision. Defendant was charged with counterfeit drug possession with intent to distribute and other crimes. Defendant admitted to sufficient facts as to the crime. As to the counterfeit drug charge, the sentencing judge found sufficient facts and entered a continuance without a finding. The Commonwealth filed a motion requesting that the sentencing judge revise or revoke the entry of the continuance without a finding because the order was an "illegal disposition" contrary to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 18. The judge denied the motion without a hearing. The Supreme Judicial court affirmed, holding (1) because the sentencing judge did not impose any terms or conditions on the record, the continuance without a finding was an illegal disposition; and (2) this holding shall apply prospectively from the date of this decision.

Commonwealth v. Ellsworth

Docket: SJC-12816

Opinion Date: June 15, 2020

Judge: Kafker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the sentencing judge imposed illegal sentences by entering continuances without a finding and immediately dismissing criminal charges without imposing any terms and conditions or probation, but the Court declined to remand the case for resentencing as to the legal sentences because ordering Defendant to be resentenced would not be just. Defendant was charged with several offenses in connection with three separate instances. The judge sentenced Defendant to thirty days in a house of correction for the charge of assault and battery and entered continuances without a finding and dismissed all remaining charges. The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that the continuances without a finding, which were immediately dismissed without any terms and conditions, constituted illegal sentences under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 18. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the continuances without a finding constituted illegal sentences because they contained no terms and conditions; but (2) it would be unfair to Defendant to vacate a disposition reflecting what appeared to be a common practice, and so this ruling applies prospectively from the date of this decision.

Commonwealth v. Rossetti

Docket: SJC-12815

Opinion Date: June 15, 2020

Judge: Kafker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court declined to remand this case for resentencing, holding that the sentencing judge imposed an illegal sentence by entering a continuance without a finding and immediately dismissing a charge absent any terms and conditions or probation but that this holding shall apply prospectively from the date of this decision. Defendant was charged with five counts, including breaking and entering, and admitted to sufficient facts as to all five counts. The sentencing facts found facts sufficient for a guilty plea and entered a continuance without a finding as to the breaking and entering charge. The judge ordered the dismissal of the charge for 4 p.m. that day and did not set any conditions or terms on the dismissal. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the continuance without a finding amounted to an illegal sentence; but (2) this holding applies prospectively from the date of this decision.