Can a Misdemeanor Count as an “Emergency” for Purposes of Skipping the Warrant?

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on a case currently before the U.S. Supreme Court that presents the question whether the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies when the suspect may have committed a misdemeanor, as opposed to a more serious crime. Colb argues that if the Court believes that a misdemeanor (or a particular misdemeanor) is not important enough to justify the invasion of a person’s home, then it ought perhaps to hold that the police officer in the present should not have entered the suspect’s home, period, with or without a warrant.

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Dat v. United States

Docket: 19-3504

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: William Duane Benton

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Dat was born in a Kenyan refugee camp in 1993. Admitted to the U.S. around 1994, he became a lawful permanent resident. Dat pled guilty to robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951, and was sentenced to 78 months' imprisonment. Dat’s robbery conviction is a deportable offense, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Dat moved to vacate his guilty plea, claiming that his attorney, Allen, assured him that his immigration status would not be affected by his plea. Allen testified that she repeatedly told Dat the charges were “deportable offenses,” that she never told him, his mother, or his fiancée that he would not be deported. that she encouraged Dat to hire an immigration attorney, and that they reviewed the Plea Petition, which says that non-citizens would be permanently removed from the U.S. if found guilty of most felony offenses. The Plea Agreement refers to immigration consequences. Dat and Allen also reviewed the PSR, which stated that immigration proceedings would commence after his release from custody. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, finding that Dat was not denied effective assistance of counsel. It was objectively reasonable for Allen to tell Dat that he “could” face immigration ramifications that “could” result in deportation. An alien with a deportable conviction may still seek “relief from removal. These “immigration law complexities” should caution any defense attorney not to advise a defendant considering a guilty plea that the result of a post-conviction, contested removal proceeding is certain.

United States v. Baez

Docket: 19-2823

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Raymond W. Gruender

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Police stopped Anguiano for expired license plates. The car contained a fake DEA badge and cash. At the hotel where Anguiano was staying, Baez’s wife, Gavino, admitted the officers. Baez was sitting next to Chevrolet keys and a methamphetamine pipe. Gavino consented to a search. In a backpack, officers found a Chevrolet Equinox owner’s manual. A locked armoire appeared to be under video surveillance. A canine unit alerted at the armoire and at an Equinox that responded to the Chevrolet keys. With a warrant, officers searched the hotel suite and the Equinox. The armoire held methamphetamine and a gun. The Equinox contained methamphetamine, another firearm, and a safe with ammunition and receipts in Baez’s name. The other conspirators pled guilty. The court denied Baez’s motions to suppress the evidence and his incriminating statements. Baez, claiming that he was infiltrating the conspiracy to assist law enforcement, sought to introduce evidence regarding his mental health and a potential informant with whom he was acquainted. Baez moved to compel the government to disclose information about the informant. The court excluded the evidence, partially granted his Brady motion, and declined to instruct the jury that it would “negate the specific intent required” if Baez intended to “assist ongoing federal investigations.” The court departed from the guidelines range of 360 months’ to life imprisonment, sentencing Baez to 168 months’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, upholding the denial of his suppression motions, the failure to instruct the jury on an “innocent-intent” defense, the exclusion of the evidence related to that defense, the partial denial of his Brady motion, and the reasonableness of his sentence.

Maras v. Curators of the University of Missouri

Docket: 19-2875

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Arnold

Areas of Law: Education Law, Labor & Employment Law

Maras's application for tenure as an associate professor at the University of Missouri Department of Educational, School and Counseling Psychology was denied. She filed suit, claiming discrimination on the basis of sex, citing the Missouri Human Rights Act and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), and violations of the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing in her employment contract. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Describing the university's tenure-review process as “elaborate and painstaking,” the court noted that numerous people over four years expressed concerns about Maras's record of scholarship. Many throughout the application process, including people outside the university, expressed similar concerns. That widely shared opinion strongly supports the university's proffered reason for tenure denial. The comparators Maras identified are not similarly situated in all relevant respects to Maras; they did not share the same ultimate decision-maker. One comparator was in a completely different department. Each of them had several positive recommendations at many steps in the tenure process, while Maras did not; it is not obvious that their records of scholarship were no better than Maras's. Maras did not show "that the circumstances permit a reasonable inference of discriminatory animus."