Latest 3 Cases: Gomersall v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center (Civil Procedure), Latvala v. Green Enterprises Inc. (Real Estate & Property Law), ...

Some Observations on Calls for Senate Reform: Part One of a Two-Part Series

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

In this first of a series of columns, Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar offers four observations about recent calls for reform of the filibuster device in the U.S. Senate. Dean Amar suggests looking at state experiences with supermajority rules, as well as the Senate’s own recent past, and he considers why senators might be reluctant to eliminate the filibuster. He concludes with a comment on President Joe Biden’s suggestion that the Senate return to the “talking filibuster” and praises a suggestion by Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) that the cloture requirement (currently at 60 votes) could be lowered gradually, the longer a measure under consideration is debated.

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Gomersall v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center

Docket: 47664

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Brody

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Personal Injury

Greg and Cyndi Gomersall filed suit on behalf of their minor child, W.G.G., claiming he received negligent medical treatment at St. Luke’s Regional Medical Center (SLRMC) in Boise when he was injured in December 2010. W.G.G. was 6 years old at the time of the incident. The Gomersalls filed suit against SLRMC on January 25, 2019, more than eight years after W.G.G. was alleged to have been injured. SLRMC moved for summary judgment on the basis that the Gomersalls’ medical malpractice action was time-barred under Idaho Code sections 5-219(4) and 5-230. The district court granted SLRMC’s motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The Gomersalls contended on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court that the district court erred because Idaho Code section 5-230 was unconstitutional. Specifically, they argued that section 5-230 violated W.G.G.’s due process and equal protection rights by failing to toll the statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims until the age of majority. They also contended the district court erred when it held that the doctrine of equitable estoppel did not preclude SLRMC’s statute of limitations defense. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of SLRMC.

Latvala v. Green Enterprises Inc.

Docket: 47296

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Bevan

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

At issue was whether a prescriptive easement existed to provide road access and utilities to a land-locked parcel and mining claim on Lake Pend Oreille in northern Idaho. Matt and Bonnie Latvala purchased the land-locked parcel, known as “Sulphide South,” in 2015 and litigation soon followed. Following a four-day bench trial and site visit, the district court quieted a prescriptive easement to the Latvalas through and over what was known as South Camp Bay Road, as well as confirming and defining an express easement across another parcel known as “Sulphide North.” Some neighboring landowners appealed the district court’s judgment, arguing the court’s findings were not supported by substantial and competent evidence. These neighbors also argued the district court erroneously allowed the prescriptive easement to be unreasonably expanded. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s determination that the use of the road at issue by Latvala’s predecessors in interest during the active mining years (1946 to 1954) created a prescriptive easement; however, the Court reversed the district court’s judgment expanding the scope of the easement.The district court’s award of costs to Latvala as the prevailing party was vacated and the matter remanded so that the district court could consider Latvala’s remaining claims about whether South Camp Bay Road was a public road and whether he has an easement by necessity.

Radford v. Van Orden

Docket: 47364

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Moeller

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

Respondent Mark Radford sued Appellant Jay Van Orden for damages from trespass of lands and trespass of cattle, among other claims, and also sued Appellant Seven J Ranches, Inc. (“Seven J”) for reimbursement for the construction of a partition fence pursuant to Idaho Code section 35-103. The two cases were later consolidated. Upon Van Orden’s motion for summary judgment, the district court determined that Radford had standing to sue Van Orden for trespass, even though Radford was not the property owner when the trespass occurred, because the previous property owner executed an assignment of claims to him. After a five-day bench trial, the district court found Van Orden was liable for trespass and awarded damages to Radford, and required Seven J to reimburse Radford for one half of a constructed partition fence. The district court also found Van Orden was not liable for trespass of cattle and ordered Radford to construct a gate at the southern edge of his property to allow Van Orden to access an easement that runs across Radford’s property. The district court determined Radford to be the overall prevailing party and awarded attorney fees only against Seven J. Van Orden and Seven J appealed the district court’s standing determination on summary judgment, the damages awarded against Van Orden on Radford’s trespass claim, the reimbursement awarded on the partition fence claim against Seven J, and the prevailing party determination for purpose of awarding attorney fees. Radford cross-appealed the district court’s denial of his claim for trespass of cattle damages and the district court’s requirement that he construct a gate for Van Orden at the edge of his property. Concerning Radford and Seven J’s appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s rulings that: (1) Radford had standing; (2) Radford proved the trespass damages with reasonable certainty; (3) Radford’s partition fence notice to Seven J was sufficient and required Seven J to reimburse Radford for the fence; (4) Radford was the prevailing party against Seven J and was entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees against Seven J. As to Radford’s cross-appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling that Radford was required to remove his fence across the prescriptive easement or install a gate for Van Orden’s ingress and egress. However, the Court reversed the district court’s decision denying Radford damages for trespass of cattle against Van Orden, and remanded with instructions to consider whether Van Orden was entitled to relief under his unjust enrichment theory.