Why the Biden Administration Was Right Earlier This Week to Change Course in the Obamacare Challenge Pending Before the Court

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois Law Dean Vikram David Amar comments on an unusual move by the U.S. Solicitor General’s office, sending a letter to the U.S. Supreme Court amending the position of the federal government in a case currently pending before the Court challenging the Affordable Care Act. Dean Amar explains why the arrival of a new administration should generally not trigger such position reversals, but he argues that the unusual circumstances—specifically the “exceptional implausibility” of the government’s prior filings—may justify the government’s action in this instance.

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In re D.C.

Docket: E073980(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 11, 2021

Judge: Manuel A. Ramirez

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Defendant-appellant D.C. (minor) appealed a court order sustaining the State's petition made pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The petition alleged minor carried a concealed dirk or dagger on his person in violation of Penal Code section 21310. Minor argued, and the State conceded, reversal was called for because the juvenile court erred when it found the human trafficking affirmative defense set forth in Penal Code section 236.23 did not apply in his case. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed the juvenile court erred, but declined the parties’ invitation to find the requirements of the defense were met. The Court reversed and ordered a new hearing on the applicability of Penal Code section 236.23.

California v. Burgess

Docket: D076287(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 11, 2021

Judge: Terry B. O'Rourke

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Months after a Pennsylvania court ordered Reginald Burgess be put on supervised probation, a jury in California convicted him of violating Penal Code section 29815, possession of a firearm in violation of an express condition of probation. The superior court suspended imposition of sentence and granted Burgess three years’ probation with various conditions, ordering that he could move to reduce the felony conviction to a misdemeanor upon 18 months of successful probation. Burgess appealed, contending insufficient evidence supported his conviction. Specifically, pointing to a Judicial Council jury instruction, CALCRIM No. 2512, he argued an essential element of the section 29815 offense was not met: his violation of a court order that he not own or possess a firearm. Burgess contended that because the Pennsylvania probation department directly set the conditions of his probation, there was no court order for purposes of the offense. The California Court of Appeal rejected these contentions. "Interpretation of section 29815 is not guided by form jury instructions, which are not the law. ... the statutory language merely requires the probationer be bound by the condition." The Court found the State proved Burgess had agreed to a condition of probation specifically restricting his possession of firearms, and substantial evidence supported his possession of such firearms in California while subject to the probation condition. Therefore, judgment was affirmed.

California v. Marrero

Docket: D076712(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 11, 2021

Judge: Guerrero

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Armando Marrero pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol and causing bodily injury to another person, with sentencing enhancements for great bodily injury, multiple victims, and a blood alcohol concentration of 0.15 percent or more. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence for five years and granted formal probation, on the condition (among others) that Marrero spend 180 days in local custody. At a subsequent hearing, the court ordered restitution in the amount of $358,047.79, covering $350,000 in attorney fees and approximately $8,000 in travel expenses. Marrero appealed, contending: (1) the attorney fees order was excessive; (2) the trial court violated his right to due process by admitting illegible handwritten attorney time records into evidence; and (3) the court violated due process by awarding travel expenses without adequate notice. The Court of Appeal disagreed with Marrero’s first two contentions but agreed with the third. The Court therefore reversed the award of travel expenses with directions to rehear the matter on proper notice. Otherwise, the Court affirmed.