Another Strike Against § 230 of the Communications Decency Act: Courts Allowing § 230 to Trump Federal and State Public Accommodations Protections

SAMUEL ESTREICHER, SAMANTHA ZIPPER

NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher and 2L Samantha Zipper describe how several courts have invoked Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act as a basis for limiting rights against discrimination in public accommodations. Estreicher and Zipper argue that as American society moves increasingly online, § 230 must be read more narrowly, with goals of safeguarding individual civil rights in an already prolific internet sector.

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In re Judiciary's Response to the COVID-19 Outbreak

Docket: SCMF-20-0000152

Opinion Date: December 23, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

Due to the rate of positive COVID-19 cases and hospitalizations on O'ahu, the Supreme Court ordered that the August 27, 2020 order regarding temporary extension of the time requirements under Haw. R. Pen. P. 5(c)(3) for first circuit criminal matters is further extended until February 14, 2021. On August 27, because of a surge of COVID-19 cases in community correctional centers and facilities, especially at the O'ahu Community Correctional Center, the Supreme Court entered its order providing that the first circuit may temporarily extend the time requirements for preliminary hearings to protect public health and safety. Because the rate of positive COVID-19 cases continues to fluctuate and the grand jury was scheduled to be in recess in January, the Supreme Court held that a further extension of the August 27 order was necessary. Thus, the Court ordered that the August 27 order be extended until February 14, 2021 unless otherwise further modified or extended.

State v. Manuel

Docket: SCWC-18-0000420

Opinion Date: December 23, 2020

Judge: Paula A. Nakayama

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals affirming Defendant's judgment of conviction and sentence for second-degree assault, holding that the circuit court erred by failing to instruct the jury on second-degree reckless endangering. At the close of trial, the circuit court instructed the jury on assault in the second and third degrees. The jury convicted Defendant of second-degree assault. In his application for writ of certiorari, Defendant argued that the circuit court was required to instruct the jury on reckless endangering in the second degree. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) reckless endangering in the second degree is a lesser-included offense of assault in the second degree; and (2) because there was a rational basis to acquit Defendant of assault in the second degree and to convict him of reckless endangering in the second degree, the circuit court erred when it failed to instruct the jury accordingly.

Skahan v. Stutts Construction Co.

Dockets: SCWC-16-0000664, SCWC-16-0000663, SCWC-19-0000077

Opinion Date: December 24, 2020

Judge: Sabrina S. McKenna

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

In these consolidated appeals arising from Kenneth Skahan's claims for workers' compensation benefits against his former employer and its insurance carrier (collectively, Employer), the Supreme Court vacated in part the judgments of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board's (LIRAB) decisions, holding that the ICA erred in part. Skahan injured his back while working for Employer, and Employer accepted workers' compensation liability. After Skahan's employment with Employer ended, he experienced mid and low back pain and was diagnosed with diffuse idiopathic skeletal hyperostosis (DISH) and filed multiple claims for additional workers' compensation benefits. LIRAB determined that Skahan's DISH injury was compensable because it was causally related to his work injury but that his low back injury was not compensable. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated in part, holding (1) the ICA erred in holding that Employer rebutted the Haw. Rev. Stat. 386-85 presumption that Skahan's low back claim was for a covered work injury; (2) LIRAB's finding that Skahan's injury was permanent and stationary and at maximum medical improvement by April 19, 2013 was clearly erroneous; and (3) LIRAB's conclusion of law ending Skahan's temporary total disability benefits on April 19, 2013 was clearly erroneous.