Latest 3 Cases: Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma (Civil Procedure), Shular v. United States (Constitutional Law), ...

A Tale of Two Victims Trying to Stay Above Water While Pursuing Justice: Corey Feldman and Patty Fortney (And Her Sisters)

MARCI A. HAMILTON

Marci A. Hamilton, professor at the University of Pennsylvania and CEO of CHILD USA, describes two stories that show the persistent barriers to justice for child sex abuse victims, despite significant progress recently. First, Hamilton relates the story of Corey Feldman, who will finally get to tell his story of abuse in the premiere of My Truth: The Rape of Two Coreys on March 9, 2020, which will air at 11pm EST in a one-time, online showing globally. Second, Hamilton describes how Patty Fortney and her sisters are pursuing justice against the diocese of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

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NEIL H. BUCHANAN

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Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma

Docket: 18-1116

Opinion Date: February 26, 2020

Judge: Samuel A. Alito, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, ERISA

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) requires plaintiffs with “actual knowledge” of an alleged fiduciary breach to file suit within three years of gaining that knowledge, 29 U.S.C. 1113(2), rather than within the six-year period that would otherwise apply. Sulyma worked at Intel, 2010-2012, and participated in retirement plans. In 2015, he sued plan administrators, alleging that they had managed the plans imprudently. Although Sulyma had visited the website that hosted disclosures of investment decisions, he testified that he did not remember reviewing the relevant disclosures and that he had been unaware of the allegedly imprudent investments while working at Intel. Reversing summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit held that Sulyma's testimony created a dispute as to when he gained “actual knowledge.” A unanimous Supreme Court affirmed. A plaintiff does not necessarily have “actual knowledge” of the information contained in disclosures that he receives but does not read or cannot recall reading. To meet the “actual knowledge” requirement, the plaintiff must, in fact, have become aware of that information. The law sometimes imputes “constructive” knowledge to a person who fails to learn something that a reasonably diligent person would have learned but section 1113(2)'s addition of “actual” signals that the plaintiff’s knowledge must be more than hypothetical. While section 1113(2)'s plain meaning substantially diminishes the protection of ERISA fiduciaries, Congress must be the one to make changes. The Court noted the “usual ways” to prove actual knowledge.

Shular v. United States

Docket: 18-6662

Opinion Date: February 26, 2020

Judge: Ruth Bader Ginsburg

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm who has at least three convictions for “serious drug offense[s],” 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). A state offense ranks as a “serious drug offense” if it “involv[es] manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.” Shular pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Shular’s 15-year sentence, ACCA’s mandatory minimum, based on his six prior cocaine-related convictions under Florida law. A unanimous Supreme Court affirmed. A “categorical approach” is often used to determine whether an offender’s prior convictions qualify for ACCA enhancement. That approach looks “only to the statutory definitions" of the prior offenses; the court must come up with a “generic” version of a crime (the elements of the offense as commonly understood) and then determine whether the statutory elements of the offense of conviction match those of the generic crime. Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)’s “serious drug offense” definition does not require a categorical approach but requires only that the state offense involved the conduct specified in the statute. The statutory text and context show that 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) refers to conduct, not offenses. State laws in existence at the time of 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)’s enactment lacked common nomenclature; the solution to identify offenses by the conduct involved, not by the name of the offenses.

Holguin-Hernandez v. United States

Docket: 18-7739

Opinion Date: February 26, 2020

Judge: Stephen G. Breyer

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Holguin was convicted on drug charges and sentenced to imprisonment and supervised release while he was still serving a term of supervised release for an earlier conviction. The prosecution sought an additional consecutive prison term of 12-18 months for violating the conditions of the earlier term. Holguin countered that 18 U.S.C. 3553’s sentencing factors either did not support imposing any additional time or supported a sentence shorter than 12 months. The court imposed a consecutive 12-month term. The Fifth Circuit held that Holguin had forfeited his argument that the sentence was greater than necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing by failing to object to the reasonableness of the sentence in the district court. A unanimous Supreme Court vacated. Holguin’s district-court argument for a specific sentence (less than 12 months) preserved his claim on appeal that the sentence imposed was unreasonably long. A party who informs the court of the “action” he “wishes the court to take,” Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51(b), ordinarily brings to the court’s attention his objection to a contrary decision. Judges, knowing their duty under section 3553(a) to impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to serve the purposes of sentencing, would ordinarily understand that a defendant in that circumstance was arguing that the shorter sentence would be “sufficient” and a longer sentence “greater than necessary.” Nothing more is needed to preserve a claim that a longer sentence is unreasonable. In any case, “reasonableness” is an appellate standard, not the substantive standard that trial courts apply under section 3553(a).