The Mask Slips: Standing, the Affordable Care Act, and Hypocrisy in High Places

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb considers one aspect of the oral argument in California v. Texas, the latest challenge to the Affordable Care Act to come before the U.S. Supreme Court. Specifically, Colb considers the way in which some of the Justices talked during the oral argument about the doctrine of judicial standing, and she calls out those Justices’ hypocrisy as to that issue.

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KST Data, Inc. v. DXC Technology Co.

Docket: 19-55422

Opinion Date: November 17, 2020

Judge: Eric F. Melgren

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts

A defendant is not required to file a new answer reasserting its affirmative defenses when the claim in the amended complaint related to those affirmative defenses remains the same. After ES entered into a contract with KST to provide services to NASA, KST filed suit against ES after ES's nonpayment of invoices. The district court granted summary judgment sua sponte to KST on its breach of contract claim. Applying de novo review, the Ninth Circuit held that, by not giving ES notice and the opportunity to assert its affirmative defenses, the district court erred in granting summary judgment sua sponte. The panel also held that ES was not required to respond and reassert its affirmative defenses to KST's Second Amended Complaint because ES had already asserted those affirmative defenses in response to the same breach of contract claim in the First Amended Complaint. Therefore, the panel reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and entry of judgment for KST and remanded with instructions for the district court to allow ES to show why KST is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on KST's breach of contract claim.

Balbuena v. Sullivan

Docket: 12-16414

Opinion Date: November 17, 2020

Judge: Bridget S. Bade

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion, denied a petition for rehearing, and denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc, in appeals arising from the district court's denial of petitioner's habeas corpus petition and his motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) for relief from judgment. Petitioner argues that the state court's admission of his confession violated his due process rights because it was the involuntary product of coercion, and that his Rule 60(b) motion was a proper motion to amend his habeas petition and not a disguised second or successive petition subject to 28 U.S.C. 2244. Considering the petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) framework and applying a highly deferential standard, the panel held that the state court's conclusion that petitioner's confession was voluntary was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. In this case, the state court did not unreasonably conclude that petitioner was sixteen years old and considered his age, experience, and maturity as part of the totality of the circumstances of his confession. Furthermore, the state did not unreasonably conclude that the circumstances of his interview were not coercive. The panel also held that, because petitioner asserted a new claim in his Rule 60(b) motion despite the district court's previously adjudicating his habeas petition on the merits, the district court properly denied that motion as an unauthorized second or successive petition.

Lambert v. Saul

Docket: 19-17102

Opinion Date: November 17, 2020

Judge: Daniel A. Bress

Areas of Law: Public Benefits

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment affirming the denial of claimant's application for social security disability benefits. In Bellamy v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 755 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1985), the panel held that a claimant's prior disability determination entitled claimant to a presumption of continuing disability. The SSA interpreted then-recent amendments to the Social Security Act as foreclosing any presumption of continuing disability. Deferring to the SSA's intervening interpretation of the Social Security Act, which is a reasonable one, the panel held that there is no presumption of continuing disability under the Act. Consequently, the ALJ did not err in evaluating, without any such presumption, the SSA's determination that claimant is no longer disabled. However, the ALJ did err in failing to articulate sufficient reasons for refusing to credit plaintiff's testimony about the severity of her medical condition. The panel remanded for further proceedings.