What’s at Stake in Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue? What the Equal Protection Clause Means in the Context of Classifications Based on Religiosity

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, ALAN E. BROWNSTEIN

Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar and UC Davis emeritus professor Alan E. Brownstein comment on a case before the U.S. Supreme Court that raises the question whether a religiously neutral student-aid program in Montana that affords students the choice of attending religious schools violates the religion clauses or the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Amar and Brownstein express no opinion as to whether the courts’ often-expressed concerns about striking down invidiously motivated laws can be effectively overcome, but they contend that jurists who reject invalidating invidiously motivated laws must explain why reasons sufficient in other contexts are not persuasive in this case.

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Rieves v. Town of Smyrna

Dockets: 19-5319, 19-5320, 19-5347

Opinion Date: May 15, 2020

Judge: Gibbons

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Rutherford County, Tennessee law enforcement officials raided stores selling legal cannabidiol (CBD) products and arrested their owners. All charges against the owners were eventually dismissed and expunged. Plaintiffs, 17 store owners, alleged violations of their constitutional rights to be free from false arrest, unlawful seizure, and unlawful prosecution, and their right to equal protection. They also alleged a civil conspiracy to violate those rights and attached documents revealing communications between law enforcement officials, expressing doubts about the CBD products’ purported illegality and concerns regarding the planned arrests and raids. The District Attorney and Assistant District Attorney claimed absolute prosecutorial immunity or qualified immunity for their alleged misconduct during the investigation; the sheriff claimed quasi-judicial absolute immunity and qualified immunity for his actions related to the investigation and arrests. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of their motions to dismiss, except with respect to the denial of qualified immunity to the sheriff, concerning equal protection. The facts, taken as true and construed in the plaintiffs’ favor, support the inference that the prosecutors erroneously advised that the plaintiffs were selling illegal CBD products even though the prosecutors knew or should have known that they had no evidence of the products’ illegality. Their actions were objectively unreasonable because their probable cause determinations rested on the inconclusive lab results. The complaint did not establish that the sheriff engaged in selective enforcement.

Stermer v. Warren

Docket: 19-1075

Opinion Date: May 15, 2020

Judge: Eric L. Clay

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Stermer was charged with killing her husband by setting him and their house on fire. At trial, the Michigan prosecutor used a fire expert to support its claim but Stermer’s counsel never retained or consulted with an expert. In his closing arguments, the prosecutor repeatedly branded Stermer a liar, misrepresented her testimony, and disparaged her while bolstering other witnesses. Stermer’s counsel did not object. Stermer was convicted of felony murder in the course of committing arson and was sentenced to life in prison. Stermer sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and granted Stermer’s petition, citing prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that the district court improperly held an evidentiary hearing and applied an incorrect standard of review. Even with significant deference under habeas review, Stermer is entitled to a new trial. It was unreasonable for the state court to conclude that the fairness of Stermer’s trial was not irreparably harmed by the prosecutor’s closing. The state’s case was relatively weak, the prosecutor relied heavily on Stermer’s statements and repeatedly called her a liar while misstating her own testimony; Stermer was clearly denied due process. Trial counsel stood by while the prosecutor bolstered the credibility of other witnesses and called her a “diabolical, scheming, manipulative liar and a murderer.” The record clearly establishes that Stermer’s trial counsel was deficient in refusing to call a fire expert.

United States v. Smith

Docket: 19-5281

Opinion Date: May 15, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2006, Smith pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine. Because he had a prior felony drug conviction, he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years of imprisonment, even though his Guidelines advisory sentencing range would otherwise have been 168-210 months. The district court sentenced him to 240 months of imprisonment. In 2018, Smith asked for review under the First Step Act, which empowers district courts to reduce a prisoner’s sentence by applying the Fair Sentencing Act, 21 U.S.C. 841, retroactively by increasing the amount of crack cocaine required to trigger mandatory minimum sentences. The district court concluded that Smith was eligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c) and the First Step Act, but declined to grant one, concluding that his original sentence remained appropriate. Smith’s guideline range after applying the retroactive amendments would be 77-96 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit vacated. If the district court decides to impose or refuse to reduce a sentence outside the applicable guideline range, “the court must 'ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.”’ This variance is major. The district court did not adequately explain why Smith should not receive at least some sentence reduction. Beyond relying on the court’s analysis at the original sentencing hearing, the court only briefly discussed the nature and circumstances of Smith’s offense and the need to protect the public.