Another Strike Against § 230 of the Communications Decency Act: Courts Allowing § 230 to Trump Federal and State Public Accommodations Protections

SAMUEL ESTREICHER, SAMANTHA ZIPPER

NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher and 2L Samantha Zipper describe how several courts have invoked Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act as a basis for limiting rights against discrimination in public accommodations. Estreicher and Zipper argue that as American society moves increasingly online, § 230 must be read more narrowly, with goals of safeguarding individual civil rights in an already prolific internet sector.

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San Joaquin Regional Transit Dist. v. Superior Court

Docket: C084755(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 28, 2020

Judge: Vance W. Raye

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Beginning in 2005, petitioner San Joaquin Regional Transit District (District) began discussing with real parties in interest DSS-2731 Myrtle LLC and Sardee Industries, Inc. (collectively, "Sardee") the possible acquisition through negotiated purchase or eminent domain of a two-acre parcel in Stockton on which Sardee operated a manufacturing facility. Correspondence regarding appraisal of the property and Sardee’s rights in eminent domain took place in 2008, but efforts to negotiate a purchase ultimately failed, leading to the filing of an eminent domain complaint in 2010. In April 2011 a stipulated order of possession gave legal possession of the parcel to District with a right of Sardee to occupy a portion of the property as it explored options for a new facility, to wind down its operations and move elsewhere. Sardee undertook to move its Stockton operations to its facility in Lisle, Illinois, which it upgraded to handle ongoing work from its Stockton plant. Under the stipulated order Sardee could occupy the property without charge until March 2012 and until June 30, 2012, by payment of rent. By March 2012 most of its equipment and operations had been relocated; in April 2012 the District abandoned its condemnation action. Following dismissal of the action, Sardee sought damages under Code of Civil Procedure section 1268.620, which permitted an award of damages “after the defendant moves from property in compliance with an order or agreement for possession or in reasonable contemplation of its taking.” District argued the costs involved in closing down Sardee’s Stockton facility and moving all but the items remaining for shipment in March could not be recovered. The trial court disagreed with this all-or-nothing interpretation of the statutory language and concluded Sardee should have been permitted to present its damage claim to a jury, whereupon District filed its petition for writ of mandate, prohibition or other appropriate relief, and sought a stay of the damages trial. The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court that sufficient evidence supported the court’s finding that Sardee had moved from the property, supporting application of section 1268.620. The District's petition was denied.

E.P. v. Superior Court

Docket: C092677(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 28, 2020

Judge: Ronald B. Robie

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

E.P., a minor in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, challenged a July 2020, decision by respondent Yolo County Superior Court, which denied his motion to physically appear in juvenile court in the presence of the judge at court hearings. Petitioner claimed the court’s decision, as well as certain temporary local rules (Super. Ct. Yolo County, Temporary COVID-19 Local Rules) issued by the court in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, conflicted with Welfare and Institutions Code section 679 and the emergency rules related to COVID-19 adopted by the Judicial Council and contained in appendix I of the California Rules of Court. The Court of Appeal concluded that, consistent with section 679 and the case law interpreting it, the emergency rules required a court obtain a minor’s consent before conducting a hearing in a juvenile delinquency proceeding remotely. Accordingly, the respondent superior court erred in denying petitioner’s motion to physically appear in court at his juvenile hearings. To the extent the court’s temporary local rules required all hearings in juvenile delinquency proceedings be conducted remotely absent a finding of good cause, the rules were in conflict with both section 679 and the emergency rules.

N.G. v. County of San Diego

Docket: D076539(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 28, 2020

Judge: Joan Irion

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

In 2018, N.G. submitted a proposed claim for damages to the County, alleging that San Diego County Deputy Sheriff Richard Fischer sexually assaulted her in 2017. N.G. acknowledged the claim was submitted 81 days after the six-month period for filing a claim expired. N.G.’s petition for relief alleged that due to the emotional trauma and psychological difficulties faced by victims of sexual assaults committed by law enforcement officers, which could cause those victims to delay in coming forward, her failure to file a timely claim should have been excused due to mistake or excusable neglect. Accordingly, N.G. also filed an application for leave to file a late claim. The County denied leave to file a late claim; N.G. appealed when the district court denied her petition under Government Code section 946.6 seeking relief from the requirement in the Government Claims Act that she timely file a claim with the County of San Diego prior to bringing a suit for damages. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court was within its discretion to conclude that N.G. did not establish mistake or excusable neglect to support her petition for relief from the claim filing requirement. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed.