Another Strike Against § 230 of the Communications Decency Act: Courts Allowing § 230 to Trump Federal and State Public Accommodations Protections

SAMUEL ESTREICHER, SAMANTHA ZIPPER

NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher and 2L Samantha Zipper describe how several courts have invoked Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act as a basis for limiting rights against discrimination in public accommodations. Estreicher and Zipper argue that as American society moves increasingly online, § 230 must be read more narrowly, with goals of safeguarding individual civil rights in an already prolific internet sector.

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Sass v. Cohen

Docket: S255262

Opinion Date: December 24, 2020

Judge: Tani Cantil-Sakauye

Areas of Law: Contracts

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal ruling that a plaintiff seeking an accounting is not excused from the requirement set out in Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 580(a) to state a specific dollar amount to support a default judgment granting monetary relief, holding that the mere fact that plaintiffs have pleaded an accounting action does not insulate them from the obligation to notify defendants of the dollar amounts sought before such relief may be granted in default. At issue was the fact that in an accounting action a plaintiff does not know the sum certain owed by the defendant and, as such, the fact that a complaint seeking an accounting cannot state the exact amount of damages sought. The Supreme Court concluded that the most reasonable interpretation of section 580 is that the statute requires plaintiffs to have alleged their relief in terms of dollars if they are to receive monetary recovery. The Court expressed no view on the proper method for comparing the amount granted in default with the amount demanded in the complaint.

In re Gadlin

Docket: S254599

Opinion Date: December 28, 2020

Judge: Tani Cantil-Sakauye

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal granting Petitioner's petition for habeas corpus relief on the grounds that the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation did not have the authority to exclude from nonviolent offender parole consideration inmates with prior sex offense convictions requiring registration, holding that this categorial exclusion violates Cal. Const. art. I, 32. After the electorate approved Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the Department's determination that he did not qualify for nonviolent offender parole consideration. The trial court denied the petition. The court of appeal granted habeas relief, holding that the amended regulations improperly excluded Petitioner from nonviolent offender parole consideration based on his two prior sex offense convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) nonviolent offender parole eligibility must be based on an inmate's current conviction; and (2) an inmate may not be excluded from nonviolent offender parole consideration based on a current conviction for a registrable felony offense that the Department's regulations have defined as nonviolent. The Court directed the Department to treat as void and repeal California Code of Regulations, 3491(b)(3) and 3496(b).

People v. Moses

Docket: S258143

Opinion Date: December 28, 2020

Judge: Carol Corrigan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court held that Defendant could be convicted of an attempt to commit trafficking of a minor under Cal. Penal Code 236.1(c) for attempting to recruit as a prostitute "Bella," who was, in fact, an undercover detective. Bella had identified herself to Defendant as a seventeen-year-old girl but was actually an undercover detective. Defendant was convicted of human trafficking of a minor, attempted pimping of a minor, and pandering. The court of appeal reversed Defendant's human trafficking conviction, holding that Defendant could not be convicted under section 236.1(c) but only under the general law of attempt. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that, in light of the statutory language and the state's long-standing application of attempt law, Defendant could be convicted of an attempt under the trafficking statute.