Religious Entities Flex Their Muscles Through the Roberts Court, Playing Both Sides of the Discrimination Coin

MARCI A. HAMILTON

Marci A. Hamilton, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania and one of the country’s leading church-state scholars, describe how legal entities wielded their religious identity as both a shield and a sword last term before the U.S. Supreme Court. Hamilton points out that religious entities won key cases that allow them to receive from government funding while enjoying exemptions from neutral generally applicable non-discrimination laws.

Read More

Sherwin Williams Co. v. County of Delaware

Docket: 19-3561

Opinion Date: July 31, 2020

Judge: Hardiman

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Legal Ethics

Two counties sued Sherwin-Williams in state court, seeking abatement of the public nuisance caused by lead-based paint. Anticipating suits by other counties, Sherwin-Williams sued in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Sherwin-Williams claimed that “[i]t is likely that the fee agreement between [Delaware County] and the outside trial lawyers [is] or will be substantively similar to an agreement struck by the same attorneys and Lehigh County to pursue what appears to be identical litigation” and that “the Count[y] ha[s] effectively and impermissibly delegated [its] exercise of police power to the private trial attorneys” by vesting the prosecutorial function in someone who has a financial interest in using the government’s police power to hold a defendant liable. The complaint pleaded a First Amendment violation, citing the company’s membership in trade associations, Sherwin-Williams’ purported petitioning of federal, state, and local governments, and its commercial speech. The complaint also argued that the public nuisance theory would seek to impose liability “that is grossly disproportionate,” arbitrary, retroactive, vague, and “after an unexplainable, prejudicial, and extraordinarily long delay, in violation of the Due Process Clause.” The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Sherwin-Williams failed to plead an injury in fact or a ripe case or controversy because the alleged harms hinged on the County actually filing suit.

Downey v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

Docket: 19-2248

Opinion Date: August 3, 2020

Judge: Restrepo

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Downey has long struggled with glaucoma, which can lead to blindness if left uncontrolled. His condition worsened while he was imprisoned at the State Correctional Institution at Waymart, Pennsylvania. Doctors recommended that Downey have surgery expeditiously to save his eyesight. Nothing happened for almost a year, although he repeatedly reached out to prison staff. Surgery came too late; Downey is now blind. Downey sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1999. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment, concluding that he failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a).. The Third Circuit reversed in part. Downey’s claims for monetary relief are not procedurally defaulted. Under the prison’s procedures, a prisoner dealing with an emergency or an urgent situation is not bound by the ordinary procedures specified in the grievance policy; he only needs to alert the closest staff person. The court rejected the prison’s “efforts to downplay the urgency” of Downey’s situation and found that Downey complied with the policy. The court affirmed the dismissal of claims against the Department of Corrections and its officials on state sovereign immunity grounds, although that defense was not raised before the district court.

Ramsay v. National Board of Medical Examiners

Docket: 20-1058

Opinion Date: July 31, 2020

Judge: Patty Shwartz

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Education Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Ramsey, a medical student. unsuccessfully sought testing accommodations for dyslexia and ADHD from the National Board of Medical Examiners. Ramsey sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Third Circuit affirmed the award of a preliminary injunction, requiring the Board to provide her accommodations. Ramsay established irreparable harm because she would likely be forced to withdraw from medical school if she could not take the initial test with accommodations and pass. The balance of equities tipped in her favor because granting her accommodations would not undermine the Board’s interests in fair and accurate testing and it was in the public interest for the ADA to be followed, to increase the number of physicians. Evidence that Ramsay’s reading, processing, and writing skills were abnormally low by multiple measures provided a sufficient comparison of her abilities to those of the general population to support the finding of disability. While the district court viewed Ramsay’s experts more favorably and found the Board’s experts unpersuasive, there is no indication that the court believed that it was compelled to defer to Ramsay’s experts; the court discounted the Board’s experts because they never met with Ramsay, engaged in too demanding an analysis of whether Ramsay had a disability, and overly focused on Ramsay’s academic achievements.