How the EEOC’s Maintenance of an “Alleged Offenders” Log Can Help Prevent the Next Harvey Weinstein

SAMUEL ESTREICHER, JOSEPH SCOPELITIS

NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher and recent graduate Joseph A. Scopelitis argue that the EEOC should maintain a log of “alleged offenders” to help prevent the next Harvey Weinstein. Estreicher and Scopelitis explain why such a log would effectively balance the interests of the alleged offender and victim, the employer, and the public.

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State Comp. Ins. Fund v. ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc.

Docket: D075942(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 12, 2020

Judge: Cynthia Aaron

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts, Government & Administrative Law, Insurance Law, Labor & Employment Law

Defendant ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. (ReadyLink) was a nurse staffing company that placed nurses in hospitals, typically on a short-term basis. Plaintiff State Compensation Insurance Fund (SCIF) was a public enterprise fund created by statute as a workers' compensation insurer. Premiums that SCIF charged were based in part on the employer's payroll for a particular insurance year. SCIF and ReadyLink disputed the final amount of premium ReadyLink owed to SCIF for the 2005 policy year (September 1, 2005 to September 1, 2006). ReadyLink considered certain payments made to its nurses as per diem payments; SCIF felt those should have been considered as payroll under the relevant workers' compensation regulations. The Insurance Commissioner concurred with SCIF's characterization of the payments. A trial court rejected ReadyLink's petition for a writ of administrative mandamus to prohibit the Insurance Commissioner from enforcing its decision, and an appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment. SCIF subsequently filed the action underlying this appeal, later moving for a judgment on the pleadings, claiming the issue of the premium ReadyLink owed for the 2005 policy year had been previously determined in the administrative proceedings, which was then affirmed after judicial review. The trial court granted SCIF's motion for judgment on the pleadings. On appeal, ReadyLink conceded it previously litigated and lost its challenge to SCIF's decision to include per diem amounts as payroll for the 2005 insurance year, but argued it never had the opportunity to challenge whether SCIF otherwise properly calculated the premium amount that it claims was due pursuant to the terms of the contract between the parties, or whether SCIF's past conduct, which ReadyLink alleged included SCIF's acceptance of ReadyLink's exclusions of its per diem payments from payroll in prior policy years and SCIF's exclusion of per diem amounts in paying out on workers' compensation claims filed by ReadyLink employees, might bar SCIF from being entitled to collect that premium amount under the contract. To this, the Court of Appeal concurred the trial court erred in granting SCIF's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Judgment was reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego

Docket: D075328(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 12, 2020

Judge: Joan Irion

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

San Diego County (County) challenged a judgment, writ of mandate, and injunction directing it to set aside its approvals of a Climate Action Plan (2018 CAP or CAP), Guidelines for Determining Significance of Climate Change, and supplemental environmental impact report (SEIR). The primary issue was whether a greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation measure in the SEIR, called M-GHG-1, was California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)-compliant. The superior court ordered the County to vacate its approvals of the CAP, Guidelines for Determining Significance, and the certification of the SEIR. The court also enjoined the County from relying on M-GHG-1 during review of greenhouse gas emissions impacts of development proposals on unincorporated County land. The Court of Appeal limited its holding to the facts of this case, particularly M-GHG-1. "Our decision is not intended to be, and should not be construed as blanket prohibition on using carbon offsets—even those originating outside of California—to mitigate GHG emissions under CEQA." The Court held: (1) M-GHG-1 violated CEQA because it contained unenforceable performance standards and improperly defers and delegates mitigation; (2) the CAP was not inconsistent with the County's General Plan; however (3) the County abused its discretion in approving the CAP because the CAP's projected additional greenhouse gas emissions from projects requiring a general plan amendment was not supported by substantial evidence; (4) the SEIR violated CEQA because its discussion of cumulative impacts ignores foreseeable impacts from probable future projects, (b) finding of consistency with the Regional Transportation Plan was not supported by substantial evidence, and (c) analysis of alternatives ignored a smart-growth alternative. The judgment requiring the County to set aside and vacate its approval of the CAP was affirmed because the CAP's greenhouse gas emission projections assumed effective implementation of M-GHG-1, and M-GHG-1 was itself unlawful under CEQA. Except to the extent that (1) the CAP is impacted by its reliance on M-GHG-1; and (2) the CAP's inventory of greenhouse gases was inconsistent with the SEIR, the Court found the CAP was CEQA-compliant.

Lak v. Lak

Docket: G056784(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 12, 2020

Judge: O'Leary

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law, Public Benefits

The Orange County Department of Child Support Services (Department) has withdrawn money from Daniel Lak’s (Father) Social Security Disability Insurance benefits (SSDI) to pay for child/spousal support arrears since 2015. Father disputed the Department's authority to withdraw money, and at a hearing, sought reimbursement for overpayments and maintained the Department violated Family Code section 5246 (d)(3) by collecting more than five percent from his SSDI. The court denied Father’s requests and determined the Department could continue withdrawing money from SSDI for support arrears. On appeal, Father maintaned the court misinterpreted the law and failed to properly consider his motion for sanctions. Finding his contentions lack merit, the Court of Appeal affirmed the court’s order the Department did not overdraw money for arrears, Father failed to demonstrate he qualified for section 5246(d)(3)’s five percent rule, and sanctions were not warranted.