Senate Secrecy: Can the Votes of Senators on President Trump’s Impeachment be Withheld from the Voting Public?

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, JASON MAZZONE

Illinois law dean Vikram David Amar and professor Jason Mazzone evaluate the suggestion made by some that the votes of senators on President Trump’s impeachment can and should be private. Amar and Mazzone argue that while the text of the Constitution alone does not foreclose secrecy, structural, prudential, and logistical considerations strongly disfavor a secret vote on the matter.

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State v. Patterson

Docket: 118180

Opinion Date: January 10, 2020

Judge: Dan Biles

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentence arising from an armed robbery in which a victim was killed by an accomplice, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion in the proceedings below. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant's felony-murder conviction did not violate due process because the felony-murder statute does not remove from the jury's consideration an intent element required by criminal statute; (2) the district court did not commit clear error when it instructed the jury to apply the law if the State proved all elements of the charged offenses; (3) the prosecutor did not commit error during voir dire by saying that an empaneled jury could not "debate" the law; (4) Defendant's constitutional challenges to his hard twenty-five life sentence were unavailing; and (5) Defendant's Apprendi challenge to the use of criminal history scores was without merit.

State v. Jenkins

Docket: 118120

Opinion Date: January 10, 2020

Judge: Carol A. Beier

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of first-degree felony murder, two counts of aggravated battery, and related offenses, holding that the district court judge properly admitted as evidence recorded jail calls made using Defendant's assigned personal identification number and that a challenged provision in the Kansas felony fleeing and eluding statute is not unconstitutionally vague. On appeal, Defendant argued that he was entitled to a new trial because the district judge erred by admitting the jail phone calls into evidence and that Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1568(b)(1)(E), the option within a means of the felony fleeing and eluding statute dependent on five or more moving violations, is unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting the recorded calls as evidence in Defendant's trial; and (2) the term "moving violations" used in section 8-1568(b)(1)(E) is not unconstitutionally vague.

State v. Lyman

Docket: 114312

Opinion Date: January 10, 2020

Judge: Lawton R. Nuss

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for felony murder based on abuse of a child, abuse of a child by shaking, and aggravated battery, holding that the district court did not err or commit judicial misconduct during the proceedings below. Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court did not err by denying Defendant's motion for new trial; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Defendant's proposed expert witness for failure to satisfy the test under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); (3) the district court did not err by allowing the State to introduce evidence of Defendant's prior bad acts; (4) the district court judge did not commit judicial misconduct by sleeping during the trial; and (5) the district court did not err by prohibiting Defendant from introducing medical records that were subject to a written stipulation.