What’s at Stake in Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue? What the Equal Protection Clause Means in the Context of Classifications Based on Religiosity

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, ALAN E. BROWNSTEIN

Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar and UC Davis emeritus professor Alan E. Brownstein comment on a case before the U.S. Supreme Court that raises the question whether a religiously neutral student-aid program in Montana that affords students the choice of attending religious schools violates the religion clauses or the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Amar and Brownstein express no opinion as to whether the courts’ often-expressed concerns about striking down invidiously motivated laws can be effectively overcome, but they contend that jurists who reject invalidating invidiously motivated laws must explain why reasons sufficient in other contexts are not persuasive in this case.

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Copley v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 18-2347

Opinion Date: May 12, 2020

Judge: Barbara Milano Keenan

Areas of Law: Bankruptcy, Tax Law

Under the federal tax offset program, the Secretary of the Treasury has the discretion to set-off "any" tax overpayment against a taxpayer's preexisting tax liabilities, and the bankruptcy code provides that exempt property cannot be used to satisfy "any" of the bankruptcy debtor's prepetition debts. At issue was which of these statutory directives controls when a bankruptcy debtor claims, as exempt property, a tax overpayment that the government seeks to set-off under the offset program. The Fourth Circuit agreed that debtors' interest in their tax overpayment became part of the bankruptcy estate. However, based on the plain language of the various statutes, particularly the plain language of 11 U.S.C. 553(a), the court held that the government's right to offset the debtors' tax overpayment under 26 U.S.C. 6402(a) cannot be subordinated or otherwise affected by debtors' attempts to claim the overpayment as exempt property. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment, remanding for further proceedings.

Champions Retreat Golf Founders, LLC v. Commissioner

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 18-14817

Opinion Date: May 13, 2020

Judge: Hinkle

Areas of Law: Tax Law

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the tax court's decision upholding the Commissioner's disallowance of a charitable deduction for taxpayer's donation of a conservative easement over property that included a private golf course and undeveloped land. The court explained that the deduction was proper if the donation was made for "the protection of a relatively natural habitat of fish, wildlife, or plants, or similar ecosystem," or was made for "the preservation of open space . . . for the scenic enjoyment of the general public" under I.R.C. 170(h)(4)(A)(ii) & (iii)(I). The court reasoned that, without the golf course, this easement would easily meet these criteria. The court held that the Code does not disqualify an easement just because it includes a golf course. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings.

In re Delaware Public Schools Litigation

Court: Delaware Court of Chancery

Docket: C.A. No. 2018-0029-JTL

Opinion Date: May 8, 2020

Judge: Laster

Areas of Law: Education Law, Tax Law

The Supreme Court held that Sussex County, Kent County, and New Castle County use assessment methodologies when preparing their assessment rolls used by school districts in levying local taxes that fail to comply with three legal requirements. Plaintiffs were the NAACP Delaware State Conference of Branches (the NAACP-DE), the Delawareans for Educational Opportunity (the DEO) and the City of Wilmington. The NAACP-DE and the DEO argued that Delaware's public schools failed to provide an adequate education for students from low-income households, students whose first language is not English, and students with disabilities. When school districts levy local taxes, they are required to use the assessment rolls prepared by Delaware's three counties. The NAACP-DE and the DEO argued that when preparing their assessment rolls, the counties failed to comply with 9 Del. C. 8306(a) (the True Value Statute) and Del. Const. art. VIII, 1 (the Uniformity Clause). The City of Wilmington argued that New Castle County also violated its obligations under 22 Del. C. 1101-1104 (the Assessment Roll Statutes). The Supreme Court held (1) Plaintiffs had standing to assert their claims; and (2) all three counties used assessment methodologies that violate the True Value Statute and the Uniformity Clause and that New Castle County violated its obligations under the Assessment Roll Statutes.