The Oprah Interview as a Truth Commission

LESLEY WEXLER

Illinois Law professor Lesley Wexler explains how Oprah’s interview with Prince Harry and Meghan Markle might illuminate how a formal truth commission to deal with legacies of racism and colonialism might function in the British empire. Professor Wexler describes the purpose and function of state-operated truth commissions and notes the similarities and differences between those and the interview.

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United States v. Chappell

Docket: 19-2946

Opinion Date: March 10, 2021

Judge: Grasz

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's request for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a related Brady challenge, and his request for a lighter sentence. In this case, a jury found defendant guilty of conspiring to launder money and conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial where defendant cannot satisfy most, if not all, of the elements that he must to receive a new trial. The court explained that a review of the trial testimony -- which includes no question about a government witness's recent or near-trial drug or alcohol use -- disproves the argument that the witness lied on the stand about recent or near-trial drug or alcohol use. Furthermore, defendant cannot show that he is entitled to a new trial based on the witness's post-trial revelation that she testified while drunk and high. The court agreed with the district court that the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and compelling, and even if defendant had blocked the witness's testimony, an acquittal seems unlikely. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding against a Brady violation where, even if the government concealed the witness's mental state, defendant cannot show that such evidence counts as material impeachment evidence. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a downward sentencing departure where the district court made an individualized assessment under the facts presented, considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553 factors, and gave a reasoned basis for exercising its judgment.

United States v. Howard

Docket: 19-3704

Opinion Date: March 10, 2021

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for reconsideration and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. In denying both defendant's pro se motion for a sentence reduction and his counseled motion for reconsideration, the district court did not specifically address whether he is eligible for relief under the First Step Act. Under these circumstances, the court concluded that it is unable to conduct meaningful appellate review of the district court's order. The court remanded for further proceedings.

Scott v. Key Energy Services, Inc.

Docket: 19-3196

Opinion Date: March 10, 2021

Judge: Bobby E. Shepherd

Areas of Law: Personal Injury, Products Liability

After plaintiff sustained injuries in an on-the-job accident, he filed suit against his former employer, Key Energy, and the company that manufactured the equipment that caused his injuries, Hydra-Walk, alleging products liability and negligence claims. Plaintiff suffered injuries when the Hydra-Walk system he was operating became unstable and overturned, crushing him. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants, concluding that Hydra-Walk is not a third-party tortfeasor for purposes of determining whether plaintiff may pursue a remedy. The court explained that plaintiff's arguments to the contrary ignored that a merger occurred between Key Energy and Hydra-Walk, with Key Energy emerging as the only surviving entity and Hydra-Walk, ceasing to exist. Furthermore, the North Dakota Supreme Court has never allowed an employee to successfully recover against an employer where the employee was injured by equipment manufactured by another company prior to the company's merger with the employer and the injury occurred post-merger. Without further indication that the North Dakota Supreme Court would be receptive to the application of the exception, the court was unwilling to apply it, for the first time, to plaintiff's claims. Finally, the court concluded that the North Dakota Supreme Court would not apply the dual capacity doctrine to the exclusive remedy rule to plaintiff's claims.