Latest 37 Cases This Week: Taylor v. Medeiros (1st Cir.), United States v. Raymundi-Hernandez (1st Cir.), United States v. Ho (2d Cir.)

American Law’s Worst Moment—2020

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat—Associate Provost and Associate Dean of the Faculty and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence & Political Science at Amherst College—explains why the police murder of George Floyd was the worst moment of 2020 in American law. Professor Sarat proposes that we remember the event and that date—May 25—as “infamous,” a word reserved for rare and atrocious events like the bombing of Pearl Harbor, in an attempt to capture the brutality and inhumanity of the act.

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Taylor v. Medeiros

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 19-1552

Opinion Date: December 23, 2020

Judge: Kermit Victor Lipez

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (SJC) reasonably applied clearly established law in holding that improper statements by the prosecutor during Appellant's trial did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. After a jury trial in Massachusetts state court Appellant was convicted of murder in the second degree and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Appellant argued that the prosecutor's closing argument was improper. The SJC affirmed Appellant's conviction, concluding that the prosecutor's "unfortunate" remarks did not warrant a new trial. Appellant later filed a habeas petition, which the district court denied. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court's conclusion that the prosecutor's challenged statements did not render Appellant's trial fundamentally unfair was a reasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court.

United States v. Raymundi-Hernandez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Dockets: 16-2490, 18-1076, 18-1528, 20-1385, 20-1438, 20-1402, 17-1081, 17-1092, 17-1314, 20-1405

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The First Circuit vacated Defendants' convictions for their roles in an expansive drug-trafficking conspiracy, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions but the trial was rendered unfair due to repeated, one-sided intercessions by the trial judge. The primary challenge of all four defendants on appeal was that they were entitled to a new trial because, throughout the eleven-day jury trial, the district court judge interjected during witness testimony in a manner that signaled an anti-defense bias to the jury and caused Defendants prejudice. The First Circuit agreed, holding that the trial judge's perceptible partiality impaired the integrity and fairness of the trial and that this judicial misconduct infringed upon all Defendants' right to a fair trial.

United States v. Ho

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 19-761

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Richard J. Sullivan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), conspiracy to commit money laundering, substantive money laundering, and violations of the FCPA. Defendant, as an officer or director of a U.S.- based organization, paid bribes on behalf of a Chinese company to the leaders of Chad and Uganda in exchange for commercial advantages. The court held that the evidence was insufficient to support defendant's FCPA conviction under 15 U.S.C. 78dd-2; defendant offers no basis to disturb his money laundering convictions where a violation of section 78dd-3 is sufficient to establish specified unlawful activity under the money laundering statute, and a wire that passes through the United States can be covered by 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(2)(A); defendant's evidentiary challenges are without merit; and the indictment properly charged defendant under different sections of the FCPA.

United States v. Bonilla-Romero

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-20643

Opinion Date: December 30, 2020

Judge: Catharina Haynes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's imposition of a 460 month term of imprisonment based on defendant's conviction for first-degree murder under 18 U.S.C. 1111(b). While a person convicted of first-degree murder under section 1111(b) "shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life," a defendant who was under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense, such as defendant, cannot be sentenced to death or mandatory life imprisonment under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (holding mandatory life without parole unconstitutional for juveniles), and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (holding the same for the death penalty.) In this case, the district court resolved the constitutional defect by severing section 1111(b)'s punishment provision for first-degree murder, determining that the statute-as-modified authorizes imprisonment "for any term of years or for life." The court rejected defendant's contention that the district court unconstitutionally fashioned a new punishment for first-degree murder committed by juveniles, violating the Due Process Clause's notice requirement and separation-of-powers doctrine. Rather, the court concluded that it is appropriate to sever as necessary, and that excising the mandatory minimum nature of the life sentence is all that is needed to satisfy the constitutional issue for juveniles under section 1111. In this case, the district court's remedy complies with Roper and Miller, functions independently, and is consistent with Congress's clear intent to criminalize "the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought." The court also rejected defendant's assertion that the district court violated the Due Process Clause and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 by failing to specify his potential sentencing range at his plea hearing. The court explained that defendant's plea hearing demonstrates that the district court properly notified him of the consequences of a guilty plea, and therefore defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary.

United States v. Galicia

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 20-40200

Opinion Date: December 28, 2020

Judge: Catharina Haynes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to knowingly and intentionally possessing with intent to distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana. The court affirmed the district court's application of a sentencing enhancement under USSG 2D1.1(b)(12) for maintaining a premises to distribute drugs because one of the primary uses for defendant's premises was the distribution of drugs. Therefore, the court rejected defendant's contention that he stored drugs in his garage on an infrequent basis and only for brief periods of time. In this case, defendant admitted to storing drugs in his garage on at least three occasions. Furthermore, the discovery of two scales in his storage sheds, along with the positive detection of narcotics by an odor-sniffing canine, indicates that defendant may not have strictly limited his drug storage activities to the garage, leaving open the possibility that his residence was used to store drugs on other occasions.

United States v. Barrera

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 20-1659

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Barrera sold a handgun to a fellow Latin Kings gang member, who was actually a government informant wearing a wire. Barrera, who had prior felonies, was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). An order barred Barrera from disclosing any discovery because of the risks that the video’s dissemination posed to further law-enforcement efforts and the informant’s safety. Barrera, while released on bond, posted the video to Snapchat, naming the informant and sending the posts to fellow Latin Kings. The government moved to revoke Barrera’s pretrial release. The defense argued that Barrera would not receive adequate treatment for his skin and lung cancer and a recent stroke and relayed Barrera’s intent to plead guilty. The court advised Barrera of the potential guideline range, explained that the range was only advisory, accepted his guilty plea, and, given assurances that the corrections facility could care for Barrera’s medical conditions, revoked his release. The court subsequently imposed a 110-month prison term, based on a 110-120 months guideline range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court adequately explained the sentence in light of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, noting Barrera’s post-arrest conduct; that trafficking guns to gang members often leads to the deaths and injuries of innocents; and Barrera’s history and characteristics, including his medical needs. The judge’s comments were relevant in assessing the nature and circumstances of Barerra’s offense and the need to protect the public and deter unlawful conduct.

United States v. Ramirez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 20-1006

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Ramirez crashed his car into a truck and fled from the police. Speeding off, he hit a passenger who had jumped from his car. He ran a red light, drove around other cars in parking lots “at a high rate of speed,” then fled on foot. A search of his car revealed a loaded revolver and ammunition, which Ramirez confessed were his. Ramirez pleaded guilty (without an agreement) to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The PSR factored in Ramirez’s flight and acceptance of responsibility and his criminal history, which included a drive-by shooting from 19 years earlier, burglary, theft, drug use, aggravated battery, resisting arrest, and parole violations, resulting in a guidelines range of 46-57 months’ imprisonment. The court addressed the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and concluded a two-level enhancement for reckless endangerment during his flight did not adequately account for the severity of his conduct, which endangered many people, and that Ramirez’s criminal history score understated his true history because it excluded some older convictions. Ramirez argued that he had aged out of crime at age 44, but admitted that he had spent much of his life in prison. The court concluded that a sentence within the guidelines range would not effectively deter him from endangering others. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his 72-month sentence. The district court appropriately handled the “aging out” argument as no data supported it, and reasonably justified its above-guidelines sentence.

United States v. Rojas-Reyes

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Dockets: 19-1188, 19-1074, 19-1110, 19-1126

Opinion Date: December 28, 2020

Judge: Diane Pamela Wood

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendants played active roles in a cross-country drug organization: Castro-Aguirre served as the head of operations; Ramirez-Prado handled logistics, including providing cars and hotels for distributors and couriers; Rojas-Reyes coordinated sales in Indianapolis; and Carrillo-Tremillo conducted sales in the northeast. A jury found each of 12 defendants guilty of conspiracy to distribute the controlled substances (methamphetamine and cocaine), 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & 846, and conspiracy to launder money., 18 U.S.C. 1956(h)) Castro-Aguirre and Rojas-Reyes were also convicted on several additional charges. The Seventh Circuit affirmed their convictions and sentences, including one life sentence, with the exception of vacating Carrillo-Tremillo’s conviction for conspiracy to launder money. The court upheld the denial of a motion to suppress cell-site location information; the government, following the procedures set forth in the Stored Communications Act, gathered it in good faith. The court also upheld the denial of a motion in limine to suppress evidence of their gang membership and evidence that the Sinaloa Cartel was behind the kidnapping and murder of the defendants’ supplier. Although the evidence of the kidnapping and murder was highly prejudicial and its connection to the charged conduct was tenuous, any error was harmless in light of the other evidence.

United States v. Stamps

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 20-1336

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: St. Eve

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Stamps sold methamphetamine to police informants. Police executed a search warrant at his apartment. In one bedroom, police found two bags of methamphetamine, each containing over 25 grams. In the other bedroom, police found a loaded handgun under Stamps’s mattress with his wallet and $1,079 in cash. Stamps confessed to having sold drugs for five years. Stamps later admitted owning a handgun, but for self-defense after receiving threats based on his wrongful implication in a murder investigation. Someone had fired shots into his apartment. Stamps pled guilty to one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute 50 grams or more (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1)). The PSR recommended a two-level increase under U.S.S.G 2D1.1(b)(1) based on the firearm and did not recommend Stamps receive safety-valve relief (18 U.S.C. 3553(f)). The court agreed, stating that “it is not clearly improbable that ... handgun … was connected with the defendant’s relevant drug trafficking conduct,” calculated a 70-87-month guideline range with a 60-month mandatory minimum, and sentenced Stamps to 60 month's imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Rather than evaluating whether Stamps had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the gun was unrelated to his drug offense, the court found only that Stamps could not prove that it was “clearly improbable” that the gun was connected to his drug offense, imposing a higher burden than required for Stamps to prove safety valve eligibility. The error was not harmless.

Dat v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 19-3504

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: William Duane Benton

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Dat was born in a Kenyan refugee camp in 1993. Admitted to the U.S. around 1994, he became a lawful permanent resident. Dat pled guilty to robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951, and was sentenced to 78 months' imprisonment. Dat’s robbery conviction is a deportable offense, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Dat moved to vacate his guilty plea, claiming that his attorney, Allen, assured him that his immigration status would not be affected by his plea. Allen testified that she repeatedly told Dat the charges were “deportable offenses,” that she never told him, his mother, or his fiancée that he would not be deported. that she encouraged Dat to hire an immigration attorney, and that they reviewed the Plea Petition, which says that non-citizens would be permanently removed from the U.S. if found guilty of most felony offenses. The Plea Agreement refers to immigration consequences. Dat and Allen also reviewed the PSR, which stated that immigration proceedings would commence after his release from custody. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, finding that Dat was not denied effective assistance of counsel. It was objectively reasonable for Allen to tell Dat that he “could” face immigration ramifications that “could” result in deportation. An alien with a deportable conviction may still seek “relief from removal. These “immigration law complexities” should caution any defense attorney not to advise a defendant considering a guilty plea that the result of a post-conviction, contested removal proceeding is certain.

United States v. Baez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 19-2823

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Raymond W. Gruender

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Police stopped Anguiano for expired license plates. The car contained a fake DEA badge and cash. At the hotel where Anguiano was staying, Baez’s wife, Gavino, admitted the officers. Baez was sitting next to Chevrolet keys and a methamphetamine pipe. Gavino consented to a search. In a backpack, officers found a Chevrolet Equinox owner’s manual. A locked armoire appeared to be under video surveillance. A canine unit alerted at the armoire and at an Equinox that responded to the Chevrolet keys. With a warrant, officers searched the hotel suite and the Equinox. The armoire held methamphetamine and a gun. The Equinox contained methamphetamine, another firearm, and a safe with ammunition and receipts in Baez’s name. The other conspirators pled guilty. The court denied Baez’s motions to suppress the evidence and his incriminating statements. Baez, claiming that he was infiltrating the conspiracy to assist law enforcement, sought to introduce evidence regarding his mental health and a potential informant with whom he was acquainted. Baez moved to compel the government to disclose information about the informant. The court excluded the evidence, partially granted his Brady motion, and declined to instruct the jury that it would “negate the specific intent required” if Baez intended to “assist ongoing federal investigations.” The court departed from the guidelines range of 360 months’ to life imprisonment, sentencing Baez to 168 months’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, upholding the denial of his suppression motions, the failure to instruct the jury on an “innocent-intent” defense, the exclusion of the evidence related to that defense, the partial denial of his Brady motion, and the reasonableness of his sentence.

Hernandez Flores v. Rosen

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 17-72888

Opinion Date: December 30, 2020

Judge: Daniel A. Bress

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision dismissing petitioner's appeal of the IJ's finding of removability based on his past drug convictions. Under the Special Agricultural Worker program (SAW), agricultural workers meeting certain qualifications could obtain lawful temporary resident status, after which they were automatically adjusted to lawful permanent residency on a set schedule. Petitioner had obtained lawful permanent resident status through SAW, but it turns out that before he applied for SAW temporary resident status, he had been convicted of two drug offenses that would have rendered him ineligible for admission into the United States. The panel held that, under SAW, an alien who was inadmissible at the time of his adjustment to temporary resident status because of disqualifying convictions may be removed after his automatic adjustment to permanent resident status, despite the Attorney General never having initiated termination proceedings while the alien was a temporary resident. The panel rejected petitioner's argument that SAW's limitations on administrative and judicial review prevent the government from seeking his removal. Finally, the panel concluded that Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442 (2020), provided no support for petitioner's assertion that under provisions unique to SAW, he could only be removed for his drug convictions during the period of his temporary residency.

United States v. Dixon

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 19-10112

Opinion Date: December 31, 2020

Judge: Kim McLane Wardlaw

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant appeals the district court's partial denial of his motion to suppress evidence resulting from a search of his vehicle. At issue was whether the insertion of a car key into a lock on the vehicle's door for the sole purpose of aiding the police in ascertaining its ownership or control is a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit has previously held that it was not, applying the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test from Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). See United States v. $109,179 in U.S. Currency, 228 F.3d 1080, 1087–88 (9th Cir. 2000). However, in light of recent Supreme Court authority tying the Fourth Amendment's reach to the law of trespass, the panel must conclude that because "[t]he Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information," United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012), it conducted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, a Fourth Amendment search occurs when an officer physically inserts a key into the lock of a vehicle for the purpose of obtaining information, as occurred in this case when an officer inserted the key specifically to learn whether defendant exercised control over the vehicle. On the record before the panel, it is unclear whether the officer had probable cause to believe that the particular vehicle into which he inserted the key was owned or controlled by defendant. The panel remanded for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and to rule on the suppression motion in light of the Jones and Jardines principles. Finally, the panel held that the district court erred in finding that defendant was categorically ineligible for an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction on the ground that defendant did not accept responsibility for the greater offense of possession with intent to distribute. The panel explained that USSG 3E1.1(a) does not require that defendant admit to all the charged offenses. Consequently, in the event the district court upholds the search on remand and reinstates defendant's conviction, the district court shall conduct a resentencing so that it may make a factual finding regarding acceptance of responsibility in the first instance.

United States v. Harris

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 19-10006

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Bennett

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for two counts of aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. 1028A. Defendant was the owner and operator of a business that provided therapeutic services, and her convictions stemmed from her fraudulently billing government health care program for speech therapy services provided to children of military families. In this case, defendant's use of the speech pathologist's name and National Provider Identifier number on the claim forms was "during and in relation" to the commission of wire fraud and thus constituted "use" of another's identification under section 1028A. Defendant's other challenges are addressed in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition.

United States v. Maynard

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 19-1304

Opinion Date: December 31, 2020

Judge: Mary Beck Briscoe

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Defendant Riordan Maynard, the former chief executive officer of two related companies, was convicted by a jury of twenty-six criminal counts arising out of his gross mismanagement of those companies. The district court sentenced Maynard to 78 months’ imprisonment. The district court also ordered Maynard to pay restitution to the Internal Revenue Service and to the employee-victims. On appeal, Maynard argued: argues that: (1) the district court misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines in calculating his offense level for Counts 1 and 2 (failure to pay corporate payroll taxes); (2) his convictions on Counts 14 through 26 were not supported by sufficient evidence (theft or embezzlement of employee health care contributions); (3) the district court erred in calculating the restitution award for Counts 4 through 13 (theft or embezzlement of employee benefit plan contributions); and (4) the district court plainly erred in calculating the restitution award for Counts 14 through 26. Rejecting these arguments, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Maynard's convictions and sentence.

United States v. Sanchez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 19-2092

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Timothy M. Tymkovich

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Late one night, Fabian Sanchez was approached by two police officers who suspected him or attempting to break into a vehicle sitting the back area of a hotel parking lot. He was wearing a trench coat with a loaded gun in the pocket. After routine questioning, he was caught in a lie and fled. During the chase, his trench coat ended up on the ground after one of the officers unsuccessfully tased Sanchez, but he kept running. He eventually ran back toward his trench coat but was tackled by the officers before he could get there. Sanchez was arrested, and the loaded gun was discovered in his trench coat. Charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, Sanchez moved to suppress the gun. The district court denied the motion and granted the government's motion in limine to admit an incriminating statement Sanchez made after his arrest. Sanchez pleaded guilty on the condition that he could appeal these rulings. He was then sentenced pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). On appeal, Sanchez argued: (1) the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to seize him and lacked probable cause to arrest him, violating his Fourth Amendment rights; (2) the officers searched his trench coat without a warrant even though he did not voluntarily abandon it, violating his Fourth Amendment rights; and (3) his incriminating statement was the product of custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings, violating his Fifth Amendment rights. Sanchez also contended his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntarily made, and that the district court erred in arriving at his sentence under the ACCA. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court.

Garcia-Simisterra v. U.S. Attorney General

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 19-13848

Opinion Date: December 30, 2020

Judge: Marcus

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

The Eleventh Circuit dismissed a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal because petitioner had been convicted of an aggravated felony. In this case, the IJ and BIA found that petitioner's Florida convictions for money laundering and workers' compensation fraud were aggravated felonies because each conviction involved fraud or deceit in which the amount of loss to the victim exceeded $10,000 under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). The court held that substantial evidence in the record, including petitioner's admission of guilt and a concomitant plea agreement, fully supports the agency's finding of the loss amount.

Senter v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 18-11627

Opinion Date: December 30, 2020

Judge: Baker

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Eleventh Circuit sua sponte vacated and withdrew its previous opinion, and issued this opinion in its place. Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Eleventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability to determined whether the district court violated Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc), by failing to address petitioner's claim that he no longer qualified as an armed career criminal in light of Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), because his prior 1988 Alabama conviction for attempted first-degree robbery has no state law elements. The court affirmed the district court's judgment and held that a close review of the district court's opinion reveals that it correctly identified and sufficiently addressed petitioner's claim. In this case, the district court classified petitioner's claim as a collateral attack against his state sentence and dismissed it. The court noted that it may be best practice for a district court to follow a "show your work" approach by directly restating a movant's claim and then laying out all analytical steps in addressing that claim. However, the district court's approach here correctly identified and sufficiently analyzed petitioner's claim and did not run afoul of Clisby

United States v. White

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 19-3058

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Harry Thomas Edwards

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The DC Circuit reversed the district court's denial of appellants' motions for reduced sentences under section 404 of the First Step Act. The court held that the district court erred in determining that if a defendant was convicted of a "covered offense" and is thus eligible for relief under section 404, "the final issues to address are whether relief is available and, if so, to what extent a sentence reduction is warranted as a matter of discretion." Rather, the court explained that there is no additional "availability" requirement in section 404 beyond the covered offense requirement in section 404(a) and the limitations set forth in section 404(c). The court also held that the district court, in reaching its alternative judgment, was unclear as to whether it properly weighed the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). Furthermore, there is nothing indicating that the district court weighed the mitigating factors raised by appellants, including post-sentencing conduct. Finally, the district court relied on inaccurate information in weighing the claims raised by Appellant Hicks. Accordingly, the court remanded so that the district court may exercise its discretion under section 404.

In re Gadlin

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S254599

Opinion Date: December 28, 2020

Judge: Tani Cantil-Sakauye

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal granting Petitioner's petition for habeas corpus relief on the grounds that the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation did not have the authority to exclude from nonviolent offender parole consideration inmates with prior sex offense convictions requiring registration, holding that this categorial exclusion violates Cal. Const. art. I, 32. After the electorate approved Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the Department's determination that he did not qualify for nonviolent offender parole consideration. The trial court denied the petition. The court of appeal granted habeas relief, holding that the amended regulations improperly excluded Petitioner from nonviolent offender parole consideration based on his two prior sex offense convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) nonviolent offender parole eligibility must be based on an inmate's current conviction; and (2) an inmate may not be excluded from nonviolent offender parole consideration based on a current conviction for a registrable felony offense that the Department's regulations have defined as nonviolent. The Court directed the Department to treat as void and repeal California Code of Regulations, 3491(b)(3) and 3496(b).

People v. Moses

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S258143

Opinion Date: December 28, 2020

Judge: Carol Corrigan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court held that Defendant could be convicted of an attempt to commit trafficking of a minor under Cal. Penal Code 236.1(c) for attempting to recruit as a prostitute "Bella," who was, in fact, an undercover detective. Bella had identified herself to Defendant as a seventeen-year-old girl but was actually an undercover detective. Defendant was convicted of human trafficking of a minor, attempted pimping of a minor, and pandering. The court of appeal reversed Defendant's human trafficking conviction, holding that Defendant could not be convicted under section 236.1(c) but only under the general law of attempt. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that, in light of the statutory language and the state's long-standing application of attempt law, Defendant could be convicted of an attempt under the trafficking statute.

California v. Ruiz

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D076580(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 30, 2020

Judge: Judith McConnell

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant-appellant Bryant Ruiz appealed the trial court’s order denying his motion to dismiss a petition to revoke parole filed by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) for lack of jurisdiction. Even though the parties stipulated Ruiz was not convicted of a serious felony and should have been placed on post-release community supervision (PRCS) rather than parole when he was released from prison, the trial court denied Ruiz’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely under Penal Code section 3000.08 (l), because he did not challenge his supervision placement within 60 days of his release. To the Court of Appeal, Ruiz contended the application of section 3000.08 (l) in this instance infringed his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. The Court of Appeal concluded the application of the 60-day limitation in this case indeed violated Ruiz’s procedural due process rights. Therefore, the order was reversed and the trial court was directed to enter a new order granting Ruiz’s motion to dismiss and transferring Ruiz from parole supervision to PRCS.

E.P. v. Superior Court

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C092677(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 28, 2020

Judge: Ronald B. Robie

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

E.P., a minor in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, challenged a July 2020, decision by respondent Yolo County Superior Court, which denied his motion to physically appear in juvenile court in the presence of the judge at court hearings. Petitioner claimed the court’s decision, as well as certain temporary local rules (Super. Ct. Yolo County, Temporary COVID-19 Local Rules) issued by the court in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, conflicted with Welfare and Institutions Code section 679 and the emergency rules related to COVID-19 adopted by the Judicial Council and contained in appendix I of the California Rules of Court. The Court of Appeal concluded that, consistent with section 679 and the case law interpreting it, the emergency rules required a court obtain a minor’s consent before conducting a hearing in a juvenile delinquency proceeding remotely. Accordingly, the respondent superior court erred in denying petitioner’s motion to physically appear in court at his juvenile hearings. To the extent the court’s temporary local rules required all hearings in juvenile delinquency proceedings be conducted remotely absent a finding of good cause, the rules were in conflict with both section 679 and the emergency rules.

People v. Martinez

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: H046164(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 30, 2020

Judge: Elia

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, White Collar Crime

A felony complaint alleged that on seven different dates in 2014, Martinez committed a felony under Insurance Code section 1814 by entering into an agreement and having an understanding with a person incarcerated in jail, to inform and notify Martinez, a bail licensee, of the fact of an arrest in violation of California Code of Regulations, title 10, section 2076. Martinez was associated with Luna Bail Bonds. The court of appeal reversed her subsequent conviction, finding the regulation facially invalid. Section 2076 prohibits bail licensees from entering, indirectly or directly, any arrangement or understanding with specified types of people— including a “person incarcerated in a jail”—“or with any other persons” to inform or notify any bail licensee, directly or indirectly, of information pertaining to (1) an existing criminal complaint, (2) a prior, impending, or contemplated arrest, or (3) the persons involved therein, which impliedly includes arrestees and named criminals. The section is not unconstitutionally vague but is a content-based regulation, which unduly suppresses protected speech and fails to survive even intermediate judicial scrutiny. While section 2076 might indirectly deter unlawful solicitation of arrestees, an indirect effect is not enough to survive intermediate scrutiny.

In re Judiciary's Response to the COVID-19 Outbreak

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCMF-20-0000152

Opinion Date: December 23, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

Due to the rate of positive COVID-19 cases and hospitalizations on O'ahu, the Supreme Court ordered that the August 27, 2020 order regarding temporary extension of the time requirements under Haw. R. Pen. P. 5(c)(3) for first circuit criminal matters is further extended until February 14, 2021. On August 27, because of a surge of COVID-19 cases in community correctional centers and facilities, especially at the O'ahu Community Correctional Center, the Supreme Court entered its order providing that the first circuit may temporarily extend the time requirements for preliminary hearings to protect public health and safety. Because the rate of positive COVID-19 cases continues to fluctuate and the grand jury was scheduled to be in recess in January, the Supreme Court held that a further extension of the August 27 order was necessary. Thus, the Court ordered that the August 27 order be extended until February 14, 2021 unless otherwise further modified or extended.

State v. Abion

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCWC-18-0000600

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Sabrina S. McKenna

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the circuit court's judgment of conviction and sentence, holding that the district court rejected evidence which, if admitted, would have presented an essential factual issue for the trier of fact. After Defendant was arrested and charged with assault, one of the medical examiners, Dr. Martin Blinder, who examined Defendant opined that Defendant suffered from amphetamine psychosis and may be entitled to a lack of penal responsibility defense. The State filed a motion for a finding of inadmissibility seeking to preclude Dr. Blinder from testifying at trial. The circuit court prevented Dr. Blinder from testifying on the grounds that State v. Young, 999 P.2d 230 (Haw. 2000), had determined that a drug-induced mental illness was self-induced intoxication prohibited as a defense by Haw. Rev. Stat. 702-230(1). Defendant was convicted of assault second, and the ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) the self-induced intoxication exception of section 702-230(1) applies only when a defendant is under the temporary influence of voluntarily ingested substances at the time of an act; and (2) by precluding Dr. Blinder's testimony at trial, the circuit court violated Defendant's due process right to present a complete defense.

State v. Manuel

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCWC-18-0000420

Opinion Date: December 23, 2020

Judge: Paula A. Nakayama

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals affirming Defendant's judgment of conviction and sentence for second-degree assault, holding that the circuit court erred by failing to instruct the jury on second-degree reckless endangering. At the close of trial, the circuit court instructed the jury on assault in the second and third degrees. The jury convicted Defendant of second-degree assault. In his application for writ of certiorari, Defendant argued that the circuit court was required to instruct the jury on reckless endangering in the second degree. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) reckless endangering in the second degree is a lesser-included offense of assault in the second degree; and (2) because there was a rational basis to acquit Defendant of assault in the second degree and to convict him of reckless endangering in the second degree, the circuit court erred when it failed to instruct the jury accordingly.

State v. Plummer

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2020 ME 143

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Connors

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court sentencing Defendant to fifteen years of imprisonment after he was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated trafficking in scheduled drugs and one count of criminal forfeiture, holding that the sentencing court did not improperly engage in "double counting." On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred when it considered the commercial motive of his offenses both when it set the basic sentence and when it set the maximum sentence. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly considered different aspects of the commercial nature of the offense at each step of the court's analysis.

Commonwealth v. Feliz

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12879

Opinion Date: December 23, 2020

Judge: Barbara A. Lenk

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the superior court denying Defendant's motion for relief from a condition of probation, holding that imposition of the condition did not violate Defendant's rights under article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Defendant pleaded guilty to multiple counts of possession and dissemination of child pornography and was sentenced to concurrent terms of incarceration, suspended subject to compliance with special conditions of probation. At issue was the condition requiring Defendant to allow the probation department to conduct random suspicionless searches of his electronic devices and other locations where child pornography might be stored. Before the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that this condition authorized unreasonable searches in violation of article 14. The Court upheld the condition, holding (1) on its face, the condition subjected Defendant to the continuing possibility of unreasonable searches throughout the term of his probation and was too broad; but (2) properly limited, imposition of the condition did not violate Defendant's rights under article 14.

Commonwealth v. Montarvo

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12905

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Lowy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 279, 25(a) of the habitual offender statute allows sentencing judges to impose probation on defendants who fall within its ambit. Defendant was convicted of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon and armed assault with intent to murder. The trial judge found that section 25(a)'s enhancements applied to Defendant but rejected Defendant's argument that the statute allowed the judge to impose probation. The judge then sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed and vacated Defendant's sentence, holding that section 25(a) provides sentencing judges with the discretion to impose probation.

Commonwealth v. Tillis

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12555

Opinion Date: December 23, 2020

Judge: Gaziano

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for murder in the first degree and related charges and the order denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, holding that the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant's request that the jury be instructed on withdrawal from a joint venture. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant was not entitled to an instruction on withdrawal from a joint venture; (2) Defendant was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel when counsel did not request a supplemental jury instruction to further explain the Commonwealth's burden to prove that the killing occurred during the course of the underlying felony and when counsel did not object to a portion of the prosecutor's closing argument; and (3) this Court declines to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 33E to reduce the murder conviction to murder in the second degree.

State v. Glover

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A19-1656

Opinion Date: December 23, 2020

Judge: Thissen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that a distress flare launcher might qualify as a firearm under Minn. Stat. 624.713, subd. 1 if used or intended to be used as a weapon, holding that a distress flare launcher is not a firearm under the statute. Defendant was charged with possession of a firearm by an ineligible person for possessing a distress flare launcher. The district court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that there was insufficient probable cause to support the charge. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that a distress flare launcher could be a "firearm" under section 624.713, subd. 1 if the fact-finder were to conclude that Defendant used or intended to use it as a weapon. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the term "firearm" is limited to weapons, meaning instruments designed for attack or defense; and (2) accordingly, the distress flare launcher in this case was not a weapon and could not be a firearm under the statute.

State v. Ingram

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 MT 327

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: James A. Rice

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the sentence and financial assessments imposed by the district court in connection with Defendant's conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), fourth or subsequent offense, holding that the district court erred by assessing a $500 surcharge in compliance with Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-236(1)(b). The district court imposed the statutory minimum fine of $5,000 for felony DUI and sentenced him to a thirteen-month commitment to the Department of Corrections, followed by a three-year suspended sentence subject to certain terms and conditions. Defendant appealed, challenging the denial of his sentencing objections. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by assessing the $5,000 fine; (2) did not err by assessing the cost of imprisonment, probation, and alcohol treatment pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 61-8-731(4)(b); (3) did not err by assessing a $100 fine pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-232(1); but (4) erred by assessing the $500 surcharge without considering Defendant's ability to pay.

State v. Reams

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 MT 326

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Shea

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the jury verdict of the district court following Defendant's conviction of incest against his ten-year-old stepdaughter, holding that the district court erred when it granted the State's motion in limine excluding the testimony of Defendant's expert witness regarding general information of false reports in child sexual abuse cases. In granting the State's motion in limine, the district court deemed Defendant's expert witness unqualified to testify under State v. Scheffelman, 820 P.2d 1293 (Mont. 1991), which allows a party to elicit expert testimony that directly comments on an alleged victim's credibility if the expert satisfies certain criteria. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by applying the Scheffelman exception criteria to exclude the expert witness's testimony, and the error was not harmless.

New Hampshire v. Cavanaugh

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2019-0608

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Gary E. Hicks

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Brenna Cavanaugh was convicted by jury of being an accomplice to first degree assault and criminal mischief. On appeal, she argued the evidence was insufficient for the jury to have convicted her and that the Superior Court erred by: (1) declining her request for a self-defense jury instruction; (2) precluding her from introducing extrinsic evidence of the victim’s prior inconsistent statements; (3) allowing certain of the victim’s statements into evidence under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule; and (4) denying her request to recall a witness. In the very early morning hours of August 18, 2018, defendant’s teenaged daughter invited the sixteen year old victim, to a party. The victim and daughter were friends, and the victim believed that the party was at defendant’s house. Entering an unlocked door, the victim discovered there was no party, and whispered the daughter's name. Hearing no response, the victim left, but not before stepping on a creaky floorboard that woke defendant and her boyfriend. After hearing the front door shut, defendant ran down two flights of stairs to chase after the victim. Her boyfriend followed soon thereafter armed with a handgun. Once outside, the defendant saw the victim inside the truck, which had its engine running and its lights on. She crossed the street and stood approximately one foot away from the front of the truck so that she could see its license plate number. As he prepared to drive away, the victim heard the defendant yell, “shoot, shoot” or “shoot him, shoot him.” Officers involved in a traffic stop approximately 200 yards away from defendant’s home heard six gunshots. After defendant called 911 to report an intruder in her home and that her boyfriend had shot at the intruder’s vehicle, the officers responded to her residence. Meanwhile, the victim returned to the scene with some friends to speak with the officers about the incident. It was later determined the truck was damaged by three different bullets. Although the evidence was conflicting, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant’s convictions, the trial court erred by failing to give the jury a self-defense instruction. The matter was remanded for a new trial.

Oregon v. Chapman

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S067066

Opinion Date: December 31, 2020

Judge: Nakamoto

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The issue presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review in this case was whether ordinary first-class mail is, or can be, a “class of delivery calculated to achieve delivery within three calendar days.” Defendant was convicted on driving while suspended and for failing to register her vehicle. Wishing to appeal that judgment and acting without legal representation, defendant sent a notice of appeal to the Appellate Court Administrator by first-class mail. Defendant certified that the “method of filing” she had used for her notice was “United States Postal Service, ordinary first class mail.” A postage validation imprint (PVI) label on the envelope showed that petitioner had submitted her notice of appeal to the United States Post Office (USPS) for mailing on Monday, July 9, 2018, the last day of the applicable appeals period. The Appellate Court Administrator received defendant’s notice of appeal two days later, on Wednesday, July 11, 2018. The notice was forwarded to the Appellate Commissioner, who concluded that it was untimely and issued an order dismissing defendant’s appeal on that ground. The Court of Appeals majority concluded that first-class mail could, in no circumstances, be such a class of delivery and therefore, a notice of appeal that had been dispatched by first-class mail on the last day of the appeals period and received by the court two days later was untimely - requiring dismissal of the underlying appeal. The Supreme Court rejected the appellate majority’s analysis and conclusion, and also rejected an alternative theory for dismissing the appeal that was raised in a concurring opinion - a supposed failure to comply with proof-of-mailing-date requirements in ORS 19.260(1)(a)(B) and (1)(b). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the appeal was reversed and the matter remanded to that court for further proceedings.

Vermont v. Gurung

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 VT 108

Opinion Date: December 31, 2020

Judge: Carroll

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The State of Vermont appealed a trial court order denying its motion for a mental examination of defendant Aita Gurung, who was charged with the first-degree murder of his wife and attempted first-degree murder of his mother-in-law. The State argued the trial court had the discretion to order the evaluation and erred when it determined that, because a former prosecution and the current prosecution were the same proceeding, Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.1(a)(1)(I) did not allow for this evaluation and that, even if the rule allowed for it, an additional evaluation would not be reasonable. Defendant, a native of Nepal, was alleged to have attacked his wife and mother-in- law with a meat cleaver in 2017. Defendant was arraigned and ordered held without bail at the Vermont Psychiatric Hospital for the purpose of conducting competency and sanity evaluations. After a first competency evaluation using a Nepali interpreter, the Chittenden County State’s Attorney’s Office and defendant stipulated defendant was competent to stand trial. A year later, the Chittenden County State’s Attorney’s Office moved for a second evaluation. The second evaluation was conducted without an interpreter; a report of the second evaluation concluded defendant was insane at the time of the attack. Concluding it did not have sufficient evidence to rebut defendant's insanity defense, the Chittenden County State’s Attorney’s Office moved to dismiss without prejudice its case. After an independent review of the case, the Office of the Vermont Attorney General (AG) filed first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder against defendant. Defendant again provided notice of an insanity defense. At a subsequent hearing, the AG notified the trial court it intended to seek the mental examination at issue in this appeal. The AG noted that if the court did not permit the AG to conduct an independent evaluation of defendant, “then in essence it is binding the Attorney General’s Office to the previously obtained expert which [it] did not hire and [has] no involvement with.” The Vermont Supreme Court determined the trial court abused its discretion in denying the AG's motion. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.